XV. THE WAR IN EGYPT, 1882
Origin of the war—Emancipation of Egypt from Turkish rule; introduction of European control—Deposition of Ismail Pasha—Tewfik becomes Khedive—Military revolts—Disorganization of the country—Joint action of the English and French; its failure—Naval demonstration—Bombardment of the forts of Alexandria—The French withdraw and leave Great Britain to act alone—British troops sent to Egypt—The Suez Canal seized—Base of operations established at Ismailia—Action of Tel el-Makhuta—Clearing the communications—Actions at Kassassin, August 28th and September 7th—Character of the Egyptian army—Night march on Tel el-Kebir—The enemy is overwhelmed, September 13th—Pursuit; losses—End of the war—Return of the Coldstream to England.
The hostilities conducted by England in Egypt in 1882 have been described as a mere bondholders' war. This, in a sense, is true, for our intimate relations with that country, which eventually led to military operations, were ostensibly due to our desire to protect the financial interests of those who had lent money to its ruler. But this is far from being the whole truth, because other and higher motives induced Great Britain to intervene in the internal affairs of the native government. Facing alike the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, and containing within its limits the isthmus of Suez, Egypt, besides being the key of the valley of the Nile, commands the most convenient water communications to India, to the further East, and to Australia. Having interests of a vital nature to defend in this far-distant quarter of the globe, it is evident we could never remain unconcerned if anarchy were to prevail in a region through which the main lines pass that connect together portions of the British Empire. Nor was the problem a new one. At the close of the last and at the commencement of the present century, England was struggling with the French for supremacy in India, and at that time Napoleon—then in the beginning of his great career—made a descent upon Egypt to secure a road to that Empire for his own nation. We were then obliged to drive his soldiers out, and, having succeeded in doing this, we prevented the French from forming an Asiatic dominion. Still the trouble continued, in a minor degree, until 1809, when we took the island of Mauritius from them, on which they depended, to base their operations against our possessions. From this date their power in the East declined; and England, relieved from rivalry, has thenceforward been able to exercise an undivided influence in India. If in the beginning of this century it was necessary to prevent France from interfering with our national expansion; so was it also the more necessary to restrain the Egyptians from obstructing (as we apprehended) our communications in 1882,—when the Suez canal having been opened (1869), nearly all our Eastern commerce was squeezed through that narrow passage, and when the importance of African exploration was adding greater value to the valley of the Nile.
Egypt has passed through some vicissitudes during the last sixty years. Still considered in theory to be a portion of the Turkish Empire, it was formerly ruled directly by the Porte, until Muhammad Ali, the Governor-General, or Vali, rebelled, and wrested concessions from the Sultan. In 1841, the Governorship was vested in him and in his heirs, and subsequent Firmans having been granted in his favour, Egypt became practically an independent principality. The last privilege accorded to his successors was the right to contract foreign loans without the previous consent of the Porte, and this right to run into debt was freely indulged in by Muhammad Ali’s grandson, Ismail Pasha. The latter, after becoming Viceroy—or Khedive, as the title is called—embarked in wild speculations, and indulged in unbounded extravagance. Desiring, like his grandfather, to erect an independent state by the adoption of European civilization, he failed to understand how this civilization was to be brought about. He hastened to produce its effects by an immense expenditure of money, but he omitted to establish an efficacious administration to curb peculation, or to introduce order into his affairs. Numerous speculators of every nationality rushed forward to help him to dissipate his fortune, and it was not long before he involved the people in financial ruin. As the import of alcohol corrupts a barbarous tribe, so did the influx of foreign gold demoralize this Muslim government.
Now, even if England had been prepared to let the bondholders shift for themselves in this crisis, so were not the other European nations; and to prevent so important a country from falling into the hands of any one of them, all agreed to intervene and regulate the evil that had been brought about. Thus Ismail, emancipated from the rule of Turkey, fell under the domination of European control. It is scarcely necessary to describe the various steps taken to secure reform in the financial concerns of Egypt. England and France were more interested in the matter than any other of the Powers. They acted harmoniously together, assumed a joint direction over the affairs of the country, and gradually tightened their hold upon the government. Thereupon the Khedive became restive, and as he would not fall in with the new order established to correct his maladministration, he was removed from Cairo. The authority of the Sultan, as Suzerain, was now requisitioned by Europe: Ismail was deposed, and his son, Tewfik Pasha, reigned in his stead, by favour of the Western Powers (June 26, 1879).
It was easy to see that such an undefined condition of things was not likely to last long. However beneficial to the people an honest administration might be, the interference of foreign officials in the internal affairs of another state, to whose ruler they owed no allegiance, could not but produce friction, and lead to trouble. It is true, Tewfik was pliant, and submitted without difficulty to the unprecedented constitution that was forced upon him; also, that there was little or no public opinion in the country, and apparently no centre of resistance to thwart the action of England and France. Nevertheless, the new Khedive soon lost his authority over his subjects, and resistance did arise, sooner than might have been expected. It originated where it ought least to have been found—in the army, where insubordination showed itself as soon as the native government was weakened and became contemptible in the eyes of the people, and when economy was introduced into the war department. Early in 1881, a military rising was threatened, and with difficulty was it appeased; but, later, a more serious event occurred (September 9th), when the Colonel of one of the native regiments, named Arabi Bey, took the lead, and, surrounding the Khedive’s palace with 4000 men, demanded, with arms in his hands, the redress of grievances from his Prince. Destitute of all real power, Tewfik was unable to crush this revolt; he met the mutineers, tried to conciliate them, and gave in to their demands. A change of government took place, and the Chamber of Notables was convened. From that moment Arabi’s influence grew stronger, the army became devoted to him, and around him rallied all groups of the people who were dissatisfied with foreign interference. “Egypt for the Egyptians” was now the cry, and the newly appointed Chamber, far from allaying the trouble, added fuel to the flames of discontent that were already kindled. It was evident the crisis could not be much longer deferred.
The French urged the British Government to take active measures to support the Joint Control which then existed in Egypt, and the latter were quite willing to carry out this advice. On the 6th of January, 1882, an Identical or Dual Note was presented to the Khedive, expressing the determination of the two nations “to ward off by their united efforts all cause of external or internal complications which might menace the régime established in Egypt.” The Notables answered this challenge by claiming the right of regulating the national budget, and Tewfik’s action became somewhat uncertain. It could not be accurately ascertained whether he meant to stand by his European allies who had placed him upon the throne, or whether he was about to throw in his lot with the national party. At any rate, Arabi, advanced to the dignity of Pasha, became still more powerful, and was appointed Minister for War.
Now, in England, there was a certain feeling in favour of the Egyptians, and this might be expected to find expression among the supporters of the Liberal party then in power, who claim, perhaps with greater emphasis than others, to respect the liberties of mankind, and to listen to the grievances of all who complain. It is against our custom to stifle the voice of an assembly, however feebly it may be supposed to represent the wishes of a people, and in this crisis there were not wanting some who hesitated to sanction the use of coercive measures. Nor was there a total absence of a primâ facie cause of discontent; for the European officials of every nationality had multiplied in Egypt, and in 1882 there were as many as 1324, receiving salaries from the taxes that amounted to a considerable proportion of the revenue,—to £373,704 per annum.[403] It is possible that if we had not deferred to the French at this juncture, we might have put an end to the commotion without resorting to war, and that, had we been the sole trustee for European interests, we might have found some satisfactory solution to the difficulty. But, as had happened before, we were fettered by our alliance with the French, which was not defined, and in order to maintain our relations with them, we followed their lead.
-----
Footnote 403:
Annual Register, 1882, pt. i. 361 (note). See, also, D. Mackenzie Wallace, Egypt and the Egyptian Question, p. 135 (London, 1883).
-----
The Dual Note having only intensified the trouble, our Government despaired of maintaining order unless some vigorous action were taken to disperse it. They believed that the best course under the circumstances was to resort to the only legal means which then existed: viz. to revive, in some shape, the dormant rights of suzerainty which the Sultan claimed, which in theory had never been abrogated, and which had been made use of, as we have seen, less than three years before, with the consent of all the European Powers. It was therefore contemplated to utilize the Turks, under certain conditions and restrictions, to put an end to the deadlock, and to prevent Egypt from becoming the prey to the anarchy that appeared to be imminent. Whether the remedy would have proved efficacious and satisfactory need not now be discussed; for the French objected to any such arrangement, and, to please them, we acquiesced in the objection. Then they proposed that the Anglo-French fleets should make a demonstration before Alexandria, and in this we readily concurred without any agreement as to subsequent action. The plan was therefore put into execution (May 20th). But far from appeasing the tumult, this step only aggravated it. The authority of the Khedive was now completely effaced, and Arabi became dictator. The excitement of the people increased, a serious riot occurred in Alexandria (June 11th), and earthworks for the defence of the town began to be thrown up. It was not easy to recede before this defiance. The British Admiral demanded that the construction of fortifications should be stopped, and, later, that they should be surrendered to him. The demand was resisted. It was then deemed necessary to take them at any risk, and to destroy by force the power of Arabi, who was proclaimed a rebel against his Prince.[404] And now a strange event occurred. The French, though they succeeded in inducing our Government to defer to their wishes, were not bound to us in any way. Having gone just far enough to ensure an armed intervention, they refused to take their share in it, and, when hostilities were imminent, their fleet sailed away from the scene where they must commence.
-----
Footnote 404:
The precise date, says a writer of the day, on which the Khedive’s troops became rebels could be no more accurately ascertained than that of the discovery that the “military tyranny” imposed by Arabi, received the cordial sympathy and support of nearly every class throughout Egypt (Annual Register, 1882, i. 369). It was not until the 16th of July, after the war began, that the Khedive issued an order dismissing Arabi from his post as Minister of War (Military History of the Campaign of 1882 in Egypt, p. 16; prepared in the Intelligence Branch of the War Office, by Colonel J. F. Maurice, Royal Artillery). As we have frequently drawn from this work, in future it will be referred to as “Maurice, Official Account.”
-----
The bombardment of the earthworks followed on the 11th of July, and it is needless to say that our navy soon reduced the enemy’s guns to silence, and drove him out of Alexandria. Arabi’s troops having retired, blue-jackets and marines were landed to restore order in the town. Meanwhile a force, drawn from Malta and Gibraltar, had been concentrated at Cyprus, and was commanded by Major-General Sir Archibald Alison, Bart., K.C.B., who arrived in the island, July 14th. These troops were speedily moved therefrom, and, reaching Alexandria on the 17th, they took up a line fronting the Egyptian army at Kafr-ed-Dauer, that lay a few miles south of the coast covering the road to Cairo.[405]
-----
Footnote 405:
See Maps No. 9, p. 379, and No. 8, p. 360. Some future historian may perhaps consider what the result would have been if the fleet had been provided with a land force when the war was begun by the bombardment of the 11th, and whether the revolt against foreign interference could have been strangled in Alexandria, before it grew and required a regular invasion to suppress it. Into these matters we do not propose to enter; it is sufficient to say that no means were prepared to take military advantage of the peculiar nature of the communications which join Alexandria with the rest of the country, and that Arabi’s troops got away unhurt.
