Part III (part 1 of 2)

Part III (part 1 of 2)

The Present testimony stated and vindicated in its principal heads.

By what is above premitted, the reader may see the series and succession of the testimony of Christ's witnesses in Scotland from time to time, in all the periods of that church; how it hath been transmitted from one generation to another down to our hands; how far it hath been extended, and what increasements it hath received in every period; how it hath been opposed by a continued prosecution of an hereditary war against Christ, by an atheistical, papistical, prelatical, and tyrannical faction; and how it hath been concerted, contended for, maintained, and sealed actively and passively, by an anti-pagan, anti-popish, anti-prelatical, anti-erastian, anti-sectarian, and anti-tyrannical remnant of the followers, professors, confessors, and martyrs of Christ in all ages. Now it remains in the third and last place, to consider the merit of the cause as it is now stated, to see whether it will bear the weight of those great sufferings wherewith it hath been sealed. I hope all the lovers of Christ, who have an esteem even of his reproaches above all the treasures of Egypt, will grant, that if these sufferings be stated on the least or lowest of the truths of Christ, then they are not mistated, nor built upon a bottom that will not bear them, or is not of that worth to sustain them. For certainly every truth, the least of truths, is of greater value than any thing that we can suffer the loss of for it; yea, of infinitely greater value, than the whole world. So that if I prove these heads of suffering to be truths wherein conscience is concerned, the cause will be sufficiently vindicated from the loadings and lashings of such as prefer peace to truth, and ease to duty, who to justify their own backwardness and detestable lukewarmness, call some of them only state questions about things civil, and not gospel truths and heads to state suffering upon: and if they be truths and duties, the cause will some way be rendered more illustrious, that it is stated upon the smallest hoofs and hair-breadths of the concerns of Christ's declarative glory; as being a greater witness of its owners love and loyalty to Christ, and of their pure and tender zeal for his honour, than if for more substantial and fundamental truths, which a natural conscience may reclaim to decline, when for the meanest circumstantials of Christ's truths they dare and are ambitious to bestow their dearest blood. But if the complex of them be impartially considered, no unprejudiced arbiter will suffer himself to have such extenuating impressions of the present word of patience, and testimony of the suffering remnant in Scotland this day: but it will appear to be a very weighty and worthy concern, as any that either men or Christians can be called to witness for; being the privilege of all mankind, the duty of all Christians, and the dignity of all churches, to assert; it is for the glory and crown prerogatives and imperial regalia of the King of kings, with reference to his visible kingdom, of which the government is laid upon his shoulders, against the heaven daring usurpations and encroachments made thereupon, both as he is Mediator, and King, and Head of the church, and as he is God and universal King of the world. As he is Mediator, it is his peculiar prerogative to have a supremacy and sole sovereignty over his own kingdom, to institute his own government, to constitute his own laws, to ordain his own officers, to appoint his own ordinances, which he will have observed without alteration, addition, or diminution, until his second coming: this his prerogative hath been, and is invaded by erastian prelacy, sacrilegious supremacy, and now by antichristian popery, which have overturned his government, inverted his laws, subverted his officers, and perverted his ordinances. As he is God and universal King, it is his incommunicable property and glory, not only to have absolute and illimited power, but to invest his deputed ministers of justice with his authority and ordinance of magistracy, to be administred in subordination to him, to be regulated by his laws, and to be improved for his glory, and the good of mankind; this glory of his, hath been invaded by tyrants and usurpers arrogating to themselves an absolute power, intruding themselves without his investment into authority, in a rebellion against him, in opposition to his laws, and abusing it to his dishonour, and the destruction of mankind. Against both which encroachments the present testimony is stated, in a witness for religion and liberty, to both which these are destructive. This will appear to be the result and tendency of the testimony in all its parts, opposed by the enemies of religion and liberty, and the end of all their opposition, to bring it to this crinomenon, who shall be king? Jesus or Caesar? Let any seriously search into all their proclamations and edicts against religion and liberty, this will be found to be the soul and sense of them, practically and really speaking to this purpose, especially since this man came to the throne.

