I. KING JOSEPH AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF (part 2 of 2)

I. KING JOSEPH AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF (part 2 of 2)

Thus, if Soult’s plan had been carried out, all central Spain, including the capital, would have been lost just as much as it was by the actual campaign of July-August 1812, and the disorganized Army of Portugal could have done nothing. For Wellington could have left not Clinton’s one division (as he actually did) but three at least to look after it--not to speak of the Galicians and the partidas. Isolated and cut off from all communication with other French armies, Soult and the King would have had to evacuate Andalusia in the end, if they did not suffer a worse fate--a crushing defeat in a position from which there would have been no retreat possible. Hypothetical reconstructions of campaigns which might have happened are proverbially futile--but it is hard to see how any final profit to the French could have come from Soult’s extraordinary plan.

SECTION XXXIII: CHAPTER XI

THE TWO DIVERSIONS: (1) OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH: SIR HOME POPHAM AND CAFFARELLI. (2) OPERATIONS IN THE EAST: SUCHET, O’DONNELL, AND MAITLAND. JUNE-AUGUST 1812

It has already been made clear that the whole of Wellington’s victorious advance, from Ciudad Rodrigo to Madrid, was rendered possible by the fact that he had only to deal with the Army of Portugal, succoured when it was too late by the Army of the Centre. If Caffarelli and his 35,000 men of the Army of the North had been able to spare any help for Marmont, beyond the single cavalry brigade of Chauvel, matters must have taken a very different turn from the first, and the Douro (if not the Tormes) must have been the limit of the activity of the Anglo-Portuguese army. How Caffarelli was to be detained, according to Wellington’s plan, has been explained in an earlier chapter[712]. The working out of the scheme must now be described.

[712] See above, pp. 340-1.

The essential duty of the French Army of the North was twofold, according to Napoleon’s general conception of the Spanish war. It was Marmont’s reserve, bound to assist him in time of trouble; but it was also the force of occupation for the Biscayan provinces, Navarre, Santander, and Burgos. Of its 35,000 men more than half were at all times immobilized in the innumerable garrisons which protected the high-road from Bayonne to Burgos, and the small harbours of the coast, from San Sebastian to Santoña. The system of posts was complicated and interdependent. Since the great guerrillero Mina started on his busy career in 1810, it had been necessary that there should be fortified places at short intervals, in which convoys moving to or from France (whether by Vittoria and San Sebastian, or by Pampeluna and Roncesvalles) could take refuge when attacked by the bands. And since a convoy, when it had sought shelter in one of the minor garrisons, might be blockaded there indefinitely, unless the high-road were cleared betimes, large movable columns had to be ready in three or four of the larger places. Their duty was to march out on the first alarm, and sweep the guerrilleros away from any post that they might have beset. Such bodies were to be found at Bayonne, where the ‘Reserve of the Army of Spain’ kept a brigade of 3,500 men under General D’Aussenac to watch for any exceptional outbreak of trouble in Guipuzcoa; at Pampeluna, where General Abbé had the head-quarters of his division; and at Vittoria, where the General-in-Chief, Caffarelli himself, normally lay with the brigade of Dumoustier--the last unit of the Imperial Guard still remaining in Spain--ready to keep the line of the Ebro under surveillance, and to communicate when necessary with the three large outlying garrisons of Santoña, Santander, and Burgos. Each of these last consisted of some 1,300 or 1,500 men[713]; even so, they were only strong enough to provide for their own safety in normal times, and might require assistance from head-quarters in face of any specially large and threatening combination of the insurgents. But the larger half of Caffarelli’s army was locked up in small towns, forts, and blockhouses, in bodies ranging down from a battalion to half a company. Every one of the dozen little ports on the Biscay coast had to be held, in order to prevent the bands of the inland from communicating with the English cruisers, which occasionally appeared in the offing to throw weapons and ammunition ashore. And similarly all the little towns along the Ebro had to be garrisoned, in order to keep touch with Reille at Saragossa; wherever there was a gap Mina’s Navarrese slipped in between.

[713] In and about Santander, 2 battalions of the 130th, 2 squadrons of gendarmes, &c. In Santoña, 93 officers and 1,382 men of the 28th, 75th, and 34th. In Burgos, 2 battalions of 34th Line.

Since the autumn of 1810, when Porlier and Renovales had made their vain attempt, with British naval aid, to break up the line of communication along the coast,[714] there had been no general attempt to shake the French occupation of Biscay and Cantabria. The Spanish resources were at a low ebb whenever Bonnet held the Asturias, and (as we have seen) he was generally in possession of that province, or at least of its capital and its chief harbours, from 1810 down to the summer of 1812. The idea of attacking the harbour-fortresses of the northern coast with a considerable naval force, which should get into regular touch with the patriot forces of the inland, and establish posts to be held permanently on suitable points of the northern littoral, had been started by Sir Home Popham, approved by Sir Howard Douglas, the British Commissioner in Galicia, and warmly adopted by Wellington himself, who at once realized the pressure which such a policy would bring upon Caffarelli. He counted upon this diversion as one of his most valuable assets, when he drew up his scheme for the invasion of Leon in May 1812. It more than fulfilled his expectation.

[714] See vol. iii. pp. 486-7.

On June 17th, four days after the Anglo-Portuguese army crossed the Agueda, Sir Home Popham sailed from Corunna with two line of battleships[715], five frigates[716], two sloops[717], and one or two smaller vessels, carrying two battalions of marines, and several thousand stand of small-arms for the insurgents. Popham had credentials from Castaños, as captain-general of Galicia, for Mendizabal, the officer who was supposed to exercise authority over all the bands of Cantabria and Biscay. These scattered forces consisted in the more or less organized brigades of Porlier in the Eastern Asturias, and Longa in Cantabria--both of which were reckoned part of the national army--and in addition of the guerrilleros of Jauregui [’El Pastor’] in Guipuzcoa, Renovales in Biscay, Marquinez, Saornil, the Curé Merino, and others in the mountains between the Douro and the sea. These were bands of varying strength, often scattered by the French, but always reassembled after a space, who roamed from region to region according as the enemy was stronger or weaker at one point or another. Occasionally Mendizabal was in touch with Mina and the Navarrese, but generally the French were in too great force about the high-road from Burgos to Pampeluna to make co-operation practicable.

[715] The Venerable (his flag-ship) and the Magnificent. The Magnificent went home with prisoners some weeks later, and was replaced for a time by the Abercrombie, from the Brest blockading squadron.

[716] Medusa, Isis, Diadem, Surveillante, and Rhin. The Belle Poule looked in for a short time later in the season.

[717] Sparrow and Lyra.

At the moment of Popham’s start matters were exceptionally favourable along the Biscay coast, because Bonnet was just evacuating the Asturias, in order to join his chief Marmont in the plains of Leon. His departure isolated Santoña and Santander, which had been the links by which he was joined to Caffarelli’s army. It also gave Porlier and Longa an open communication with Galicia, from which they had hitherto been cut off by Bonnet’s presence in Asturias, and a safe retreat thitherward if they should be pressed. In addition Marmont had called up all the small garrisons and detached columns from his rear, for the main struggle with Wellington; so that the Upper Douro valley and the Soria country were much more free from the French than they had been for a long time. The opportunity for molesting Caffarelli and his much-scattered Army of the North was unique.

The idea which lay at the back of Popham’s plan was that a fleet furnished with the heaviest ship guns, and with a landing-force of over 1,000 men, could operate at its choice against any one of the long chain of posts which the French held, calling in to its aid the local bands in each case. The insurgents had never been able to capture any of these places because they lacked a battering-train. The fleet supplied this want, and with few exceptions the French strongholds were not suited for resistance against heavy guns. They were mediaeval castles, fortified convents, or the patched-up walls of little towns, all defensible against irregular bands without cannon, but most vulnerable to 18-or 24-pounders. The number of the French garrisons gave ample liberty of choice between one and another: individually they were generally weak--not over 300, 500, or 1,000 men. There were succouring columns, no doubt, ready to relieve them, at Bayonne and Vittoria and elsewhere. But the squadron had the power of misleading these forces to any extent--of drawing them from one remote port to another by false attacks and demonstrations, and then of attacking some third point when the enemy had been lured as far as possible from it. Here lay the beauty of naval operations--the squadron could appear to threaten any objective that it chose, could attract the enemy thither, and then could vanish, and be fifty miles away next day. The relieving column could only follow slowly over mountain roads, and would invariably be late in learning what new direction the squadron had taken. It was something like the advantage that the Danes had in their attacks on England in the ninth century: a defending army cannot guard all points of a coast-line at once against a movable landing force on shipboard. The weaker points of the scheme were, firstly, the dependence of all operations on fine weather--contrary winds could in those days delay a fleet for whole weeks on end; secondly, the want of a base nearer than Corunna, till some good and defensible haven should have been captured; and third and greatest of all, the difficulty of inducing the local chiefs to combine: they paid a very limited amount of obedience to their nominal chief, Mendizabal: they had private grievances and jealousies against each other: and each of them disliked moving far from the particular region where his men were raised, and where every inch of the mountain roads was known to him.

However, all these dangers were known and were chanced, and the game was well worth the risk. The operations began with the appearance of the squadron before Lequeitio on June 21st. Popham landed a heavy gun and some marines, and the band of El Pastor [’Don Gaspar’ as the English dispatches call him] appeared to co-operate from the inland. The defences consisted of a fort and a fortified convent: the 24-pounder breached the former, which was then stormed by the guerrilleros in a very handsome fashion[718]: its garrison was slain or captured. The gun was then brought up against the fortified convent, whose commander, the chef de bataillon Gillort, surrendered without further fighting; the prisoners amounted to 290 men, a half-battalion of the 119th regiment (June 22). Popham then moved off to Bermeo and Plencia, both of which the French evacuated in haste, leaving guns unspiked and some useful stores of provisions. The British force had set the wildest rumours abroad, and Renovales, the Spanish commander in Biscay, appeared at Orduna with his bands and threatened Bilbao, the capital of the province. It was these reports which made Caffarelli suddenly break off his project for sending reinforcements to Marmont, and prepare rather to march northward when he was most wanted on the Douro[719].

[718] So says Popham in his dispatch at the Record Office: though Napier (iv. p. 246) says that the Spaniards attacked and were repulsed. But Popham must have known best! Sir Howard Douglas corroborates him, Life, p. 168.

[719] See above, p. 378.

Popham’s next blow was at Guetaria, a most important post, owing to its nearness to the great chaussée leading to Bayonne, which passes quite close to it between Tolosa and Ernani. If it had fallen, the main road from France to Spain would have been blocked for all practical purposes. But being far to the East and near the French border, it was remote from the haunts of the guerrilleros: few of them turned up: after a few days Popham had to re-embark guns and men, and to take his departure, owing to the arrival in his neighbourhood of a strong French flying column. He then sailed off to Castro Urdiales, where he had much better luck: Longa had left the Upper Ebro with his brigade and joined him there on July 6th, by Mendizabal’s orders. Their united force drove off on the 7th a small French column which came up from Laredo to raise the siege. The governor of Castro then surrendered with some 150 men, and 20 guns on his walls fell into Popham’s hands (July 8). The place seemed so strong that the commodore resolved to keep it as a temporary base, and garrisoned it with some of his marines.

Three days later Popham appeared before Portugalete, the fortified village at the mouth of the Bilbao river, and bombarded it from the side of the sea, while Longa (who had marched parallel with the squadron along the shore), demonstrated against its rear. But a French flying column happened just to have arrived at Bilbao, and the force which marched out against the assailants was so powerful that they made off, each on his own element [July 11th.] Popham now turned his attention for a second time to the important strategical post of Guetaria; he had enlisted the support of the Guipuzcoan bands under Jauregui, and the distant Mina had promised to send a battalion to his aid from Navarre. Popham got heavy guns on shore, and began to batter the place, while Jauregui blockaded it on the land side. This move drew the attention of D’Aussenac, commanding the flying column which belonged to the Bayonne reserve: he marched with 3,000 men towards Guetaria, and drove off Jauregui, whereupon Popham had to re-embark in haste, and lost two guns which could not be got off in time and thirty men [July 19], Mina’s battalion came up a day too late to help the discomfited besiegers.

This petty disaster was in the end more favourable than harmful to Popham’s general plan, for he had succeeded in drawing all the attention of the French to the eastern end of their chain of coast-fortresses, between Santoña and San Sebastian. But now he used his power of rapid movement to attack unexpectedly their most important western stronghold. On July 22nd he appeared in front of the harbour of Santander, while (by previous arrangement) Campillo--one of Porlier’s lieutenants--invested it on the land side. Porlier himself, with his main body, was blockading at the moment the not very distant and still stronger Santoña.

There was very heavy fighting round Santander between the 22nd July and August 2. Popham landed guns on the water-girt rock of Mouro, and bombarded from it the castle at the mouth of the port: when its fire was subdued, he ran his squadron in battle order past it, and entered the harbour, receiving little damage from the other French works (July 24). The enemy then evacuated the castle, which the marines occupied: but an attempt to storm the town with the aid of Campillo’s men failed, with a rather heavy casualty list of two British captains[720] and many marines and seamen disabled (July 27th). However, Popham and Campillo held on in front of Santander, and Mendizabal came up on August 2nd to join them, bringing a captured French dispatch, which proved that the enemy intended to evacuate the place, a strong relieving column under Caffarelli himself being at hand to bring off the garrison. And this indeed happened: the General-in-Chief of the Army of the North had marched with all the disposable troops at Vittoria to save his detachment. The governor Dubreton--the same man who afterwards defended Burgos so well--broke out of the place with his 1,600 men on the night of the 2nd-3rd and joined his chief in safety: he left eighteen guns spiked in his works. Caffarelli then drew off the garrison of the neighbouring small post of Torrelavega, but threw a convoy and some reinforcements into Santoña, which he had determined to hold as long as possible. He then hastened back to Vittoria, being under the impression at the moment that Wellington was in march against him from Valladolid, in pursuit of the routed host of Clausel. But the Anglo-Portuguese main army--as will be remembered--had really followed the retreating French no farther than Valladolid, and no longer than the 30th July. Instead of finding himself involved in the affairs of the Army of Portugal, Caffarelli had soon another problem in hand.

[720] One of them, Sir George Collier, commanding the Medusa.

The capture of Santander by the allies was the most important event that had happened on the north coast of Spain since 1809, for it gave the squadron of Popham possession of the sole really good harbor--open to the largest ships, and safe at all times of the year--which lies between Ferrol and the French frontier. At last the Spanish ‘Seventh Army’ had a base behind it, and a free communication with England for the stores and munitions that it so much needed. It might be developed into a formidable force if so strengthened, and it lay in a position most inconvenient for the French, directly in the rear of Clausel and Caffarelli. Popham saw what might be made of Santander, and drew up for Wellington’s benefit a report on the possibilities of the harbour, in which he details, from the information given by Porlier and his staff, the state of the roads between it and Burgos, Valladolid, and other points. Six weeks before the siege of Burgos began, he wrote that by all accounts six or eight heavy guns would be required to take that fortress, and that he could manage that they should be got there--a distance of 115 miles--by ox-draught, if they were wanted[721]. But Wellington, at the moment that this useful information was being compiled, was turning away from Valladolid and Burgos toward Madrid; and when his attention was once more drawn back to Burgos, he made no use of Popham’s offers till it was too late. Of this more in its proper place.

[721] Popham’s prescience is shown by the fact that his papers relating to Burgos began to be drawn up as early as July 26. He cross-questioned not only Porlier but other Spanish officers. Their answers did not always tally with each other. See all Popham’s dispatches of the time, in the Admiralty Section at the Record Office--under the general head ‘Channel Fleet!’ They have this misleading heading because Popham was under Lord Keith, then commanding that fleet.

Having brought all his squadron into Santander, and made himself a fixed base in addition to his floating one, Popham began to concert plans for further operations with Mendizabal, whom he described as a man of ‘vacillating councils,’ and hard to screw up to any fixed resolution. The scheme which the commodore most recommended to the general was one for a general concentration of all his scattered forces against Bilbao, in which the squadron should give its best help. But he suggested as an alternative the sending of Porlier to join Longa, who had already gone south to the Upper Ebro after the failure at Portugalete on July 11th. Porlier and Longa would together be strong enough to cut the road between Burgos and Vittoria, and so divide Clausel from Caffarelli. If the two French generals combined against them, they could always escape north-westward into their usual mountain refuges.

According to Popham’s notes Mendizabal first seemed to incline to the second scheme, and then decided for the first. He even in the end ordered up Longa--then very usefully employed against Clausel’s rear about Pancorbo and Cubo--to join in the attack upon Bilbao. But Longa came late, being busy in operations that he liked better than those which his chief imposed on him. After waiting a few days for him in vain, Mendizabal marched against Bilbao by land with two battalions belonging to Porlier and one recently raised in Alava, while Popham took three Biscayan battalions belonging to Renovales on board his squadron and sailed for Lequeitio, where he put them ashore. He himself then made for Portugalete, at the mouth of the Bilbao river. The triple attack, though made with no very great total force was successful. The officer commanding in Bilbao, went out to meet Mendizabal, and in order to collect as many men as possible, drew off the garrison of Portugalete. The British squadron, arriving in front of the port, found it undefended and threw the marines ashore. Hearing of this descent in his rear the French general, then indecisively engaged with Mendizabal and Renovales, thought that he was in danger of being surrounded, and retired hastily toward Durango, abandoning Bilbao altogether [August 13].

Learning next day that they had overrated the enemy’s force, the French returned and tried to reoccupy the Biscayan capital, but were met outside by all Mendizabal’s troops, arrayed on the position of Ollorgan. An attack entirely failed to move them, and the French fell back to Durango. General Rouget, the commanding officer in the province, then drew in all his minor garrisons, and sent Caffarelli notice that all Biscay was lost, unless something could be done at once to check Mendizabal’s progress [August 14]. Indeed the situation looked most threatening, for Longa had at last come up and joined his chief with 3,000 men, and the Biscayans were taking arms on every side. A general junta of the Basque provinces was summoned by Mendizabal to meet at Bilbao, and the French had for the moment no foothold left save in San Sebastian and Guetaria. Thereupon Caffarelli, collecting every man that he could at Vittoria, marched to join Rouget. Their united forces, making some 7,000 men, attacked Bilbao on August 27th-29th, and after much confused fighting drove Mendizabal and Longa out of the place, only a fortnight after it had come into Spanish hands. The defeated troops dispersed in all directions, each section seeking the region that it had come from--Porlier’s men retired towards Cantabria, Longa’s toward the Upper Ebro. Renovales and his Biscayan battalions were caught in their retreat, and badly cut up at Dima.

While this fighting was going on around Bilbao, Popham was trying a last attack on Guetaria, with his own resources only, as nearly all the Spaniards were engaged elsewhere. He had accomplished nothing decisive when he heard of Mendizabal’s defeat, and had to reship his guns and take his departure before the victorious Caffarelli came up. He retired to Santander, and heard there that Wellington was leaving Madrid, and once more marching on Burgos. He determined to open up communications with the British army without delay, and on August 31 sent off Lieutenant Macfarlane to seek for the head of the approaching columns. That officer, skirting the flank of Clausel’s retreating host, reached Valladolid betimes, and explained to Wellington that the Santander road would be open and available for the transport of ammunition, guns, and even food, so soon as he should have driven the French past Burgos. And--as will be seen--it was so used during the unlucky siege of that fortress again and again--but not (as Popham recommended) for the bringing up of the heavy artillery that Wellington so much lacked.

By September 1st Caffarelli had patched up matters for a time on the side of Biscay, but though he had recovered Bilbao and preserved Guetaria, all the other coast-towns were out of his power save Santoña, and that important place was cut off from the nearest French garrison by a gap of some sixty miles. Even now Popham’s useful diversion had not ceased to have its effect. But its further working belongs to a later chapter.

So much for the annals of the war in northern Spain from June to August. The diversion which Wellington had planned had been brilliantly successful. A very different story must be told of the equally important scheme that he had concerted for keeping his enemies distracted on the eastern side of the Peninsula, by means of the Anglo-Sicilian expedition and the Spanish Army of Murcia.

Suchet, it will be remembered[722], had been stayed from further conquests after the fall of Valencia partly by the indirect results of Wellington’s operations on the Portuguese frontier--starting with the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo--partly by Napoleon’s action in drawing back to the Ebro the two divisions of Reille, and calling out of Spain the numerous Polish battalions serving in the Army of Aragon. But not the least of the hindering causes was a purely personal one--the long illness which kept Suchet confined to his bed for ten weeks in February, March, and April. By the time that he was in the saddle again a notable change had come over the aspect of the war all over the Peninsula. During his sickness his lieutenants, Habert and Harispe, maintained their position in front of the Xucar river, and observed the wrecks of the Valencian and Murcian divisions that had escaped from Blake’s disaster in January. The whole force remaining under Suchet--excluding the troops left behind in Catalonia and Aragon--was not above 15,000 men, and of these nearly 4,000 were locked up in garrisons, at Valencia, Saguntum, Peniscola, Morella, and other places. It is not surprising, therefore, that no farther advance was made against the Spaniards. Joseph O’Donnell, the successor of the unlucky Mahy, was able during the spring to reorganize some 12,000 men on the cadres of his old battalions. In addition he had Roche’s reserve at Alicante, 4,000 strong, which had now been profiting for many months by the British subsidy and training, and was reckoned a solid corps. He had also Bassecourt’s few battalions in the inland--the troops that D’Armagnac had hunted in December and January in the district about Requeña[723]. Cartagena, the only fortress on the coast still in Spanish hands save Alicante, had been strengthened by the arrival of a British detachment[724]. Altogether there were some 20,000 enemies facing Suchet in April, and he regarded it as impossible to think of attacking Alicante, since he had not nearly enough men in hand to besiege a place of considerable size, and at the same time to provide a sufficient covering army against Joseph O’Donnell. So little was the Murcian army molested that General Freire, O’Donnell’s second-in-command, ignoring Suchet altogether, took advantage of Soult’s absence in Estremadura, at the time of the fall of Badajoz, to alarm eastern Andalusia. He occupied Baza on April 18th, and when driven away after a time by Leval, governor of Granada, turned instead against the coast-land of the South. On May 11th an expedition, aided by English war-ships from Alicante, landed near Almeria, and cleared out all the French garrisons from the small towns and shore batteries as far west as Almunecar. Already before this (on May 1-3) an English squadron had made a descent on Malaga, seized and destroyed the harbour-works, and carried off some privateers and merchant vessels from the port. But naught could be accomplished against the citadel of Gibalfaro. Soult did little or nothing to resent these insults, because he was at the time obsessed with his ever-recurring idea that Wellington was about to invade Andalusia, and his attention was entirely taken up with the movements of Hill and Ballasteros in the West and North, so that the East was neglected. Leval at Granada had a troublesome time, but was in no real danger, since Freire’s raids were executed with a trifling force.

[722] See above, p. 86.

[723] See above, p. 56.

[724] The 2/67th and a part of the foreign Regiment of de Watteville, also a British battery, from Cadiz.

Suchet was occupied at this time more with civil than with military affairs: for some time after his convalescence he was engaged in rearranging the administration of the kingdom of Valencia, and in raising the enormous war-contribution which Napoleon had directed him to exact--200,000,000 reals, or £2,800,000--in addition to the ordinary taxes. The Marshal in his Mémoires gives a most self-laudatory account of his rule; according to his rose-coloured narrative[725], the imposts were raised with wisdom and benevolence, the population became contented and even loyal, the roads were safe, and material prosperity commenced at once to revive. Napier has reproduced most of Suchet’s testimonials to his own wisdom and integrity, without any hint that the Spanish version of the story is different. The Marshal who drove the civil population of Lerida under the fire of the cannon[726], and who signalized his entry into Valencia by wholesale executions of combatants and non-combatants[727], was not the benevolent being of his own legend. Since that legend has been republished in many a later volume, it may be well to give as a fair balance the version of an enemy--not of a Spaniard, but of a Prussian, that Colonel Schepeler whose authority on the war of Valencia we have so often had occasion to quote.

[725] See Mémoires, ii. pp. 283-99.

[726] See vol. iii. p. 307.

[727] See above, p. 75.