-----
Preparations were now actively pushed forward to follow up the first blow struck by the British fleet for the purpose of restoring the authority of the Khedive. A vote of credit was agreed to in Parliament, troops were ordered to be got ready to proceed to the seat of war, and a portion of the reserves were called up to serve during the emergency (July 25th). The French also at last plainly expressed their intentions, by declining definitely to take part in the expedition which had now to be undertaken. The decision was made on the 29th of July in their Chambers, by a majority of 416 against 75 votes. Thus Great Britain was obliged to act alone, and if this was the result, it may seem to be a pity that she had not been allowed to have a free hand from the beginning. Be this as it may, she gained the advantage of being at least unfettered in the military operations that followed, and hence the dangers and inconvenience of a joint occupation were happily avoided.
As early as the 3rd of July, General Sir Garnet Wolseley, G.C.B., appointed to take command of the expedition in case hostilities were undertaken, confidentially traced the plan of operations to be pursued. Soon the field army was organized, among which a Guards Brigade was included; and on the 30th of July, the first troops, the 1st Scots Guards (Colonel Knox), left England on board the Orient.[406] The other two Battalions of this Brigade, the 2nd Grenadiers (Colonel P. Smith), and the 2nd Coldstream (Colonel G. Wigram), being at Cork and Dublin respectively, left these stations for the seat of war as soon as they received drafts from London to fit them to take the field. For this purpose, the 2nd Battalion obtained from the 1st Coldstream, one Colour-sergeant, 9 sergeants, and 204 rank and file (28th); and on the 1st of August, having proceeded to Kingstown from Richmond Barracks, Dublin, they embarked, about 750 strong, on board the Iberia, and started for Alexandria. They reached their destination on the 13th, and moved immediately to Ramleh, where the Brigade was collecting under the orders of Major-General H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught, K.G.[407]
The following Officers formed part of the Battalion:—
Commanding the 2nd Battalion.—Colonel G. Wigram.
Mounted Majors.—Colonels A. Lambton; F. C. Manningham-Buller.
Dismounted Majors and Captains.—Lieut.-Colonels J. B. Sterling; Viscount de Vesci; R. S. Hall; W. F. Ramsden; Hon. E. Acheson; R. W. Follett; Hon. E. Boscawen.
Lieutenants.—Captains R. Pole-Carew; J. G. Montgomery; F. C. Manley; L. D. Mackinnon: Lieutenants Hon. E. Dawney; Hon. H. Monck; J. R. Gladstone; D. F. R. Dawson; G. V. Boyle; W. O. Corbet (in command of Regimental transport); G. P. Bouverie; Hon. A. Fortescue; P. A. Lovell (Signalling Officer); D. J. Hamilton; Hon. Alan Charteris; and H. G. Shute; also H. Somers-Cocks (who left Portsmouth for Egypt, August 16).
Adjutant.—Lieutenant Hon. A. Henniker-Major.
Quartermaster.—W. Webster.
Medical Officers.—Surgeon-Major G. Perry; Surgeon J. Whipple, M.D.
-----
Footnote 406:
Lieut.-General Willis and Major-General H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught, with their Staffs, were on board the Orient.
Footnote 407:
Captain Ivor Herbert, Grenadier Guards, was appointed Brigade Major; Major R. Lane, Rifle Brigade, Aide-de-camp to His Royal Highness.
-----
The following Officers, also belonging to the Regiment, served upon the Staff:—
Lieut.-Colonel Lord William Seymour, attached to the British Admiral.
Captain Pole-Carew, Orderly Officer to H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught.
Lieutenant A. Codrington, Aide-de-camp to Lieut.-General Willis, commanding the First Division.
Before this date, Sir A. Alison had been covering the concentration of the army at Alexandria, and, by means of strong reconnaissances, he endeavoured to make the enemy believe that the invaders meant to attack him from the north. But this was not the intention of Sir G. Wolseley, whose object was to seize the Maritime Canal, and, basing himself upon Ismailia, to advance thence to the capital of Egypt. In this manner, the main water-way between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea would be secured from any attempt which Arabi might make upon it, and the invading army would obtain the best route into the interior. The route, it is true, was far from being a good one, for it lay in a desert of deep sand; but none of the communications of the country, other than by rail or canal, are good, and, in fact, roads, as we understand them, may be said to have no existence. The one selected, however, besides the strategical advantage it offered, of enabling an army to turn the Delta, and to proceed by the shortest way to Cairo, had along its course a fresh-water canal, where drinking water was to be obtained, and a railway; and both of these served as easy lines of supply. Arabi, indeed, had done his best to render these communications useless, but he could only obstruct them temporarily; and, though he thereby impeded our advance, he was not able to arrest it.
The British Commander had from the beginning believed that the enemy would make a stand at Tel el-Kebir, some thirty miles from Ismailia, on the road to Cairo; and if this were to prove to be correct, he determined to deliver a crushing and effective blow there, and so bring the campaign to a speedy and prompt conclusion. We shall see that he was entirely right in the opinion he had formed, and successful in carrying out his plan. To ensure this success, it was necessary to push advanced troops, of sufficient strength, from Ismailia to a point within striking distance of Arabi’s position, behind which the water and rail communications could be restored, and where the main army could be concentrated for the final battle.
The forces massing at Alexandria from the middle of July came, as we know, from the Mediterranean stations, and from the United Kingdom; but troops, native and British, also were despatched to the seat of war from India; and these, beginning to arrive on the 20th of August, landed at Suez, and, later, at Ismailia. The whole formed an Army-Corps, under the command of General Sir G. Wolseley (who landed in Egypt on August 15th), and was made up of a cavalry division, two infantry divisions, corps troops, and an Indian contingent. Each division was formed of two brigades and divisional troops.
The Cavalry Division, 23 squadrons, mounted infantry, and 6 guns, under Major-General Drury-Low: the 1st Brigade (Brigadier-General Sir Baker Russell) contained, among others, three squadrons of Household cavalry, under Colonel Ewart, 2nd Life Guards;[408] the 2nd Brigade (Brigadier-General Wilkinson), Indian cavalry. The First Division, 8 battalions, 2 squadrons, and 12 guns, under Lieut.-General Willis: 1st Brigade (three Guards Battalions), Major-General H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught; 2nd Brigade (4 Battalions), Major-General Graham, V.C. The Second Division, 9 battalions, 2 squadrons, and 12 guns, under Lieut.-General Sir E. Hamley: 1st Brigade (4 battalions), Major-General Sir A. Alison; 2nd Brigade (4 battalions), Major-General Sir E. Wood, V.C. The Corps troops contained one battery of Royal Horse Artillery, and three batteries of Field Artillery, 24 guns. The Indian contingent, under Major-General Sir H. Macpherson, V.C., 4 battalions (of which 2 were native), 1 company Beluchis, 6 guns (mountain battery). Total force, including a reserve at Aden of 2 native battalions, not brought into the field, amounted to 23 battalions, 27 squadrons, and 60 guns, besides Engineers, Marines, Marine Artillery, siege trains, etc.; or to 1180 Officers, and 28,300 men.[409]
-----
Footnote 408:
One squadron from each Regiment of Household Cavalry.
Footnote 409:
Appendix No. XIV. contains the order of battle.
-----
Although all this army had not landed, yet a sufficient force had been collected to seize the Suez Canal, and to begin the real business of the campaign. Ample preparations had already been made by the Navy for this operation. The final details having been settled, a simultaneous landing was effected by blue-jackets and marines at all the important places from Port Said to Suez; and the water-way was cleared from end to end by 4 a.m. on the morning of the 20th of August.[410] Meanwhile, those portions of the Cavalry and First Divisions that were at Alexandria were embarked on board ship, while those of the Second Division were left behind to protect the town, and to keep up the delusion that Egypt was to be invaded from the north. In order to give the greater currency to this idea, it was further given out that the troops on board ship were destined to make an attack on Abukir. The 2nd Coldstream, which since their arrival at Ramleh had been facing south towards Kafr-ed-Dauer, re-embarked on the Iberia on the 18th of August, and the whole fleet, consisting of 8 ironclads and 17 transports, left in the direction of Abukir at noon on the 19th, and approached Port Said next day, in the early morning. As soon as possible the ships entered the canal, and, piloted by Officers of the Royal Navy, were concentrated at Ismailia. They grounded occasionally as they steamed through the difficult passage, and delayed the procession; but these accidents did not materially check the movement, which was not confined merely to the fleet that sailed from Alexandria, but included also transports, conveying troops direct to the seat of war, from England by Port Said, and from India by Suez. General Graham, having landed with a small force of infantry on the evening of the 20th, pushed forward to Nefisha early next day; and the Guards Brigade, arriving at their destination late on the 21st, disembarked on the 22nd. For two days they were busily engaged in fatigue duties at Ismailia, during which time the concentration of troops continued with unabated energy, so that on the evening of the 23rd about 9000 men were on shore.[411]
-----
Footnote 410:
Three ships, one French and two English, delayed the operation for a few hours.
Footnote 411:
Maurice, Official Account , p. 36. See Map No. 8, p. 360.
-----
The invaders were dependent for drinking water upon the fresh-water canal previously mentioned, that runs from the Nile near Cairo to Ismailia; and now a fear seized the military authorities that Arabi might be able to destroy its banks, and stop the greater portion of our supply, not only at Nefisha and Ismailia, but also as far as Suez. It was therefore determined to send forward a small force on the 24th, under General Graham, to occupy El-Magfar, where the danger was most to be apprehended, and to prevent the occurrence of any such calamity. The force (1 battalion, 3 squadrons, and 2 guns) was not a large one; but it met with no resistance, and soon accomplished its object, not, however, without causing the enemy to show that he was concentrating a formidable body of men in a position further up the canal, at Tel el-Makhuta. It was evident that the British advanced detachment, if attacked with energy, might be unable to hold its own, and be obliged to fall back; but it was also clear that an initial advantage could be gained if we could bring up a sufficient force to cause the Egyptians to evacuate the ground they were engaged in taking up. Accordingly Sir G. Wolseley, who was present, sent back immediately to direct that the Guards Brigade at Ismailia and a battalion of infantry at Nefisha should move to the front without delay.
Meanwhile, the advanced troops became engaged, and a very unequal fight, as far as the numbers of the combatants were concerned, took place under the orders of General Willis. But the large Egyptian forces showed no disposition to close with the small body opposed to them, and the latter maintained their position until reinforcements, consisting of all the three arms, arrived to their support. Just before sundown the Guards Brigade appeared on the scene, the Coldstream leading; the Battalion then coming into the advanced line, under shell fire which happily was not effective, occupied an extended line of outposts during the night. The day had been exceedingly hot and oppressive, and the operations as well as the want of water had greatly exhausted the men, both those who fought and those who marched to their support under a scorching sun and through the burning sand.