'J. R.

'James the VII. II. by the V. of G. king of Scotland, England, France, and Ireland, defender of the antichristian faith: To all and sundry our good subjects, whom these presents do, or may concern: greeting. We having taken into our royal consideration, the many and great inconveniencies which have happened in that our ancient kingdom of Scotland, especially of late years, through the persuasions of the christian religion, and the great heats and animosities, betwixt the professors thereof, and our good and faithful subjects, whose faith and religion is subject and subservient to our royal will (the supreme law, and reason, and public conscience) to the disappointment of our projects, restraint of our pleasures, and contempt of the royal power, converting true loyalty and absolute subjection, into words and names (which we care not for) of religion and liberty, conscience and the word of God, thereby withdrawing some to the christian faction, from an absolute and implicit subjection to us and our will, as if there were a superior law to which they might appeal; and considering that these rebellious christians do never cease to assert and maintain strange paradoxes, such principles as are inconsistent with the glory and interest of our government, as that the authority of kings should be hemmed in with limits, and that their acts and actions are to be examined by another rule than their own authority to make them lawful, that some things in the kingdom are not subject to the king's authority, that there is a kingdom within a kingdom not subordinate to the king, and that there is another King superior to the supreme whom they will rather obey than us, and that we must either take laws from him, or otherwise we are no magistrates; and considering also their practices are conform to their principles, they will not obey our laws, but the laws of another inconsistent with ours, and will calculate their religion according to his laws, and not according to ours, and continually make their addresses to, and receive ambassadors from a prince whom we know not, whom our predecessors, of truly worthy memory, did crucify, one Jesus who was dead, whom they affirm to be alive, whose government they alledge is supreme over all kings, whom they acknowledge but as his vassals: being now by favourable fortune, not only brought to the imperial crown of these kingdoms through the greatest difficulties, but preserved upon the throne of our royal ancestors, which from our great founder Nimrod of glorious memory, and our illustrious predecessors Pharaoh, Nebuchadnezzar, Herod the great, Nero, Caligula, &c. of blessed and pious memory, hath been ever opposite to, and projecting the destruction of that kingdom of Christ, do, after their laudable example, resolve to suppress that kingdom by all the means and might we can use, because his government is hateful to us, his yoke heavy, his sayings are hard, his laws are contrary to our lusts; therefore we will not let this man reign over us, we will break his bonds, and cast away his cords from us; and advance and exercise our sovereign authority, prerogative royal, and absolute power, which all our subjects are to obey without reserve. 'And as by virtue of our supremacy, whereby we are above all, but such as we are pleased to subject ourselves to, settled by law, and lineally derived to us as an inherent right to the crown, we have power to order all matters of church as well as state, as we in our royal wisdom shall think fit, all laws and acts of Christ to the contrary notwithstanding; and accordingly in our royal wisdom have overturned the platform of that government which Christ hath instituted, razed all courts fenced in his name, and severely interdicted all meetings of his subjects, and entertainment of his ambassadors: many of whom, in contempt of him that sent them, we have punished according to law, for negotiating his affairs in our kingdoms without our pleasure, and requiring allegiance and obedience to him, after we had exauctorated him; we have also established our right trusty, and well beloved clerks in ecclestiastic affairs, and their underlings, by our authority to have the administration of the business of religion and impowered our right trusty and well beloved cousins and counsellors, to compel all to submit to them, by finings, confinings, imprisonment, banishment, oaths, and bonds, and all legal means: so now having prosecuted this war against Christ to this length, that we have no fears of a rally of his forces again so often beaten, we are now engaged with other antichristian princes to give our power to our holy father antichrist, so far as may serve his purpose to oppose Christ in his way; but we reserve so much to ourselves, as may encroach upon him in our capacity. And therefore we have thought fit to restore to antichrist our ecclesiastical supremacy, from whom we borrowed it, and for which we have no use at present: but we resolve to maintain and prosecute our sovereign authority, prerogative royal, and absolute power foresaid, against Christ, and without subordination to him, from whom, as we sought none, so we received no power by his warrant