‘Napoleon Bonaparte looked upon Valencia as the prey of France, and Suchet did not fall behind in his oppressive high-handedness. The long-desired goal, the wealthy city, now lay open to their rapacity, and the riches that the clergy had denied to the needs of the nation went to fill the plunder-bag of the conqueror. The miraculous statue of Our Lady of Pity was stripped of her ancient jewelled robe: only a light mantle now draped her, and showed the cut of the nineteenth century. The silver apostles of the cathedral took their way to France with many other objects of value, and the Chapter was forced to pay ransom for hidden treasures. The magnanimous marshal imposed on the new French province, as a sort of “benevolence,” six million dollars (ten had been spoken of at first), with an additional million for the city of Valencia. The churches had to buy off their bells with another 60,000 dollars. Suchet, in his moderation, contented himself with exacting 500 dollars a day for his own table and household expenses.

‘Political persecution began with a decree of March 11, which ordered the judges of the local Audiencia [Law Court] to meet as before, but to administer justice in the name of Napoleon Empereur et Roi. The patriots refused to serve and fled; whereupon their goods were confiscated, their families were harried, and when some of them were captured they were threatened with penal servitude or death. A decree drawn up in words of cold ferocity, declared every Spaniard who continued to oppose the French to be a rebel and a brigand, and therefore condemned to capital punishment. Several villages were punished with fire and sword, because they were too patriotic to arrest and deliver up insurgents. Contrary to the promise made at the capitulation in January[728], many patriots were arrested and executed, under the pretence that they had been concerned in the murder of Frenchmen in 1808, even though they might actually have saved the lives of certain of those unfortunates at that time.

[728] See p. 73 above.

‘Valencia produces little wheat: there was much lack of it, and the French would not accept rice. Their requisitions were exacted with cruel disregard of consequences, even from the poorest, and quickly brought back to the patriotic side the mutable Valencian people, who had already been sufficiently embittered when they found that they were annexed to France. All over the province there began to appear slaughter, rebellion, and finally guerrillero bands[729].’

[729] Schepeler, pp. 609-10.

The point which Schepeler makes as to Valencia being practically annexed to France--as shown by the administration of justice in the name of Napoleon, not of King Joseph--should be noted. It illustrates Suchet’s determination to consider himself as a French viceroy, rather than as the general of one of the armies recently placed by the Emperor under the King as Commander-in-Chief in the Peninsula. We have already noted the way in which he contrived to plead special orders from Paris, exempting him from the royal control, whenever Joseph tried to borrow some of his troops for use against Wellington[730]. At the same time it must be conceded that he had a much better excuse than Soult for his persistent disobedience to such orders--his whole available force was so small, that if he had sent 6,000 men to San Clemente or Ocaña, as Joseph directed, there would have been little or nothing left in Valencia save the garrisons, and the Spaniards from Alicante and Murcia could have taken their revenge for the disasters of the past winter[731]. He represented to the King that to draw off such a body of troops to La Mancha implied the abandonment of all his recent conquests, and that if something had to be evacuated, it was better that Soult should begin the process, since Andalusia was a more outlying possession than Valencia--’les provinces du sud devaient être évacuées avant celles de l’est.’ And here he was no doubt right: as we have been remarking again and again, the only solution for the situation created by Wellington’s successes was to concentrate a great mass of troops at all costs, and the Army of the South could best provide that mass. It had 50,000 men under arms at the moment--Suchet had not in Valencia more than 15,000.

[730] See above, pp. 304-5.

[731] This is Suchet’s own view, see his Mémoires, ii. p. 251.

Hitherto we have spoken of those parts of the east coast of Spain which lie south of the Ebro. But if the situation in Valencia had not altered much between February and June, the same was also the case in Catalonia. Since Eroles’s victory over Bourke at Roda in March[732] there had been much marching and counter-marching in that principality, but nothing decisive. Lacy, the unpopular captain-general, was at odds with the Junta, and especially with Eroles, the best of his divisional officers, who was the most influential man in Catalonia, owing to his local connexions and his untiring energy. Lacy was a stranger, an enemy of the ‘Somaten’ system, and a pronounced Liberal. The political tendencies of the Catalans were distinctly favourable to the other or ‘Servile’ party. The captain-general was also accused of nourishing jealousy against Sarsfield, his second-in-command: and it is certain that both that officer and Eroles believed him capable of any mean trick toward them. But though divided counsels and mutual suspicions often hindered the co-operation of the commanders and the people, all were equally bitter enemies of the invader, and none of them showed any signs of slackening in their grim resolve to hold out to the end. The Catalan army did not now count more than 8,000 men in the field, but its central position in the mountains of the interior, round which the French garrisons were dispersed in a long semicircle, gave it advantages that compensated to a certain extent for its lack of numbers. It could strike out at any isolated point on the circumference, and, whether its blow failed or succeeded, generally got off before the enemy had concentrated in sufficient numbers to do it much harm. On the other hand, Decaen, now commanding in Catalonia, and Maurice Mathieu, the governor of Barcelona, though they had some three times as many men under arms as Lacy, were reduced to a position that was little more than defensive. It is true that they occasionally collected a heavy column and struck into the inland: but the enemy avoided them, and replied by counter-attacks on depleted sections of the French circle of garrisons. On April 9th, for example, 4,800 men marched from Gerona against Olot: the local levies under Claros and Rovira skirmished with them, giving ground, and finally losing the town. But though they did not stop the advance of the enemy, Milans, with a larger force, moved on the important harbour of Mataro, and laid siege to the garrison there (April 22), a stroke which soon brought the bulk of French troops back from Olot to drive him off. At the same time Sarsfield’s division pressed in upon the garrison of Tarragona, and cut off its communications with Barcelona.

[732] See above, p. 98.

This forced Decaen to march to open the road, with all the men that Maurice Mathieu could spare from Barcelona (April 28). Letting them go by, Lacy at once renewed the attack on Mataro, bringing up the forces of Sarsfield and Milans, and borrowing four ship-guns from Commodore Codrington to batter the fort, in which the French had taken refuge after evacuating the town [May 3]. Decaen and Lamarque promptly turned back, and on the third day of the siege came hastily to break it up. The Spaniards dispersed in various directions, after burying the guns, which (much to Codrington’s regret) were discovered and exhumed by the enemy. The net result of all this marching and counter-marching was that much shoe-leather had been worn out, and a few hundred men killed or wounded on each side: but certainly no progress had been made in the conquest of Catalonia. Indeed, Manso, at the end of the campaign, established himself at Molins de Rey, quite close to Barcelona, and Sarsfield occupied Montserrat, so that between them they once more cut off the communications from Barcelona southward and westward. Both had to be driven off in June, in order that the roads might again be opened.

Early in July Lacy devised a scheme which made him more hated than ever in Catalonia. He concerted with some Spanish employés in the French commissariat service a plan for blowing up the powder magazine of the great fortress of Lerida, and arranged to be outside its walls on the day fixed for the explosion, and to storm it during the confusion that would follow. Eroles and Sarsfield both protested, pointing out that a whole quarter of the city must be destroyed, with great loss of life. Lacy replied that the results would justify the sacrifice, persisted in his scheme, and moved with every available man towards Lerida to be ready on the appointed day. He miscalculated his hours, however; and, though he left hundreds of stragglers behind from over-marching, his column arrived too late. The explosion took place on the 16th, with dreadful success; not only did a hundred of the garrison perish, but a much larger number of the citizens; many houses and one of the bastions fell. The governor Henriod, a very firm-handed man whose record in Lerida was most tyrannical[733], had been entirely unaware of the approach of the Spaniards, but proved equal to the occasion. He put his garrison under arms, manned the breach, and showed such a firm front, when Lacy appeared, that the captain-general, having tired troops and no cannon, refused to attempt the storm. He went off as quickly as he had come, having caused the death of several hundred of his countrymen with no profit whatever. If he was ready to adopt such terrible means, he should at least have had his plans correctly timed. The Catalans never forgave him the useless atrocity[734].

[733] See notes in Vidal de la Blache’s L’Evacuation d’Espagne, 1914, which reaches me just as this goes to press, for anecdotes concerning his doings.

[734] About the same time a still more dreadful plot was said to have been formed in Barcelona, with the knowledge and approval of Lacy--arsenic was to be mixed with the flour of the garrison’s rations by secret agents. [See Suchet’s Mémoires, ii. p. 256, and Arteche, xii. p. 353.] How far the plan was a reality is difficult to decide. There is a large file of papers in the Paris War Office concerning experiments carried out by a commission of army-doctors, in consequence of a sudden outbreak of sickness among the troops in July. One or two soldiers died, a great number were seized with vomiting and stomach-cramps; poison being suspected, the doctors took possession of the flour, attempted to analyse it, and tried its effects on a number of street dogs. A few of the animals died: most were violently sick, but got over the dose. Poison was not definitely proved, and dirty utensils and bad baking might conceivably have been the cause of the outbreak. Some Catalan writers say that there was a poisoning-plot, or I should have doubted the whole story. See the Appendix to Arteche, xii. p. 483.

Operations in Catalonia and Valencia were thus dragging on with no great profit to one side or the other, when Wellington’s great scheme for the Anglo-Sicilian diversion on the east coast began at last to work, and--as he had expected--set a new face to affairs. Unfortunately the expedition was conducted very differently from his desire. We have already shown how, by Lord William Bentinck’s perversity, it started too late, and was far weaker than was originally intended[735]. But on July 15th General Maitland arrived at Port Mahon with a fleet carrying three English[736] and two German battalions, and parts of three foreign regiments, with a handful of cavalry, and two companies of artillery. He sent messengers across Spain to announce to Wellington his arrival, and his purpose of landing in Catalonia, as had been directed. At Majorca he picked up Whittingham’s newly-organized Balearic division, and after some delay he set sail on July 28 for Palamos, a central point on the Catalan coast, off which he arrived on the morning of July 31st with over 10,000 men on board.

[735] See above, p. 347.

[736] 1/10th, 1/81st, 1/58th, 4th and 6th Line battalions K.G.L., and parts of the foreign battalions of De Roll, Dillon, and the Calabrian Free Corps. See table in Appendix XIV. The total was 248 officers, and 6,643 rank and file.

Owing to Bentinck’s unhappy hesitation in May and June, after the expedition had been announced and the troops ordered to prepare for embarkation, French spies in Sicily had found the time to send warning to Paris, and Suchet had been advised by the Minister of War that a fleet from Palermo might appear in his neighbourhood at any moment. He received his warning in the end of June, a month before Maitland’s arrival[737], and this turned out in the end profitable to the allied cause; for, though the fleet never appeared, he was always expecting it, and used the argument that he was about to be attacked by an English force as his most effective reply to King Joseph’s constant demands for assistance in New Castile. The arrival at Alicante of transports intended to carry Roche’s division to Catalonia, and of some vessels bearing the battering-train which Wellington had sent round for Bentinck’s use, was duly reported to him: for some time he took this flotilla to be the Anglo-Sicilian squadron. Hence he was expecting all through June and July the attack which (through Bentinck’s perversity) was never delivered. The threat proved as effective as the actual descent might have been, and Wellington would have been much relieved if only he could have seen a few of Suchet’s many letters refusing to move a man to support the King[738].

[737] Clarke’s dispatch with the information was dated June 9th.

[738] Two of them dated July 22 and August 12 did ultimately fall into his hands, but only after the victory of Salamanca. See below, pp. 617-18.

Suchet’s great trouble was that he could not tell in the least whether the Sicilian expedition would land in Catalonia or in Valencia. It might come ashore anywhere between Alicante and Rosas. He prepared a small movable central reserve, with which he could march northward if the blow should fall between Valencia and Tortosa, or southward--to reinforce Habert and Harispe--if it should be struck in the South. Decaen was warned to have a strong force concentrated in central Catalonia, in case the descent came in his direction, and Suchet promised him such assistance as he could spare. On a rumour that the Sicilian fleet had turned northward--as a matter of fact it was not yet in Spanish waters--the Marshal thought it worth while to make a rapid visit to Catalonia, to concert matters with Decaen. He marched by Tortosa with a flying column, and on July 10th met Decaen at Reus. Here he learned that there were no signs of the enemy to be discovered, and after visiting Tarragona, inspecting its fortifications, and reinforcing its garrison, returned southward in a more leisurely fashion than he had gone forth.

During Suchet’s absence from his Valencian viceroyalty the captain-general of Murcia took measures which brought about one of the most needless and gratuitous disasters that ever befell the ever-unlucky army of which he was in charge. Joseph O’Donnell knew that the Sicilian expedition was due, and he had been warned that Roche’s division would be taken off to join it; he was aware that Maitland’s arrival would modify all Suchet’s arrangements, and would force him to draw troops away from his own front. He had been requested by Wellington to content himself with ‘containing’ the French force in his front, and to risk nothing. But on July 18th he marched out from his positions in front of Alicante with the design of surprising General Harispe. He knew that Suchet had gone north, and was not aware of his return; and he had been informed, quite truly, that Harispe’s cantonments were much scattered. Unfortunately he was as incapable as he was presumptuous, and he entirely lacked the fiery determination of his brother Henry, the hero of La Bispal. According to contemporary critics he was set, at this moment, on making what he thought would be a brilliant descent on an unprepared enemy, without any reference to his orders or to the general state of the war[739]. And he wished to fight before Roche’s troops were taken from him, as they must soon be.

[739] See Schepeler, pp. 617 and 623.

Harispe had only some 5,000 men--his own division, with one stray battalion belonging to Habert[740], and Delort’s cavalry brigade[741]. He had one infantry regiment in reserve at Alcoy[742], another at Ibi[743], the third[744]--with the bulk of Delort’s horsemen--in and about Castalla, the nearest point in the French cantonments to Alicante. O’Donnell’s ambitious plan was to surround the troops in Castalla and Ibi by a concentric movement of several columns marching far apart, and to destroy them before Harispe himself could come up with his reserve from the rear. Bassecourt and his detachment from the northern hills was ordered to fall in at the same time on Alcoy, so as to distract Harispe and keep him engaged--a doubtful expedient since he lay many marches away, and it was obvious that the timing of his diversion would probably miscarry.

[740] Of the 44th Line.

[741] The 13th Cuirassiers and 24th Dragoons.

[742] The 116th Line, 2 battalions.

[743] The 1st Léger, 3 battalions.

[744] The 7th Line, 2 battalions.

O’Donnell marched in three masses: on the right Roche’s division went by Xixona with the order to surprise the French troops in Ibi. The main body, three weak infantry brigades under Montijo, Mijares, and Michelena, with two squadrons of cavalry and a battery, moved straight upon Castalla. The main body of the horse, about 800 strong, under General Santesteban, went out on the left on the side of Villena, with orders to outflank the enemy and try to cut in upon his rear. The whole force made up 10,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry, not taking into account the possible (but unlikely) advent of Bassecourt, so that Harispe was outnumbered by much more than two to one. As an extra precaution all the transports ready in Alicante were sent out--with only one battalion on board--along the coast, to demonstrate opposite Denia and the mouth of the Xucar, in order to call off the attention of Habert’s division, which lay in that direction.

Having marched all night on the 20th July, the Spanish columns found themselves--in a very fatigued condition--in front of the enemy at four o’clock on the morning of the 21st. They were out of touch with each other, Roche being separated from the centre by the mountain-spur called the Sierra de Cata, and the cavalry having been sent very far out on the flank. General Mesclop was opposed to Roche at Ibi, with four battalions and a squadron of cuirassiers--General Delort, at Castalla, had only one squadron of the cuirassiers, two battalions, and a battery, but was expecting the arrival of the 24th Dragoons from the neighbouring town of Biar, some way to his right, and of the remaining two squadrons of the 13th Cuirassiers from Onil on his left. Meanwhile he evacuated Castalla, but took up a position on a hillside covered by a stream and a ravine crossed by a narrow bridge, with his trifling force. He had already sent orders to Mesclop at Ibi to come in to his aid, leaving only a rearguard to hold off as long as possible the Spanish column in front of him. The latter did as he was bid; he threw into the Castle of Ibi a company of the 44th and two guns, and left the rest of that battalion and a troop of cuirassiers to support them. With the rest of his force, the three battalions of the 1st Léger and the remaining troop of cuirassiers, he set off in haste for Castalla.

O’Donnell assailed Delort in a very leisurely way after occupying the town of Castalla--his troops were tired, and four of his six guns had fallen behind. But Montijo’s brigade and the two pieces which had kept up with it were developing an attack on the bridge, and Michelena and Mijares had passed the ravine higher up, when the French detached troops began to appear from all directions. The first to get up were the 400 men of the 24th Dragoons, who--screened by an olive wood--came in with a tremendous impact, and quite unforeseen, upon Mijares’s flank, and completely broke up his three battalions. They then, after re-forming their ranks, formed in column and charged across the narrow bridge in front of O’Donnell’s centre, though it was commanded by his two guns. An attack delivered across such a defile, passable by only two horses abreast, looked like madness--but was successful! The guns only fired one round each before they were ridden over, and the brigade supporting them broke up. Delort then attacked, with his two battalions and with the cuirassiers who had just come up from Onil. Montijo’s brigade, the only intact Spanish unit left, was thus driven from the field and scattered. The 6,000 infantry of O’Donnell’s centre became a mass of fugitives--only one regiment out of the whole[745] kept its ranks and went off in decent order. Of the rest nearly half were hunted down and captured in droves by the French cuirassiers and dragoons. Mesclop with the three battalions from Ibi arrived too late to take any part in the rout. Delort sent him back at once to relieve the detachment that he had left in front of Roche. The latter had driven it out of the village of Ibi after some skirmishing, when he saw approaching him not only Mesclop’s column, but Harispe coming up from Alcoy with the 116th of the Line. He at once halted, turned to the rear, and retired in good order towards Xixona: the enemy’s cavalry tried to break his rearguard but failed, and the whole division got back to Alicante without loss. The same chance happened to Santesteban’s cavalry, which, marching from Villena at 7 o’clock, had reached Biar, in the enemy’s rear, only when the fighting--which had begun at 4--was all over. O’Donnell tried to throw blame on this officer; but the fact seems to be that his own calculation of time and distance was faulty: he had sent his cavalry on too wide a sweep, separated by hills from his main body, and had kept up no proper communication with it. Nor does it appear that if Santesteban had come up to Biar a little earlier he would have been able to accomplish anything very essential. Bassecourt’s diversion, as might have been expected, did not work: before he got near Alcoy the main body had been cut to pieces: he retired in haste to Almanza on hearing the news.

[745] Cuenca, of Montijo’s brigade. Schepeler, p. 619.

O’Donnell’s infantry was so shattered that his army was reduced to as bad a condition as it had shown in January, after Blake’s original disaster at Valencia. He had lost over 3,000 men, of whom 2,135 were unwounded prisoners, three flags, and the only two guns that had got to the front. The survivors of the three broken brigades had dispersed all over the countryside, and took weeks to collect. It was fortunate that Roche’s division had reached Alicante intact, or that city itself might have been in danger. The French had lost, according to their own account, no more than 200 men[746]: only the two cavalry regiments, two battalions of the 7th Line, and one of the 44th had been put into action. As Suchet truly remarks in his Mémoires[747] the total numbers engaged--3,000 men[748]--on his side were somewhat less than the casualty list of the enemy.

[746] This is the figure given by Suchet in his contemporary dispatch to King Joseph, of which a copy lies in the Scovell papers. In some French accounts the number is cut down to 70.

[747] Vol. ii. p. 260.

[748] 7th Line, about 1,200; 13th Cuirassiers and 24th Dragoons, about 1,000; one battalion 44th, about 650; artillery, &c., about 150 = 3,000 in all. The 1st Léger and 116th Line were practically not engaged.

The rout of Castalla put the Murcian army out of action for months--a lucky thing for Suchet, since the force of the allies at Alicante was just about to be increased by the arrival there of Maitland’s expedition, and if O’Donnell’s army had been still intact, a very formidable body of troops would have been collected opposite him. It remains to explain the appearance of the Anglo-Sicilians in this direction, contrary to the orders of Wellington, who had expressed his wish that they should land in Catalonia, join Lacy, and lay siege to Tarragona--an operation which he thought would force Suchet to evacuate Valencia altogether, in order to bring help to Decaen.

We left Maitland anchored in the Bay of Palamos on July 31. The moment that he appeared Eroles went on board his ship, to urge his immediate disembarkation, and to promise the enthusiastic assistance of the Catalans. The energetic baron gave a most optimistic picture of the state of affairs, he declared that the whole country would rise at the sight of the red-coats, that Tarragona was weakly held, and that the total force of the French, including Suchet’s column near Tortosa, was only 13,000 men. Lacy and Sarsfield appeared later, and gave much less encouraging information: they rated the enemy at a far higher figure than Eroles, and were right in so doing, for Decaen had some 25,000 men, and could by an effort have concentrated 15,000, exclusive of succours from Suchet. The Spanish Army of Catalonia could only furnish 7,000 foot and 300 horse, of whom many were so far off at the moment that Lacy declared that it would take six or eight days to bring them up. By the time that they were all arrived, the French would have concentrated also, and would be equal in numbers to the whole force that the allies could collect. Tarragona was reported to be in a better state of defence than Eroles allowed, and the engineers declared that it might take ten days to reduce it. But the greatest problem of all was that of provisions: Lacy declared that the country could furnish little or nothing: he could not undertake to keep his own small army concentrated for more than a week. The Anglo-Sicilians must be fed from the fleet, and he could provide no transport. Evidently the expedition would be tied down to the shore, and the siege of Tarragona was the only possible operation. Since the Anglo-Sicilian army could not manœuvre at large or retire into the inland, it would have to fight Decaen, to cover the investment of Tarragona, within a few days of its landing. On the other hand if, as Eroles promised, the somatenes rose on every side at the news of the disembarkation, the outlying French troops might not be able to get up to join Decaen, the roads would be blocked, the enemy might never be able to concentrate, and the force about Barcelona, his only immediately available field army, was not more than 8,000 strong, and might be beaten.

There were those who said that Lacy never wished to see the expedition land, because he was jealous of Eroles, and thought that a general rising which ended in success would have meant the end of his own power and tenure of office[749]. It is at least certain that the views which he expressed caused Maitland much trouble, and made him to flinch from his original idea of landing without delay and attacking Tarragona, according to Wellington’s desire. The English general took refuge in a council of war--the usual resource of commanders of a wavering purpose. His lieutenants all advised him to refuse to land, on the ground that his forces were too small and heterogeneous, that Lacy could give no prompt assistance, and that there was no sign as yet of the general rising which Eroles promised. Moreover, some of the naval officers told him that anchorage off the Catalan coast was so dangerous, even in summer, that they could not promise him that the army could be taken safely on board in case of a defeat. To the intense disgust of Eroles and the other Catalan leaders, but not at all to Lacy’s displeasure, Maitland accepted the advice of his council of war, and resolved to make off, and to land farther south. The original idea was to have come ashore somewhere in the midst of the long coast-line south of the Ebro, between Tortosa and Valencia, with the object of breaking Suchet’s line in the middle. But the news of Joseph O’Donnell’s gratuitous disaster at Castalla, which obviously enabled the Marshal to use his whole army against a disembarking force, and the suggestion that Alicante itself might be in danger, induced Maitland in the end to order his whole armament to steer southward. He arrived at Alicante on August 7th, and commenced to send his troops ashore--both his own 6,000 men and Whittingham’s 4,000 auxiliaries of the Balearic division. Since Roche was already there, with his troops in good order, there were 14,000 men collected in Alicante, over and above the wrecks of O’Donnell’s force. If only the Murcians had been intact, the mass assembled would have caused Suchet serious qualms, since it would have outnumbered the French corps in Valencia very considerably, and there was in it a nucleus of good troops in Maitland’s British and German battalions. The news of Salamanca had also come to hand by this time, and had transformed the general aspect of affairs in Suchet’s eyes: King Joseph was again demanding instant help from him, in the hope of retaining Madrid, and had called in (without his knowledge or consent) the division of Palombini from Aragon, and the garrison of Cuenca[750]. If Wellington should advance--as he actually did--against the King, and should drive him from his capital, it was possible that the main theatre of the war might be transferred to the borders of Valencia.

[749] This seems to have been Codrington’s view, see his Memoirs, i. p. 278, and he knew Lacy and the Catalans well.

[750] See above, pp. 487 and 488.

The Marshal therefore resolved to concentrate: he ordered Habert and Harispe to fall back behind the Xucar with their 8,000 men, abandoning their advanced positions in front of Alicante, and placed them at Jativa; here he threw up some field-works and armed a tête-de-pont on the Xucar at Alberique. He ordered Paris’s brigade to come down from northern Aragon to Teruel, and he warned the generals in Catalonia that he might ask for reinforcements from them.