“A scarcely less trying task had fallen to the lot of the Brigade of Guards. A march over the two miles of heavy road between Ismailia and Nefisha, difficult at any time, was, during the burning hours of the midday sun of an exceptionally hot day, a very serious task indeed. Throughout all the rest of the campaign, both before and after this, troops were ordered to march in the cool hours of the early morning, or of the late afternoon and evening. The sudden necessity for taking advantage of the enemy’s stand at Tel el-Makhuta alone made this severe task imperative. Even for troops in presence of the Egyptians, the direst enemies all that day were the sun and the parching glare of the desert sand. But at least they had the excitement of actual fighting, and were able at all times to take advantage of any shade that waggons and hillocks afforded, and they had not during those hours of fierce heat the additional labour of plodding over sand, burning to the feet and ankle deep. Man after man during the march was knocked down by the severity of the strain, and by stroke of the sun. All who were physically able pushed on with honest pride and steady discipline, but it was not until 6.20 p.m. that the march was over, and that H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught was able to bring up his Brigade to the support of the troops engaged.”[412]
-----
Footnote 412:
Maurice, Official Account , p. 49. One man of the Coldstream, struck down by sun apoplexy, died at Nefisha next day (25th).
-----
N^o. 8.
Mintern Bros. Photo lith. A.D. Innes & C^o. London.
At daybreak (25th), an advance was made by the First Division, General Graham in front, followed by the Guards Brigade in support, and, protecting the right flank, the King’s Royal Rifles and Marine Light Infantry, who had just come up, in second line; the Cavalry, under General Drury Low, on the extreme right front. Tel el-Makhuta was found to be abandoned by the enemy; but the Cavalry, still pushing on, found him at Mahsama, where, after a short struggle, they not only dislodged him but captured his camp, seven Krupp guns, and a large quantity of ammunition, stores, and provisions. Next day we took possession of Kassassin, and it was occupied by General Graham, the Guards being left at Tel el-Makhuta.
Meanwhile the disembarkation of men, horses, guns, and stores of all sorts still continued at Ismailia. As the English advanced troops had reached Kassassin,—within striking distance of Tel el-Kebir, where Arabi was known to be entrenching, with the object of making a definite stand against us,—it was now necessary to bring up all available forces for the assault of his lines. General Sir E. Hamley was therefore ordered round to Ismailia from Alexandria with the Second Division (except Sir E. Wood’s brigade, which was directed to remain there for the defence of the town and neighbourhood); so also was the Indian contingent moved up from Suez. While the concentration was in progress, communications were restored as rapidly as possible between the base and Kassassin. The line of railway was repaired where it was torn up, and where embankments of earth had been found to block it; and rolling stock brought out from England was landed and placed upon it. The fresh-water canal also was cleared by removing the dams, which had been constructed across it at Makhuta and Magfar. The Guards Brigade remained at Makhuta until the 9th of September, busily engaged in digging away the obstructions that impeded the traffic on the railway and on the canal at these two points, and partly in throwing up redoubts to strengthen the lines of communications. It was a laborious work;—
“for the skilful dam-makers ... had so wattled in reeds, telegraph wires, and other binding materials into the mass of the earthworks, that our men, standing in the muddy canal without any convenient foothold, had the greatest difficulty in removing the obstacles.”[413]
-----
Footnote 413:
Maurice, Official Account , p. 55.
-----
Supplies also ran short, on account of the impossibility of conveying them across the deep sand, through which lay the only road to the front, until the railway or canal could be used.
“But the most trying circumstance which the rapid movement had entailed was the absence of tents and camp equipage. These were pushed on by rail and canal as rapidly as the condition of both permitted, but for some days the necessity of depending for chance shade upon the shelter of the trees and villages under that glaring sun called for much endurance on the part of the troops so employed. It was the price paid for the rapid successes of the 24th and 25th. The tents reached the troops at Tel el-Makhuta on the 28th. The valises of the men reached them on the following day.”[414]
-----
Footnote 414:
Ibid. , p. 57.
-----
Nevertheless, in spite of the difficulties to be overcome, the scorching heat, and the shadeless glare, the work was well and expeditiously performed. The following communication from Colonel Drake, Commanding Royal Engineer of the First Division, refers to what the Brigade did at this period of the campaign:—[415]
Tel el-Makhuta, August 30, 1882. I wish to bring to the notice of the Lieutenant-General Commanding, the excellent work which has been done by the Brigade of Guards on the important work, of opening the communications on the railway and canal. Engineering work, always fatiguing to troops fully employed on military duties, has been especially harassing in this climate; but in consequence of the great interest shown in the work by the Guards Officers in charge of parties, it has been executed by the men cheerfully and well, and it is my opinion, that had this spirit not been shown by Officers and men, the progress of the army must have been for several days delayed.
-----
Footnote 415:
An extract of a report upon the signalling performed in Egypt by the Coldstream is reproduced in Appendix No. XIV.
-----
Once, on the 28th of August, this labour was interrupted for a brief space. On that day the enemy attempted to make an attack on Kassassin, which, owing to the fact that it was commanded by hills in his possession, was not a strong military position. Having made a demonstration in the morning, which resulted only in a distant artillery fire of little value, Arabi ordered a more vigorous attack upon General Graham in the afternoon, and this produced some fighting, and a charge conducted in moonlight by the three squadrons of the Household Cavalry. The Egyptians then retired, and the action came to an end; but as soon as it was perceived that the enemy was endeavouring to recapture Kassassin, the Guards Brigade were hurried forward from Makhuta to the threatened point, and were placed in reserve. The three Battalions did not return to their quarters until midnight.
On the 7th of September, communications were cleared, a railway service was established, the main bulk of the supplies and stores—of which large quantities had already been despatched to the front—were ready to be sent forward, and the remaining troops, hitherto kept back at Ismailia, were awaiting to be moved to Kassassin. Orders to concentrate the army there were given, when Arabi made one more attempt to defeat the advanced troops opposed to him at that place, before the rest came into position (September 9th). His previous efforts had failed; and it was scarcely likely that, having effected so little before—although in contact with a small portion of the British forces only—he would now be able to achieve a success at this late stage of the war. The attack was nevertheless a formidable one in point of numbers, and almost the whole of the hostile forces, supported by a powerful artillery, were employed in it. But it was easily repulsed, and the enemy was pursued towards Tel el-Kebir, where he ran for shelter.[416] During the action, the Guards Brigade were once more moved forward from Makhuta to remain in reserve should their services be required; but they were not brought into action. It seems probable that, had the advance of the First and Cavalry Divisions, who were then present, been continued, Arabi would then and there have been driven out of his entrenched position. The pursuit, however, was not pressed home. Instead of returning to their former camp, the Guards remained for the next few days on the ground they occupied on the evening of the 9th.
-----
Footnote 416:
Our losses amounted to 3 killed and 77 wounded.
-----
The Egyptian army could scarcely be considered a very formidable foe. The Generals had shown little military capacity, the native Officers no enterprise or power of leadership, and the men in consequence had displayed but a small amount of valour. Drawn principally from the fellaheen, or the peasantry of the country, the ranks of the forces opposed to us were filled with men who had no desire to excel in the profession of arms; and during the first combats of the campaign we gained ample proof of their inefficiency in the field.[417] As regards their numbers, we are informed that at the date of the bombardment (July 11th), the Egyptian army consisted in all of about 9000 men, 288 field guns, and only 750 horses. Of these, 5000 were in Alexandria, the rest being dispersed over the country. The reserves were called in afterwards, and the 9000 expanded to 60,000, by the 20th of August; when 15,000 were before Alexandria, 12,000 at Tel el-Kebir, 11,000 at Cairo, and 22,000 were distributed in remote garrisons unmolested by the invaders; besides this, there were 6000 Beduin Arabs, half at Tel el-Kebir and the remainder before Alexandria. Again, later, 40,000 raw recruits without training were enlisted, and the total of the army reached the high figure of 100,000 men, not counting the Beduins. For all these men, it appears, arms were available, and 11,000 untrained draft horses were procured.[418] These vast numbers of undisciplined and unorganized men could do little to serve Arabi’s cause, and they seem to have been rather a source of weakness to him. Unable to fight, they were liable to panic, and their presence was more calculated to unsteady the few soldiers who alone possessed some knowledge of their duties than to augment the strength of the army.
-----
Footnote 417:
Arabi’s force contained a few battalions of Sudanese, or black troops; the latter were his best soldiers, and fought well.
Footnote 418:
Maurice, Official Account , p. 40, etc.
-----
By the evening of the 12th of September, the whole available British forces were at Kassassin, some eight miles from Tel el-Kebir, and numbered 634 Officers, and 16,767 Non-commissioned officers and men, 61 guns, and 6 gatlings. Previous to this date, several reconnaissances had been undertaken towards the enemy’s entrenched position to examine his works, and to observe his strength, disposition, and habits. The knowledge so gained could only confirm the poor opinion in which the enemy deserved to be held. His lines were continuous, stretching from the canal for a distance of some 6000 yards; but they were not apparently protected by any advanced works, nor provided with efficient inner entrenchments. They seemed to present little difficulty to storming parties, nor were any formidable obstacles visible.[419] The left (north) flank, moreover, was entirely open and unguarded; and, lastly, no outposts secured the front during the night. Thus feebly did Arabi venture to oppose the army of one of the great Powers of Europe; and if he was unable to bring civilized science to his aid, so also were his troops incapable of displaying the wild heroism that belongs to the barbarian. In short, he invited a night attack either on his left flank or in front; with the certainty that, if the invaders could reach unseen the position he endeavoured to fortify, they could turn it or penetrate it, before he was ready to meet them; and the whole of his defences would be rendered useless. This would bring about his complete defeat, and the dispersal of his raw levies, who eagerly watched for an early opportunity to desert and fly to their homes.
-----
Footnote 419:
The lines were afterwards found to consist of a parapet from 3 to 5½ feet high, with a ditch in front, about 4 feet deep; they were stronger in the south, near the canal, than on the north, where, in fact, they died away, as it were, into nothing in the desert.
-----
It is, however, one thing to perceive after the event, what ought to be done, but quite another thing to determine beforehand, the best line of action, and to ensure a result as successful and decisive as the assault on Tel el-Kebir proved to be. The night march across the desert was by no means an easy operation. It entailed the bringing up the whole army in battle array, through the dark, close to a given position at a given time. Careful arrangements to prevent confusion had to be therefore made on the part of the leaders, from the Commander-in-chief downwards; and attention and rigid discipline were more than ever required on the part of the men who were thus led to the assault. It is needless to say that all ranks vied with one another in discharging correctly the important functions that every man had to perform during that night; and in this manner was the difficult operation carried through without hitch, and even without temporary delay. It should be added here, that fortune also favoured us in no small degree. Arabi had, in fact, constructed one, and only one, advanced work in front of his lines of defence; but it had not been discovered during our reconnaissances, and we were ignorant of its existence. By good luck that work was avoided by our columns, as they went forward in the dark to the attack. Thus we managed to cross the desert unperceived by so dangerous a tell-tale of our movement, and arrived at dawn before the hostile lines, close enough to storm them before the Egyptians even knew that we were in their vicinity.