and grant, and against whom we mind to manage it to the uttermost of our power. Yet reflecting upon the conduct of the four last reigns, how, after all the frequent and pressing endeavours that were used in each of them, to reduce our kingdoms to antichrist, the subjects of Christ were so stubborn, that the success hath not answered the design: we must now change our methods a little, and tolerate that profession of Christ which we cannot yet get overturned, his subjects being so numerous, but always upon these terms, that they take a special care that nothing be preached or taught among them, which may be a testimony for Christ's prerogatives, in opposition to our usurpation, or may any way tend to alienate the hearts of our people from us, or our government, or preach his truths which we have condemned as seditious and treasonable, under the highest pains these crimes will import. Hereby we shall establish our government on such a foundation, on the ruin of Christ's, as may make our subjects happy, and unite them to us by inclination as well as duty, in a belief that we will not restrain conscience in matters of mere religion: for which we have a dispensation from our holy father, and also from our own absoluteness, to be slaves to this promise no longer than consists with our own interest; and which we have power to interpret as we please: and would have all to understand, that no testimony for Christ's supremacy against our encroachments thereupon, shall be comprehended under these matters of mere religion, for which the conscience shall not be constrained: but we will have the consciences of such subjects of his, that dare assert it, brought to a test and probation how they stand affected in this competition betwixt us and this King Jesus, and see whether they will own or decline our authority, because not of him, nor for him, nor to him, but against him and all his interests. Our will is therefore, that all who will countenance any other meetings of his subjects than we have allowed, or connive at them, shall be prosecuted according to the utmost severity of our laws made against them, which we leave in full force and vigour, notwithstanding of all the premises. And for this effect, we further command all our judges, magistrates, and officers of our forces, to prosecute all these subjects and followers of Christ, who shall be guilty of treating with, or paying homage to that exauctorated king of theirs, in their assemblies with his ambassadors in the fields with the utmost rigour, as they would avoid our highest displeasure: for we are confident none will, after these liberties and freedom we have given to all without reserve, to serve God publicly, in such a way, as we, by our sovereign authority, prerogative royal, and absolute power aforesaid, have prescribed and allowed, presume to meet in these assemblies, except such whose loyalty to Christ doth alienate them from us and our government. As also, under the same certifications, by the same sovereign authority, and prerogative royal, and absolute power foresaid, we charge, impower, warrant, and authorize, against all hazards (hell excepted) all our foresaid judges and officers, in their respective places, to prosecute and execute our laws, against all that may be suspected or convicted of their adherence to Christ, or be found guilty of owning their allegiance to him as their liege Lord, by solemn covenant, which we have caused burn by the hand of the hangman, and declared criminal to own it, or shall be found guilty of declining allegiance to us and our absolute authority, stated in opposition to him and his, or of maintaining that pernicious principle, inconsistent with our government, that their lives are their own, which they will preserve without surrender to our mercy: all which we command to be executed to death, or banished as slaves, as shall be found most conducible to our interest. And to the end, the few that remain of that way may be totally exterminated, we straitly command all our soldiers, horse and foot, to be ready upon order, to march and make search, pursue and follow, seize and apprehend, kill and slay, and cause to perish, all such, whether they shall be found at meetings, or in their wanderings, wherever they may be apprehended: and ordain all our good subjects to be assistant to these our forces, in prosecuting this war against Christ and his followers, and contribute their best help and encouragement, in giving them their required maintenance, and duly paying cess and locality imposed for that end; and that they shall not dare to countenance, converse with, refer, harbour, supply, or keep any manner of correspondence with any of these traitors that adhere to Christ, under the pain of being found art and part with them, and obnoxious to the same punishments to which they are liable; but on the contrary, to assist our forces to apprehend, and raise the hue and cry after them wherever they shall be seen, that they may be forthwith pursued, seized, cut off, and destroyed, which we order to be instantly done upon the place, where they or any of them are apprehended, and that without any delay or mercy to age or sex,' &c.