Maitland therefore, after his landing, found that the French had disappeared from his immediate front. He was joined by Roche, and by the 67th regiment from Cartagena, and proposed to drive Harispe from Castalla and Ibi. But he marched against him on August 16th-18th, only to find that he had already retired behind the Xucar. Farther than Monforte he found himself unable to advance, for want of transport and food. For the expedition from Sicily had not been fitted out for an advance into the inland. It had been supposed by Bentinck that the troops would be able to hire or requisition in Spain the mules and carts that they would require for a forward movement. But the country-side about Alicante was already exhausted by the long stay of the Murcian army in that region; and O’Donnell--before Maitland had come to know the difficulties of his position, got from him a pledge that he would not take anything from it either by purchase or by requisition. The British general had hired mules to draw his guns, but found that he could not feed them on a forward march, because the resources of the district were denied him. He himself had to stop at Elda, Roche at Alcoy, because the problem of transport and food could not be solved. All that he could do was to feel the French line of outposts behind the Xucar with a flying column composed of his own handful of cavalry--200 sabres--and a detachment of Spanish horse lent him by Elio, the successor of O’Donnell [August 20th-21st].

But even the thought of farther advance had now to be given up, for the news arrived that King Joseph had evacuated Madrid on the 14th, and was marching on Valencia with the 15,000 men that he had collected. To have tried any further attack on Suchet, when such an army was coming in from the flank to join the Marshal, would have been insane. The French force in this region would be doubled in strength by the King’s arrival. Wherefore Maitland drew back his own division to Alicante, and brought Roche back to Xixona, not far in front of that fortress, expecting that he might ere long be pushed back, and perhaps besieged there. Wellington in the end of the month, having the same idea, sent him elaborate directions for the defence of the place, bidding him to hold it as long as possible, but to keep his transports close at hand, and to re-embark if things came to the worst[751].

[751] See Wellington to Maitland, Dispatches, ix. p. 386, dated Aug. 30.

On the 25th King Joseph’s army and its vast convoy of French and Spanish refugees, joined Suchet’s outposts at Almanza, and the dangerous combination which Maitland and Wellington had foreseen came to pass. But what was still more threatening for the army at Alicante was the rumour that Soult was about to evacuate Andalusia, and to bring the whole of the Army of the South to Valencia. This would mean that nearly 80,000 French troops would ere long be collected within striking distance of the motley force over which Maitland and Elio now held command, and it seemed probable that Soult in his march might sweep over the whole country-side, disperse the Spanish forces on the Murcian border, and perhaps besiege and take Cartagena and Alicante as a parergon on the way. We have seen in chapter X that nothing of this kind happened: Soult hung on to Andalusia for a month longer than Wellington or any one else deemed probable: he only left Granada on September 17th, and when he did move on Valencia he took the bad inland roads by Huescar, Calasparra, and Hellin, leaving Murcia and Cartagena and the whole sea-coast undisturbed. The reason, as has been already pointed out, was the outbreak of yellow fever at Cartagena, which caused the Duke of Dalmatia so much concern that he preferred to keep away from the infection, even at the cost of taking inferior and circuitous roads.

For the whole of September, therefore, Suchet on the one side and Maitland and the Spaniards on the other, were waiting on Soult: in the expectation of his early arrival both sides kept quiet. Thus tamely ended the first campaign of the Anglo-Sicilian army, on whose efforts Wellington had so much counted. And its later operations, as we shall presently see, were to be wholly in keeping with its unlucky start.

SECTION XXXIII: CHAPTER XII

WELLINGTON RETURNS TO THE DOURO. FINIS

The garrison of the Retiro had surrendered on August 14th: Wellington remained for seventeen days longer in Madrid, and did not leave it, to take the field again, until August 31st. His stay in the Spanish capital was not due, in the first instance, to the causes which might seem most plausible--a desire to give his war-worn infantry a rest during the hottest weeks of the year, or a determination to reorganize the military resources of Madrid and New Castile for the profit of the allied cause[752]. Both these ideas existed, and the latter in especial absorbed much of his attention--he spent long hours in trying to concert, with Carlos de España, measures for the utilization of the captured munitions of the Retiro, and for the recruiting of the regiments of the Spanish ‘Fifth Army.’ In this he accomplished less than he had hoped, partly because of the dreadful exhaustion of the central provinces of Spain after the famine of the preceding year, partly because of the inefficiency of most of the Spanish officials with whom he had to deal. He was much discontented with the list of persons appointed by the new Regency to take up authority in the reconquered provinces; and Castaños, whom he most trusted, and desired to have with him, was lingering in Galicia[753].

[752] Wellington to Henry Wellesley, Dispatches, ix. p. 364.

[753] Same to same, Dispatches, ix. p. 373. He was particularly indignant at the supersession of Mexia, Intendant of Castile, by Lozano de Torres, with whom he had quarrelled in Estremadura in 1809, ‘the most useless and inefficient of all God’s creatures, and an impediment to all business.’

But the main reason for the halt at Madrid was the uncertainty as to the movements of Soult. Was the Duke of Dalmatia about, as would seem reasonable, to evacuate Andalusia? And if so, would he pick up King Joseph and the Army of the Centre in La Mancha, and march on Madrid with the 65,000 men whom they could collect? Or would he retire on Valencia and join Suchet? Or again, would he persist in his intention, expressed in dispatches to Joseph, which had fallen into Wellington’s hands, of holding on to Andalusia and making it a separate base of French power, despite of the fact that he had been cut off from communication with the imperial armies of the East and North?

‘Any other but a modern French army would now leave the province [of Andalusia],’ wrote Wellington to Lord Bathurst on July 18[754], ‘as they have now absolutely no communication of any kind with France or with any other French army; and they are pressed on all sides by troops not to be despised, and can evidently do nothing. Yet I suspect that Soult will not stir till I force him out by a direct movement upon him: and I think of making that movement as soon as I can take the troops to the South without injuring their health.’ All military reasons were against the probability of Soult’s holding on in Andalusia, yet he had certainly expressed his intention of doing so as late as the middle of July, and, what was more important still in judging of his plans, he had not made a sudden movement of retreat when the news of Salamanca reached him. Hill writing on August 4th, six days after the receipt of the tidings of Marmont’s disaster, had to report[755] that ‘the recent glorious event’ seemed to have had very little effect on the enemy, who ‘continued in a strong position in his front.’ And this was true, for Soult, after hearing the news of Salamanca, had made his last frantic appeal to King Joseph to fall back on Andalusia, and make his base at Seville if Madrid were lost. Wellington was right in suspecting that, if the Marshal had got his desire, the South would have been maintained against him, and he would have had to march thither in person, to pick up Hill, and to bring matters to an issue by another pitched battle. It was only on August 12th that Soult reluctantly resolved to evacuate Andalusia: his first precautionary movements for retreat were made on August 15th, but it was not till the 24th that the Cadiz Lines were destroyed, or till the 26th that all the French troops in front of Hill suddenly vanished. Wellington was therefore kept for more than a fortnight in a state of complete uncertainty as to whether he might not have to march southward in the end, to evict Soult from his viceroyalty. It was only on the 24th that he got information from Hill (written on the 17th) which gave the first premonitory warning that the French seemed to be on the move[756]. Next day confirming evidence began to come to hand: ‘it is generally reported, and I have reason to believe, that the Army of the South is about to make a general movement ... it is supposed in the direction of Granada and Valencia[757].’ On August 30, ‘though Sir Rowland Hill on the 17th instant had no intelligence that the march was commenced, there was every appearance of it.’ The fact that seemed to make it incredible that Soult could be proposing to hold Andalusia any longer, was precise information that King Joseph and the Army of the Centre had marched upon Valencia to join Suchet, and had passed Chinchilla on August 24th, going eastward[758]. If the King had gone by the passes of the Sierra Morena southward, to join Soult, doubt might still have been possible: but since he had made Valencia his goal, and was crawling slowly along in that direction with his immense convoy of refugees and baggage, Soult--left entirely to his own resources--could not retain his present position. He must march on Valencia also, and it would be many weeks before he could place himself in touch with Suchet, and produce a threatening combination on the Mediterranean coast.

[754] Dispatches, ix. p. 370.

[755] See above, p. 537.

[756] Dispatches, ix. p. 377.

[757] Ibid., ix. pp. 380-1.

[758] News from Joseph O’Donnell commanding the Spanish army of Murcia. Dispatches, ix. p. 388.

On August 31st, therefore, with no absolutely certain news yet to hand as to Soult’s retreat, but with every military probability in favour of its having been begun, Wellington resolved to leave Madrid and to return to the valley of the Douro, where the movements of Clausel and the French Army of Portugal demanded his attention. He never thought for a moment of endeavouring to march through La Mancha to intercept or molest Soult’s retreat. The distance was too great, the roads unknown, the problem of feeding the army in the desolate and thinly-peopled country about the Murcian and Andalusian borders too difficult. Wellington made up his mind that he had some time to spare: he would march against Clausel and then ‘return to this part of the country [Madrid] as soon as I shall have settled matters to my satisfaction on the right of the Douro. And I hope I shall be here [Madrid] and shall be joined by the troops under Sir Rowland Hill, before Soult can have made much progress to form his junction with the King[759].’ It is important, therefore, to realize that, in Wellington’s original conception, the operations in Old Castile, which we may call the Burgos campaign, were to be but a side-issue, an intermediate and secondary matter. The real danger in Spain, as he considered, was the approaching, but not immediate, junction of Soult, Suchet, and King Joseph at Valencia. And the Commander-in-Chief evidently proposed to be at Madrid, to face this combination, by October 1st. How and why he failed to carry out this intention must be explained at length in the next volume.

[759] Wellington to Lord Bathurst, August 30, from Madrid. Dispatches, ix. p. 390.

Meanwhile, when he marched off to the Douro with part of his army, he had to make provisions for the conduct of affairs in the South during his absence. Hill, as has been shown in another chapter, had been told to march on Madrid, as soon as Soult’s forces had made their definitive departure for the East. As Drouet only disappeared from Hill’s front on August 26th, the northward march of the army from Estremadura began late: it had not commenced to cross the Guadiana on September 1: its progress to and along the Tagus valley was slow, owing to the difficulty of procuring food, and its main body had not reached Almaraz and Talavera before the 20th September, and was only concentrated about and behind Toledo at the end of the month. But though Hill’s movement was not rapid, it was made in sufficiently good time to face the danger that was brewing on the side of Valencia. And there can be no doubt that if he had received orders to hurry, he could have been in line some days before he actually appeared[760]. He brought up all his force[761] except Buchan’s Portuguese brigade[762], which was left at Truxillo and Merida, to keep up his communication with Elvas. Estremadura, so long the contending ground of armies, had now no solid body of troops left in it save the Spanish garrison of Badajoz. For Penne Villemur and Morillo, with the division which had so long operated in Hill’s vicinity, moved with him into New Castile. They went by the rugged roads through the mountains of the province of Toledo[763], and took post at Herencia, on the high-road from Madrid to the Despeñaperros pass, in front of the British 2nd Division.

[760] The cavalry at the head of the column were at Truxillo on the 15th September, Almaraz on the 19th, Talavera on the 21st. The infantry in the rear of the division only crossed the Guadiana at Medellin on September 14th, was at Truxillo on the 17th, Almaraz on the 20th, Talavera on the 26th, Toledo on the 30th (Swabey’s diary).

[761] Hill brought up the 2nd Division--British, 7,000; Portuguese, 2,900; Hamilton’s Portuguese, 5,300; Long’s and Slade’s cavalry, about 1,900; artillery, about 400 = 17,500 of all ranks.

[762] Late Power’s brigade: The 5th and 17th, the old garrison of Elvas, and the 22nd.

[763] They marched from Cabeza del Buey, on the borders of Andalusia and Estremadura, via Talarubia and Mazarambros to Herencia. ‘Journal of Regiment of Leon,’ in Clonard, vol. iv.

In the rear of Hill’s column, and separated from it by many days’ march, was another small British force toiling up to Madrid from a very distant point. This was the force under Colonel Skerrett, which had taken part in the fighting round Seville. It consisted of the battalion of the Guards from Cadiz, the 2/47th and 2/87th, two companies of the 2/95th, a squadron of the 2nd Hussars K.G.L., the 20th Portuguese Line, and a battery. By Wellington’s orders no British troops were now left in Cadiz save the 2/59th, part of de Watteville’s regiment, the ‘battalion of foreign recruits,’ soon to become the 8/60th, and a few artillery. Skerrett’s column, some 4,000 strong, marched by Merida and Truxillo, and reached Toledo in time to join Hill for the autumn campaign in front of Madrid. Hill’s corps, when joined by Skerrett, provided a force of over 20,000 men, about equally divided between British and Portuguese.

It would have been profitable to Wellington, as matters went in the end, if he had handed over the entire task of observing Soult’s operations to Hill. But being under the impression that he would return ere long to Madrid, he left there and in the neighbourhood nearly half the force that he had brought from Salamanca. He only took with him to oppose Clausel the 1st, 5th, and 7th Divisions, with Pack’s and Bradford’s Portuguese, and Bock’s and Ponsonby’s (late Le Marchant’s) brigades of heavy dragoons, a force of some 21,000 men[764]. He left the 3rd and Light Divisions at Madrid, the 4th Division at the Escurial, and Carlos de España’s Spaniards at Segovia. The cavalry of Victor Alten and D’Urban were assigned to this force, and remained, the former at Madrid, the latter at the Palacio de Rio Frio, near Segovia. The British infantry divisions had all suffered heavily at Badajoz, and the 4th at Salamanca also--they were weak in numbers, but were expecting ere long to be joined by numerous convalescents. The total force left behind amounted to about 17,000 men, including the Spaniards[765]. Thus when Hill and Skerrett came up from the South, there was a mass of nearly 40,000 men accumulated round Madrid, while Wellington himself, after picking up Clinton and the 6th Division, and the other troops left on the Douro, had a little under 30,000. This proved in the autumn campaign an ideally bad partition of the army, for on each wing the Anglo-Portuguese force was decidedly less numerous than that which the French could bring against it. If Wellington had taken his full strength to the North, he could have defied Clausel and Caffarelli, and they could never have made head against him, or pressed him away from Burgos. Hill, on the other hand, in front of Madrid, would have been no more helpless with 22,000 men than he actually was with 38,000 men, when Soult and King Joseph brought 60,000 against him in October. In either case he could only retreat without offering battle. But Wellington, if the three additional divisions left in New Castile had been brought to the North, would have had such a superiority over the French in Old Castile that he could have dealt with them as he pleased. The only explanation of the unfortunate proportional division of his army, is that Wellington undervalued the task he had to execute beyond the Douro, thought that he could finish it more quickly than was to be the case, and calculated on being back at Madrid in October before Soult could give trouble.

[764] There marched with Wellington--1st Division, 5,980 of all ranks; 5th Division, 4,726; 7th Division, 4,841; Pack and Bradford, 3,954; Bock and Ponsonby, 1,673; artillery, &c., about 500 = 21,674.

[765] There remained at Madrid, the Escurial, &c.--Arentschildt’s cavalry, 515; D’Urban’s Portuguese cavalry, 552; 3rd Division, 4,234; 4th Division, 4,548; Light Division, 3,462; artillery, about 350; Carlos de España’s Spaniards, about 3,000 = 16,661.

Yet when he started he was not comfortable in his mind about the general situation. If the French drew together, their total strength in Spain was far too great for him. In a moody moment he wrote to his brother Henry: ‘though I still hope to be able to maintain our position in Castile, and even to improve our advantages, I shudder when I reflect upon the enormity of the task which I have undertaken, with inadequate powers myself to do anything, and without assistance of any kind from the Spaniards.... I am apprehensive that all this may turn out ill for the Spanish cause. If by any cause I should be overwhelmed, or should be obliged to retire, what will the world say? What will the people of England say? What will those in Spain say?[766]’

[766] Dispatches, ix. p. 375.

Wellington’s forebodings were, only too soon, to be justified. But the tale of the campaign against Clausel and Caffarelli, of the advance to and retreat from Burgos, must be told in another volume.

APPENDICES

I

SUCHET’S ARMY IN VALENCIA. MORNING STATE OF OCT. 1, 1811

1st Division (Musnier): Officers. Men. Total. Robert’s { 114th Line (3 batts.) 58 1,579 1,637 Brigade { 1st of the Vistula (2 batts.) 27 836 863 Ficatier’s { 121st Line (3 batts.) 44 1,156 1,200 Brigade { 2nd of the Vistula (2 batts.) 26 1,103 1,129 = 4,829

2nd Division (Harispe): Paris’s { 7th Line (4 batts.) 55 1,584 1,639 Brigade { 116th Line (3 batts.) 42 1,105 1,147 Chlopiski’s { 44th Line (2 batts.) 35 1,191 1,226 Brigade { 3rd of the Vistula (2 batts.) 26 724 750 = 4,762

3rd Division (Habert): Montmarie’s { 5th Line (2 batts.) 31 771 802 Brigade { 16th Line (3 batts.) 56 1,261 1,317 Bronikowski’s Brigade, 117th Line (3 batts.) 49 1,291 1,340 = 3,459

Palombini’s Italian Division: Saint Paul’s{ 2nd Léger (3 batts.) 59 2,141 2,200 Brigade { 4th Line (3 batts.) 57 1,603 1,660 Balathier’s { 5th Line (2 batts.) 37 893 930 Brigade { 6th Line (3 batts.) 51 1,378 1,429 = 6,219

Compère’s Neapolitan Division: 1st Léger (1 batt.) 27 419 446 1st Line (1 batt.) 24 536 560 2nd Line (1 batt.) 27 358 385 = 1,391

Cavalry (General Boussard): 4th Hussars (4 squadrons) 30 720 750 24th Dragoons (2 squadrons) 17 419 436 13th Cuirassiers (4 squadrons) 27 557 584 Italian ‘Dragoons of Napoleon’ 24 442 466 Neapolitan Chasseurs 13 156 169 = 2,405

Artillery (General Vallée) 48 1,757 1,805 Engineers (General Rogniat) 16 584 600 Équipages Militaires and Gendarmerie 10 653 663 = 3,068 --- ------ ------ ------ 916 25,217 26,133 26,133

N.B.--Ficatier’s Brigade, 3 battalions of Palombini’s division, and two squadrons of 4th Hussars were not present at the battle of Saguntum, being on the line of communications, and blockading Peniscola and Oropesa.

This return, lent me by Mr. Fortescue who found it in the Paris Archives, differs by over 2,000 men from Suchet’s figures given in his Mémoires, p. 436 of vol. ii. The Marshal has left out the 3 battalions and 2 squadrons on the line of communications, mentioned above.

II

STRENGTH OF BLAKE’S ARMY AT THE BATTLE OF SAGUNTUM

I. ‘THE EXPEDITIONARY CORPS.’ Officers. Men. Total.

Lardizabal’s Division: Africa (2 batts.), Murcia (2 batts.), 2nd of Badajoz (2 batts.), Campo Mayor (1 batt.), Tiradores de Cuenca (1 batt.) 149 2,823 2,972

Zayas’s Division: 2nd Spanish Guards, 4th ditto, 1st Walloon Guards, Voluntarios de la Patria, Toledo, Ciudad Rodrigo, Legion Estrangera (1 batt. each), Companies of Cazadores 177 2,373 2,550

Loy’s Cavalry: Granaderos (2 squadrons), Rey (1 ditto), Husares de Castilla (1 ditto) 50 244 294

Horse Artillery: two batteries 11 214 225 --- ----- ----- Total of the ‘Expeditionary Corps’ 387 5,654 6,041

II. VALENCIAN TROOPS (‘SECOND ARMY’).

Miranda’s Division: Valencia (3 batts.), Voluntarios de Castilla (2 batts.), 1st of Avila (1 batt.), 2nd Cazadores de Valencia (1 batt.) 120 3,844 3,964

Obispo’s Division: Cariñena (2 batts.) 2nd of Avila (1 batt.), 1st Voluntarios de Aragon (1 batt.), Daroca (1 batt.), Tiradores de Doyle (1 batt.) 110 3,290 3,400

Villacampa’s Division: Princesa (2 batts.), Soria (2 batts.), 2nd Voluntarios de Aragon (1 batt.), 1st Cazadores de Valencia (1 batt.), Molina (1 batt.) 162 3,190 3,352

Reserve (General Velasco): 3rd Battalions of Voluntarios de Castilla, Don Carlos, Avila, Cazadores de Valencia, and Voluntarios de Orihuela 75 3,595 3,670

San Juan’s Cavalry: Cuenca, Dragones del Rey, Reina, Numancia, Husares de Aragon, Cazadores de Valencia, Alcantara, Husares Españoles, Husares de Granada (none over two squadrons strong) 111 1,610 1,721

Artillery: 1 horse, 2 field batteries 21 340 361 --- ------ ------ Total ‘2nd Army’ 599 15,869 16,468

III. MURCIAN TROOPS (‘3RD ARMY’).

Officers. Men. Total. Creagh’s Brigade: Corona, Alcazar, Tiradores de Cadiz (1 batt. each) 97 2,121 2,218

Montijo’s Brigade: 1st of Badajoz, 1st of Cuenca, Voluntarios de Burgos, Sappers (1 batt. each) 108 2,302 2,410

Cavalry: Reina (2 squadrons), Pavia (2 squadrons), Granada (2 squadrons), Madrid (1 squadron), Husares de Fernando 7me (1 squadron) 83 743 826

Horse Artillery: 1 battery 3 78 81 --- ----- ----- Total ‘3rd Army’ 291 5,244 5,535

General Total of the Army: 1,277 officers, 26,767 men = Total, 28,044.

III

SUCHET’S ARMY AT THE SIEGE OF VALENCIA. MORNING STATE OF DEC. 31

N.B.--The regiments of the Army of Aragon are the same as in Appendix I.

I. ARMY OF ARAGON (officers and men).

Musnier’s Division (10 battalions) 3,727 Harispe’s Division (10 battalions) 4,828 Habert’s Division (8 battalions) 3,150 Palombini’s Division (10 battalions) 3,591 Compère’s Division (3 battalions) 1,092 Boussard’s Cavalry (13 squadrons) 1,839 Artillery 1,511 Engineers, &c. 857 ------ Total Army of Aragon 20,595

II. REILLE’S CORPS (officers and men).

Pannetier’s { 10th and 81st Line (7 battalions) 2,834 Brigade {

Bourke’s { 20th and 60th Line (7 battalions) 3,961 Brigade {

Severoli’s Italian { 1st Line (3 batts.) } { 7th Line (2 batts.) } 4,370 Division { 1st Léger (3 batts.) }

Cavalry { 9th Hussars 543 { 1st Italian Chasseurs 262

Artillery 1,153 ------ Total Reille’s Corps 13,123

General Total of combined forces, 33,718.

IV

SURRENDER-ROLL OF BLAKE’S ARMY OF VALENCIA, JAN. 9, 1812

Officers. Rank and file. Zayas’s Division 96 1,319 Lardizabal’s Division 165 3,385 Miranda’s Division 237 5,513 Division of Reserve, &c. 130 3,171 Cavalry 77 818 Artillery 73 1,581 Engineers and Sappers 38 383 --- ------ Total 816 16,170

General total, 16,986 of all ranks, not including 62 officers in staff or administrative employments, 23 chaplains, and 19 surgeons.

Of the remainder of Blake’s army there had rallied at Alicante by January 14 of infantry 361 officers and 5,125 men, of cavalry 164 officers and 671 men, of artillery 30 officers and 720 men--total of all arms, 7,071.

V

FRENCH TROOPS EMPLOYED AT THE SIEGE OF TARIFA (DEC. 1811-JAN. 1812)

[From the table in Belmas, iv. pp. 40-2.] Of all ranks. From Leval’s Division, 43rd Line, 7th and 9th Poles (2 batts. each) 3,000

From Barrois’s Division, 16th Léger (3 batts.), 51st Ligne (2 batts.), 54th Ligne (2 batts.) 4,200

From Villatte’s Division, 27th Léger (1 batt.), 94th and 95th Ligne (1 batt. each) 1,800

Cavalry, 16th Dragoons, and one squadron 21st Dragoons 585

Artillery 469

Engineers, Sappers, Marines, &c. 385 ------ Total 10,439

In addition three battalions of the 8th and 63rd line and two squadrons of the 2nd Dragoons were occupied on the lines of communications, between Vejer and Fascinas.