A conspicuous point in the lines had been selected upon which to direct the march of the Second (Hamley’s) Division; Sir A. Alison’s Highlanders in front, followed by a brigade formed of the two Divisional battalions of the infantry divisions, under Lieut.-Colonel Ashburnham, C.B., King’s Royal Rifle Corps. The First Division was on Sir E. Hamley’s right, with an interval of 1200 yards; General Graham’s brigade in front, supported by the Guards 1000 yards in rear. Forty-two guns were placed between the two divisions, in line with the Guards Brigade. The Cavalry Division with 12 guns Royal Horse Artillery were on the extreme right. The Indian contingent and the Mountain battery, on the south of the canal, with orders to move off an hour after the rest of the army.
The troops began to strike their tents when dusk set in, and marched to their various rendezvous not without difficulty. It was, of course, imperative that every corps should reach its starting-point in proper order, and there was naturally some moving backwards and forwards in the dark before the masses were correctly formed and aligned. The Brigade took post in their usual formation, the Coldstream on the left, and each Battalion was in columns of half battalions. Everything was ready at 11 p.m.; the men then lay down till 1.30 a.m. of the 13th of September, when they arose in silence, and commenced the advance. We had the advantage of meeting no obstacles in the way; the trackless gravelly soil everywhere afforded an easy passage, and, guided by the stars alone, the army maintained the direction of their march.
At night, however, men are always somewhat under the influence of a vague and undefined feeling. The absence of sound, the inability to see for more than a few feet, the sense of isolation which every group experiences, the strange surroundings, the uncertainty of the future, the idea that some untoward event may happen,—all contribute to produce a suppressed excitement almost akin to nervousness.[420] The principal danger lay in the fact that should the centre halt, the wings would continue to move, and so wheel inwards, until one flank faced the other. This actually occurred in the Highland Brigade; but the mishap went no further, and was very speedily rectified by the vigilance, discipline, and intelligence of all ranks. The First Division moved more slowly than the Second, and its leading brigade appears to have executed some changes of formation during the night; the Guards, following in support, made no change in this respect, but marched in the order in which they had originally started. Just before reaching the enemy’s position, the British army was in an irregular echelon; the left was forward and nearest to the enemy, and the right was about 800 yards back.
-----
Footnote 420:
“It is impossible adequately to convey an impression of the absolute silence which prevailed, and of the entire absence of any indication of the existence of a moving army at only a few yards from each of the columns” (Maurice, Official Account , p. 82).
-----
The Egyptians say their forces at Tel el-Kebir amounted to 20,000 men and 75 guns; but there seems reason to believe that they have under-estimated their numerical strength, and that they had from 25,000 to 30,000 men present.[421]
-----
Footnote 421:
Maurice, Official Account , p. 92. If there is no exaggeration in the total numbers which, we are told, the rebel government collected after the bombardment of the 11th of July, and in the number of guns which were at their disposal at that date, it would appear likely that at least 30,000 men instead of 20,000 men must have been present at Tel el-Kebir; and it is somewhat a surprise to find that Arabi had only so small a force of artillery defending his lines, as 75 guns, when as many as 288 were apparently available at his orders.
-----
As the enemy had no outposts to cover his front; and as we had been fortunate enough to pass by the only advanced work he had constructed, without coming in contact with it,—though our left was at one time unpleasantly close to it,—he had no sort of warning that our whole army was approaching his defensive position, and would assault it at daybreak. He was completely surprised. At 5 a.m., when the first gleam of light was beginning to appear, the Highlanders were close to Tel el-Kebir, and, dashing forward, they carried, after a brief but sharp struggle, the defensive lines in which Arabi apparently had placed so much confidence. While this fight was proceeding, General Graham’s brigade hurried up, and penetrated the Egyptian lines, where they presented a smaller obstacle than did those which faced the Second Division. The battle lasted scarcely half an hour. By the end of that time, the enemy was entirely overpowered, and his forces were annihilated and completely dispersed. The Guards followed, and got into the works as soon as possible, but the short action was then practically at an end.
“The first of the enemy’s shells landed in the middle of some vedettes, about eighty yards to our left front; nearly all the rest fell about one hundred yards in rear of us. As we advanced the Egyptians did not seem to alter their elevation. The bullets were falling all around us; but firing ceased at about 6 a.m., except our guns blazing at the flying Arabs.”[422]
-----
Footnote 422:
Captain Shute (Coldstream Guards), Diary .
-----
The cavalry was ordered immediately to pursue the enemy to Cairo, the infantry advancing into and occupying the Egyptian camp and the bridge at Tel el-Kebir. The former pushed boldly on to a suburb of the capital, whence Lieut.-Colonel Herbert Stewart went forward with a small force of fifty men, and secured the capitulation of the town and the surrender of Arabi (September 14th). Egypt now lay at the mercy of the British army.[423]
-----
Footnote 423:
See Appendix No. XIV., giving Her Majesty’s message to the British army, and Sir G. Wolseley’s General Orders, issued after the battle of Tel el-Kebir.
-----
The losses of Arabi’s forces at the battle of the 13th of September can scarcely be reckoned by the killed and wounded; for such was the extent of the disaster he experienced, that he had no further troops at the end of the action. Many fled to their homes, many rushed wildly onwards panic-stricken; all idea of further resistance had come to an end; every man only thought how he could best make his submission, and welcome the conquerors with demonstrations of joy. The Egyptian casualties are reckoned at 2500, and 58 of their guns were captured. The British lost 9 Officers and 48 men killed, 27 Officers and 355 men wounded, and 30 missing, total 469. Of these the Highlanders lost 45 killed, 180 wounded, and 6 missing; General Graham’s brigade 9 killed, 119 wounded, and 24 missing; the Guards Brigade 1 man killed, and 2 Officers and 20 men wounded; in the Coldstream, 1 Officer (Lieut.-Colonel J. B. Sterling), and 7 men were wounded,—of the latter, one man subsequently died of his wounds.[424]
-----
Footnote 424:
Lieut.-Colonel Balfour, Grenadier Guards, reckoned among the wounded, died of his wounds; as did also two Officers of the Highland Brigade.
-----
The victorious forces pushed on towards Cairo after the battle, and secured all the railway centres which communicated with the Egyptian garrisons, still held by the enemy. There was little trouble in causing these garrisons to submit, and by the 24th the whole country was pacified and disarmed. General Willis, with his 2nd Brigade and Divisional infantry, remained at Tel el-Kebir for a short time longer, while Sir G. Wolseley, with the Duke of Connaught, and a company of the Scots Guards as escort, went by train, on the afternoon of the 14th, to the capital, followed by the rest of the Scots Guards, by the Coldstream, and by the Grenadier Guards. Owing to obstructions on the line, the Commander-in-chief did not reach his destination until the morning of the 15th; and the Coldstream, starting the same day, reached Cairo that afternoon. The Battalion were then quartered in the Abdin barracks.
The rebellion had now been crushed, and the Khedive’s authority having been completely restored, Tewfik entered his capital in state on the 25th, and resumed his place in the government of the country. British troops, and among them the Guards, lined the streets, which were gaily decked with triumphal arches and inscriptions of welcome. If it is allowable to compare a small event with a great one, the scene was in a very minor degree (in principle, at least), not wholly unlike that which attended the return of the Bourbons to Paris in 1815. The “Usurper” in this case was not redoubtable, nor had he scourged Europe as had his proto-type; but he had interfered with the legal gains of European bondholders, and withstood the wishes and designs of the Western nations. The people, also, in the two cases, not having much will of their own, like many others in a similar position, were influenced by one very simple and burning desire—to give their hearty applause to the strongest party.
A draft from England left for the Battalion, under Lieut.-Colonel F. Graves-Sawle and Lieutenant E. Wigram, September 11th; but they were too late to take part in any of the hostilities that marked the campaign, and they went no further than Malta.
There is little more to record. The six weeks spent in Cairo passed agreeably enough, and many eagerly availed themselves of the opportunity to see the sights and the remains of an ancient civilization that makes Egypt one of the most interesting countries in the world. Nor was a race-meeting forgotten, held on the 28th of September, even though other national sports and pastimes had to be discarded on account of the heat. A serious accident, that occurred the same day at the railway-station of Cairo, may also be mentioned. An accidental explosion took place in a waggon laden with ammunition, near the platform, and, as the flames could not be got under, the station buildings were soon destroyed, and much rolling stock and a considerable amount of stores were burnt. Troops were at once sent to the spot, and amongst them the 2nd Coldstream assisted to clear away the débris, and guard the place; several smaller explosions continued even during the night.
On the 30th of September a review was held before the Khedive, and the spectacle was made as imposing as possible to impress the natives, not only by the appearance of English troops, but also by the presence of the Indian contingent—Mussulmans like themselves—in the service of Her Majesty. Two days later, the Khedive gave a garden party at the Gezireh palace, to which all Officers were invited in “full dress,” the latter being defined for the occasion, “red serges, swords, and forage caps.” Lastly, there was the famous procession of the “Sacred Carpet,” carried through Cairo on its way to Mecca, and escorted by British troops—an incident which gave rise to some comment in England.
“I had a good deal of difficulty,” writes Captain Shute in his diary, “to find the camel with the carpet, as it had gone another way to the station so as to avoid the British escort. Tremendous procession of Arabs with banners; behind the camel with the carpet came several more camels bearing pilgrims to Mecca, and their baggage.”
The health of the troops gave some cause for anxiety on account of fever and other illnesses, which broke out among them; and, in consequence, several Officers and men of the Battalion had to be sent home invalided. But the sickness was not abnormally great, considering the fatigues and the privations to which the men were subjected during the campaign; the losses of the Battalion in this respect amounted to eighteen men, of whom twelve died of fever.
Soon after the Carpet incident the war organization of the invading army was broken up, and Sir A. Alison, being left in Cairo with a British force, while the re-settlement of Egypt was being accomplished, arrangements were made to send the remainder home to England, and the Indian contingent to India. The Coldstream, leaving their quarters in Cairo on the 31st of October by train for Alexandria, embarked there, the next day, on board the Batavia, and, reaching Portsmouth on the 16th, proceeded thence to Chelsea barracks.
It only remains to record that, in recognition of the services of the army in Egypt in 1882, Her Majesty was graciously pleased to augment the honourable distinctions upon the Colours of the regiments engaged in the campaign by the words “Egypt, 1882,” and “Tel el-Kebir.”
Thus was the war in Egypt conducted, and thus did the British army conquer Arabi Pasha, and subject the country once more to the rule of Tewfik. A new period now commenced, when Egypt was placed under the protection of England—a temporary protection only, as the Foreign Secretary of the day eagerly announced,—who assumed the responsibility of forming a pure administration out of discordant elements, and of educating the people to respect the system which was introduced for their benefit. The success that has attended our efforts, under difficult circumstances, is an interesting subject; so also is the resentment which the French pretend to feel—because we are obliged to stay in a land we conquered and saved from what might have been anarchy, when they would not move themselves to put an end to the trouble. But the consideration of these matters does not enter into the scope of this volume, as the Coldstream was not employed in the work of Egyptian reconstruction. A question, closely connected with our intervention, did, however, still remain to be settled, and it very speedily involved us in further military operations, in which the Regiment took its share. We must therefore devote the next two chapters to the causes and conduct of this war.