On the other hand, if any will take a look of the declarations and testimonies of the other party without prejudice or stumbling at some expressions, which may be offensive to critics, he will find the scope and strain of them to have this importance.

'We, a poor company of persecuted, reproached, and despised Christians; who indeed have not many wise men among us after the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble, but are a few foolish, weak, base, and despised nothings in the world; yet having this ambition to be his called chosen; and faithful soldiers, who is King of glory, King of heaven, King of saints, King of nations, King of kings, whose kingdom is everlasting and universal; considering the many insolent indignities, affronts, and reproaches cast upon his name and glory, and the many usurpations, encroachments, and invasions made upon his crown and dignity, by a pestilent generation of his atheistical, papistical, prelatical, and tyrannical enemies, who have rebelled against him, and have renounced, corrupted, and subverted his royal government, both in the church and in the world, both in his kingdom of grace and of power: do bear witness and testimony against these rebels, from the highest to the lowest: and assert the interest and title of our princely Master, and own allegiance and absolute obedience to him and his government, to which he hath undoubted right; an essential right by his eternal Godhead, being the everlasting Father, whose goings forth have been of old from everlasting; a covenant-right by compact with the Father, to bear the glory and rule upon his throne, by virtue of the council of peace between them both; a donative right by the Father's right of delegation, by which he hath all power given to him in heaven and in earth, and all authority, even because he is the Son of man; an institute right by the Father's inauguration, which hath set him as King in Zion; an acquisite right by his own purchase, by which he hath merited and obtained not only subjects to govern, but the glory of the sole sovereignty over them in that relation, a name above every name; a bellical right by conquest, making the people fall under him, and be willing in the day of his power, and overcoming those that make war with him; an hereditary right by proximity of blood and primogeniture, being the first born, higher than the kings of the earth, and the first born from the dead, that in all things he might have the pre-eminence; an electing right by his people's choice and surrender, a crown wherewith his mother crowned him in the day of his espousals. In a humble recognizance of all which rights, we own and avouch, that he hath that incommunicable prerogative of sole sovereignty over his visible kingdom, as well as invisible, without a co-partner or competitor, either co-ordinate or subordinate; in prescribing laws, by no human authority to be reversed; in appointing ordinances immutable, without addition or diminution, for matter or manner; instituting a government, which no man or angel can, without blasphemy, arrogate a power either to invert or evert, change or overturn; and constituting officers, which must depend only on his authority, and his alone; and must be cloathed only with his commission, and his alone; guided by his instructions, and his alone; acting according to his laws and prescribed platform, and his alone; without any dependence on, subordination to, licence, warrant or indulgence from any mortal. And therefore we disown and detest every thing that hath not the stamp of his authority, either in doctrine, worship, discipline or government: and will discountenance prelacy, supremacy, popery, and all corruption contrary to his institution, who is sole and supreme lawgiver to the conscience, and will submit to, or comply with nothing that may directly or indirectly signify our respect unto them. Hence we will take none of their oaths, subscribe none of their bonds, yield to none of their impositions, pay none of their exactions; neither will we hear or receive ordinances from any minister, but the faithful authorized ambassadors of Christ our king, whatever either rage or reproach we suffer for it. We assert and affirm also, that our exalted Prince is King of the whole world, by whom kings reign, and princes decree justice, as his ministers of justice, in subordination to him; whom he hath hath appointed to rule over us, with just boundaries, that they may not exceed, and true characters, by which we should know them and pay them deference. And therefore, whosoever shall arrogate to themselves, and extend their power beyond and above his prescripts, being neither called to, nor qualified for, nor improving the office for the ends he hath appointed; we will acknowledge them no otherwise than usurping tyrants, and not magistrates nor ministers of justice, to whom he hath given the sword by his perceptive will; only as lions, bears, wolves, to whom he hath given a rod by his providential will; in that case we may be passively subject, when we cannot do better; but will never own conscientious allegiance to them, nor own them as our lawful magistrates; and therefore we will not bow down to their idols they have set up, nor prostitute either conscience or liberty to their lust, but will endeavour, under our Master's banner and conduct, to preserve whatever he hath intrusted to us religion, life, liberty, estate, and whatsoever the Lord our God hath given us to possess, as they unjustly possess what their god gives them; and will maintain a war of constant opposition to them (against whom our Lord hath declared a war for ever) without parley, treaty of peace, capitulation, composition, truce, or any transaction; we will neither meddle nor make with them, less or more, nor seek their favour, nor embrace it when it is offered, on any terms that may imply any obligation to surcease from our duty to our King, and irreconcileable opposition to them,' &c.