ANGLO-SPANISH GARRISON OF TARIFA

_Of all British (Colonel Skerrett): ranks._ 2/47th 570 2/87th 560 Battalion of Flank Companies 400 1 company 95th regiment 75 1 troop 2nd Hussars K.G.L. 70 Artillery (Hughes’s Company R.A.) 83 ----- Total 1,758

Spanish (General Copons): Cantabria (1 batt.) 450 Irlanda (1 batt.) 357 Cazadores 333 Artillery 106 Sappers 83 Cavalry 17 ----- Total 1,346

N.B.--Another return makes the total of the British part of the garrison 67 officers and 1,707 men, a total of 1,774.

VI

CIUDAD RODRIGO

A. THE FRENCH GARRISON

The garrison, according to Belmas, iv. pp. 282-3, stood on the day of the investment as follows:

34th Léger, one battalion 975 officers and men effective. 113th Ligne, one battalion 577 ” ” Artillery, 2 companies 168 ” ” Engineers 15 ” ” Non-combatants (Civil officers, &c.) 36 ” ” Sick in Hospital 163 Staff 3 ----- Total 1,937

B. BRITISH LOSSES DURING THE SIEGE

The British losses between the investment and the storm were, according to the official returns at the Record Office, 1 officer and 69 men killed, 19 officers and 462 men wounded, 2 men (both Portuguese) missing, or a total of 553. These figures added to the 568 lost in the storm (for details see below), make altogether 1,121, which does not agree with the statement in Wellington Dispatches, viii. p. 557; this gives as the total for the siege 9 officers and 169 men killed, 70 officers and 748 men wounded, 7 men missing, or only 1,003, over a hundred less than the total from the return quoted above. Napier gives 1,290 as the casualties for the whole siege, which much exceeds the return in the Record Office; he also makes the total for the storm 60 officers and 650 killed and wounded, while the official return here printed makes it only 59 officers and 509 men. Lord Londonderry and Sir John Jones also give figures agreeing with no others. I prefer to take the total of the official report, which is here appended.

C. BRITISH LOSSES AT THE STORM OF CIUDAD RODRIGO. JANUARY 19, 1812

Killed. Wounded. Officers. Men. Officers. Men. Total. Staff 1[767] -- 2[768] -- 3 Engineers -- -- 2 2 4

3rd Division: {1/45th 3 14 4 27 48 Mackinnon’s {5/60th -- 1 1 3 5 Brigade {74th -- 4 4 13 21 {1/88th -- 7 4 23 34

{2/5th 1 33 8 52 94 Campbell’s {77th -- 14 5 31 50 Brigade {2/83rd -- 1 -- 4 5 {94th 2 13 6 48 69 --- Divisional Total 326

Light Division: Vandeleur’s {1/52nd 1 2 2 23 28 Brigade {2/52nd -- 1 1 7 9 {3/95th -- -- -- 9 9

Barnard’s {1/43rd -- 7 3 31 41 Brigade {1/95th -- 1 3 16 20 {2/95th -- -- 2 4 6 --- Divisional Total 113

Portuguese -- 19 4 91 114 -- --- -- --- --- Grand Total 8 117 51 384 560

Adding 5 British and 3 Portuguese missing, the total loss is 568 in the storm.

[767] General Mackinnon.

[768] Generals Craufurd and Vandeleur.

VII

NOTE ON SOME POINTS OF CONTROVERSY REGARDING THE STORM OF CIUDAD RODRIGO

Beside the controversy alluded to on page 183 about the exact amount of co-operation by the Light Division in helping the 3rd to clear the French from behind the Greater Breach, there are several other vexed points concerning the storm of Ciudad Rodrigo. The one on which most dispute arose was that concerning the capture of General Barrié. Gurwood of the 52nd claimed to have been the first officer to enter the Castle, and to receive the surrender of the governor and his staff. He is mentioned as doing so in Wellington’s Rodrigo dispatch, and generally had the credit at the time. But Lieutenant Mackie of the 88th, who had led the forlorn hope of the 3rd Division, also put in a claim, and had many supporters. Many years after the war was over, Maxwell (the author of one of the several Lives of the Duke of Wellington, which came out in early Victorian times) championed Mackie’s claim with such vehemence that Gurwood issued a pamphlet defending his own credit. Considerable controversy arose in the United Service Journal for 1843, and elsewhere. Mackie’s story was that he, with some of the 88th, arrived first at the Castle, summoned the governor to surrender, and was received by several French officers, who handed him over a sword and announced that the general yielded. Some moments after, according to Mackie, Gurwood came up, spoke to the governor himself, and obtained his sword, which, when the prisoners were brought before Wellington, he presented to his commander, who gave it him back, telling him to retain it as a trophy, and entered Gurwood’s name in his dispatch as the officer who had received the surrender. Gurwood’s story, told with as much detail and circumstance as Mackie’s, is that he, with two soldiers of the 52nd, arrived at the citadel, got the gate opened by threatening the officer in charge that no quarter would be given if resistance were made, and was received by Barrié, who in a great state of nervousness, threw his arms round his neck, kissed him, and said, ‘je suis le Gouverneur de la place--je suis votre prisonnier,’ handing over his sword at the same time. He accompanied the captive staff-officers to Wellington’s presence, and presented them to him. It is difficult to come to any certain conclusion in face of two such contradictory tales, but there is a bare possibility of reconciling them, by supposing that Mackie entered first, that the door was closed behind him and his party, and that Gurwood was let in a moment later, and spoke to the governor, while Mackie had been dealing only with his aide-de-camp, whose sword he had received. But if so, it is odd that Gurwood never saw Mackie: Mackie is quite positive that he saw Gurwood, and that he came in some minutes later than himself. The dispute tended to become a controversy between Light Division and 3rd Division veterans, each backing their own man. A synopsis of the papers may be found in the last two chapters of vol. i of Grattan’s second series of Adventures with the Connaught Rangers (London, 1853). Napier, who was much interested in the discussion, put in his final definitive edition the non-committal statement that ‘the garrison fled to the Castle, where Lieutenant Gurwood, who though severely wounded had entered among the foremost at the Lesser Breach, received the governor’s sword’ (iv. p. 90). Harry Smith says (i. p. 58): ‘Gurwood got great credit here unfairly. Johnstone and poor Uniacke were the first on the ramparts, Gurwood having been knocked down in the breach, and momentarily stunned. However, Gurwood’s a sharp fellow, and he cut off in search of the governor and brought his sword to the Duke. He made the most of it.’

Another controversy is as to which troops of the 3rd Division got first into the body of the town. The 88th claimed the priority, but also the 94th. The late Mr. Andrew Lang lent me a very interesting letter of his kinsman, William Lang of the 94th, very clearly stating that a solid body of 200 men of his regiment were the first troops that penetrated in force to the Plaza Mayor, and received the surrender of the garrison there.

Still another controversy, about which there is much in the Rice Jones papers, in the possession of Commander Hon. Henry Shore, R.N., is as to what engineer officers conducted the storming-columns. Apparently some credit has been misplaced among individuals here, but to decide upon the point would take more space than a book like this can afford.

VIII

ARMY OF THE SOUTH

REORGANIZED AFTER THE DEPARTURE OF THE POLES AND OTHER REGIMENTS

RETURN OF MARCH 1, 1812

[From the returns in the Archives Nationales. Lent me by Mr. Fortescue.]

Officers. Men. 1st Division: Conroux. Head-quarters: Villamartin (near Bornos). 1st Brigade, Meunier; 9th Léger (2 batts.)*, 24th Ligne (3 batts.). 2nd Brigade, Mocquery; 96th Ligne (3 batts.).

Total, including artillery 182 5,263

2nd Division: Barrois. Head-quarters: Puerto Real (near Cadiz). 1st Brigade, Cassagne: 16th Léger, 8th Ligne (3 batts. each). 2nd Brigade, Avril: 51st Ligne, 54th Ligne (3 batts. each).

Total, including artillery 225 7,551

3rd Division: Villatte. Head-quarters: Santa Maria (near Cadiz). 1st Brigade, Pécheux: 27th Léger, 63rd Ligne (3 batts. each). 2nd Brigade, Lefol: 94th Ligne, 95th Ligne (3 batts. each).

Total, including artillery 244 7,115

4th Division: Leval. Head-quarters: Granada. 1st Brigade, Rey: 32nd Ligne, 43rd Ligne (4 batts. each). 2nd Brigade, Vichery: 55th Ligne (4 batts.), 58th Ligne* (3 batts.).

Total, including artillery 273 9,131

5th Division: Drouet D’Erlon. Head-quarters: Zafra (Estremadura). 1st Brigade, Dombrowski: 12th Léger, 45th Ligne (3 batts. each). 2nd Brigade, Reymond: 64th Ligne* (2-2/3 batts.), 88th Ligne* (2 batts.)

Total, including artillery 192 5,927

6th Division: Daricau. Head-quarters: Zalamea (Estremadura). 1st Brigade, Quiot: 21st Léger, 100th Ligne (3 batts. each). 2nd Brigade, St. Pol: 28th Léger*, 103rd Ligne* (2 batts. each).

Total, including artillery 174 4,854 ----- ------ Total of six divisions 1,290 39,841

The regiments marked * had each one battalion in garrison at Badajoz, except the 64th, which had two companies there only [9th Léger, 28th Léger, 58th, 88th, 103rd Ligne]. The total of these 5-1/3 battalions was 2,951 officers and men. Adding these to the six divisions the total was 44,082 French infantry present under arms.

CAVALRY.

1st Division. Head-quarters: Ribera (Estremadura). 1st Brigade, Perreymond: 2nd Hussars, 21st Chasseurs, 26th Dragoons. 2nd Brigade, Bonnemain: 5th Chasseurs, 27th Chasseurs.

Total 116 1,840

2nd Division. Head-quarters: Cordova. 1st Brigade, Digeon: 2nd, 4th, 5th Dragoons. 2nd Brigade, Lallemand: 14th, 17th, 27th Dragoons.

Total 170 3,307

3rd Division, Pierre Soult. Head-quarters: Granada. 1st Brigade, Boille: 10th Chasseurs, 12th Dragoons. 2nd Brigade, Ormancey: 16th Dragoons, 21st Dragoons.

Total 135 2,203 --- ----- Total Cavalry 421 7,350

N.B.--7th Lancers, a Polish regiment, is omitted here, but actually stayed with the Army of the South till the end of 1812.

Spanish Troops [by return of April 1]: Officers. Men. Infantry 218 2,732 Cavalry 163 2,358 --- ----- Total Juramentados 381 5,090

Artillery (deducting divisional batteries) 100 2,800 Engineers and Sappers 20 900 Three naval battalions (43rd and 44th _équipages de flotte_, and a battalion of _ouvriers de marine_) 60 1800 Gendarmerie, &c. 10 600 ----- ------ General Total of army 2,282 58,381

Or adding the garrison of Badajoz (2,951 infantry, 268 artillery, 265 sappers, 42 cavalry, of the Army of the South, not including 910 Hessians of the Army of the Centre), a total of 64,189, without sick, &c.

When Soult on April 1st, 1812 marched to attempt the relief of Badajoz, he drew up the following statistics as to the strength of his army, omitting the naval troops, and the gunners of the Cadiz Lines:

(1) Marched for Badajoz: Officers. Men. Infantry 600 17,964 Cavalry 237 3,944 Artillery 26 613 Engineers 2 116 --- ------ Total 865 22,637 = 23,502

(2) Left before Cadiz and in Granada, &c.: Infantry 611 18,312 Cavalry 152 2,555 --- ------ Total 763 20,867 = 21,630

(3) Garrisons of the Provinces of Cordova, Jaen, Granada, and Seville: Infantry 90 2,547 Cavalry 57 1,654 --- ----- Total 147 4,201 = 4,348

(4) Spanish troops: Infantry 218 2,732 Cavalry 163 2,358 --- ----- Total 381 5,090 = 5,471

Adding up these four totals we get officers 2,156, rank and file 52,795 = 54,951. This total omits the artillery in the Cadiz Lines and other fortified places, and the three marine regiments, and such sappers, gendarmes, military train, &c., as did not form part of the expedition that marched with Soult to relieve Badajoz. Adding these, at their strength of March 1, we get a total of about 59,000 of all ranks, not including the garrison of Badajoz. This agrees well enough with the March total of 60,663, allowing for a month’s wear and tear.

IX

THE SIEGE OF BADAJOZ, MARCH 15-APRIL 6, 1812

(A) STRENGTH OF THE FRENCH GARRISON ON MARCH 15

[See the Tables in Belmas, iv. pp. 364-5 and in Jones, i. p. 229.]

Staff 25 Infantry: 3/9th Léger officers and men 580 1/28th Léger ” ” 597 1/58th Ligne ” ” 450 3/88th Ligne ” ” 600 3/103rd Ligne ” ” 540 64th Ligne (2 companies) ” ” 130 Hesse-Darmstadt (2 batts.) ” ” 910 Juramentados 54 = 3,861 infantry. Cavalry 42 Artillery 261 Engineers and Sappers 260 Sick in Hospital 300 Civil Departments, non-combatants, &c. 254 ----- 5,003

A report of the governor at noon on April 5, found among his papers after the storm, gave the following as surviving under arms (sick excluded)--infantry 3,403, artillery 282, engineers 217, cavalry 50, Juramentados 86. This report, printed in Jones, i. p. 230, implies a higher original total than Belmas allows--the artillery and Juramentados are actually more numerous on April 5 than on March 15! And the infantry are only 458 less, despite of losses of a considerably higher figure, for another paper of the commandant shows (Jones, i. p. 230)--Sortie of March 19: killed 30, wounded 287=317[769]. Storm of Picurina Fort: killed or prisoners, 8 officers, 278 men = 286. We have thus 603 casualties in these two affairs only, beside the ordinary wear and tear of the siege.

[769] Phillipon’s report to Clarke, drawn up on June 12, gives 273 instead of 317 for the loss in this sally (see Belmas, iv. p. 414).

Noting the considerable number of ‘round figures’ in Belmas’s table, I am inclined to think that the total of the garrison must have been a few hundreds over what he allows.

(B) LOSSES AT STORM OF BADAJOZ, APRIL 6, 1811

[From the Returns at the Record Office.]

Killed. Wounded. Missing. Officers. Men. Officers. Men. Officers. Men. Total. General Staff 1 -- 16 -- -- -- 17 Royal Artillery 1 6 1 9 -- -- 17 Royal Engineers 2 -- 3 5 -- -- 10 Assistant Engineers -- -- 3 -- -- -- 3

THIRD DIVISION. Kempt’s Brigade: 1/45th Foot 6 19 8 64 -- -- 97 3/60th Foot 1 4 4 26 -- -- 35 74th Foot -- 12 7 33 -- 2 54 1/88th Foot 3 28 7 106 -- -- 144 J. Campbell’s Brigade: 2/5th Foot 1 11 3 28 -- -- 43 77th Foot -- -- 3 11 -- -- 14 2/83rd Foot 1 22 7 39 -- -- 69 94th Foot 1 12 1 51 -- -- 65 -- --- -- --- -- -- --- Total 3rd Division 13 108 40 358 -- 2 521

FOURTH DIVISION. Kemmis’s Brigade: 3/27th Foot 4 37 12 132 -- -- 185 1/40th Foot 2 51 13 170 -- -- 236 Bowes’s Brigade: 1/7th Foot 5 44 12 119 -- -- 180 1/23rd Foot 3 22 14 92 -- 20 151 1/48th Foot 3 32 16 122 -- -- 173 -- --- -- --- -- -- -- Total 4th Division 17 186 67 635 -- 20 925

FIFTH DIVISION. Hay’s Brigade: 3/1st Foot -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1/9th Foot -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2/38th Foot 1 12 3 26 -- -- 42 Walker’s Brigade: 1/4th Foot 2 40 15 173 -- -- 230 2/30th Foot -- 38 6 86 -- -- 130 2/44th Foot 2 37 7 88 -- -- 134 -- --- -- --- -- -- -- Total 5th Division 5 127 31 373 -- -- 536

LIGHT DIVISION: 1/43rd Foot 3 74 15 249 -- -- 341 1/52nd Foot 5 53 14 248 -- -- 320 1/95th Foot 3 27 10 154 -- -- 194 3/95th Foot 4 9 4 47 -- -- 64 -- --- -- --- -- -- --- Total Light Division 15 163 43 698 -- -- 919

Brunswick Oels, dispersed in companies in 4th and 5th Divisions -- 7 2 26 -- -- 35 -- --- --- ----- -- -- ----- Total British loss 54 597 206 2,104 -- 22 2,983

PORTUGUESE 8 147 45 500 -- 30 730 -- --- --- ----- -- -- ----- General Total 62 744 251 2,604 -- 52 3,713 -- --- --- ----- -- -- ----- Losses during previous operations 10 219 54 661 -- 13 957

The total loss during the siege and storm would therefore appear to have been 4,670.

X

WELLINGTON’S ARMY AT SALAMANCA. STRENGTH AND LOSSES

N.B.--Strength by the morning state of July 15, 1812. Losses of the British by the return annexed to Wellington’s dispatch: those of the Portuguese from the official returns at Lisbon. The fighting strength on July 22, owing to losses at Castrejon and Castrillo, and to weary men falling out during the retreat, may have been perhaps 1,000 less.

I. BRITISH TROOPS

Losses. Strength. Killed. Wounded. Missing. Officers. Men. Total. Officers. Men. Officers. Men. Men. Total Loss. CAVALRY (Stapleton Cotton): Le Marchant’s Brigade 3rd Dragoons 17 322 339 1 6 -- 11 2 20 4th Dragoons 22 336 358 -- 7 1 21 -- 29 5th Dragoon Guards 22 313 325 -- 9 2 42 3 56

G. Anson’s Brigade 11th Light Dragoons 30 361 391 -- -- -- -- -- -- 12th Light Dragoons 19 321 340 1 2 -- 2 -- 5 16th Light Dragoons 14 259 273 -- -- -- -- -- --

V. Alten’s Brigade 14th Light Dragoons 23 324 347 -- 1 -- 2 -- 3 1st Hussars K.G.L. 23 376 399 -- 2 5 16 -- 23

Bock’s Brigade 1st Dragoons K.G.L. 25 339 364 -- -- -- -- -- -- 2nd Dragoons K.G.L. 23 384 407 -- -- -- -- -- -- --- ----- ----- -- -- -- -- -- --- Total British Cavalry 218 3,335 3,543 2 27 8 94 5 136 --- ----- ----- -- -- -- -- -- ---

INFANTRY. 1st Division (H. Campbell): Fermor’s Brigade 1st Coldstream Guards 26 928 954 -- 7 1 22 8 38 1st Third Guards 23 938 961 -- 1 1 20 2 24 1 comp. 5/60th Foot 1 56 57 -- -- -- -- -- --

Wheatley’s Brigade 2/24th Foot 23 398 421 -- -- -- 5 -- 5 1/42nd Foot 40 1,039 1,079 -- -- -- 3 -- 3 2/58th Foot[770] 31 369 400 -- -- -- 3 1 4 1/79th Foot 40 634 674 -- -- -- 1 3 4 1 comp. 5/60th 1 53 54 -- -- -- -- -- --

Löwe’s Brigade 1st Line Battalion K.G.L. 26 615 641 -- 1 -- 8 -- 9 2nd Line Battalion K.G.L. 26 601 627 -- 1 2 40 4 47 5th Line Battalion K.G.L. 30 525 555 -- 1 1 17 -- 19 --- ----- ----- -- -- -- --- -- --- Total 1st Division 267 6,156 6,423 -- 11 5 119 18 153 --- ----- ----- -- -- -- --- -- --- 3rd Division (Pakenham):

Wallace’s Brigade 1/45th Foot 26 416 442 -- 5 5 45 -- 55 74th Foot 23 420 443 -- 3 2 40 4 49 1/88th Foot 21 642 663 2 11 4 110 8 135 3 comps. 5/60th Foot 11 243 254 -- 6 3 24 3 36

J. Campbell’s Brigade 1/5th Foot 32 870 902 -- 10 6 110 -- 126 2/5th Foot 19 289 308 -- 1 2 21 -- 24 2/83rd Foot 24 295 319 -- 2 2 30 -- 34 94th Foot 24 323 347 1 3 3 21 -- 28 --- ----- ----- -- -- -- --- -- --- Total 3rd Division 180 3,498 3,678 3 41 27 401 15 487 --- ----- ----- -- -- -- --- -- --- 4th Division (Lowry Cole):

W. Anson’s Brigade 3/27th Foot 19 614 633 -- -- 1 7 -- 8 1/40th Foot 24 558 582 -- 12 5 115 -- 132 1 comp. 5/60th 2 44 46 -- -- -- -- -- --

Ellis’s Brigade 1/7th Foot 24 471 495 1 19 10 165 -- 195 1/23rd Foot 19 427 446 1 9 6 90 -- 106 1/48th Foot 22 404 426 -- 9 10 60 -- 79 1 comp. Brunswick Oels[771] 1 53 54 -- -- -- -- -- -- --- ----- ----- -- -- -- --- -- --- Total 4th Division 111 2,571 2,682 2 49 32 437 -- 520 --- ----- ----- -- -- -- --- -- --- 5th Division (Leith):

Greville’s Brigade { 3/1st Foot 32 729 761 -- 23 8 129 -- 160 { 1/9th Foot 31 635 666 -- 3 1 42 -- 46 { 1/38th Foot[772] 36 764 800 2 14 12 115 -- 143 { 2/38th Foot 20 281 301 -- 9 2 40 1 52 { 1 comp. Brunswick { Oels[2] 2 76 78 -- -- -- -- -- --

Pringle’s Brigade { 1/4th Foot 36 421 457 -- -- 1 17 -- 18 { 2/4th Foot 27 627 654 -- 2 -- 23 6 31 { 2/30th Foot 20 329 349 -- 3 1 22 1 27 { 2/44th Foot 20 231 251 2 4 -- 23 -- 29 { 1 comp. Brunswick { Oels[2] 3 66 69 -- -- -- -- -- -- --- ----- ----- -- -- -- --- -- --- Total 5th Division 227 4,159 4,386 4 58 25 411 8 506 --- ----- ----- -- -- -- --- -- --- 6th Division (Clinton):

Hulse’s Brigade { 1/11th Foot 31 485 516 1 44 14 281 -- 340 { 2/53rd Foot 25 316 341 -- 26 11 105 -- 142 { 1/61st Foot 29 517 546 5 39 19 303 -- 366 { 1 comp. 5/60th 2 59 61 -- -- -- -- -- --

Hinde’s Brigade { 2nd Foot 27 381 408 1 13 6 77 12 109 { 1/32nd Foot 33 576 609 2 15 9 111 -- 137 { 1/36 Foot 29 400 429 4 16 5 74 -- 99 --- ----- ----- -- --- -- --- -- ----- Total 6th Division 176 2,734 2,910 13 153 64 951 12 1,193 --- ----- ----- -- --- -- --- -- ----- 7th Division (Hope):

Halkett’s Brigade { 1st Light Batt. K.G.L. 25 544 569 -- -- 2 7 -- 9 { 2nd Light Batt. K.G.L. 21 473 494 1 5 1 9 -- 16 { Brunswick Oels[773] (9 { companies) 23 573 596 -- 4 2 42 1 49

De Bernewitz’s Brigade { 51st Foot 27 280 307 -- -- -- 2 -- 2 { 68th Foot 21 317 338 1 3 2 14 -- 20 { Chasseurs { Britanniques 27 686 713 -- 5 -- 10 14 29 --- ----- ----- -- -- -- -- -- --- Total 7th Division 144 2,873 3,017 2 17 7 84 15 125 --- ----- ----- -- -- -- -- -- --- Light Division (Chas. Alten):

Barnard’s Brigade { 1/43rd Foot 30 718 748 -- -- 1 15 -- 16 { Detachments 2/95th and { 3/95th Rifles 19 373 392 -- -- -- 5 -- 5

Vandeleur’s Brigade { 1/52nd Foot. 28 771 799 -- -- -- 2 -- 2 { 8 comps. 1/95th 27 515 542 -- -- -- 2 2 4 --- ----- ----- -- -- -- -- -- -- Total Light Division 104 2,377 2,481 -- -- 1 24 2 27 --- ----- ----- -- -- -- -- -- --

Royal Horse Artillery (troops of Ross, Macdonald, and Bull, and drivers) 18 403 421 -- 1 -- 2 -- 3 Field Artillery (companies of Lawson, Gardiner, Greene, Douglas, May, and drivers) 35 650 685 -- 1 -- 4 -- 5 King’s German Legion Artillery (battery of Sympher) 5 75 80 -- 2 -- 4 -- 6 -- ----- ----- -- -- -- -- -- -- Artillery Total 58 1,128 1,186 -- 4 -- 10 -- 14 -- ----- ----- -- -- -- -- -- -- ENGINEERS 12 9 21 -- -- -- -- -- --

STAFF CORPS 5 81 86 -- -- -- -- -- --

WAGON TRAIN 24 115 139 -- -- -- -- -- --

[770] The 2/58th though properly belonging to the 5th Division, appears to have acted on this day with the 1st Division.