XVI. FIRST PART OF THE WAR IN THE SUDAN, 1884-85—EXPEDITION UP THE NILE
General description of the possessions of the Khedive in 1882—Rebellion in the Sudan; rapid rise of the Mahdi—Policy of the British Government—General Gordon sent to Khartum; he is cut off and besieged there—General Lord Wolseley goes to Egypt—Formation of a Camel Corps, of which the Guards compose a Regiment—Problem how to effect the rescue of Gordon—The Nile route selected—Advance to Korti—News from General Gordon—Two columns advance from Korti: one across the Bayuda Desert, the other up the river—Battles of Abu Klea and Abu Kru—The Nile reached near Metemmeh—Sir C. Wilson’s effort to proceed to Khartum—Death of General Gordon—Change of plan entailed by this event—Battle of Kirbekan—Retrograde movement of both columns—Troops placed in summer quarters.
Egypt proper is generally a long and narrow strip of land formed by the valley of the Nile.[425] Outside the influence of that river, there is nothing but desert, and it is due to the fact that the stream branches out into a Delta at Cairo, that there is any breadth at all in the country. This great water artery receives no affluents for more than 1500 miles from its mouth—the Atbara River, meeting it above Berber, being the last tributary that joins it,—and throughout a considerable portion of its lower course, reckoned from the Nubian Desert northwards, the people can only live by congregating close to its banks. A great part of the soil, in fact, which is situated a few miles from the Nile or from the canals that are fed by it, constructed for purposes of irrigation, is a mere barren waste, covered by sand, and unfit for habitation. To the south of the Nubian Desert there is the fertile province of Dongola, and, separated from it by another desert, a rich country, which, owning Khartum as its chief town, is watered by the tributaries of the great river that flow down from the Abyssinian mountains. This large region, usually called the Sudan,—which includes the seaboard from Suakin to Massowa, and extends to about the line of latitude eleven degrees north,—was for many a century overrun by wild tribes of nomad Arabs, until 1820, when the Egyptians, having begun then to invade it, gradually brought it under their rule. Later, the territories lying still further to the south, were opened up to the energy of the Khedives; and at the time of the war in 1882, Tewfik’s sway, outside Egypt proper, stretched to the great water reservoirs in the heart of the African continent close to the equator, where the Nile takes its rise. In the government of these enormous dominions the Khedives had been assisted by more than one Englishman, who succeeded in partially checking the evils of the slave-trade that prevailed among the natives, and in introducing some form of civilization in their midst. By far the most celebrated of these administrators was Colonel, afterwards Major-General, C. Gordon, C.B., whose illustrious name is now a household word in England.
-----
Footnote 425:
Map No. 9, p. 379.
-----
In 1881, a rebellion broke out in the Sudan, and this calamity was mainly brought about by two causes. In the first place, the Egyptians misgoverned the country, and had been obliged to relax their hold upon it, on account of the troubles that eventually involved them in war with England. Their administration, always corrupt, became weak, and as a matter of course the Arabs grew discontented with it. But, in the next place, the people were deeply stirred by a tradition that fixed this time—the completion of twelve centuries from the Hegira, November 12, 1882—as the moment when a great chief was to arise, to regenerate Islam, and to restore the Mussulman world to its former power, glory, and magnificence. Nor had the Sudanese to wait for the exact date fixed in the prophecy; for a native of Dongola, named Muhammad Ahmad, proclaiming himself to be the long-expected Mahdi, enrolled his followers, whom we call Dervishes, headed a serious revolt, and preached a “Jehad,” or a “Holy War,” against the authority of the Khedive. By October, 1882, when the British were in possession of Egypt, the struggle had begun in earnest, and the rebels had obtained some important advantages. To meet the danger, 10,000 men of Arabi’s late army were despatched during the winter to the south; and in March, 1883, General Hicks Pasha, a retired British Officer who had served in India, reached Khartum to direct military operations against the enemy. It is sad to relate that he was poorly supported at Cairo; that, in endeavouring to drive the Mahdi from his head-quarters at El-Obeid, he cut himself off from his communications; and that his whole force was surrounded and entirely destroyed. General Hicks and his Staff died with arms in their hands on the field of battle, and none survived to tell the tale of their misfortunes (October 7, 1883).[426] With this disaster, the bulk of the Egyptian forces were annihilated; the dervishes acquired an immense addition to their former strength, both material and moral: Khartum was in danger, and there were only some 2000 men left to defend it.[427]
-----
Footnote 426:
Colonel Arthur Farquhar (late Coldstream Guards) accompanied this ill-fated expedition, and perished in it. Some account of the good services rendered by this Officer is given in Slatin Pasha’s recent publication (Fire and Sword in the Sudan, 1879-95 , by Rudolf C. Slatin Pasha, C.B.; translated by Major F. R. Wingate, C.B., D.S.O., R.A.; London, 1896; chap. viii.).
Footnote 427:
History of the Sudan Campaign (compiled at the Intelligence Department of the War Office, by Colonel Colvile, C.B., Grenadier Guards), part i. p. 16 (London, 1889).
-----
Nor was this the only trouble, for the dervishes of the Eastern Sudan, led by one Osman Digna, also raised the standard of revolt, and gained several successes over the Egyptians in the autumn of 1883. In order to save so important a port as Suakin from the ruin that seemed imminent, a force of nearly 4000 men was despatched to oppose the rebels, under a former British Officer, General Baker Pasha, who had rendered distinguished service in the Turkish army during the war with Russia in 1877. But all his efforts were of no avail, for his troops also were overwhelmed and destroyed, February 4, 1884.
These events showed how impossible it was for the Khedive to cope single-handed with the Mahdi; so also did they put the British Government in no small difficulty. Our intervention in Egypt had weakened the military resources of the country, and had imposed responsibilities upon us which had not been foreseen when we began hostilities by the bombardment of the forts of Alexandria. We little imagined then, that we should not only have to guard the frontiers from the irruption of savage hordes of Arabs, but also be obliged to try to save the Egyptian garrisons in the Sudan from the perils that menaced them, and to prevent that slave-dealing region from relapsing into the darkness and barbarism that oppressed it in the past. And yet little was done. The revolt was not met at once, and it had time to grow into formidable proportions. The power of the Mahdi increased with great rapidity; the native tribes were unsupported, and had to submit to the terror he inspired. It was then too late to act, unless we were prepared to re-conquer the huge provinces which had already been devastated. It is indeed a calamity that the first-fruits of the regeneration we determined to effect in Egypt, should thus have been unfortunately coupled with the abandonment of many of the Khedive’s troops to a merciless foe, and with the obliteration of the work of civilization in an immense tract of country, by the most cruel form of a hateful tyranny.
It was determined to evacuate the Sudan; and General Gordon was requested by the British Government to accomplish this difficult and perilous mission. Accompanied by Lieut.-Colonel Donald Stewart, 11th Hussars, he cheerfully accepted it, and reached Khartum unattended by any force, February 18, 1884. He immediately placed the town in a state of defence, infused new life and hopes into the panic-stricken garrison and inhabitants, and took early measures to carry out his instructions. But it was not long before he perceived the impossible nature of the task that had been allotted to him. He had no soldiers available to secure the withdrawal of the many for whose safety he was responsible, and soon the Mahdi surrounded him, intercepted his supplies, and cut off his communications with Egypt. In March, the enemy threatened Shendi. The month following, he established himself in the vicinity of that place. And towards the end of May, Berber fell. Gordon was thus shut out from the rest of the world, and he was little more than a prisoner in Khartum—besieged there, and fighting for his life and for those entrusted to his charge. Retreat was impossible, and the end must infallibly come, as soon as his powers of resistance were exhausted, unless an expedition were sent to his relief.
Meanwhile Major-General Sir G. Graham and a British field force of some 5000 men had been landed in the neighbourhood of Suakin, to defend that seaport and coast from the inroads of Osman Digna (February 28, 1884). In less than a month, he had inflicted severe losses upon the followers of that chieftain, and had pacified the district. But this was all; and these successes bore no fruit. Graham was not ordered to advance in force upon Berber to guard that important town and the communications thereto with the Red Sea.[428] Instead of this, he was withdrawn from Suakin on the 3rd of April, leaving only a small garrison behind him. Hence, just at this critical moment, when it was obvious that the nearest and the ordinary road to Khartum should have been secured and made easily accessible by a light railway, the opportunity of approaching General Gordon was neglected, and the means of enabling him to accomplish his mission were denied him.[429] On General Graham’s departure there was a pause for several months, during which no further operations took place as far as we were concerned,[430] though the Arabs continued to advance northwards; and, unopposed, they re-occupied their former positions in the Eastern Sudan from which they had just been expelled.
-----
Footnote 428:
A proposition had been made at this time to send 200 or 300 cavalry to Berber, which probably they could have reached. But the General Commanding in Egypt (Lieut.-General Sir F. Stephenson, K.C.B.) opposed it, on the grounds that it was undesirable to fritter away our troops in small detachments, that so weak a force in the Mahdi’s country and unsupported there, could achieve no success, and must only add to the numbers who had to be rescued from the Sudan.
Footnote 429:
The reader will presently see that a strong force was landed at Suakin in the spring of 1885, to construct a railway to Berber, when it was too late.
Footnote 430:
Except some battalions pushed to the frontier of Egypt to guard it against invasion, that appeared to be threatening; also the first preparations for laying a line of railway from Suakin to Berber, but which was stopped at the end of August. Major-General A. Lyon Fremantle (late Coldstream Guards) assumed command at Suakin at the end of July.
-----
During this interval of inaction in the field, the British Cabinet deliberated on the situation, and, having asked for advice, considered the merits of the various schemes relating to the invasion of the Sudan that were placed before them by the military authorities at home and on the spot. As a result, they at length announced their determination in a despatch, dated August 8th, when Khartum had been already beleaguered and hidden from their view for many months. In this paper[431] they expressed their opinion that “General Gordon, acting on his instructions,” might still “secure the withdrawal from Khartum, either by the employment of force or of pacific means, of the Egyptian garrisons and of such of the inhabitants as may desire to leave;” they announced their intention “to undertake operations for the relief of General Gordon, should they become necessary, and to make certain preparations in respect thereof;” and they further indicated their resolution that the expedition—“whose general scope” was to enable Government “to give directions at a very short notice for the despatch of a brigade of troops of all arms to proceed to Dongola,”—was to advance, “should the necessity arise,” along the valley of the Nile.
-----
Footnote 431:
Given in full in Colvile’s History of the Sudan Campaign , part i. p. 45. Hereafter referred to as “Colvile, Official Account .”