Now I shall come more distinctly to the purpose, in offering a short vindication of the heads and grounds of our great sufferings, dividing them into their principal parts, which I reduce to two, to wit, negatives and positives. The negative grounds I reckon three principally. 1. For refusing to acknowledge a corrupt ministry. 2. For refusing to own a tyrannical magistracy. 3. For refusing to swear and subscribe their unlawful imposed oaths, chiefly that of abjuration, which was the occasion of suffering unto death. The positive grounds are also three. 1. For frequenting field-meetings, to receive gospel ordinances from faithful ministers. 2. For maintaining the principle and practice of defensive resistance of superior powers. 3. For maintaining the privilege and duty of offensive revenge, in executing justice upon murdering enemies of mankind, in cases of extreme necessity, in prosecuting which, I shall intertex some subordinate questions relating to their respective heads, and endeavour to discuss them briefly.

HEAD I.

Where the sufferings of many, for refusing to acknowledge a corrupt ministry, are vindicated; and the question of hearing curates is cleared.

This question, though it may seem nice, and of no great moment, to persons of Gallio's or Laodicea's temper, indifferent and lukewarm dispositions, consulting their own more than the things of Christ, which make it pass without any enquiry with the most part of the world; yet, to all who are truly tender in keeping a good conscience, free of the times contagion, to all who have the true impression of the fear of God, who is jealous, especially in the matters of his worship; to all who have the true zeal of God eating them up, in a just indignation at the indignities done to him, in usurping the office and corrupting the administration of the ministry; to all who truly love the gospel, and put a due value on the ordinances of Christ, the corruptions whereof this question touches, it will be accounted of great importance.