[771] The losses of the attached companies of Brunswick Oels are only to be found under its regimental total in 7th Division.

[772] This battalion only joined the division on the battle-morning.

[773] The losses of the attached companies of Brunswick Oels are only to be found under its regimental total in 7th Division.

BRITISH TOTAL

Infantry 1,209 24,368 25,577 24 329 159 2,387 69 2,968 Cavalry 218 3,335 3,553 2 27 8 94 5 136 Artillery 58 1,128 1,186 -- 4 -- 10 -- 14 Engineers 12 9 21 -- -- -- -- -- -- Staff Corps 5 81 86 -- -- -- -- -- -- Train 24 115 139 -- -- -- -- -- -- General Staff ? ? ? 2 -- 9 -- -- 11 ----- ------ ------ -- --- --- ----- -- ----- Total 1,526 29,036 30,562 28 360 176 2,491 74 3,129

II. PORTUGUESE TROOPS

CAVALRY: D’Urban’s Brigade: 1st and 11th Dragoons (12th Dragoons absent)[774] 32 450 482 2 5 2 18 10 37 INFANTRY: Power’s Brigade, 3rd Division: 9th and 21st Line, 12th Caçadores 90 2,107 2,197 1 29 9 23 14 76 Stubbs’s Brigade, 4th Division: 11th and 23rd Line, 7th Caçadores 137 2,417 2,554 3 177 18 267 11 476 Spry’s Brigade, 5th Division: 3rd and 15th Line, 8th Caçadores 156 2,149 2,305 3 45 4 64 7 123 Rezende’s Brigade, 6th Division: 8th and 12th Line, 9th Caçadores 134 2,497 2,631 8 113 10 336 20 487 Collins’s Brigade, 7th Division: 7th and 19th Line, 2nd Caçadores 132 2,036 2,168 -- 5 1 10 1 17 Pack’s Independent Brigade: 1st and 16th Line, 4th Caçadores 85 2,520 2,605 5 97 15 242 17 376 Bradford’s Independent Brigade: 13th and 14th Line, 5th Caçadores 112 1,782 1,894 -- 8 -- 3 6 17 Attached to Light Division: 1st and 3rd Caçadores 30 1,037 1,067 -- 5 -- 12 -- 17 ARTILLERY: Arriaga’s battery 4 110 114 -- -- -- 1 -- 1 --- ------ ------ -- --- -- --- -- ----- Total 912 17,105 18,017 22 484 59 976 86 1,627

[774] The 12th Dragoons were marching to the rear in charge of the baggage-train.

III. SPANISH TROOPS

Carlos de España’s Division: 2nd of Princesa, Tiradores de Castilla, 2nd of Jaen, 3rd of 1st Seville, Caçadores de Castilla, Lanceros de Castilla 160 3,200 3,360 -- 2 -- 4 -- 6

GENERAL TOTAL

BRITISH 1,526 29,036 30,562 28 360 176 2,491 74 3,129 PORTUGUESE 912 17,105 18,017 22 484 59 976 86 1,627 SPANISH 160 3,200 3,360 -- 2 -- 4 -- 6 ----- ------ ------ -- --- --- ----- --- ----- Total 2,598 49,341 51,939 50 846 235 3,471 160 4,762

XI

STRENGTH AND LOSSES OF MARMONT’S ARMY AT SALAMANCA

To fix the fighting strength of Marmont’s army at Salamanca is comparatively easy. It consisted of the 49,636 officers and men accounted for by the return of July 15th printed on the next page, minus some 700 men lost at the combats of Castrillo and Castrejon [also called ‘combat of the Guarena’] on July 18, and such few hundreds more as may have fallen behind from fatigue during the long marches of July 20-1. Roughly speaking, it must have counted some 48,500 men, as opposed to Wellington’s 50,000. The French translators of Napier’s Peninsular War (Mathieu Dumas and Foltz) only give a table of June 15, which is of course a month out of date for Salamanca, and append a note that ‘deducting artillery, engineers, équipages militaires, officers, sergeants, and garrisons, as also losses between June 15 and July 15 they find the result of about 42,000 sabres and bayonets for the battle.’ Why any sane person should deduct officers, sergeants, and artillerymen from a fighting total I am unable to conceive, though contemporary British writers, including Wellington himself, often did so. But the results of adding to their ‘42,000 sabres and bayonets’ the list of 1,925 officers, 3,244 artillerymen and artillery train (both in the divisions and in the reserve), 332 engineers, and 742 équipages militaires, is to give the figure 48,343, which practically agrees with the total that I state above; if sergeants are added it would much exceed that total. We may take this, therefore, as fairly correct--bearing in mind that the 26 officers and 742 men of the équipages militaires cannot be counted as combatants.

These totals do not include the 23rd Léger (2 batts.) and the 2/1st Line, both from Thomières’s division, which were garrisoning Astorga, about 1,500 strong. Nor do they include the minor garrisons left at Toro, Zamora, Olmedo, Valdestillas, Tordesillas, Simancas, Cabezon, Medina del Campo, Puente de Duero, Tudela de Douro, Amagro, &c., which appear to have been altogether about 4,184 strong, nor the dépôts at Valladolid, 3,307 strong on June 15, but probably much less on July 15, when Marmont had remounted nearly 1,000 dismounted dragoons and picked up all detachments and convalescents that he could gather. Nor do they include the sick, who had been 8,633 on June 15th, and 8,332 on May 15th--probably the total in hospital was a trifle more on July 15, owing to the fatigues of the campaigns round San Cristobal in the latter days of June.

Parallel with the return of July 15th, I have printed that of August 1. The difference between the two--211 officers and 10,124 men--might be supposed to represent the losses in the campaign between those dates. It does not, however, because the total of August 1 represents not only the survivors from the battle of Salamanca, but all the men from garrisons evacuated after it, and from the Valladolid dépôt, who joined the colours after the disaster of July 22, in consequence of the district in which they were lying having been evacuated by the army. The garrisons of Toro and Zamora held out till they were relieved, that of Tordesillas surrendered to the Galicians: but the men from the other smaller garrisons and from the dépôts fell in to their respective corps before August 1. I imagine that we may take these additions to be some 5,000 men at least, but cannot give the exact figures, through being unable to say what the Valladolid dépôts (3,307 strong on June 15) amounted to on July 15.

After comparing the totals of the brigades and regiments shown under July 15 and August 1, we must proceed to show the reasons why, in individual cases, the regimental differences between the two sets of figures cannot be taken to represent the sum of the losses in the Salamanca campaign. The proof is clear.

THE ARMY OF PORTUGAL BEFORE AND AFTER THE BATTLE OF SALAMANCA

From two returns of effectives in the Archives of the Ministry of War, Paris, dated July 15 and August 1, respectively.

July 15. August 1. Officers. Men. Officers. Men. 1st DIVISION (Foy):

Brigade { 6th Léger (2 batts.) 46 1,055 41 684 Chemineau { 69th Ligne (2 batts.) 50 1,408 47 1,322

Brigade { Desgraviers- { 39th Ligne (2 batts.) 49 918 49 872 Berthelot { 76th Ligne (2 batts.) 56 1,351 45 887

Artillery Train, &c. 7 207 7 207 --- ----- --- ----- Divisional Total 208 4,939 189 3,972 --- ----- --- ----- 2nd DIVISION (Clausel):

Brigade { 25th Léger (3 batts.) 54 1,485 43 1,222 Berlier { 27th Ligne (2 batts.) 40 1,637 31 1,248

Brigade { 50th Ligne (3 batts.) 52 1,490 46 1,177 Barbot { 59th Ligne (2 batts.) 47 1,531 38 1,278

Artillery Train, &c. 7 219 7 216 --- ----- --- ----- Divisional Total 200 6,362 165 5,141 --- ----- --- -----

Brigade { 31st Léger (2 batts.) 46 1,359 45 1,325 Menne { 26th Ligne (2 batts.) 44 1,145 43 1,116

{ 47th Ligne (3 batts.) 67 1,558 62 1,650 ? { 70th Ligne (2 batts.) 49 1,114 36 1,061

Artillery Train, &c. 5 302 3 193 --- ----- --- ----- Divisional Total 211 5,478 189 5,345 --- ----- --- ----- 4th DIVISION (Sarrut):

Brigade { 2nd Léger (3 batts.) 66 1,772 68 1,702 Fririon { 36th Ligne (3 batts.) 69 1,570 71 1,514

Brigade { 4th Léger (3 batts.) 63 1,219 63 989 ? { 130th Ligne (absent) -- -- -- --

Artillery Train, &c. 5 238 5 214 --- ----- --- ----- Divisional Total 203 4,799 207 4,419 --- ----- --- ----- 5th DIVISION (Maucune):

Brigade { 15th Ligne (3 batts.) 52 1,615 46 1,229 Arnaud { 66th Ligne (2 batts.) 38 1,131 34 661

Brigade { 82nd Ligne (2 batts.) 41 966 39 729 Montfort { 86th Ligne (2 batts.) 30 1,155 28 961

Artillery Train, &c. 4 212 4 212 --- ----- --- ----- Divisional Total 165 5,079 151 3,792 --- ----- --- ----- 6th DIVISION (Brennier):

Brigade { 17th Léger (2 batts.) 46 1,074 42 855 Taupin { 65th Ligne (3 batts.) 59 1,527 52 1,302

{ 22nd Ligne (3 batts.) 61 1,486 40 716 ? { Régiment de Prusse (remnant { of) 9 79 9 79

Artillery Train, &c. 4 213 4 213 --- ----- --- ----- Divisional Total 179 4,379 147 3,165 --- ----- --- ----- 7th DIVISION (Thomières):

Brigade { 1st Line (3 batts.)[775] 80 1,683 79 1,454 Bonté { 62nd Line (2 batts.) 47 1,076 45 1,048

{ 23rd Léger (absent)[776] -- -- -- -- ? { 101st Line (3 batts.) 61 1,388 29 412

Artillery Train, &c. 5 203 nil nil --- ----- --- ----- Divisional Total 193 4,350 153 2,914 --- ----- --- ----- 8th DIVISION (Bonnet):

Brigade { 118th Line (3 batts.) 53 1,584 37 1,024 Gautier { 119th Line (3 batts.) 64 1,265 48 831

{ 120th Line (3 batts.) 63 1,745 66 1,152 ? { 122nd Line (3 batts.) 55 1,582 40 1,000

Artillery train, &c. 3 107 nil nil --- ----- --- ----- Divisional Total 238 6,283 191 4,007 --- ----- --- ----- LIGHT CAVALRY DIVISION (Curto):

{ 3rd Hussars (3 squadrons) 17 231 14 165 { 22nd Chasseurs (2 squadrons) 17 236 18 233 ? { 26th Chasseurs (2 squadrons) 16 278 18 225 { 28th Chasseurs (1 squadron) 7 87 3 39

{ 13th Chasseurs (5 squadrons) 20 496 28 426 ? { 14th Chasseurs (4 squadrons) 14 308 18 332 { Escadron de marche 11 141 9 52 --- ----- --- ----- Divisional Total 102 1,777 108 1,472 --- ----- --- ----- HEAVY CAVALRY DIVISION (Boyer):

{ 6th Dragoons (2 squadrons) 19 376 19 332 ? { 11th Dragoons (2 squadrons) 19 411 18 359

Brigade { 15th Dragoons (2 squadrons) 15 328 16 294 Carrié { 25th Dragoons (2 squadrons) 18 314 18 282

Artillery attached to cavalry 3 193 3 148 --- ----- --- ----- Divisional Total 74 1,622 74 1,415 --- ----- --- ----- Total Cavalry Divisions 176 3,399 182 2,887 --- ----- --- ----- Artillery Reserve, Park, &c. 50 1,450 22 707 Engineers and Sappers 17 332 16 345 Gendarmerie 6 129 6 186 Équipages militaires 26 742 22 707 État-Major Général 54 -- 54 -- ----- ------ ----- ------ { Infantry Divisions 1,597 41,669 1,392 32,755 General Total { Cavalry Divisions 176 3,399 182 2,887 { Auxiliary Arms 153 2,653 120 1,945 ----- ------ ----- ------ 1,925 47,721 1,694 37,587

[775] Not including 2nd battalion, about 450 strong, at Astorga in garrison.

[776] In garrison at Astorga.

N.B.--Guns, July 15, 78; August 1, 58; lost 7 12-pounders, 3 8-pounders, 9 4-pounders, 1 3-pounder. Horses, July 15, 4,278; August 1, 3,231. Draught horses, July 15, 2,037; August 1, 1,847. Équipages militaires, horses, July 15, 800; August 1, 331.

To these two tables we must append, as a side-light, the results of a compilation of the totals of officers killed and wounded at Salamanca, from Martinien’s admirable Liste des officiers tués et blessés pendant les guerres de l’Empire. This of course does not include unwounded prisoners.

Killed. Wounded. Foy’s Division (including losses at Garcia Hernandez on July 23rd): 6th Léger 1 10 = 11 69th Line 2 8 = 10 39th Line -- 2 = 2 76th Line 1 7 = 8 -- Total 31

Clausel’s Division: 25th Léger 4 10 = 14[777] 27th Line 2 5 = 7 50th Line 9 17 = 26 59th Line 4 15 = 19 -- Total 66

Ferey’s Division: 31st Léger 1 6 = 7 26th Line -- 6 = 6 47th Line 5 13 = 18 70th Line 2 3 = 5 -- Total 36

Sarrut’s Division: 2nd Léger -- 3 = 3 36th Line -- 3 = 3 4th Léger -- 2 = 2 -- Total 8

Maucune’s Division: 15th Line 4 12 = 16 66th Line 2 15 = 17 82nd Line 1 7 = 8 86th Line -- 3 = 3 -- Total 44

Brennier’s Division: 17th Léger 1 3 = 4[778] 65th Line 1 8 = 9[779] 22nd Line 2 19 = 21[780] -- Total 34

Thomières’s Division: 1st Line -- 4 = 4 62nd Line 1 14 = 15 101st Line 6 19 = 25 -- Total 44

Bonnet’s Division: 118th Line 2 18 = 20 119th Line 3 23 = 26 120th Line -- 8 = 8 122nd Line 3 13 = 16 -- Total 70

Curto’s Light Cavalry: 3rd Hussars -- 2[781] 13th Chasseurs -- 7 14th Chasseurs -- 5[782] 22nd Chasseurs -- 5 26th Chasseurs -- 4 28th Chasseurs -- 2 -- Total 25

Boyer’s Division of Dragoons: 6th Dragoons -- 9 11th Dragoons -- 2[783] 15th Dragoons -- 1[784] 25th Dragoons -- 6[785] -- Total 18

Artillery, Horse -- 1 ” Field -- 5 ” Train -- 1 -- Total 7

Engineers -- 3 = 3 Staff 3 17[786] = 20 Miscellaneous officers, whose regiments were not present at Salamanca -- 2 = 2

[777] Plus 1 killed and 5 wounded at the combat of the Guarena, July 18.

[778] Plus 2 killed 6 wounded at the Guarena.

[779] Plus 2 killed 1 wounded at the Guarena.

[780] Plus 5 wounded at the Guarena.

[781] Plus 1 killed 1 wounded at Castrejon.

[782] Plus 3 wounded at Castrejon.

[783] Plus 1 wounded on July 21, and 2 wounded at Garcia Hernandez, July 23.

[784] Plus 1 killed 1 wounded at the Guarena, July 18.

[785] Plus 4 wounded at the Guarena.

[786] Plus 1 general wounded July 16, died next day (Dembouski), and 1 general wounded and taken July 18 (at the Guarena), Carrié, and 1 officer wounded at Garcia Hernandez.

General total 60 officers killed, 347 wounded at Salamanca and Garcia Hernandez; plus 7 officers killed and 27 wounded at the Guarena on July 18, and 2 wounded in minor engagements.

Loss in killed and wounded, not including unwounded prisoners, during the campaign, 67 killed, 376 wounded = 443 officers in all.

After arriving at this general loss in killed and wounded officers, so far as is possible from Martinien’s tables, which are not quite complete for all corps, it only remains to estimate the unwounded prisoners. I searched the immense volumes of rolls of French officers in captivity at the Record Office, and found 63 names of prisoners taken at Salamanca, the Guarena, and Garcia Hernandez. A few of these duplicate the names of wounded officers to be found in Martinien’s tables, the remainder must represent the unwounded prisoners. Wellington in his Salamanca dispatch wrote that he had 137 French officers prisoners--evidently the larger number of them must have been wounded, as only 63 were sent off to England that autumn. Probably many died in hospital. Prisoners are most numerous from the 101st, 22nd, and from Foy’s two regiments cut up at Garcia Hernandez, the 76th and 6th Léger.

In the Library of the Archives de la Guerre at the Paris Ministry of War I went through the regimental histories of all the French infantry regiments present at Salamanca. Like our own similar compilations, they differ much in value--some are very full and with statistics carefully worked out from regimental reports and pay-books; others are very thin and factless. Fourteen units give their losses, which I herewith annex:

Clausel’s Division: 25th Léger, 336; 27th Line, 159; 59th Line, 350. Ferey’s Division: 70th Line, 111; 31st Léger, 340. Sarrut’s Division: 2nd Léger, 202. Maucune’s Division: 15th Line, 359. Brennier’s Division: 17th Léger, 264; 65th Line, 359. Thomières’s Division: 1st Line, 227; 62nd Line, 868; 101st Line, 1,000. Bonnet’s Division: 120th, 458; 122nd, 527.

The total of this makes 5,560 for these fourteen corps; we leave fifteen others unaccounted for. As a rough calculation I suppose that we may hold that as these regiments lost, as we know from Martinien’s lists [which are not quite complete], at least 152 officers out of 5,560 of all ranks, then the other fifteen regiments with 181 officers killed or wounded must have lost something like 6,000. The vagaries of the proportion between officers and men hit are extraordinary in individual units, but these tend to rectify themselves on a large total consisting of many regiments. I therefore believe that 11,560 would be something very like the total loss killed and wounded in the French infantry. We have then to allow for some 40 unwounded officers taken prisoners, and corresponding to them perhaps 1,200 unwounded men. The total loss for the infantry would thus be 12,800. For cavalry and artillery, &c., 53 officers hit--as by Martinien’s tables--must imply something over a thousand men lost. We should thus arrive at a total of 14,000 for the casualties--the sum which I suggest in my text (p. 469).

To show the worthlessness of any attempt to deduce the French losses by a mere comparison of the official ‘morning states’ of July 15 and August 1, the following instances may suffice.

The 65th Line shows 59 officers and 1,527 men present on July 15, 52 officers and 1,302 men on August 1. The apparent loss is 7 officers and 225 men. But this unit’s regimental report shows 3 officers killed, 5 officers wounded, 204 men killed or prisoners, 106 men wounded, 39 missing; total, 8 officers and 349 men. Therefore, as is obvious, one officer and 124 men must have joined from somewhere (dépôt at Valladolid?) between the two dates, or the deficiency would be 125 greater between the ‘present under arms’ of the two dates than is shown.

A more striking case is the 62nd Line, of Thomières’s Division. It shows present on July 15, 47 officers and 1,076 men, on August 1st 45 officers and 1,048 men--the apparent loss is only 2 officers and 28 men. But Martinien’s lists show us that the regiment lost at least 15 officers, killed and wounded, and the regimental report gives 20 officers and 848 men killed, wounded, or missing! The real loss is 868 not 30! Therefore 18 officers and about 800 men, the equivalent of a strong battalion, must have joined between July 15 and August 1. This corresponds to the fact that the 62nd showed only 2 battalions[787] at Salamanca, while the ‘morning state’ of June 15th showed it as having at the front three battalions and 1,900 rank and file. Clearly the third battalion rejoined the colours after the battle--having presumably been quartered in the small garrisons of Castile evacuated after the disaster of July 22. Many men must also have rejoined the other two battalions.

[787] And one odd company of its 3rd battalion, 61 of all ranks, while in the return of August 1, the 3rd battalion has 13 officers and 480 men.

But the most absurd case of all is that of the 47th Line, whose total figures actually go up from 1,625 to 1,712 of all ranks between July 15th and August 1st--in despite of the fact that it lost (as Martinien’s lists show), 18 officers and not less therefore than 360 rank and file (20 men per officer is a low allowance) at Salamanca. It must have picked up from Valladolid and the small garrisons 13 officers and 452 men at least[788].

[788] The 2/47th shows on July 15, 310 of all ranks, on August 1, 513.

Clausel, writing to King Joseph on July 25, said that of the whole Army of Portugal he could not yet show in the field on that day 20,000 men. This tallies well enough with the conclusion that we have already drawn, that the total loss from the army, which on July 15 had about 48,000 men, must have been some 14,000 killed, wounded, and prisoners, and over 10,000 men dispersed who were only just rallying.

XII

BRITISH LOSSES AT THE COMBATS OF CASTREJON AND CASTRILLO[789], JULY 18, 1812

[789] The fight at Castrillo is often called the ‘Combat of the Guarena’.

Officers. Men. Missing Total. Killed. Wounded. Killed. Wounded. Men.

G. Anson’s Brigade: 11th Lt. Dragoons -- 2 3 10 -- 15 12th Lt. Dragoons -- 1 5 11 1 18 16th Lt. Dragoons -- -- -- -- -- --

V. Alten’s Brigade: 1st Hussars K.G.L. -- 4 7 45 4 60 14th Lt. Dragoons -- 3 14 49 9 75

Bock’s Brigade: 1st Dragoons K.G.L. -- -- -- 1 -- 1 2nd Dragoons K.G.L. -- -- 5 1 1 7

Le Marchant’s Brigade: 3rd Dragoons -- 1 -- 9 -- 10

4th DIVISION.

W. Anson’s Brigade: 3/27th Foot 2 1 11 58 -- 72 1/40th Foot -- 1 8 59 1 69

Ellis’s Brigade: 1/7th Foot -- 1 1 14 3 19 1/23rd Foot -- -- -- 2 2 4 1/48th Foot -- -- -- 5 1 6

5th DIVISION.

Greville’s Brigade: 3/1st -- -- -- 2 -- 2 Detached Companies of 5/60th -- -- -- 1 2 3 Horse Artillery -- 1 2 2 -- 5 German Artillery -- -- -- 2 -- 2 Portuguese 1 6 33 90 27 157 -- -- -- --- -- --- Total 3 21 89 361 51 525

XIII

SPANISH TROOPS ON THE EAST COAST OF SPAIN IN THE SPRING OF 1812

(A) REMAINS OF THE 2ND (VALENCIAN) AND 3RD (MURCIAN) ARMIES, MARCH 1

Officers. Men. 1st Division: Conde de Montijo, 1st of Badajoz (2 batts.), Cuenca (2 batts.), 2 squadrons cavalry 110 2,049 2nd Division: General Luis Riquelme, 2nd Walloon Guards, Guadalajara (3 batts.), 1st of Burgos (3 batts.), Guadix (2 batts.), Baden (1 batt.), Alpujarras (1 batt.), dismounted cavalry (1 batt.) 335 5,214 Reserve Division: General Philip Roche. Voluntarios de Aragon, Canarias, Alicante, 2nd of Murcia, Alcazar de San Juan, Chinchilla (1 batt. each), 2 squadrons of Husares de Fernando 7º 300 5,576 Cavalry: General A. Rich. Principe (2 squadrons), España (2 squadrons), Reina (2 squadrons), Carabineros Reales, Farnesio, Montesa, Dragones del Rey, Cazadores de Valencia, Pavia, Rey, Granaderos a caballo, Husares de Castilla (one squadron each), three provisional squadrons 321 1,565 Cadres of dispersed battalions, now reorganizing: Lorca, Velez Malaga, Almanza, America 98 1,079 Artillery (Field) 38 651 Artillery (Garrison) in Alicante and Cartagena 17 582 Engineers 8 202 ----- ------ Total 1,227 16,918

(B) JOSEPH O’DONNELL’S ARMY, JULY 21, 1812, AND ITS LOSSES AT CASTALLA

[The figures of the former from Los Ejércitos españoles. The list of prisoners from Suchet’s dispatch in the Paris Archives de la Guerre.]