-----
In order to produce an early moral effect upon the enemy, and to facilitate a prompt advance into the Sudan, which every one knew was imperative if Gordon was to be saved, Sir F. Stephenson, on the receipt of this despatch, was anxious to send up troops without delay to Dongola. But such a proceeding did not at once commend itself to Government, and they still hesitated before venturing so far, even though the movement could have been made with perfect safety. At the same time, 400 boats, each suitable for the conveyance of 12 men and 100 rations per man up the Nile, were ordered in England on the 12th of August, and a further number of 400 were also put in hand on the 22nd. But it was not till a month later (September 20th) that the first British battalion entered Dongola, and it was also only then decided (on the 21st) that, “if necessary,” the expedition might proceed beyond that place.[432]
-----
Footnote 432:
Colvile, Official Account , part i. p. 53.
-----
Meantime, General Lord Wolseley, having been sent to Egypt to take command, reached Cairo on the 9th of September, and two days later he wrote home to request that a special Camel Corps might be immediately placed at his disposal, in addition to the troops whom he proposed should take part in the campaign. The new corps, 1200 strong, was composed of detachments of 40 men, with one or two Officers, taken from every Battalion of the Foot Guards (280 men), from the 16 Regiments of Cavalry at home (640 men), and from two Battalions of the Rifle Brigade (80 men); also 100 men from the three Regiments of Household Cavalry, and a similar number from the Royal Marines. The corps was divided into three sections, viz. the Guards (to which the Marines were eventually attached), the Heavy, and the Light Camel regiments. The detachments were quickly got together; they left England on the 26th of September, and landed at Alexandria on the 7th of October.
The command of the Guards Camel regiment was assigned to Lieut.-Colonel Hon. E. Boscawen, Coldstream Guards; the Adjutant being Lieutenant C. Crutchley, Scots Guards; the Signalling Officer, Lieut.-Colonel Bonham, Grenadier Guards; and the Medical Officer, Surgeon J. Magill, Coldstream Guards. The following Officers, two from each Battalion, also formed part of the corps:[433]—
Lieut.-Colonels C. Rowley and I. Herbert; Captain E. Crabbe; Lieutenants Count Gleichen, D'Aguilar, and R. Wolridge-Gordon: Grenadier Guards.
Lieut.-Colonel F. A. Graves-Sawle; Captain Vesey Dawson; Lieutenants Douglas Dawson, and Hon. H. Amherst: Coldstream Guards.
Lieut.-Colonels M. Willson, and Sir W. Gordon-Cumming, Bart.; Lieutenants A. Drummond, and B. Baden-Powell: Scots Guards.
-----
Footnote 433:
The detachments furnished by the Coldstream amounted to: from the 1st Battalion, three sergeants, two corporals, one drummer, and 38 privates; from the 2nd Battalion, two sergeants, three corporals, one drummer, and 38 privates. Total, 92 of all ranks.
-----
The rest of the British troops required for field operations were drawn from our force already in occupation of Egypt.[434] Of these, 3½ battalions of infantry, and one of Marines, one squadron, most of the artillery, and a portion of the Royal Engineers were left in garrison at Alexandria, Cairo, and Suakin. The remainder, 9 battalions, 3 squadrons (of the 19th Hussars), the Mounted infantry, a Camel battery, and Royal Engineers took part in the expedition, and were disposed along the Nile to guard the communications, and to form the fighting force.[435] In addition, the Egyptian army was also utilized, but all, except a Camel battery which was pushed to the front later on, were left upon the lines of communication, not further south than Hannek.
-----
Footnote 434:
Except one Battalion, which came from India, and some 390 Canadians (called “Voyageurs”), under Lieut.-Colonel Denison, brought to Egypt to help our men to pilot the boats up the Nile.
Footnote 435:
The numerical strength, together with the Camel corps, appears to have been about 10,000 men and 6 guns, and eventually 6 additional guns, belonging to the Egyptian army. Subsequently Dongolese troops fought with us against the enemy.
-----
N^o. 9.
Khartum, inaccessible from the south, is cut off from all ordinary communications with the north by large tracts of almost waterless desert, that lie between the town and Egypt and the Red Sea. The determination, therefore, to relieve Gordon entailed a military problem of considerable difficulty, relating to the manner in which he should be reached in time, by a sufficient number of troops and quantities of food supplies, and thus be enabled to retreat from the Sudan together with those he was pledged to save. This problem has been enunciated as follows: How to “place a force of about 5000 fighting men at or near Shendi, at the latest by the end of the year, and to carry with them, not only supplies for themselves, but also for the inhabitants and garrison of Khartum.”[436] Two proposals had been made to solve it:—
1. By taking the Nile route, and advancing to the neighbourhood of Dongola, to continue either along the river by Abu Hamed, or else to strike across the Bayuda Desert to Metemmeh, situated on the Nile opposite Shendi. There were many difficulties attending this proposal. The distance from Cairo to Shendi, or Metemmeh, is as much as 1527 miles, and the navigation of the river is greatly obstructed by cataracts, so that frequent disembarkations of men and stores would be necessary to surmount these obstacles. Hence much time, which was an essential element in the problem, would be consumed. Between Cairo and Dongola (1033 miles), and indeed for quite 100 miles further on, no enemy was to be expected; but beyond this point it was uncertain where he might be met. The desert road from Korti, some 100 miles above Dongola, to Metemmeh, had the advantage of avoiding the loop of the Nile that passes round Abu Hamed, and of thus saving a distance of more than 200 miles. But it was likely to be occupied by the enemy; a distance of 24 miles, in the face of the dervishes, would have to be traversed without water from station to station; and even if the route were opened up, it did not offer facilities for the transport of stores, which was a far more serious difficulty to be overcome than the mere conveyance of the troops. The desert, in short, was only suited to enable the British Commander to take a short cut towards Khartum, and to make a dash forward to Gordon’s relief, should his position become critical; and it was in view of this consideration that he requested (September 9th) to have a Camel corps allotted to him, as we have just seen. But under any circumstances the expedition would have to proceed forward across many obstacles, for more than 1100 miles from Cairo, before he could avail himself of the services of that corps.
-----
Footnote 436:
Colvile, Official Account , part i. p. 58. Shendi is about one hundred miles north of Khartum.
-----
2. The other plan was to base the army of relief at Suakin, and to push therefrom to Berber, a comparatively short distance of 245 miles. But this project, though it contained several important advantages, also presented no small difficulties. Instead of having to form a fighting base at so very remote and inaccessible a place as Dongola, or Korti, it would have been established at Suakin, in easy and direct communication with the centre of our national resources, and where men, and stores of even the heaviest description, could be readily accumulated as they were required. Owing to the fact that Osman Digna had been unmolested since the spring of the year, he had again taken up an offensive attitude in the Eastern Sudan; Berber also was occupied by the enemy, and hence it was hopeless to suppose that there would be any less fighting upon this route than there would be on the other. This, however, taken by itself was not of great moment. But another circumstance of the utmost importance has to be mentioned. There appears to be a more serious dearth of water in one section of the desert, between the Red Sea and the Nile, than in the worst place on the road from Korti to Metemmeh; and a greater distance to be traversed from well to well in the former (58 miles) than in the latter (24 miles). Herein lay the main difficulty of the Suakin-Berber route. To overcome it, a light railway was necessary to span the whole distance; and it had been calculated that it would have taken three months to achieve such an undertaking. If successful, the advance from Berber to Shendi (95 miles) would have been easily accomplished.
It is not our intention to compare these two methods of solving the problem that had to be faced—rendered exceedingly difficult, and perhaps not in any manner to be solved, within the short space of time allotted, by the unfortunate way in which the Mahdi had been allowed to consolidate his power, and to become a formidable foe. An effort has rather been made to give, as clearly as it is possible in a few words, a short account of the obstacles which beset both these routes, of the conditions which surrounded the two proposals, and to explain some of the considerations that had to be weighed when the Nile route was adopted.
The first stage of the campaign is the history of the advance over more than a thousand miles to Dongola, and across the many obstacles, formed by rapids and cataracts, that interfere with the navigation of the river. The most troublesome obstructions blocking the passage did not begin till Gemai was reached, just above Wady Haifa, and about 780 miles from Cairo. Up to this place, progress was made by rail and by river steamers; though even in this section, the journey entailed five disembarkations. Here the boat service began, and the first serious difficulty had soon to be met; afterwards many others had to be surmounted, always at the expense of much labour and of valuable time.
“To write a detailed account,” says Sir H. Colvile, “of the prolonged struggle between man and nature which the ascent of these cataracts by six hundred English boats involved,—how company after company, and battalion after battalion, unloaded and loaded, rowed and tracked, day by day, and hour by hour, under a blazing sun, against that ever-rushing, ever-changing torrent, between unchanging walls of burning basalt,—to tell all this in detail would be to tell an unequalled tale of pluck, determination, and endurance, but one which would be of little practical use in a military history.”[437]
-----
Footnote 437:
Colvile, Official Account , part i. p. 117.
-----
The boats ordered in England had been despatched to Egypt with the utmost promptitude, and such was the energy displayed that the first troops embarked in them at Gemai on the 1st of November.[438] Assisted by the Canadian “Voyageurs,” nearly three-fourths of the fighting force were past that station on the 18th, struggling forward; though only some 1300 men were as far as Dongola. The Guards Camel regiment marched from Assuan (547 miles from Cairo), and on this date were south of Dal. Korti having been selected as the point of concentration instead of Dongola, it was now calculated that the first infantry battalion should arrive there by the middle of December, and the last on January 22, 1885.
-----
Footnote 438:
The last left Gemai on December 19th.
-----
The Mounted infantry, provided with camels, had throughout the advance been near the head of the column, and early in December were as far forward as Shabatut (some 40 miles above Dongola). The Guards Camel regiment reaching that place on the 4th, was brigaded with them under the orders of Brigadier-General Sir Herbert Stewart, and until the 10th, the force was practised in their new formations and drill.[439] On the 11th, the whole advanced to Korti, and arrived on the 15th; the Marines detachment joined the Guards here. Shortly afterwards a portion of the Heavy Camel regiment marched into that camp, and two battalions and a squadron of the 19th Hussars also reached it.
-----
Footnote 439:
Article in the Nineteenth Century , Nov., 1885, by Lieutenant Douglas Dawson, Coldstream Guards.
-----
While these operations were in progress, some news had been received from General Gordon. On the 17th of November a letter, dated the 4th, announced that he could “hold out forty days with ease,” but “after that it will be difficult;” also that there were at Metemmeh five of his steamers with nine guns, awaiting orders.[440] Again, on the 31st of December, a diminutive piece of paper had reached Lord Wolseley at Korti, bearing the words, “Khartum all right, 14/12/84.—C. G. GORDON,” but supplemented by a verbal message to the effect that the garrison were in great straits, that provisions were running low, and would therefore be exhausted before long.[441]
-----
Footnote 440:
The letter is given in Colvile’s Official Account , part i. p. 121.