There are three questions about the duty of hearing the word, concerning which the Lord Jesus gives us very weighty cautions, to wit, what we should hear, Mark iv. 24. how we should hear, Luke viii. 28. and whom we should hear. The last of which, though it be not so expressly stated as the other two, yet the searcher of the scriptures will find it as clearly determined, and as many cautions to guard from erring in it, as in any other case, and that the concern of conscience in it is very weighty. And certain it is, if there had been more advertency in this point, there would not have been such inconsideration and licentiousness in the matter and manner of hearing. Nor would that itching humour and luxuriancy of lust, in heaping up teachers to please the fancy, have been so much encouraged, to the great detriment of the church, disgrace of the gospel, and destruction of many poor souls. But through the ignorance and neglect of this duty of trying whom we should hear, by seeking some satisfying evidence of their being cloathed with authority from Christ, the world hath been left loose in a licence to hear what they pleased, and so have received the poison of error from the mountebanks, instead of the true and wholesome potions of Christ's prescripts from them that had power and skill to administer them. Hence the many sects, and schisms, and errors that have pestered the church in all ages, have in a great measure proceeded from this latitude and laxness of promiscuous hearing of all whom they pleased, whom either the world's authority impowered, or by other means were possessed of the place of preaching, without taking any cognizance whether they had the characters of Christ's ambassadors or not. If this had been observed, and people had scrupled and refused to hear these whom they might know should not have preached; neither the great antichrist, nor the many lesser antichrists, would have had such footing in the world as they have this day. It is then of no small consequence to have this question cleared. Neither is it of small difficulty to solve the intricacies of it, what characters to fix for a discovery of Christ's true ministers; whom we should submit to and obey in the Lord, and love and esteem them for their work's sake, and for their qualities sake, as standing in Christ's stead, having the dispensation of the word of reconciliation committed to them; and how we may discern those characters; what judgment is incumbent to private Christians, for the satisfaction of their own consciences in the case; and how they ought to demean themselves in their practice, without scandal on either hand, or sin against their own conscience; how to avoid the rocks and extremes that inadvertency or precipitancy in this matter may rush upon; so as to escape and sail by the Scylla of sinful separation on the one hand, and the Charybdis of sinful union and communion on the other, which are equally dangerous; especially how these cautions are to be managed in a broken, and disturbed, and divided case of the church. The question also is the more difficult, that as it was never so much questioned before this time, and never so much sought to be obscured, by the perverse disputings of men of corrupt minds, to find out evasions to cover sin and escape sufferings upon this account; so it hath never been discussed by divines either at home or abroad, with relation to our case, except what hath been of late by some faithful men, who have suffered upon this head, from whom I shall gather the most of my arguments, in as compendious a way as I can without wronging them. The reason, I fancy, that we are at such a loss in our helps from the learned on this head, is partly, that they have written with relation to their own times, in a constitute case of the church, when corruptions and disorders might be orderly rectified, and people might have access to get their scruples removed in a legal way by church-order, in which case the learned and judicious Mr. Durham hath written excellently in his book on scandal; but therein neither he nor others did consult, nor could have a prospect of such a case as ours is; and partly, that foreign divines, not having this for their exercise, could not be acquainted with our circumstantiate case, and so are not fit nor competent arbiters to decide this controversy; hence many of them do wonder at our sufferings upon this head. Every church is best acquainted with her own testimony. Yet we want not the suffrage of some of the most learned of them, as the great Gisb. Voetius in his polit. eccles. in several places comes near to favour us: where he allows people to leave some, and hear such ministers as they profit most by, from these grounds, 'That people should choose the best and most edifying gifts, and from that scripture, 1 Thess. v. 21. Prove all things, &c. and answers objections to the contrary, and granteth, that, upon several occasions, one may abstain from explicit communion with a corrupt church, for these reasons, that such communion is not absolutely necessary, by necessity either of the mean or precept, where the Christian shall have more peace of conscience, and free exercise of Christian duties elsewhere, and that he may keep communion with more purity in other places, polit. eccles. quest. 17. pag. 68. And he approves of the people refusing to bring their children to be baptized by such corrupt ministers, because they may wait until they have occasion of a minister; for if the best gifts be to be coveted, why should not the best ministers be preferred? and why should not Christians shew by their deeds, that they honour such as fear the Lord, and contemn a vile person? They ought not to partake of other men's sins, 1 Cor. v. 9, 11. Eph. v. 11. They should not strengthen the hands of the wicked, and make sad the godly; the authority of such ministers should not be strengthened,' Voet. polit. eccles. pag. 637 to 640. But though it labour under all these disadvantages; yet it is not the less, but so much the rather necessary, to say somewhat to clear it, with dependence upon light from the fountain, and with the help of faithful men who have sufficiently cleared it up, to all that have a conscience not blinded nor bribed with some prejudices, by which more light hath accrued to the church in this point of withdrawing from corrupt ministers than ever was attained in former times; which is all the good we have got of prelacy. Insomuch that I might spare labour in adding any thing, were it not that I would make the arguments, vindicating this cause of suffering, a little more public, and take occasion to shew, that the grounds espoused by the present and reproached party for their withdrawings, so far as they are stretched, are no other than have been owned by our writers on this head; to the intent that it may appear, there is no discrepancy, but great likeness and harmony between the arguments and grounds of withdrawing, in the late informatory vindication, &c. and those that are found in other writings. And so much the rather I think it needful to touch this subject now, that not only this hath been the first ground of our sufferings, but many that suffered a while for it, now have fainted, and condemned all their former contendings for this part of the testimony, calling in question all these reasons that formerly satisfied them. But to proceed with some distinctness in this thorny point: some concessory assertions must first be permitted, and then our grounds propounded.