_Unwounded Strength. prisoners Officers. Men. Total. reported by Suchet._ Michelena’s {Corona (1 Batt.) 24 630} 255 Brigade {Velez Malaga (1 batt.) 36 834} 2,035 -- {Guadix 24 487} 337

Montijo’s {2nd Walloon Guards (1 batt.) 20 569} 350 Brigade {Cuenca (2 batts.) 33 890} 2,152 112 {1st of Badajoz (1 batt.) 27 613} --

{Bailen (1 batt.) 32 708} 405 Mijares’s {Alcazar de San Juan (1 batt.) 31 855} 2,187 434 Brigade {Lorca (1 batt.) 25 536} 242

Cavalry (Provisional Regiment, 2 squadrons) 29 207 -- Engineers 26 325 --

Roche’s Division: 1st of Burgos (2 batts.) 27 786 -- Canarias (1 batt.) 34 818 -- Alicante (2 batts.) 35 1,110 -- Chinchilla (2 batts.) 26 918 -- --- ------ ----- Total 429 10,286 2,135

Suchet also reports 697 wounded prisoners, of whom 56 died of their wounds.

No figures are given for the detached cavalry division of Santesteban, which was not in action at Castalla.

XIV

THE BRITISH FORCES ON THE EAST COAST OF SPAIN IN 1812

[A NOTE BY MR. C. T. ATKINSON]

I. MAITLAND’S FORCE, EMBARKATION RETURN, JUNE 25, 1812

(War Office: Secretary of State’s Original Correspondence, Series I, vol. 311.)

Officers. _N.C.O.’s and Men._ 20th Light Dragoons 9 158 Foreign Troop of Hussars 3 68 R.A. (including drivers) 8 73 Marine Artillery 1 29 R.E. 5 42 Staff Corps 1 13 1/10th Foot 33 902 1/58th Foot 31 840 1/81st Foot 44 1,230 4th Line Battalion, K.G.L. 36 953 6th Line Battalion, K.G.L. 33 1,041 De Roll’s Regiment (3 companies) 11 320 Dillon’s Regiment (5 companies) 18 536 Calabrian Free Corps (1 division)[790] 14 338 --- ----- Total 247 6,543

[790] This corps was organized in five ‘divisions,’ each of three companies.

II. CAMPBELL’S CORPS, EMBARKATION RETURN, PALERMO, NOVEMBER 14, 1812

(Ibid., vol. 312.)

Officers. _N.C.O.’s and Men._ 20th Light Dragoons -- 13 Guides -- 14 R.A. (including drivers) 4 131 Grenadier Battalion[791] 35 924 Light Infantry Battalion[792] 21 582 1/27th Foot 25 828 2nd Battalion, Anglo-Italian Levy[793] 33 1,184 Sicilian Artillery -- 155 Sicilian Grenadiers[794] -- 605 --- ----- Total 118 4,436[795]

[791] From 2/10th, 1/21st, 1/31st, 1/62nd, 1/75th, 3rd, 7th, and 8th K.G.L.

[792] Schwertfeger, i. pp. 480-1, says it was composed of the light companies of De Roll’s, Dillon’s, De Watteville’s (this is inaccurate, as De Watteville’s regiment had moved to Cadiz before the end of 1811), and the 3rd, 7th, and 8th K.G.L.

[793] 150 men were left behind from lack of room but sent later.

[794] 140 men were left behind from lack of room but sent later.

[795] A ‘division’ of the Calabrian Free Corps, 300 strong, was left behind for want of room, as well as the Sicilian Regiment de Presidi, 1,200 strong.

III. SUBSEQUENTLY EMBARKED, DECEMBER 25[796]

[796] In a letter to Lord Bathurst of December 9 Bentinck announces his intention to add to this force 2/27th Foot and 1st Anglo-Italians, who had been 28 officers and 823 men and 40 officers and 1,153 men respectively, in the ‘state’ of October 25, but are not present in the ‘state’ of December 10 (except for 288 men of 1st Anglo-Italians).

Officers. _N.C.O.’s and Men._ 20th Light Dragoons 8 223 R.A. -- 60 2nd Anglo-Italians 2 176 Calabrian Free Corps (1 division) 14 325 Sicilian Cavalry 22 204 Sicilian Infantry (the Estero Regiment) 77 1,185 --- ----- Total 123 2,173

It may be well to give here the garrisons of Cadiz and Gibraltar in 1812, as both of them supplied troops to the field army during that year.

In Gibraltar, under General Campbell, there were the 2/9th, 2/11th, 37th, and the 4th and 7th Veteran Battalions throughout the year. The 1/82nd was there till the summer, when it was relieved by the 1/26th, sent back from Portugal by Wellington. The 1/82nd sailed for Lisbon and marched up to the front, but arrived just too late for the battle of Salamanca.

At Cadiz General Cooke commanded, at the commencement of the year, the 3/1st Guards (which had arrived and relieved the ‘composite battalion of Guards’ before the end of 1811), also the 2/47th, 2/67th, 2/87th, two companies of the Chasseurs Britanniques, De Watteville’s regiment (which arrived before the end of 1811), the strange corps sometimes called the ‘battalion of Foreign Deserters,’ sometimes the ‘battalion of Foreign Recruits,’ two companies of the 2/95th, and a squadron of the 2nd Hussars K.G.L., also the 20th Portuguese.

Early in the year the 2/67th and five companies of De Watteville’s regiment were sent off to Cartagena.

In September the 3/1st Guards, 2/47th, 2/87th, two companies 95th, and 20th Portuguese marched to join Hill at Madrid, taking with them the German squadron and two field-batteries: they were just 4,000 strong.

The 2/59th came out from home about the same time, and was in October the only British battalion at Cadiz. With them remained the ‘Foreign Deserters,’ seven companies of De Watteville, and two companies of Chasseurs Britanniques, as also some artillerymen.

XV

THE SCOVELL CIPHERS

By the very great kindness of Mr. G. Scovell of Brighton, I have had placed at my disposition the papers of his great-uncle, General Sir George Scovell, G.C.B., who served during the Peninsular War in the Intelligence branch of the Quartermaster-General’s department. In the beginning of 1812 the number of intercepted French dispatches in cipher which came into Wellington’s hands, through the happy activity of Julian Sanchez and other guerrillero chiefs, began to be so considerable that the Commander-in-Chief thought it worth while to detail a member of his staff to deal with them. Captain Scovell was selected because of his ingenuity in this line, and became responsible for attempting to interpret all the captured documents. They were made over to him, and, having done what he could with them, he placed the fair-copy of the ‘decoded’ result in Wellington’s hands, but seems to have been allowed to keep the originals--which were, of course, unintelligible because of their form, and therefore useless to his chief. The file of documents which thus remained with him is most interesting: they range in size from formal dispatches of considerable bulk--eight or ten folio pages long--down to scraps of the smallest size written on thin paper, and folded up so as to go into some secret place of concealment on the bearer’s person. Some of them look as if they had been sewed up in a button, or rolled under the leather of a whip handle, or pushed along the seam of a garment. I take it that these must all have been entrusted to emissaries sent in disguise, Afrancesados or peasants hired by a great bribe. Presumably each of these scraps cost the life of the bearer when it was discovered--for the guerrillero chiefs did not deal mildly with Spaniards caught carrying French secret orders. The large folio dispatches, on the other hand, must no doubt have been carried by French aides-de-camp or couriers, whose escorts were dispersed or captured by the partidas at some corner of the mountain roads between Madrid and the head-quarters of the Armies of Portugal and Andalusia.

The cipher letters are of two sorts--in the first (and more numerous) class only the names of persons and places, and the most important sentences are in cipher--invariably a numerical cipher of arbitrary figures. In the other class the whole dispatch is written in figures, not merely its more weighty clauses. The reason for adopting the former method was that it saved much time; the transliterating of unimportant parts of the dispatch (such as compliments, and personal remarks of no strategical import) would have taken many extra hours, when it was necessary to get a letter sent off in a hurry. But, as we shall see later on, there was grave danger in using this system, because the context might sometimes allow the decipherer to make a good guess at the disguised words, after reading that part of the letter which was not so guarded.

Occasionally a French dispatch is ciphered after the same infantile system that readers of romances will remember in Poe’s Gold Bug or Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes, where letters or numbers are merely substituted for each other--where, for example, 2 always means letter e, or 25 letter r. This sort of cipher is dangerously easy to an expert reader, especially if the words are separated from each other, so that the number of letters in each can be counted. Take, for example, a letter sent to Soult in 1813 by Cassan, the blockaded governor of Pampeluna[797]. Only one precaution had been taken in this cipher-epistle, viz. that elaborate care has been taken to defeat the attempt of the reader to arrive at results by counting what figures appear most frequently, and so deducing by their repetition that these must be e (the most frequently used letter in French, as in English), s, i, a, t, and other common letters. This is done by having six alternative numbers for e, four each for a and i, three for t, s, and n. Taking the simple phrase

47.50.40.41.14.26 58.24 3.51.10.36.44.23.17.24.10.50.53.27 47.46 11.18.39.17.46.21,

which deciphers into ‘depuis le commencement du blocus,’ we see that e appears five times, but is represented by both 50, 24, and 44; u three times, but varied as 14 and 46; m thrice, varied as 10 and 36. This made the reader’s work harder, but not nearly so difficult as that required for certain other ciphers: for the whole set of signs, being not much over 60 in number, there was a limited amount of possibilities for each figure-interpretation. And the words being separated by spaces, there was a certainty that some of the two-letter units must represent et, de, ce, eu, du, and similar common French two-letter words. As a matter of fact this particular dispatch was deciphered in a few hours owing to the lucky guess that its initial words

10.45.23.21.16.2.41.25 5.24 10.4.25.24.3.9.8.5

might be ‘Monsieur le Maréchal,’ the preliminary address to the intended recipient. This hypothesis was verified at once by finding that this rendering made good sense for the two-letter words 23.24 = ne, and 10.2 = me, lower down in the letter. After this all was plain sailing.

[797] This particular letter is not one of the Scovell file.

But the usual French cipher, the ‘Great Paris Cipher’ as Scovell called it, was a very much more complicated and difficult affair, as the list of figures, instead of being only a few score, ran to many hundreds. And of these only some few represented individual letters, more were parts of a syllabary: ma, me, mi, mo, mu, for example, had each a figure representing them, and so had ab- ac- ad- af- ag- &c. Moreover, there was a multitude of arbitrary numbers, representing under a single figure words that must often be used in a dispatch, such as hommes, armée, général, marche, ennemi, corps d’armée, canons. In addition there was a code of proper names, e.g. 1216 meant the River Douro, 93 Portugal, 1279 Talavera, 585 King Joseph, 1391 General Dorsenne, 1327 the Army of the South, 1280 Soult, 1300 Wellington, 400 Ciudad Rodrigo, &c. If the King wished the Duke of Dalmatia to send 9,000 men of the Army of the South to Talavera, he had only to write

‘585 désire que 1280 dirige 1156 (neuf) 692 (mille) 1102 (hommes) de 1327 sur 1279.’

He would then cut up désire and dirige into the syllables de-si-re and di-ri-ge, for each of which the syllabary had set figures; there were also arbitrary numbers for sur, de, and que. So the whole sentence would take up only fourteen numbers when written out.

It would seem at first sight that to interpret such a dispatch would be a perfectly hopeless task, to any one who had not the key to the cipher before him. That the admirably patient and ingenious Scovell at last made out for himself a key from the laborious comparison of documents, was nevertheless the fact. He was started on the track by the fortunate circumstance that most of the intercepted dispatches were only partly in cipher. Marmont would write

‘Avec les moyens que j’ai, et 798, 1118, 602, 131, 1112.663.1135.502 au delà de Sabugal,’

or

‘J’avais donné l’ordre que 1003, 497, 1115, 1383, 69,711, 772, 530, de descendre cette rivière et de se mettre en communication avec moi.’

Clearly the cipher-figures in the first case have something to do with a march on Sabugal, in the second with orders to some general or body of troops (to be identified hereafter) to march down a river which the context shows must be the Tagus. This is not much help, and the task looked still very hopeless. But when intercepted dispatches accumulated in quantities, and the same cipher-figures kept occurring among sentences of which part was written out in full, it became evident that various cryptic figures must mean places and persons who could be guessed at, with practical certainty. Occasionally a French writer completely ‘gives himself away’ by carelessness: e.g. Dorsenne wrote on April 16 to Jourdan,

‘Vous voulez de renseignement sur la situation militaire et administrative de 1238:’

obviously the probable interpretation of this number is ‘the Army of the North,’ and this is rendered almost certain by passages lower down the same letter. Equally incautious is King Joseph when he writes to Marmont,

‘J’ai donné l’ordre au général Treillard de 117.8.7 la vallée du 1383, afin de marcher à 498.’

Considering the situation of the moment 117.8.7 must almost certainly mean evacuate, 1383 Tagus, and 498 some large town.[798] [The particular dispatch in which this occurs is on a most curious piece of paper, half an inch broad, a foot long, and excessively thin. It is bent into twelve folds, and would fit into any small receptacle of one inch by half an inch. I fear the bearer who had it on his person must have come to a bad end.] Suchet also made Scovell the present of some useful words when he wrote on September 17 to Soult,

‘Le Général Maitland commande l’expédition anglaise venue de 747: O’Donnell peut réunir 786 692 1102 en y comprenant le corps de l’Anglais Roche. Le 19 août je n’avais que 135 692 1102 à lui opposer.’

Here it is quite clear that ‘747’ means Sicily; that ‘692.1102’ in the two statements of forces means thousand men. A little guessing and comparison with other cryptic statements of forces would soon show that 135 meant 7 and 786 meant 12.

[798] Wellington wrongly guessed Plasencia: it was Aranjuez.

Notwithstanding much useful help it was still a marvellous feat of Scovell to work out by the end of 1812 no less than nine hundred separate cipher-numbers, ranging in complexity from the simple vowel a to the symbol that represented ‘train des équipages militaires’! He must have had a most ingenious brain, and unlimited patience. Down to the end there remained numbers of unsolved riddles, figures that represented persons or places so unfrequently mentioned that there was no way of discovering, by comparison between several documents, what the number was likely to mean.

Sometimes very small fish came into the net of the guerrilleros, and were sent on to Wellington; take, for example, the tiny scrap containing the pathetic letter of the young wife of General Merlin, of the cavalry of the Army of the Centre--I fear that the bearer must have fallen into the hands of Julian Sanchez or one of his lieutenants, and have had short shrift:--

‘Mon cher Ami,--Depuis ton départ je n’ai reçu qu’un seul mot de toi--pendant qu’il arrive des courriers (c’est-à-dire des paysans) du quartier général. Mon oncle qui écrit régulièrement dit toujours qu’on se porte bien, mais tu peux te mettre à ma place! Je crains que ta goutte ne soit revenue, je crains tant de choses, qui peut-être passent le sens commun, mais qui me tourmentent. Je ne dors plus, et n’ai d’autre plaisir que celui de regarder ma fille, qui se porte bien. Encore si elle pouvait m’entendre et me consoler! Adieu! Je suis d’une tristesse insupportable, parce que je t’aime plus que moi-même.--Mercédes.’

It may suffice to show the general character of a typical cipher-dispatch if we give a few lines of one, with the interpretation added below--the following comes from a dispatch of Marmont written on April 22, 1812, to Berthier, from Fuente Guinaldo:--

Le roi après m’avoir donné l’ordre

1060 462 810 195 1034 1282 de faire par- tir deux divisions

971 216 13 192 614 20 90 92 et plus de la moi- ti- é de la

1265 582 637 851 809 388 177 cavalerie dis- po- ni- ble, et avoir

669 112 923 2 786 692 1102 ré- du- it à douze mille hommes

le nombre de troupes que j’ai disponible m’ordonne

13 1040 1003 370 860 400 817 69 862 718 1100 de chercher à pren-dre Ciudad Rodrigo lors que je ne ai

423 815 591 710 850 pas un canon de siège!

It will be noted that of all the words only partir, moitié, disponible, réduit, prendre, required to be spelled out in the syllabary: single fixed numbers existing for all the common words, and for the military terms siège, cavalerie, and division.

It was, of course, only by degrees that Scovell succeeded in making out the bulk of the French phrases. In Wellington’s dispatches there is often, during the spring and summer of 1812, an allusion to information only partly comprehensible, obtained from captured letters. On June 18 (Dispatches, ix. p. 241) Wellington writes to Lord Liverpool that he ‘is not able entirely to decipher’ the intercepted papers that have been passing between King Joseph and Soult and Marmont. On June 25th he sends to the same recipient the happy intelligence that he has now the key to King Joseph’s cipher. Yet again, on July 16th (Dispatches, ix. p. 290)--with No. 36 of the file catalogued below before him--he says: ‘I have this day got a letter from the King to Marmont of the 9th inst. in cipher, which I cannot entirely decipher: it appears, however, that he thinks Drouet will not cross the Tagus, and I suspect he orders General Treillard to collect some troops in the valley of the Tagus, and to move on Plasencia.’ The interpretation was correct, save that Treillard was to move not on Plasencia but on Aranjuez. The code-numbers for the two places were neither of them known as yet. But by September all essential words were discovered, and Wellington could comprehend nearly everything, unless Joseph or Soult was writing of obscure places or distant generals.

A list of the whole of Scovell’s file of 52 French dispatches may be useful: those whose number is marked with a star are wholly or partly in cipher, the remaining minority are in plain French without disguise. It is clear that Wellington had many more French papers not in cipher, which did not get into Scovell’s portfolio.

Date. Sender. Recipient. Contents. 1. Mar. 6, 1812 Col. Marmont Long interview with Jardet Berthier. He says you must ‘contain’ Wellington in the North. All else in Spain matters comparatively little. 2*. April 11 ” Marmont Brennier See that Silveira does not molest my communications. 3*. April 14 ” Soult Berthier Marmont has betrayed me, and caused the loss of Badajoz. Synopsis of Andalusian affairs. 4*. April 16 ” Marmont Berthier As I prophesied, my raid into Portugal produces no effect: we begin to starve. 5*. April 16 ” Dorsenne Jourdan I refuse to acknowledge the king as controlling my army. 6*. April 17 ” Soult Berthier Details of the fall of Badajoz, ‘événement funeste.’ 7*. April 22 ” Marmont Berthier I have been starved out of Portugal. Have seen no British troops, save a few cavalry.

8*. April 23 ” Foy Jourdan Send me food. My division is nearly starved.

9*. April 25 ” King Dorsenne I am your Commander-in-Chief. Joseph Send me a report of your army.

10. April 26 ” Gen. Lafon- Gen. News from Andalusia at last: Blaniac[799] Treillard[800] Soult has failed to save Badajoz.

11*. April 28 ” Marmont Dorsenne Send me 8,000 quintals of wheat at once.

12*. April 28 ” Marmont Berthier I have sent Bonnet, as ordered, to invade the Asturias.

13. April 28 ” Gen. Clarke I send parole of Colquhoun Lamar- Grant, a suspicious character. tinière[801] The police should look to him[802].

14*. April 29 ” Marmont Jourdan If I keep troops on the Tagus, I am too weak on the Douro and Tormes. I must draw my divisions northward.

15*. April 29 ” Marmont Berthier I find that five British divisions were chasing me last week. Wellington is very strong in the North.

16*. April 30 ” Marmont Berthier Send me a siege-train, I am helpless without one: also plenty of money.

17. April 30 ” Marmont Gen. Come up at once to join my Tirlet[803] army.

18*. May 1 ” Jourdan Marmont We will keep unhorsed guns for you at Talavera, so when moving South bring gunners and horses only.

19*. May 1 ” King Dorsenne You are placed under my command. Joseph Obey my orders.

20*. May 1 ” Jourdan Dorsenne Send a division to Valladolid, to support Marmont.

21*. May 1 ” Jourdan Marmont You must send more troops to the Tagus: Drouet is hard pressed in Estremadura.

22*. May 1 ” Jourdan Berthier Wellington is advancing in Estremadura. Marmont must send troops southward.

23*. May 1 ” King Berthier Observations on the Joseph military situation.

24. May 1 ” Col. Gen. Technical artillery Bousseroque Doguerau[804] matters.

25. May 20 ” Proclamation by Suchet The King is appointed Commander-in-Chief in Spain.

26*. May 26 ” King Soult Hill has stormed Almaraz. Joseph Why was not Drouet near enough to save it?

27*. May 26 ” Jourdan Soult Hill has stormed Almaraz. Try to re-open communications with Foy.

28*. June 1 ” Marmont Jourdan The fall of Almaraz means that Wellington will attack me next. He is not threatening Soult, but me.

29*. June 22 ” Marmont King I stop in front of Salamanca Joseph manœuvring. I dare not attack Wellington till Caffarelli’s reinforcements arrive.

30*. June 24 ” Marmont Caffarelli I am manœuvring opposite Wellington. Your reinforcements are required at once.

31*. July 1 ” Marmont King When the Salamanca forts fell, Joseph I retreated to the Douro. I cannot fight Wellington till I get 1,500 more horse and 7,000 more infantry.

32. July 1 ” Suchet King Narrative of guerrilla war Joseph in Aragon.

33. July 1 ” Suchet King Favour shall be shown to Joseph Afrancesados.

34*. July 6 ” Marmont Jourdan I had to retreat to the Douro because Caffarelli sent no help. Can you lend me Treillard’s cavalry division?

35*. July 7 ” King Soult Send 10,000 men to Toledo Joseph at once.

36*. July 9 ” King Marmont I shall march to your aid in a Joseph few days, when my troops are collected.

37*. July 22 ” Suchet King I am much worried by Maitland’s Joseph approach. Have beaten Joseph O’Donnell at Castalla.

38. July 29 ” Gen. Lafon- King Madrid remains tranquil. Blaniac[805] Joseph

41*. July 30 ” Marmont King We can never hope to unite. Joseph My army retires via Lerma on Burgos.

42. Aug. 2 ” Gen. King Wellington is marching on Espert[806] Joseph Segovia.

43*. Aug. 7 ” King Marmont Communicate with me by the Joseph Somosierra Pass.

44*. Aug. 12 ” Suchet King I am much alarmed at the possible Joseph results of Maitland’s landing.

45*. Aug. 12 ” Soult Clarke The King is betraying the Emperor and negotiating with the Cadiz Cortes[807].

46*. Sept. 17 ” Suchet Soult Explains situation in Valencia.

47*. Dec. 9 ” King Napoleon Plans for reorganizing Joseph the armies.

48*. Dec. 22 ” King Napoleon Plans for next year. Should I Joseph make Burgos my capital, and hold Madrid only as an outpost?

49*. Jan. 8, 1813 King Napoleon Soult is intolerable. Let D’Erlon Joseph replace him. Send us money.

50*. Jan. 28 ” King Napoleon Your decision about Soult shocks Joseph me. I shall send him away on my own authority.

51*. Mar. 14 ” King Gen. D’Erlon shall look after Salamanca. Joseph Reille Send two divisions to hunt the guerrilleros.

52. Mar. 16 ” Col. King Discouraging news from Paris. No Lucotte Joseph men or money for Spain!

[799] Governor of La Mancha.

[800] Commanding cavalry on the Tagus.

[801] Marmont’s Chief-of-the-Staff.

[802] See above, p. 293.

[803] Commanding artillery of the Army of Portugal, on leave.

[804] Commanding artillery of the Army of the Centre.

[805] Now governor of Madrid.

[806] Governor of Segovia.

[807] For the story of this letter see above, pp. 538-9.

In addition to the ciphers, the Scovell papers consist of short diaries of Major Scovell for the Corunna Campaign, and for 1809-10-11-12-13, as also a large bundle of reports and maps of roads and passes in Portugal, all the papers concerning the raising of the Corps of Guides, a number of notes and reports on suggested travelling forges for the artillery and engineers, and some whole or mutilated contemporary Spanish newspapers. There is some curious and interesting information scattered through all of them.

XVI

BRITISH AND PORTUGUESE ARTILLERY IN THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1812

[DETAILS COLLECTED BY MAJOR J. H. LESLIE, R.A.]

I. ROYAL HORSE ARTILLERY

The following troops were serving in the Peninsula in 1812:--

Troop. Under Command of _Arrived in Designation in 1914. Peninsula._ A Brevet Major H. D. Ross July 1809 ‘A’ Battery, R.H.A. D Captain G. Lefebure[808] March 1810 ‘V’ Battery, R.H.A. [Later 2nd Captain E. C. Whinyates] E Captain R. Macdonald August 1811 ‘E’ Battery, R.H.A. I Brevet Major R. Bull August 1809 ‘I’ Battery, R.H.A.