Footnote 441:
Ibid. , i. 138.
-----
Before the arrival of this last communication, however, arrangements had already been made to advance in two directions from Korti: one column, called the River column, under Major-General Earle, was to push along the Nile through Abu Hamed towards Berber, while the other, under Brigadier-General Sir H. Stewart, was to march across the desert and seize Metemmeh.
Now, it was known that there were no supplies to be obtained at the latter place; and as a sufficient number of camels do not seem to have been procurable, it was found impossible to convey the Desert column, with the whole of its stores, to its destination in one journey. The distance to be traversed (176 miles) is, moreover, so great, that it was imperative to establish one or two posts on the route. The principal station was fixed at Jakdul wells, where water was plentiful, 98 miles from Korti. Owing, however, to the scarcity of camels, it was necessary, before the final advance could be made, to occupy that place and to make several journeys to it, in order to victual it and organize it as a depôt for future requirements. This preliminary operation took some days to accomplish, and was not completed until the 14th of January, upon which date Sir H. Stewart was enabled to start for Metemmeh.
The orders he received were to attack and occupy that town, to leave there a portion of his force, and to return with the remainder to Jakdul. Colonel Sir C. Wilson, R.E. (the Chief of the Intelligence Department), and Captain Lord C. Beresford, R.N., with a small party of seamen, accompanied the column, and both had special instructions given to them. The latter was to take over one or two of the steamers which were known to be at Metemmeh, and, when he had reported them to be ready, the former was to proceed in them to Khartum, and to deliver a letter to General Gordon. Sir C. Wilson was to be accompanied by a small detachment of infantry; he might march the men through the city, and show them to the garrison; but they were not to sleep there; and they were to return with him to Metemmeh. Further, he was only to stay long enough to confer fully with General Gordon, and, having done so, he was to get back to Korti with all convenient despatch.[442] Lastly, he was supplied with an estimate showing the approximate dates upon which the troops were calculated to arrive at the different stations along the route to Khartum. According to this estimate, General Earle was to reach Abu Hamed about the 10th of February, Berber the 22nd, and Shendi the 5th of March; while the remainder “will commence to reach Metemmeh the 16th of January, and should be concentrated there with sixty days' supplies by the 2nd of March,” adding, “If we hire many camels this date may be anticipated.”[443]
-----
Footnote 442:
Colvile, Official Account , part ii. p. 6, etc., where the full text of all these orders are given.
Footnote 443:
Colonel Sir Charles Wilson, K.C.B., R.E., From Korti to Khartum , p. 3, where this paper is given in full. (London, 1885.)
-----
Sir H. Stewart started from Korti on the 30th of December, with 78 Officers, 1029 men, 221 natives, 2206 camels, and 45 horses, among them the Guards Camel regiment. Marching in the afternoons and at night, he reached Jakdul, without opposition, early on the 2nd of January, and the same day returned, leaving the Guards and Royal Engineers behind, under Lieut.-Colonel Boscawen. He was again in Jakdul on the 12th. During the interval, the water arrangements were improved, and the post strengthened. In respect to this duty, Sir H. Stewart reports as follows on the 14th January:—
The post at Jakdul has been vastly improved by Lieut.-Colonel Hon. E. Boscawen and the Guards Camel regiment, during the eight days they have been quartered there.... I think it right to state that nothing but extreme hard work on the part of Officers and men could have effected so complete a metamorphosis in this post, and I venture to submit that it reflects the highest credit on the Guards Camel regiment.
Leaving a garrison behind of 150 men of the Royal Sussex Regiment, the force started from Jakdul at 2 p.m. on the 14th, consisting of two squadrons of the 19th Hussars, the Naval division, half a Camel battery, Royal Engineers, Guards, Heavy, and Mounted infantry Camel regiments, a wing Royal Sussex (on camels), Medical and Transport details; approximately, 115 Officers, 1687 men, 351 natives, 153 horses, 2888 (of whom 860 transport) camels, 3 guns, and one Gardner. Next day, evidence of the enemy’s proximity became apparent, and on the 16th the cavalry, which had been pushed well to the front, reported that he had taken up a position to bar our access to the Abu Klea wells. The advance was continued, and in the afternoon, when it was too late to attack, we got into close touch with him. A zeriba was then constructed, strengthened by a hastily made wall and by mimosa thorn; and during the night the Arabs fired into it, but without doing much mischief. Early on the 17th, a small garrison was placed there, and the remainder emerged in square, with skirmishers in front and on the flanks. The formation was as follows:—Front face, Coldstream on the right, Royal Artillery in the centre, Mounted infantry on the left; Right face, Scots Guards on the left, then Grenadier Guards, Marines, Sussex Regiment; Left face, Mounted infantry on the right, then Heavy Camel regiment; Rear face, Heavies on the right, then Naval division, with the Gardner gun, and Sussex; the 19th Hussars were outside on the left. We soon became engaged, and several casualties occurred, the dervishes firing, and apparently being driven back behind the folds of the ground. Our progress was slow, for the cumbrous square formation had to be maintained, and the camels, carrying the wounded, to be prevented from straying outside.[444] We were making for a line of flags that was to be seen in front of us, and many now believed that the enemy was in full retreat.
-----
Footnote 444:
Nevertheless, some did lag behind, and would have been cut off, but for the courage of Lieut.-Colonel Rowley, Grenadier Guards, who drove them into the square, just as the Arabs began the attack which is about to be described.
-----
“Just at this moment, when about 450 yards from the flags, as if they had risen from the earth, up rose a line of spearmen all across the wady, [gully], and at the same moment the whole wady behind appeared black with them.”[445]
“The skirmishers at once retired, but as they did so directly in the line of advance of the enemy, they screened him from the fire of the square during the first stage of his charge, and it was not until the spearmen were within 200 yards of the square that the fire could be developed.”[446]
-----
Footnote 445:
Nineteenth Century , loc. cit.
Footnote 446:
Colvile, Official Account , part ii. p. 18.
-----
The sudden and fierce onslaught of some 5000 fanatics, who
held death in contempt, was eventually directed against the left rear corner; and such was the impetus of the rush, that the Heavies were pressed back by sheer weight of numbers into the centre of the square, where the camels were, and almost as far as the front and right faces. The square was practically broken, and a desperate hand-to-hand fight followed, but it happily was only of brief duration. The Guards and Marines had been unmoved by the shock; and keeping up a steady fire with the front rank upon the masses of the Arabs, who were hovering near to complete the victory should the rush be successful, they turned about the rear rank to assist in the struggle that was going on behind them.[447] In a few minutes the violence of the dervishes had expended itself, and they fell back, slowly and sullenly, until we got our guns to play upon them, and they left us in possession of the ground. The cavalry then pushed forward to the wells, and, when the square was reformed, it followed slowly on, the men elated by success, but suffering agonies from thirst. At 5 p.m. the water was reached, but it was not until early on the 18th that the zeriba was transferred to Abu Klea, and the post there was then established and strengthened.
-----
Footnote 447:
“I was much struck by the demeanour of the Guards Officers. There was no noise or fuss; all the orders were given as if on parade, and they spoke to their men as if nothing unusual was going on” (From Korti to Khartum , p. 36).
-----
Our losses, which fell principally on the Heavies and the Naval division, were very great, and amounted to 9 Officers and 65 men killed, and 9 Officers[448] and 85 men wounded; total 168 of all ranks. Of the former, Colonel Fred Burnaby (Royal Horse Guards) fell, well known for his travels and for his adventurous character. Of the Coldstream detachment 2 men (one a sergeant) were killed; Surgeon James Magill and 10 were wounded, of whom one died of his wounds. The strength of the enemy is not accurately known; it is supposed to have been from 9000 to 11,000: his losses were considerable, and 800 lay dead in the open ground close to the square.
-----
Footnote 448:
Two subsequently died of their wounds.
-----
In the afternoon of the 18th, the column started for the Nile, and continued to move throughout the night. The troops, the native drivers, and the animals were becoming exhausted by the toil they had undergone; the men found it difficult to keep awake; the camels, insufficiently fed, and at work incessantly for nearly three weeks, lagged behind, or got off the track. The line of advance led through a thick mimosa scrub; there was no moon, and, on account of the enemy’s proximity, bugles could not be sounded to keep the column together. During the darkness, therefore, there was much confusion, and it was not until dawn that order could be restored. In a short time the river came into sight, some four miles away. To the left front appeared a large and well-built town, now recognized to be Metemmeh, and looking far more important and strong than was represented on our maps or indicated in our reports. As the British column, from its position near Abu Kru, gazed on the fertile valley beneath, they perceived large crowds of armed men issuing from the walls of Metemmeh, and it soon became clear that no water was to be obtained without a fight.
A zeriba was at once formed, wherein to guard the stores and baggage, before a force could advance to cut its way through the enemy. But as this was being accomplished, the latter, creeping up through the long grass and scrub, opened fire from concealed positions, and several casualties occurred. Sir H. Stewart at this moment was severely wounded, and the command devolved upon Sir C. Wilson.
At 2.30 the zeriba was ready, and garrisoned by half the Heavies, the Cavalry, Artillery, and Naval division, while the remainder, under Sir C. Wilson, emerged therefrom in square, the executive command of which was entrusted to Lieut.-Colonel Boscawen. An important duty now devolved upon this Officer, viz. to lead the square past the enemy in the bush to the river, and to keep it as much as possible on the open ground. That the losses at this particular period of the day were comparatively few, may be ascribed to the manner in which the column was directed and manœuvred at this time. Warned by the tactics of the dervishes at Abu Klea, no skirmishers were extended; but as long as the enemy kept up his fire from the scrub, our men, unable to reply with effect, were at a disadvantage. Fortunately this did not last long; for the Arabs, unable to restrain their fiery ardour, charged the square with fury, and were met by the steady and withering fire of our soldiers. In less than five minutes the fight was over.
“The seething mass of fanatics who had headed the charge were now a heap of lifeless bodies, their comrades in rear had melted away into the distance, and the British troops (sadly reduced in numbers since their first fight at Abu Klea) made the echoes ring with a loud cheer.”[449]
-----
Footnote 449:
Colvile, Official Account , ii. 27.
-----
There was no more resistance that day, and Sir C. Wilson, having gone forward to select a bivouac, the column was halted on the river as dusk began to fall.
The joy of being once more near a plentiful supply of water, and the sense of relief that the march across the desert had been at last successfully accomplished, now filled the minds of our men, and atoned in some degree for the hardships and privations they had just undergone; but rest was also required, for not only the labours, but the excitement and the dangers of the last few days had told severely upon them, and a much-needed sleep was only partially obtained during the night of January 19th-20th. Next day the bivouac was shifted to the village of Gubat, which was placed in a state of defence; and the zeriba, formed the day before, having been evacuated, the wounded and stores were brought there.[450] The enemy was hovering near, but made no attempt to interfere with our operations. In view of the orders given to the Commander of the Desert column, and to secure our position at Gubat from attacks which could be easily organized against us in Metemmeh, Sir C. Wilson determined to capture that place, if this could be accomplished without serious risk. On the 21st, therefore, he advanced against it with the greater part of his force, but found it stronger than he anticipated. During the day, Gordon’s steamers appeared on the scene, and assisted in the attack; but they also brought news that another horde of Arabs might be soon expected from the direction of Khartum, and orders were therefore given to fall back upon Gubat.