First, I willingly yield to, and cordially close with the truth of these assertions.

I. The unity of the spirit, in the bond of peace, ought to be the endeavour of all that are members of the one body of Christ, partakers of his one Spirit, called in one hope, professing one Lord, confessing one faith, sealed with one baptism, Eph. iv. 3. &c. and for brethren to dwell together in unity, is good and pleasant, and like the precious ointment upon the head, that ran down upon Aaron's beard, Psal. cxxxiii. 1, 2. A fragrant ointment indeed, if it be composed aright of gospel simples, according to divine art, and the wisdom that is from above, which is pure, and then peaceable: and not made up of adulterate politics: that union that hath the Spirit for its author, the scripture for its rule, peace for its bond and beauty, love for its cement, faith for its foment, Christ for its foundation, and truth and holiness for its constant companions, cannot but be intensely desired, enixly endeavoured, and fervently followed by all the professors of the gospel of peace, and subjects of the Prince of peace: which makes division and schism, not only a great misery, but a grand sin. But it must be in the way of truth and duty, and consistent with holiness and the honour of Christ, otherwise if it be in the way of apostasy and defection, it is but a confederacy and conspiracy against the Lord. And true union can neither be attained, nor retained, nor recovered, except the sinful cause of division, defection, and the holy over-ruling cause, the anger of the Lord be removed, in turning to and following him.

II. Though there be not perfect union, but diversity both of judgments and practices, in several cases there may be communion with a church in its ordinances and ministry. As, 1. We may have a catholic communion with all christian ministers and members of the catholic church, considered as such; holding the head Christ, and the fountain sure. And so we may meet for worship with all devout men in every nation under heaven, whether they be Parthians, or Medes, or Elamites, or French or Dutch, &c. though differing in controversies of lesser moment, not overturning that; if they hold the universal testimony of the gospel, against the common enemies thereof, Jews, Turks, or Pagans: for there is neither Greek nor Jew, if he be a christian, Christ is all and in all, Col. iii. 11. But if they be heretics, we can have no communion with them. 2. We may have a more special communion with all protestant ministers and members of the reformed church, considered as such, more strictly, and upon stricter conditions: providing they hold, not only the universal of christians, but the general testimony of protestants, against the greater and lesser antichrists; though differing from us in some circumstantial points, not reformed, and not contradictory unto the protestant testimony against popery, and all heresy; nor declining from their own reformation, by defection or schism. And consequently, it is lawful to own communion with the churches of the united provinces, and take ordination from them, though they have some forms not allowable, from which they were never reformed, because they are sound in the protestant testimony. But with the sectarians, or schismatics, or apostates among them, we cannot own that special communion. 3. We may have a more particular communion upon yet stricter conditions with all our covenanted brethren, ministers and members of the churches of Britain and Ireland, considered as such: providing they hold, not only the universal, not only the more special, protestant testimony against the greater and lesser antichrists, but the covenanted testimony for the reformation in doctrine, worship, discipline, and government, against popery, prelacy, superstition, heresy, schism, and profaneness, according to the covenant; though differing from us in those controversial points, never reformed, and which were never the word of Christ's patience, and do not overturn the covenanted testimony. But with those that contradict and counteract that, we own that particular communion. 4. We may have yet a nearer organical communion, upon stricter conditions still with all the ministers and members of the national church of Scotland constitute and confederate under one reformed government, according to the rule of Christ: providing they hold, not only all the former testimonies under the foresaid considerations, but the presbyterian testimony as stated in the ecclesiastical constitution, and sworn to in the national covenants and engagements of that church, founded upon the word of God, against popery, prelacy, erastianism, sectarianism, toleration, schism and defection; though differing in some things from us, never reformed, never considered in ecclesiastical judicatories, never engaged against in our covenants, never stated as the word of patience and matter of testimony. But with those that oppose, suppress, reproach, and abandon this testimony, we cannot own this organical communion, in this broken state of the church. We may have yet a stricter congregational communion, upon stricter conditions, in and with the ordinary or extraordinary meetings or societies of the Lord's people for gospel ordinances, with any minister or ministers, duly and truly admitted to that function, according to Christ's appointment, and the call of the people, whether in a fixed or unfixed relation; providing he holds the testimony of Christ, under all the considerations, and owns and adheres unto the true received principles of the church of Scotland, in doctrine, worship, discipline and government, founded upon the written word of God, and whatsoever declarations or testimonies, former or latter, particular or more general, are agreeable thereunto; though differing from us in some of the integral and not essential parts of our testimony against the enemies of our covenanted reformation. But with such as deny or decline from it, by schism or defection, or compliance with the enemies thereof, we cannot own this congregational communion, in this broken state of the church.