[808] Lefebure died of sickness in October, and the battery was commanded till next spring by Whinyates.

A, E, and I were serving with Wellington’s main army in 1812, attached respectively to the Light Division, the 7th Division, and the 1st Division of Cavalry (Stapleton Cotton). All three were present at Salamanca, but A was left at Madrid in August with the Light Division, and did not take part in the Burgos Campaign. D was attached to Erskine’s ‘2nd Cavalry Division,’ and served under Hill in Estremadura from the beginning of the year till Hill marched up to Madrid in October.

II. ROYAL (FOOT) ARTILLERY

A.

The seven companies shown in the following tables were serving in the Peninsula in 1812 with the field army.

NOTE.--In 1812 there were ten battalions of Royal (Foot) Artillery, the companies of which were always designated by the name of the commanding officer, whether he was actually present with his company or no.

_Bat- Under Command of _Arrived in Designation in 1914. talion. Peninsula.

1st Captain J. May[809] March 1809 2nd Battery, R.F.A. 4th Captain S. Maxwell October 1810 72 Company, R.G.A. 5th Captain F. Glubb[810] March 1809 48 Company, R.G.A. 8th Brevet Major R. W. April 1811 78 Company, R.G.A. Gardiner 8th Captain R. Lawson August 1808 87th Battery, R.F.A. 8th Captain J. P. Eligé[811] October 1810 Reduced in 1819. [Later, Captain T. A. Brandreth] 9th Captain R. Douglas March 1812 45th Battery, R.F.A.

[809] Actually under command of 2nd Captain H. Baynes.

[810] Actually under command of 2nd Captain W. G. Power.

[811] Eligé was shot through the heart on the second day of the siege of the Salamanca forts. 2nd Captain W. Greene commanded the company at the battle of Salamanca.

Of these, Gardiner’s company was attached to the 1st Division, Maxwell’s to the 2nd, Douglas’s to the 3rd, Lawson’s to the 5th, Eligé’s to the 6th. May’s company accompanied the main army without guns, in charge of the Reserve ammunition train.

Glubb’s company was attached to the heavy 18-pounders and 24-pounder howitzers of the Reserve Artillery.

Gardiner’s, Douglas’s, Lawson’s, and Eligé’s [now temporarily under 2nd Captain W. Greene, Eligé having been killed at the Salamanca forts] companies were present at Salamanca, as was also the Reserve Artillery, but the last-named was not engaged.

Maxwell’s company was with Hill in Estremadura from January till the march to Madrid in September-October. Part of it was present at the capture of Almaraz on 19 May.

B.

The following additional companies were in Portugal in 1812, but did not join the field army:--

_Bat- Under Command of _Arrived in Designation in 1914. talion. Peninsula. 6th Brevet Major H. F. April 1811 102 Company, R.G.A. Holcombe 1st Captain A. Bredin September 1808 37th Battery, R.F.A. 6th Captain G. Thompson March 1809 18th Battery, R.F.A. 5th Captain H. Stone March 1812 92 Company, R.G.A. 6th Captain W. Morrison October 1812 51 Company, R.G.A.

Of these Holcombe’s company was employed at the sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz. The other companies present at these leaguers were Glubb’s and Lawson’s at Rodrigo, and Glubb’s and Gardiner’s at Badajoz.

In June Holcombe’s and Thompson’s companies were sent round by sea to the east coast of Spain, and there joined the Anglo-Sicilian expedition of General Maitland, with which they continued to serve.

C.

At the beginning of 1812, there were present at Cadiz, Cartagena, and Tarifa, doing garrison duty, the following companies under Lieut.-Col. A. Duncan:--

_Bat- Under Command of _Arrived in Designation in 1914. talion. Peninsula. 2nd Captain P. Campbell[812] March 1810[813] 62 Company, R.G.A. 5th Captain H. Owen January 1810 60 Company, R.G.A. 9th Captain P. J. Hughes January 1810 Reduced in 1819. 10th Captain W. Roberts March 1810 63 Company, R.G.A. 10th Major A. Dickson April 1810 21 Company, R.G.A. 10th Captain W. Shenley April 1810 11 Company, R.G.A.

[812] This company went to Cartagena from Cadiz at the end of January 1812, where it remained until the end of the war. Campbell was not with it, having command of an infantry regiment in the Spanish Army.

[813] From Gibraltar.

Of these Hughes’s company was detached to Tarifa, and took a brilliant part in its defence in Dec. 1811-Jan. 1812. The rest were in Cadiz and the Isle of Leon. Owen’s and Dickson’s companies (the latter until July 1812 being commanded by Captain R. H. Birch, whose own company of the 10th battalion was at Gibraltar, as Dickson, with the rank of Major, was serving with the Portuguese Army) marched from Cadiz to Madrid with Skerrett’s column at the end of September 1812, and in October joined Wellington’s main field army. Hughes’s, Roberts’s, and Shenley’s companies remained in garrison at Cadiz, and Campbell’s was divided between Cartagena and Tarifa.

D.

At Alicante, under General Maitland, there were present during the later months of the year not only Holcombe’s and Thompson’s companies, which had come round from Lisbon, but also the two following British companies from Sicily:--

_Bat- Under Command of _Arrived in Designation in 1914. talion. Peninsula. 8th Captain J. S. Williamson August 1812 40th Battery, R.F.A. 4th Captain R. G. Lacy December 1812 25 Company, R.G.A.

III. KING’S GERMAN LEGION ARTILLERY

Of the three companies of the Legionary Artillery in the Peninsula only one (No. 4) was with the field army, that of Captain F. Sympher, attached to the 4th Division. This unit was present at the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, and also at the battle of Salamanca.

Captain K. Rettberg’s (No. 1) and Captain A. Cleeves’s (No. 2) companies were doing garrison duty in the Lisbon forts; but Rettberg himself, with a detachment of two officers and thirty men of his company, came up to the siege of Badajoz in March-April.

IV. PORTUGUESE ARTILLERY

[The details are taken from Major Teixeira Botelho’s Subsidios.]

Only three field batteries accompanied the allied field army during the campaign of 1812, though seven had been at the front in 1811. These batteries were:--

Captain J. da Cunha Preto’s 6-pounder [from the 1st regiment] and Captain W. Braun’s 9-pounder [from the 2nd regiment] batteries, both attached to General Hamilton’s Portuguese division, which always acted with Hill in Estremadura, and Major S. J. de Arriaga’s 24-pounder howitzer battery, which formed part of the Artillery Reserve, and accompanied Wellington’s own army to Badajoz, Salamanca, and Burgos. This company came from the 1st (Lisbon) regiment.

But in addition the 2nd or Algarve regiment supplied one company, under Captain J. C. Pereira do Amaral for the siege of Badajoz.

The 4th or Oporto regiment gave two companies (200 men) under Captain J. V. Miron for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, and one (70 men) under Captain William Cox for the siege of Badajoz. Cox’s company was sent round to Alicante in June, along with the British companies of Holcombe and Thompson, and joined Maitland’s Anglo-Sicilian corps for the rest of the war.

Another company of the 4th regiment under Captain D. G. Ferreri formed the divisional artillery of Silveira’s Militia corps, and was present at the blockade of Zamora in June-July 1812.

The 1st or Lisbon regiment sent a company under Captain M. A. Penedo to Alicante, along with the company of Cox mentioned above from the 4th regiment. It also supplied one company under Lieutenant A. da Costa e Silva for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo.

The 3rd or Elvas regiment supplied three companies, under the command of Major A. Tulloh[814], for the siege of Badajoz--they were those of Captains A. V. Barreiros, J. Elizeu, and J. M. Delgado.

[814] Captain R.A., but now serving in the Portuguese Artillery, with the rank of Major.

INDEX

Abadia, Francisco Xavier, general, orders for, 220; tiresome conduct of, 337.

Abbé, general, governor of Navarre, his proclamation against guerrilleros, 102; defeated by Mina, 198.

Alba de Tormes, Carlos de España fails to hold castle of, 415, 466.

Albuera, Hill in position at, 269; combats in front of, 527-30.

Alcantara, bridge of, restored by Wellington, 333.

Aldaya, combat of, 64.

Alicante, occupied by Mahy, repulses Montbrun, 78, 79; Maitland lands at, 573.

Almaraz, forts of, stormed by Hill, 322-30.

Almeida, re-fortified by Wellington, 160; repulses the attack of Clausel, 281.

Almendralejo, seized by Hill, 132.

Altafulla, combat of, 96.

Alten, Victor, general, fails to assist Carlos de España at Rodrigo, 280; retreats to Villa Velha, 284; results of his action, 290; with Wellington’s advance into Spain, 352; at Salamanca, 365, 369, 372-3; at Pollos, 389, 399, 401; his successful charge at Castrillo, 405-6; wounded at Salamanca, 422.

America, Spanish colonies in, troubles of, 136-8, 337.

Andalusia, position of Soult in, 80, 108, 109, 110, 274, 305; evacuation of, proposed by Jourdan, 307, 308; resisted by Soult, 309-10; operations in, during June-August, 521, 522, 535, 536; evacuation of, by Soult, 539-43.

Andriani, Luis, colonel, defends Saguntum, 13, 17-30; surrenders, 45-6.

Anson, George, major-general, operations of his cavalry, 401, 402; at Salamanca, 449, 461; at Garcia Hernandez, 501.

Anson, William, major-general, his brigade at Castrillo, 406; at Salamanca, 457, 458.

Aragon, French army of, 5; Suchet’s garrisons in, 6; operations of Duran and the guerrilleros in, 21-3; French reinforcements for, 51-2; Palombini’s and Severoli’s campaigns in, 98-101.

Arentschildt, Friedrich, colonel, takes command of a brigade at Salamanca, 442-5, 454, 461, 494; marches on Madrid, 504.

Artificers, Royal Military, at siege of Badajoz, 225, 255-6; converted into Royal Sappers and Miners, 256.

Artillery, the allied, table of the, in 1812, Appendix, pp. 619-22.

Astorga, siege of, 337-8, 388, 502.

Asturias, the, evacuated by Bonnet, 196-8; reconquered by him, 338; evacuated again, 390, 391.

Aubert, colonel, governor of Almaraz, slain there, 324-6.

Ayerbe, skirmish at, 22.

Baccelar, Manuel, general, commands Portuguese of the North, 219-21; concentrates to keep off Marmont, 282-3; dissuades Trant from attacking Marmont, 285.

Badajoz, siege of, 217-56; disgraceful sack of, 256-64.

Ballasteros, Francisco, general, harasses Soult in south Andalusia, 111; harasses the besiegers of Tarifa, 116-17; unwilling to receive orders from British, 230; threatens Seville, 274; retires prematurely, 275; his ineffective raids on Zahara and Osuna, 275; routs Rey at Alhaurin, 276; checked at battle of Bornos, 336, 348, 385; instructed by Wellington to threaten Seville, 519; defeated at Bornos, 521, 522; surprises Malaga, 535; and Osuna, 536; harasses retreating French, 542, 544.

Barcelona, alleged poisoning plot at, 565.

Barnard, Andrew, colonel, at the storm of Ciudad Rodrigo, 179; becomes commander of the Light Division on Craufurd’s death, 182, 184.

Barrié, general, governor of Ciudad Rodrigo, 165, 173, 188.

Barrois, general, takes part in siege of Tarifa, 116; sent to Drouet’s aid by Soult, 525, 531.

Bathurst, Henry, second earl, his correspondence with Wellington on financial difficulties, 350, 351.

Bentinck, Lord Frederick, negotiates with Wellington, 344.

Bentinck, Lord William, commander of British forces in Sicily, proposes expedition against east coast of Spain, 342, 343; sends only a small force, 346, 347; his indecision, 386, 408; the expedition starts, 499, 565.

Beresford, William Carr, marshal, his strict discipline for Portuguese army, 149; at siege of Badajoz, 217, 228; leads centre of army advancing into Leon, 352; nominated by Wellington second in command in event of his being disabled, 353; before Salamanca, 359; with Wellington involved in skirmish of Castrejon, 402; urges delay in attack at Salamanca, 427; in the battle, 459; wounded, 471.

Berkeley, admiral, sends Russian guns for siege of Badajoz, 224.

Berthier, Louis Alexander, marshal, his dispatch to Marmont on reorganization of army of Portugal, 189; sends news of Joseph’s appointment as Commander-in-Chief to the marshals in the Peninsula, 298-9.

Bertoletti, general, governor of Tarragona, 96.

Bilbao, taken by Popham and Mendizabal, 556; recaptured by Caffarelli, 557.

Blake, Joaquim, general, Spanish commander-in-chief in Valencia, assumes defensive against Suchet, 10; his plans, 19-23; advances against Suchet, 31; defeated at battle of Saguntum, 36-43; besieged by Suchet in Valencia, 47-72; surrenders, 73; imprisoned at Vincennes, 73.

Blaniac, H. Lafon, general, appointed governor of Madrid on Joseph’s departure, 488; defends the Retiro against Wellington, 507; surrenders, 516.

Bock, Eberhard, major-general, commanding Heavy Dragoons K.G.L. at Badajoz, 219, 229; with army advancing into Leon, 352; at Salamanca, 365, 372, 373; at Pollos, 389; at Castrillo, 399; at Salamanca, 403, 425; at Garcia Hernandez, 476-7; marches on Madrid, 504; goes north with Wellington, 581.

Bonnet, general, his expedition into the Asturias, 338; summoned by Marmont before Salamanca, 354; joins him, 381, 390, 391; his feigned advance against Wellington, 397; at Salamanca, 424-39; assumes command on Marmont’s being disabled, 440; wounded, 440, 469.

Bornos, battle of, 336, 385.

Bourke, general, defeated by Eroles at Roda, 98.

Boussard, general, wounded at Aldaya, 64.

Brennier, Antoine François, general, blockades Rodrigo, 281; beaten at Castrillo, 405, 406; his division routed at Salamanca, 451.

Burgoyne, John, major of engineers, takes charge of assault on castle of Badajoz, 251; besieges the forts of Salamanca, 362.

Cadiz, bombardment of by the French, 167, 168; politics at, 137-44; siege of, raised, 539, 540.

Caffarelli, Louis Marie, general, occupies Saragossa, 57; troubles of, in Aragon, 82; vainly pursues Mina, 103; Wellington’s plans against, 339, 340; promises help to Marmont, 356, 372; fails to send it, 378, 393, 394; sends cavalry brigade under Chauvel, 419; relieves Santander, 554; retakes Bilbao from Mendizabal, 556, 557.

Calatayud, captured by Duran, 21, 22; attacked by Montijo, 51-2; captured by Gayan, 101.

Campbell, Colin, general, governor of Gibraltar, garrisons Tarifa, 112; forbids abandonment of the town, 123.

Campbell, John, colonel, commands brigade of Portuguese horse in Estremadura, 219, 530, 531, 534.

Caro, José, general, at battle of Saguntum, 33, 41, 42.

Caroline, queen of the Two Sicilies, her intrigues against the British, 346, 347.

Carrera, La, Martin, brigadier, encompasses Boussard’s cavalry at Aldaya, 64; his gallant raid on Murcia, 81; death, 81.

Carrié, general, beaten and captured at Castrillo, 405.

Castalla, battle of, 567-70.

Castaños, Francis Xavier, general, in command in Galicia, 197, 219, 337, 388.

Castello Branco, sacked by Clausel, 284.

Castlereagh, Lord, succeeds Canning at the Foreign Office, 155, 349.

Castrejon, combat of, 401, 402.

Castrillo, combat of, 405, 406.

Castro Urdiales, taken by Popham, 553.

Catalonia, French army of, 4, 5; operations of Lacy, Eroles, and Decaen in, 90-9; formally annexed by Napoleon, 97; projected British landing in, 344; Lacy’s summer campaign in, 562-4; Maitland refuses to land in, 571.

Ceccopieri, colonel, slain near Ayerbe, 22.

Cerdagne, ravaged by Eroles, 93; by Sarsfield, 99.

Chauvel, general, arrives after Salamanca, and covers retreat of French army, 482.

Chlopiski, general, commands flank-guard at Saguntum, 35; his victorious charge, 37.

Chowne, Christopher Tilson, general, makes false attack on castle of Miravete, 324-8.

Ciudad Real, seized by Morillo, 134.

Clausel, Bertrand, general, fails to attack Almeida, 281; occupies Castello Branco, 284; dissuades Marmont from attacking at Salamanca, 367, 368; his unsuccessful attack at Castrillo, 405, 406; at battle of Salamanca, 430, 435; assumes command after Marmont and Bonnet are disabled, 440; advances on Wellington’s centre, 458; repulsed, 460; wounded, 469; his dispatch to Joseph, 489; continues to retreat north, 491.

Clinton, Henry, general, his victorious advance at Salamanca, 459-60; left to contain Clausel, 501.

Codrington, Edward, captain R.N., operations of, on the coast of Catalonia, 92, 563, 564; his views on Lacy and Eroles, 572.

Colborne, John, colonel, leads storming-party at Ciudad Rodrigo, 167; wounded, 182, 184.

Cole, Hon. Lowry, general, his operations on June 10, 403-6; his advance at Salamanca, 455; wounded, 456.

Conroux, Nicolas, general, surprised by Ballasteros, 522.

Constitution, the Spanish, drawn up by the Cortes, 140, 144.

Copons, Francisco, general, at the siege of Tarifa, 112, 118; opposes evacuation of the town, 123, 125.

Cortes, the, at Cadiz, Constitution drawn up by, 140.

Cotton, Stapleton, general, routs Drouet’s rearguard at Villagarcia, 278; commands rearguard on retreat to Salamanca, 401; in the battle, 434-47, 449; wounded there, 471.

Craufurd, Robert, general, observing Ciudad Rodrigo, 159; mortally wounded in storm of Ciudad Rodrigo, 182; Charles Stewart’s high estimate of him, 186.

Creagh, Juan, general, at Valencia, 60, 65.

Cruz Murgeon, Juan, general, storms Seville, 540, 541.

Cuenca, occupied by Mahy, 24; taken by D’Armagnac, 56; evacuated by Maupoint, 488.

Daricau, general, operations of, in Estremadura, 233, 275, 521, 526, 533.

D’Armagnac, general, goes to aid Suchet in Valencia, 56-76; co-operates with Montbrun, 478.

Decaen, Charles, general, commands in Catalonia, 4, 5, 90; his difficulties with Barcelona, 92; relieves Barcelona, 94; harassed by the Catalan army under Lacy, 563.

Decken, Gustav von der, captain, his gallant charge and mortal wound at Garcia Hernandez, 477.

Delort, colonel, defeats O’Donnell at Castalla, 568, 569.

D’Erlon, see Drouet.

Denia, captured by General Harispe, 87.

Dickson, Alexander, colonel, brings up siege-guns to Ciudad Rodrigo, 160; prepares for siege of Badajoz, 201, 224; his account of the storm, 247; with Hill’s expedition to Almaraz, 322; at Salamanca, 364.

Dombrouski, general, driven from Merida, 131, 132.

Dorsenne, Jean Marie, general, ignores the danger of Ciudad Rodrigo, 187, 188, 194; meets Marmont at Valladolid, 192; declines to obey Jourdan’s orders, 300, 304.

Downie, John, colonel, his gallant conduct at Seville, 541.

Doyle, Charles, general, suggests fortification of Saguntum (Murviedro), 11, 12.

Drouet, Jean Baptiste, Comte d’Erlon, in Estremadura, observing Hill, 106, 107; driven from Almendralejo by Hill, 132; retires before Graham, 230, 231; sends pressing summons to Soult, 267; routed by Le Marchant at Villagarcia, 277; fails to intercept Hill after Almaraz, 330, 331; threatened by Hill, 525; his manœuvres against Hill, 531-5; retreats suddenly to join Soult, 543.

Duran, José, chief of guerrilleros, seizes Calatayud, 21; attacks Suchet’s rear, 49; seizes Almunia, and retires to Molina, 51.

D’Urban, Benjamin, colonel, chief of the Portuguese staff, his views on Wellington’s advance into Leon, 317; with Silveira on the Douro, 339; his activity, 386, 387, 409; joins Wellington before Salamanca, 410-13; in the battle, 426-36; his charge, 441-5, 453, 454, 461; in pursuit of Joseph at Segovia, 495; enters the town, 496; marches on Madrid, 504; routed by Treillard at Majalahonda, 509-13.

‘El Manco,’ guerrillero chief, 102.

Empecinado, Juan Martin, the, his co-operation with the army of Valencia, 3, 5, 10; seizes Calatayud, 21; attacks Suchet’s rear, 49; attacks Mazzuchelli, 51; his jealousy of Montijo, 52; his disaster at Siguenza, 102; captures the garrison of Guadalajara, 516.

Engineers, Wellington’s demand for sappers and miners, 255, 256.

Eroles, General Baron, raids French frontier, 93; destroys a French column at Villaseca, 95; defeated at Altafulla, 96; defeats Bourke at Roda, 98; his differences with Lacy, 562-3.

Erskine, Sir William, lieut.-general, sends false intelligence of French advance to Hill, 330; Wellington’s comments on, 331-2; his slack pursuit of Pierre Soult, 542.

España, Carlos de, general, 220; retires from Rodrigo before Marmont’s advance, 280, 281; reports lack of provisions to Wellington, 290; joins Wellington before Salamanca, 355, 365; at the ford of Pollos, 389; at Castrillo, 399; at Salamanca, 411; fails to hold castle of Alba de Tormes, 415, 466; marches on Madrid, 504; governor of Madrid, 517, 567.

Estremadura, invaded by Hill, 133, 134; operations by Hill and Graham in, 228-33; campaign of Hill and Drouet in, June-August, 520-33.

Ferey, general, advises Marmont to fight at San Cristobal, 367; covers retreat of French at Salamanca, 462-5; slain, 464, 469.

Figueras, fall of, 1.

Fletcher, Richard, colonel, engineer officer directing siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, 170; at Badajoz, 228, 237; wounded, 238; again on duty, 243.

Fortescue, Hon. John, his estimate of the British Ministers and their dealings with Wellington, 152.

Foy, Maximilien, general, moves with Montbrun against Valencia, 52-78; attempts to divert British from Badajoz, 233, 266; fails to help Almaraz, 329; his description of Marmont’s plans at San Cristobal, 367; at Toro, 390; makes feigned advance against Wellington, 397; describes opening of battle of Salamanca, 420, 421, 424, 433; criticism of Marmont, 438, 461; successfully covers French retreat, 467; his account of battle of Salamanca, 472-3; defeated at Garcia Hernandez, 475-8.

Freire, Manuel, general, prevented from joining Blake at Valencia, 57; with Mahy’s force, 77, 78; his raid on eastern Andalusia, 559.

Frère, general, protects Suchet’s rear in Catalonia, 6, 92.

Galicia, state of, in 1812, 220, 337, 338.

Garcia Hernandez, combat of, 467-8.

Gaspard-Thierry, colonel, governor of Picurina fort at Badajoz, taken prisoner, 240.

Gayan, guerrillero chief, seizes Calatayud, 101.

Gijon, occupied by the French, 338.

Gough, Hugh, colonel, takes part in defence of Tarifa, 118; opposes its evacuation, 122-7.

Graham, Thomas, general, overruns Estremadura, 228; fails to catch Reymond, 230-2; falls back on Albuera, 268; obliged to throw up his command, 352-3; before Salamanca, 359, 369, 373-5.

Granada, evacuated by Soult, 544, 545.

Grant, Colquhoun, major, captured at Idanha Nova, 292, 318.

Guarda, Trant’s disaster at, 285-6.

Guarena, combat of the, 404-5.

Gudin, colonel, at the storming of Saguntum, 17, 18.

Guetaria, attacked by Home Popham, 553, 557.

Gurwood, lieutenant, J., leads forlorn hope at storm of Ciudad Rodrigo, 181; controversy concerning, 589.

Habert, general, at storming of Saguntum, 17, 28, 33, 39; at capture of Valencia, 58-63; joins Harispe, 67; at Gandia, 85.

Hamilton, general A., commands a Portuguese division under Hill, 130, 520.

Harispe, general, in invasion of Valencia, 14; at battle of Saguntum, 34, 40; at capture of Valencia, 58, 61-4; moves toward Alicante, 85; defeats O’Donnell at Castalla, 567-70; retires behind the Xucar, 573.