-----
Footnote 450:
The horses had all been fifty-eight hours, and some even as many as seventy-five hours, without water (Nineteenth Century , loc. cit.). The camels had not received anything to drink for six or seven days, having been previously accustomed to be watered every second or third day (From Korti to Khartum , p. 95).
-----
The casualties during the 19th, 20th, and 21st, amounted to one Officer and 22 men killed, and 9 Officers and 93 men wounded; total, 125: added to this, two war correspondents to London newspapers (the Morning Post and Standard ) also lost their lives. Among the severely wounded, belonging to the Guards Camel regiment, were Lieutenant Crutchley, Scots Guards, and Major H. Poë, Royal Marines; in the Coldstream detachment two men were wounded. It is extremely sad to have to relate that the brilliant Commander of the column, Sir H. Stewart, never recovered from his wound, and died on the 17th of February, before he could be taken even as far as Korti, deeply regretted by all who served under his command, as well as by every one who knew his kindly, generous, and manly character.
Directly the Queen learnt that the column had reached the Nile, and heard of the pluck and endurance exhibited by her soldiers, Her Majesty caused the Secretary of State to signify by telegram “her satisfaction and warm thanks to her brave troops, and her deep concern for their losses and sufferings, but especially for General Stewart’s severe wound;” and in consideration of that Officer’s gallant service, Her Majesty was also pleased to promote him to the rank of Major-General. The Khedive, moreover, telegraphed his congratulations and thanks to the men for the success they had achieved.
Sir C. Wilson had now a double function to discharge. His original mission was to communicate a letter to General Gordon, and to give him that moral support which the appearance of a few red-coats for a day or two in Khartum might confer upon him.[451] But a new duty also obliged him to provide for the safety of the small and sadly diminished force which had just been unexpectedly placed under his command. To this most important task he therefore applied himself. It was reported that enemies were closing about him from Berber and from the south; Metemmeh also was too strong to be taken by a coup de main. Thus it was essential that he should see for himself the extent of the Arab resources which might be brought to bear upon Gubat; and while he sent the cavalry up the river, early on the 22nd, he embarked in a steamer, and made his way down the stream. The results of these reconnaissances were satisfactory, and he returned convinced that the dervishes were not in such numbers as he had been led to believe. Meanwhile, the position we occupied was strengthened, and communications with the Nile were secured; Gubat, situated on a height about half a mile from the water, could not be evacuated, and it was garrisoned by the Guards; and another fort, connected with an island by a tête de pont, was constructed near the river.
-----
Footnote 451:
Three British Officers were, moreover, to accompany Wilson to Khartum, and to be left there with Gordon.
-----
Then a vexatious delay occurred. The steamers required repair, and it was not until the afternoon of the 23rd, when too late to start on that day, that they were reported fit to move. Accompanied by 20 men of the Royal Sussex and 240 black troops, Sir C. Wilson left for Khartum on the morning of the 24th. The passage up the river was rapidly made, in a falling Nile, and on the 28th the beleaguered city was approached. It would be outside the scope of this volume to give any account of the numerous thrilling adventures and hairbreadth escapes that marked this perilous journey. It is sufficient to say that Khartum had fallen on the 26th, and Gordon was killed. The whole place was in the hands of the Mahdi, and the little band of Englishmen ran the gauntlet past the enemy right up to Khartum, and under its guns, until they made sure that the end had indeed come, and that there was no further use in remaining where they were.[452] We now know that Gordon had been starved out, and that his food ran short on the 3rd or 4th of January, when the last issue of rations took place; that Omdurman, having fallen soon afterwards (January 15th), the dervishes drew closer round Khartum; that they could have entered it any day they chose, as the falling Nile laid bare the weak points of the defences of the city; that at dawn on the 26th this helpless quarter was stormed; and that the place fell after a few minutes' fighting. The expedition had been sent a month too late, and the “game was played out before the British troops reached Gubat; at that period nothing could save Khartum.”[453]
-----
Footnote 452:
An account of this journey is to be found in Colvile’s Official Account , part ii. p. 33, etc.—how the steamers ascended the river with difficulty and advanced to Khartum in the teeth of hostile batteries and under fire from the city; how the fall of the place became undoubted; how the native crews of the steamers showed signs of disaffection; how both steamers were wrecked on the return journey, and how the small British party were exposed to imminent danger; how Lieutenant Stuart-Wortley was sent down the river in an open row-boat, and succeeded in reaching Gubat; and how a rescue party was immediately organized under Lord Charles Beresford, who went to the relief of Sir Charles Wilson, and those with him, in another steamer, amid many difficulties, and in spite of the opposition of the dervishes.
Footnote 453:
Major C. M. Watson, C.M.G., R.E., Royal Engineers' Journal, June 1, 1892. See Fire and Sword in the Sudan , p. 342.
-----
Little occurred to the small British force near Metemmeh during this interval. Convoys, under Lieut.-Colonel Hon. R. Talbot (1st Life Guards), of about a thousand camels and 300 to 400 men, started for Jakdul, to bring up supplies to the Nile, on January 23rd and on February 2nd. Sir C. Wilson, also, after his gallant effort to reach Khartum, left Gubat on the 6th, with an escort of twelve men of the Coldstream, under Captain V. Dawson, and reached Korti on the 9th. These and other movements took place without opposition on the part of the enemy, and thus it appeared that the desert had been effectively swept of Arabs; but they were still to be feared, and rumours were not wanting to the effect that they were concentrating and were converging upon our advanced position on the river. When Lord Wolseley heard of Sir H. Stewart’s wound, he decided to send his Chief of the Staff, Major-General Sir Redvers Buller, to replace him, and to despatch some infantry to reinforce the Desert column. Accompanied by six companies of the Royal Irish Regiment, who marched on their feet the whole way from Korti, the new General reached Gubat on the 11th, and assumed command there.
The fall of Khartum, reported at head-quarters on the 4th of February, made a change in the conduct of the war, and the object of his mission being no longer possible, the British Commander was left without instructions as to his future proceedings.[454] He was thus unable to send any precise orders to Sir R. Buller, who had already left Korti before the death of General Gordon was known there, until he had ascertained the views of Government upon the new situation that had arisen. But these views were not at once forthcoming; for, the first telegram, dated London, February 6th, gave no indication of the policy to be pursued in the Sudan, and it was only after a more explicit statement had been requested, that he was informed that “the power of the Mahdi at Khartum must be overthrown.” Orders were then despatched to the Desert column to hold on to the Nile, and, when Metemmeh was taken, to combine with General Earle in an attack upon Berber. But before this message was received, arrangements had been already taken for the evacuation of Gubat. This determination had been rendered necessary because the camels were insufficient in number, and were too much reduced by hard work, to perform the transport service across the desert; supplies were liable to run short; and a hostile force was reported to be marching from Khartum.
-----
Footnote 454:
Colvile, Official Account , part ii. p. 57.
-----
Accordingly, the last of the wounded left the Nile on the 13th under escort, commanded by Colonel Talbot, consisting of portions of the Guards, Heavy, and Mounted infantry Camel regiments. Early next day the enemy showed signs of renewed activity, by attacking the convoy, which, encumbered by wounded, many of whom were carried on stretchers, and by Egyptian soldiers and camp followers who had come from Khartum in the steamers, was not advantageously circumstanced to ward off a serious attack. After keeping the enemy at bay by some sharp fighting, the Light Camel regiment, which was luckily in the vicinity, came up to the support of the convoy, and with their assistance the Arabs were soon driven away. Our losses were two killed and six wounded, of whom one belonged to the Coldstream.[455] On the same day, the 14th, Gubat was finally evacuated by our troops. Abu Klea was reached on the 15th, and, in order to reduce the consumption of water, for the wells were only capable of supplying a moderate force, the Hussars, Guards, Heavies, and the Sudanese who manned the steamers, were sent to Jakdul on the 16th.[456]
-----
Footnote 455:
This man, Lance-Sergeant Leaning, who died of his wounds, was noted for his gallantry upon this occasion.
Footnote 456:
Owing to the amount of hard work done, the Guards were now without boots; and this seems to have been the reason why they were selected to go back.
-----
The River column, under Major-General Earle, had meanwhile started on its way to Berber by Abu Hamed (January 24th), and found the ascent of the Nile, through a hostile and practically unexplored country, by no means an easy operation. The physical difficulties of the route seemed to increase day by day, but by dint of hard work and perseverance the troops continued to push on slowly. On the 10th of February, meeting the enemy at Kirbekan, where he attempted to make a stand, they attacked and defeated him; but the victory was unfortunately accompanied by the death of the General—killed by a bullet fired from a stone hut, in which some Arabs had taken refuge. The advance was immediately resumed, and was continued until the 24th, when a point, 26 miles from Abu Hamed, was reached. Here the troops were stopped by a message, dated head-quarters 20th, which ordered the column to return. A retrograde movement was therefore at once commenced. The cause of this fresh order has now to be briefly explained.
On receiving instructions directing the overthrow of the Mahdi’s power at Khartum, Lord Wolseley decided that the first step was to reduce Berber, and he therefore wished, as we have seen, to combine both the River and Desert columns to secure that object. But insuperable difficulties presented themselves to the execution of that design. In the first place, the absence of all means of rapid communication between Korti and the two columns was a serious obstacle to any form of combined operations. Supplies for immediate and future use had, moreover, to be carried along with the troops, over the formidable obstructions which everywhere opposed our progress. The camels of the Desert column had completely broken down, and there was no transport available; the men’s boots were also worn out, and their marching powers were in consequence diminishing day by day. The River column, moreover, though able to move forward,—but only slowly, on account of the physical difficulties in the way and the low condition of the Nile,—had not sufficient carrying power to store Berber with the supplies which it would have been necessary to place there.[457]
-----
Footnote 457:
Colvile, Official Account , part ii. p. 72.
-----
These difficulties entailed a change of plan, and both columns were therefore ordered to return. Sir R. Buller had been annoyed by hostile demonstrations against him near Abu Klea since the 16th, and on that day and on the next he lost three men killed, and 4 Officers, and 23 wounded. As soon as this advanced position had no longer to be held, he evacuated it on the 23rd and 24th, in the face of a large number of Arabs, estimated at not less than 8000 men, with such skill and judgment that, having deceived them, they made no effort to interfere with his movements. The retirement was everywhere continued, the Guards reaching Korti on the 9th of March, and the last troops leaving the desert on the 16th. From Korti, the Guards went to Dongola on the 16th, and remained there for some months; while the rest of the army also took up summer quarters on the Nile, not further forward than Merowi,—to await the coming of the autumn, when a fresh advance was to be made to free Khartum from the despotism of the Mahdi.