Hay, Andrew Leith, captain, his account of the storming of Badajoz, 255; of the battle of Salamanca, 448-9.

Henriod, governor of Lerida, repulses Lacy, 564.

Hill, Rowland, General, his advance into Estremadura, 86: retires into Portugal, 106; seizes Merida, 130-2; forms covering force for siege of Badajoz, 218, 228, 233; joins Graham at Albuera, 268; contains Drouet in Estremadura, 291; his raid on Almaraz, 311-29, 348; Wellington’s instructions to him to harass Drouet, 519; advances to Zafra, 522; awaits Drouet’s attack, 527; his manœuvres against Drouet, 531-5; does not pursue when Drouet joins Soult, 543; warns Wellington of Soult’s evacuation of Andalusia, 578; marches on Madrid, 579.

Hodenberg, Karl, captain in the K.G.L., his account of the sack of Badajoz, 262; of Garcia Hernandez, 480.

Infantado, J. de Silva, Duke of, created a member of the Regency 144, 145.

Jones, John, colonel R.E., his remarks on the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, 173; on the storming of Badajoz, 247; on the siege of the Salamanca forts, 371.

Joseph Bonaparte, King of Spain, Napoleon’s instructions to him to send troops to Valencia, 53; he negotiates with the Cortes at Cadiz, 138; receives news of the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, 188; appointed commander-in-chief by Napoleon, 298; difficulties of his situation, 301, 302; determines to march to Marmont’s aid, 385; authorizes Marmont to give battle, 395; marches north to join Marmont, 484; receives news of the defeat of Salamanca, 488; retreats to Madrid, 489; halts at Segovia, 492; evacuates Madrid, 505; orders Drouet to join him, 533; marches on Valencia, 574-8.

Jourdan, Jean Baptiste, marshal, appointed Chief-of-the-Staff to Joseph, 298; his comments on the situation, 301; his Mémoire of May 1812, 303-7; urges Marmont to attack Wellington, 394, 395; his criticism of Marmont’s failure at Salamanca, 430, 473; marches with Joseph to aid Marmont, 488; and retreats, 489; urges evacuation of the Retiro, 507.

Kempt, James, major-general, leads assault on castle of Badajoz, 239-40; takes command when Picton is disabled, 251; wounded, 252.

Kincaid, John, his account of the sack of Badajoz, 261.

King, Henry, major, takes part in defence of Tarifa, 112, 118; opposes its evacuation, 122, 123.

La Carrera, see Carrera.

Lacy, Luis, general, his raids against Igualada, Cervera, and Montserrat, 5; his quarrels with the Catalan Junta, 91; endeavours to starve out Barcelona and Tarragona, 94; his unpopularity, 91, 562, 563; his fruitless attack on Lerida, 564; dissuades Maitland from landing at Palamos, 571.

Lafosse, general, governor of Tortosa, surprised and routed by Eroles, 95.

Lallemand, general, defeats Slade at Maguilla, 523, 524; skirmishes with Hill’s cavalry, 530, 531.

Lamare, commandant of engineers at Badajoz, 235; his able conduct in the defence, 246.

La Peña, Canon, secret agent of King Joseph, 139, 140.

Lardizabal, José, general, commanding a division in Valencia, 3; at battle of Saguntum, 32, 40, 44; at siege of Valencia, 60, 66; fails to cut his way out, 70; surrender of, 73.

Leith, James, general, commanding 5th Division, his successful escalade at Badajoz, 245, 253, 254; at Salamanca, 434, 435; leads central attack, 446, 448; wounded, 449, 471.

Le Marchant, John Gaspard, general, commanding heavy dragoons, 219, 228; routs Drouet’s rearguard at Villagarcia, 277; with Wellington’s advance into Leon, 352; at Salamanca, 365, 374; at Pollos, 389; to Fuente la Peña, 399; at Salamanca, 403, 425, 447, 449; charges Maucune’s division, 450, 451; fatally wounded, 452; founder of Military College at High Wycombe, 452.

Le Mesurier, Haviland, general, governor of Almeida, repulses Clausel, 281; his report on the defences of the city, 283.

Leval, Jean François, general, besieges Tarifa, 116-29; fails to catch Ballasteros, 536; harassed by Freire, 559, 560.

Liverpool, Lord, his support of Wellington, 152-6, 349; sanctions Sir Home Popham’s naval expedition on coast of Biscay, 340; and Bentinck’s scheme for attacking Catalonian coast, 342, 343.

Llerena, Graham’s operations round, 230, 231.

Longa, Juan, guerrillero chief, 340; joins Popham’s raid on Biscayan coast, 553; joins Mendizabal at Bilbao, 557.

Lübeck, sack of, by Bernadotte’s troops a parallel to that of Badajoz, 262.

Luddites, the, riots of, 153.

Macdonald, Étienne, marshal, Duke of Tarentum, recall of, 1.

Mackinnon, Henry, major-general, at siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, 178, 180; killed in the storm, 181.

Madrid, Wellington marches on, 497; evacuated by Joseph, 506, 507; Wellington’s triumphal entry, 513, 514.

Maguilla, combat of, 385, 523, 524.

Mahy, Nicolas, general, commands Murcian army, 20; his abortive expedition against Cuenca, 23; joins Blake in attacking Suchet, 31; at battle of Saguntum, 36-8; his comments, 39; opinion of Valencians, 50; abandons Valencia, escapes to the south, 64, 68; occupies Alicante, 78; abandons Denia, 87; removed from his command, 87.

Maitland, Frederick, general, leads Sicilian expedition against Catalonia, 346, 347, 499, 565; arrives at Palamos, 571; at Alicante, 572; threatens Harispe, 573; withdraws to Alicante, 574.

Majalahonda, combat of, 509-13.

Malaga, surprised by Ballasteros, 535; seized by English squadron, 559.

Marmont, Auguste Frédéric, marshal, Duke of Ragusa, sends expedition to Valencia, 53, 157, 161; receives news of fall of Ciudad Rodrigo, 187, 188; reorganization of his army by Napoleon, 190, 191; warned by Thiébault of Wellington’s advance on Ciudad Rodrigo, 192, 195; concentrates troops to oppose him, 196; retires to Valladolid 199; deprived of some troops by the Emperor, 203, 204; severely criticized by Napoleon, 203-6, 221-6; makes a raid on central Portugal, 243; concerts joint action with Soult against Wellington, 266; masks Rodrigo and Almeida, and marches to Sabugal, 283; surprises Trant at Guarda, 285; returns to Sabugal, 288; and Fuente Guinaldo, 288; escapes from Wellington at Fuente Guinaldo, 290-5; receives news of Joseph’s appointment as commander-in-chief, 298-9; sends in report to Joseph, 302; his partial compliance with Joseph’s orders, 310-11; his intercepted dispatches, 318-19; evacuates Salamanca, 354; his dispatch to Joseph, 370; waits vainly for Caffarelli, 370-8; retreats on to the Douro, 380; requisitions horses, 391; advances against Wellington, 397; long strategical movements, 398-417; opens battle of Salamanca, 421-37; wounded, 437; his dispatch, 469; criticism of his actions, 472-4; his report to Joseph, 488.

Mathieu, Maurice, general, operations of, in Catalonia, 94-6, 563.

Maucune, general, at Salamanca, 430-7.

May, John, brevet-major, R.A., in charge of siege of forts of Salamanca, 362.

Mazzuchelli, general, his skirmishes with Aragonese guerrilleros, 51.

Melito, André, Miot de, Joseph’s minister, his comments on his master’s situation, 301.

Mendizabal, Gabriel, general, commanding 7th army, employed by Wellington to harass Caffarelli, 339, 348; comes to aid Popham, 554; in conjunction with Popham captures Bilbao, 550-7; driven out by Caffarelli, 557.

Merida, seized and evacuated by Hill, 130-2; reoccupied, 233; raided by the French, 535.

Merino, guerrillero chief, his cruelty, 102.

Mina, Francisco, guerrilla chief, 4, 6, 21; destroys Ceccopieri, 22; eludes Musnier, 23; his reprisals against the governor of Navarre, 102; escapes into Aragon, 103; seizes French convoy in the Pass of Salinas, 103; escapes from Pannetier, 104; his activity in the North, 190; defeats Abbé near Pampeluna, 198; his activity 548, 549; sends aid to Popham, 553.

Miranda, José, general, at battle of Saguntum 36-44; at Valencia, 60.

Mislata, combat of, 65-6.

Montbrun, Louis Pierre, general, leads expedition against Valencia, 53, 76; advances on Alicante, 77; retires, 78; returns to Toledo, 79, 265.

Montijo, conde de, commands irregular troops against Suchet, 49, 52; besieges Soria, 198; with O’Donnell at rout of Castalla, 568-9.

Morillo, Pablo, general, his raid on La Mancha, 134, 135; with Penne-Villemur threatens Seville, 274; co-operates with Hill, 520; marches with Hill on Madrid, 580.

Mosquera, Joaquim, member of the Council of the Indies, created member of the Spanish Regency, 144.

Murat, Joachim, King of Naples, failure of his expedition against Sicily, 341.

Murcia, captured and evacuated by Pierre Soult, 80, 81.

Murviedro, see Saguntum.

Musnier, general, 9; opposed by guerrilleros, 21-3; marches on Valencia, 57; attacks Valencia, 61, 69: relieves Tarragona, 94-6.

Napier, George, major, at the storm of Ciudad Rodrigo, 181; wounded, 182.

Napier, Sir William, historian, his remarks on the surrender of Peniscola, 88; comments on the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo, 194; account of the storming of Badajoz, 247; of Salamanca, 407, 457; comments on Soult’s plan for retiring on Andalusia, 546; accepts Suchet’s version of his administration in Valencia, 560, 561.

Napoleon, Emperor, his plans for the invasion of Valencia, 2; arrangements for reinforcing Suchet, 53-5, 80; withdraws troops from Spain for the Russian War, 83-4, 189; his plan for the subjection of Catalonia, 96-7; fails to foresee Wellington’s advance on Ciudad Rodrigo, 193, 194; withdraws troops from Marmont, 203: his criticism on the fall of Badajoz, 270; his forebodings about the Russian campaign, 297; appoints Joseph commander-in-chief of forces in the Peninsula, 298; further instructions to Joseph, 312, 313; his condemnation of Marmont’s failure at Salamanca, 396, 397, 431, 439, 473.

Navarro, Garcia, treacherously surrenders Peniscola, 87; deserts to the French, 89.

Navas de Membrillo, combat of, 131.

Neveux, captain, exploit of, at Navas de Membrillo, 131.

Nevill, P. P., colonel, his account of the sack of Badajoz, 263, 264.

Ney, Michel, marshal, Duke of Elchingen, his views on the treatment of a garrison that held out to the last, 259.

Niebla, the Condado of (western Andalusia), operations in, 107, 274, 539.

Obispo, José, general, cuts French communications, 20; driven away by Palombini, 24; returns to Segorbe, 30; advances on Saguntum, 32, 35; arrives too late for the battle, 36, 38; at Valencia, 60; retires to Cullera, 65.

O’Donnell, Charles, general, threatens Suchet’s flank, 20, 21; forced to retire from Benaguacil by Suchet, 24, 25; at battle of Saguntum, 35, 544.

O’Donnell, Henry, conde de la Bispal, made member of the Regency, 144.

O’Donnell, Joseph, general, captain-general of Murcia, reorganizes Mahy’s troops, 559; routed by Harispe at Castalla, 567-70.

Ollorgan, combat of, 557.

O’Ronan, colonel, at battle of Saguntum, 32, 37.

Oropesa, garrisoned by Blake, 13, 14; taken by Suchet, its garrison escapes, 25.

O’Toole, Bryan, major, commanding Portuguese caçadores at Ciudad Rodrigo, 179, 183.

Oviedo, captured by Bonnet, 338; evacuated by him, 381.

Pack, Denis, general, commanding Portuguese brigade at Ciudad Rodrigo, 179, 183; sent to Badajoz, 217, 229; to Portalegre, 291; with Wellington’s advance into Leon, 352; at Salamanca, 365; at Pollos, 389; at Salamanca, 411, 424, 425; his attack on the Greater Arapile, 455, 457; marches on Madrid, 504; with Wellington’s army moves North, 581.

Pakenham, Hon. Edward, major-general, takes command of the 3rd Division before Salamanca, 352, 353; in battle, 425, 426; executes turning movement, 436; routs Thomières, 443, 445, 461.

Palacio, Marquis, captain-general of Valencia, 20.

Palamos, Maitland at, 571.

Palombini, general, sent against Obispo, 24, 30; at siege and battle of Saguntum, 28, 33, 41; at capture of Valencia, 63, 65, 66; moved to southern Aragon, 85; checked by Villacampa, 100; summoned by Joseph to Madrid, 487; at Majalahonda, 509.

Peña La, Canon, employed by Joseph to negotiate with Cortes at Cadiz, 139.

Peniscola, held by General Garcia Navarro, 13; treacherously surrendered by him, 87, 88.

Penne-Villemur, Conde de, threatens Seville, 229, 230; with Morillo makes a raid on Seville, 274; co-operates with Hill, 520, 522; routed by Lallemand at Santa Marta, 530; pursues Drouet, 543; marches with Hill on Madrid, 580.

Perceval, Spencer, Prime Minister, his troubles, 151-6.

Phillipon, Armand, general, governor of Badajoz, 235; his energy and ability, 236, 240, 242; his gallant defence at the storm of the city, 45, 246; surrenders, 254; Soult’s over-confidence in him, 270.

Picurina, fort at Badajoz, stormed, 239, 240.

Ponsonby, Hon. William, commanding cavalry brigade at Villagarcia, 278; at Salamanca, 365; marches on Madrid, 504; drives away Treillard from Majalahonda, 512; goes north with Wellington’s army, 58.

Popham, Sir Home, leads naval expedition against coast-forts of Cantabria and Biscay, 340-8; prevents Caffarelli from joining Marmont, 378, 384, 393; his descent on the Biscayan coast, 550; his successes, 552, 553; captures Santander, 554, 555; captures Bilbao, 556, 557.

Porlier, Juan Diaz, guerrillero leader, in Cantabria, 338, 339, 340, 555, 556.

Regency, the, of Portugal, its financial difficulties, 145, 350-51.

Regency, the, of Spain, its composition changed, 144.

Reille, Honoré Charles, general, commands division on Upper Ebro, 4; joins Suchet, 7, 48, 52, 57; attacks Valencia, 61; appointed chief of the army of the Ebro, 96; his plan for the subjection of Catalonia, 98; fails to capture Mina, 104.

Reizenstein, August von, captain K.G.L., leads charge at Garcia Hernandez, 479.

Renaud Redoute, at Rodrigo, stormed by Colborne, 167, 168.

Renovales, Colonel, his operation in Biscay, 556-7.

Reymond, general, escapes from Graham, 230, 231.

Ridge, Henry, lieut.-colonel, killed at the storm of Badajoz, 252.

Rignoux, general, governor of Seville, alarmed by raids of guerrilleros, 274, 275.

Rivas, Ignacio Rodriguez de, member of the Cadiz Regency, 144.

Roche, Philip K., general, organizes a Spanish division at Alicante, 85; his operations at the battle of Castalla, 567-70; joins Maitland at Alicante, 572.

Roda, combat of, 98.

Rodrigo, Ciudad, siege of, 158, 161-86; defies Marmont, 281; blockaded by Brennier, 281.

Rogniat, general, at the storm of Saguntum, 27.

Ross, captain, killed at Ciudad Rodrigo, 170.

Rouget, general, his campaign about Bilbao, 557.

Russia, Napoleon’s war with, causes withdrawal of French troops from the Peninsula, 83.

Saguntum (or Murviedro), its defences, 11, 16, 17; ineffectually stormed by Suchet, 17-19; battle of, 26-45; surrender of, 45.

Salamanca, evacuated by Marmont, 354; Wellington enters, 360; its forts besieged, 361-79; Marmont and Wellington manœuvre before, 402-17; battle of, 421-70.

Salinas (Puerto de Arlaban), Mina’s victory at, 102.

Sanchez, Julian, guerrillero chief, his activity in the neighbourhood of Salamanca, 188, 220, 299; marches with Wellington on Madrid, 504.

San Juan, José, general, rout of his Valencian cavalry at Saguntum, 37.

Santander, captured by Popham, 554-5.

Santesteban, general, in the Castalla campaign, 568, 570.

Santocildes, José Maria, general, his half-hearted attack on Astorga, 386-9; comes to Benavente, 409; sent to threaten Valladolid, 490; occupies the town, 502, 503.

Santoña, French garrison at, 551, 555, 558.

Sarrut, general, joins expedition against Valencia, 53; guards the fords of Huerta, 415-16; his action at Salamanca, 458-61.

Sarsfield, Pedro, general, his raid on Foix, 99; Lacy’s jealousy of, 563.

Schepeler, colonel, his account of Blake at Saguntum, 43; and at Valencia, 66; seizes Cordova, 543; his notes on Suchet’s tyranny, in Valencia, 560, 561.

Scovell, George, captain, his ingenuity as cipher-secretary to Wellington, 317; account of his file of ciphers, Appendix, 611-18.

Segovia, Joseph, halts at, 492; occupied by D’Urban, 495.

Severoli, general, commands a division on Upper Ebro, 4; joins Suchet, 4; occupies western Aragon, 22, 23; summoned to Valencia, 48, 52, 57.

Seville, attacked by Penne Villemur, 274, 275; stormed by Cruz Murgeon and Skerrett, 540, 541.

Silveira, Francisco, general, commanding Portuguese in Tras-os-Montes, 219, 220; moves on Lamego to protect Beira, 282; told off by Wellington to blockade Zamora, 339, 348, 386, 387, 491, 502.

Slade, John, general, defeated at Maguilla, 385, 523, 524.

Smith, Charles F., captain R.E., opposes evacuation of Tarifa, 122.

Smith, Harry, 95th regiment, his romantic marriage at Badajoz, 264.

Souham, Joseph, general, put under Marmont’s orders, 189; summoned by Marmont to Salamanca, 198.

Soult, Nicolas, marshal, Duke of Dalmatia, Napoleon orders him to assist Suchet, 80; failure of his expedition to Tarifa, 78; disposition of his troops in Andalusia, 106-10; sends Victor to besiege Tarifa, 115; denounces King Joseph to Napoleon, 140; moves toward Badajoz, 243, 268; concerts action with Marmont against Wellington, 265, 266; retires on hearing of the fall of Badajoz, 269; reproaches Marmont, 271; summoned back to Seville, 274, 275; receives news of Joseph’s appointment as commander-in-chief, 299; his recalcitrance, 302, 309; threatens to give up command of Army of the South, 332; believes Wellington is about to attack him, 357; refuses to obey Joseph, 485, 492, 493, 495, 528; denounces Joseph to Napoleon, 538; begins to evacuate Andalusia, 539, 540, 557; at Granada, 544; joins Suchet, 545; results of his insubordination, 545.

Soult, Pierre, general, seizes Murcia, 80, 81; marches against Ballasteros, 276; sent to Drouet’s help, 525, 531; his raid on Ribera, 542.

Stewart, Charles (Lord Londonderry), his estimate of Craufurd, 186.

Stuart, Charles, British Ambassador in Lisbon, 145, 148.

Sturgeon, Henry, colonel, restores bridge of Alcantara, 333.

Suchet, Louis Gabriel, marshal, invades Valencia, 2; takes Murviedro and Valencia, 2; estimate of his forces, 4-9; crosses Valencian frontier, 14; fails to storm Saguntum, 17-19; besieges Saguntum, 26-30; wins battle, 34-45; attacks and takes Valencia, 57-73; violates treaty of capitulation, 74, 75; deprived of troops for the Russian War, 84; his illness, 86; his threats to the governor of Tortosa, and governor of Tarragona, 259; and Blake, 260; receives news of Joseph’s appointment as commander-in-chief, 299; refuses obedience, 304, 309, 341; alarmed by reports of the Sicilian expedition, 345, 346, 500, 566; weakness of his position, 559; raises a war-contribution, 560; Schepeler’s account of his methods, 561.

Synge, Charles, his narrative of Pack’s attack on the Greater Arapile, 455.

Tarifa, garrisoned by General Colin Campbell, 112; siege of, 114-29.

Tarragona, blockaded by the Catalans, 94, 95, 563; Wellington’s designs against, 344.

Taupin, general, anecdote concerning, 392.

Thiébault, Paul, general, governor of Salamanca, revictuals Ciudad Rodrigo, 159; warns Marmont and Dorsenne of Wellington’s movement on Ciudad Rodrigo, 187, 192, 194.

Thomières, general, his division at Salamanca, 432; his rout and death, 445, 469.

Todd, Alex., major, restores bridge of Alcantara, 333, 334.

Tordesillas, captured by Santocildes, 502.

Toreno, conde de, his account of Joseph’s negotiations with the Cortes at Cadiz, 139.

Trant, Nicholas, general, protects Almeida, 281; moves to Guarda, 283; his rash scheme for attacking Marmont, 284, 285; surprised and routed at Guarda, 285.

Treillard, general, routs D’Urban’s force at Majalahonda, 508-13.

Uslar, Frederich von, captain, leads the last charge at Garcia Hernandez, 486.

Valencia, kingdom of, invasion of by Suchet, 2; Napoleon’s opinion of the importance of its subjection, 53; Suchet’s campaign of conquest in, 8-67; Suchet’s levy of a war-contribution on, 560, 561.

Valencia, city of, 10; fortified by Blake, 48, 49; attacked by Suchet, 61-9; siege of, 70-3; surrendered by Blake, 73; oppression of by Suchet, 560.

Valladolid, abandoned by French, entered by Wellington, 491.

Vallée, general, at the siege of Saguntum, 27.

Vandeleur, J. Ormsby, general, commands brigade at the storm of Ciudad Rodrigo, 179, 181; wounded, 182.

Vere, Charles, A.Q.M.G., his account of the battle of Salamanca, 455-6.

Victor, Claude Perrin, marshal, Duke of Belluno, his unsuccessful siege of Tarifa, 115-29.

Villacampa, Pedro, general, rout of his infantry at Saguntum, 37; at Valencia, 60; moves to Aragon, 89; his activity in southern Aragon, 100, 101.

Villagarcia, combat of, 277, 278.

Villa Velha, bridge of, its importance, 284, 333.

Villavicencio, admiral, member for the Cadiz Regency, 144.

Vives, general, governor of Ciudad Rodrigo, refuses Marmont’s summons to surrender, 280, 281; commended by Wellington, 296.

Wachholz, Ludwig von, Captain Brunswick-Oels Jägers, his account of Salamanca, 455, 456.

Wellesley, Richard, marquis, resignation of, 153-6, 349.

Wellington, Arthur Wellesley, Marquis of, takes Ciudad Rodrigo, 2; his relations with the Portuguese Regency, 145; financial difficulties, 146-50; his support by the Home Government, 151-6; prepares for siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, 161-7, 186; prepares to be attacked by Marmont, 199; plans attack on Badajoz, 201-17; moves to Elvas, 219; his memorandum on Marmont’s probable action, 221-3; comments on fall of Badajoz, 255; his views on giving quarter to a resisting garrison, 260; soundness of his plan for taking Badajoz, 272; determines to march on Marmont, 290; his plan for Hill’s raid on Almaraz, 320, 321; advances into Leon, 335; approves Bentinck’s plan for attacking French on Catalonian coast, 343-8; his financial difficulties, 348-52; advances on Salamanca, 353-8; his adventure with French cavalry skirmishers, 402; long strategical movements, 402-17; battle of Salamanca, 421-70; summary of, 470-4; urges on pursuit of enemy, 475; gives up pursuit, 483; enters Valladolid, 491; marches on Madrid, 497; his letter to Bentinck, 499; triumphal entry into Madrid, 514; his comments on Slade’s defeat at Maguilla, 524; leaves Madrid for the valley of the Douro, 578; division of his forces on advancing toward Burgos, 582.

Whigs, their factious opposition to the Peninsular War, 151.

Whittingham, Samuel Ford, general, leads Balearic division to descent on coast of Catalonia, 565; at Alicante, 572.

Wilson, John, general, brings Portuguese militia to Guarda, 283; surprised by Marmont at Guarda, 285.

Zamora, besieged by Silveira, 386-7, 502.

Zayas, José, general, commanding a division in Valencia, 3; at battle of Saguntum, 32, 39; at siege of Valencia, 60-6.

END OF VOL. V

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