III. Though there be many things in a church, to brangle and lessen the comfort of our communion with it, and the ministry thereof; yet we may keep fellowship with a true church, though in many things faulty and corrupt, as all churches are, in some measure, in this militant state. As the church of Corinth had many corruptions in their practice, yet no separation is enjoined from it. And the Lord did not require separation from the churches of Pergamos and Thyatira; though they had many corruptions and deficiences in discipline, in a toleration of heretics; and would lay no other burden upon them, but to hold fast what they had: as Mr. Durham shews in his Commentary on the Revelation, chap. 2. lect. 6. page 148, 149. as also chap. 18. lect. 1. page 585. in 4to. This must be granted especially in these cases, 1. In the infant state of the church, when the reformation is only begun: then many things may be tolerated, before they be gradually reformed, which, in an adult state, are not to be suffered. 2. In a growing case of the church, advancing out of corruptions, then many things may be borne with, while they are ascending and wrestling up the hill, which in a declining state, when the church is going backward, must not be yielded unto. See that objection of hearing prelatical men in the time of former prelacy, answered above, Period 4. In a constitute and settled case of the church, enjoying her privileges and judicatories, corruptions may be forborn, and the offended are not to withdraw, before recourse to the judicatories for an orderly redress; but in a broken and disturbed state, when there is no access to these courts of Christ; then people, though they must not usurp a power of judicial censuring these corruptions, yet they may claim and exercise a discretive power over their own practice; and by their withdrawing from such ministers as are guilty of them, signify their sense of the moral equity of these censures that have been legally enacted against these and the equivalent corruptions, and when they should be legally inflicted. As we do upon this ground withdraw from the prelatic curates, and likewise from some of our covenanted brethren, upon the account of their being chargeable with such corruptions and defections from our reformation, as we cannot but shew our dislike of. This the reverend author of Rectius Instruendum justifies, Confut. 3. Dial. chap. 10. p. 8. where he is shewing what separation is not sinful; and gives this for one, If we separate in that, which a national church hath commanded us as her members to disown, by her standing acts and authority, while those from whom we separate own that corruption. Which holds true of the curates, and indulged and addressers, and all that we withdraw from. However it be, certainly those are to be withdrawn from, with whom we cannot communicate without submitting to the laws establishing them, and taking on that test and badge of our incorporation with them, and partaking of their sin, and in hazard of their judgment.

IV. Though in some cases, as we are warranted, so are necessitated to withdraw: yet neither do we allow it upon slight or slender grounds, nor can any tender soul be forced to discountenance the ministers of Christ, (I do not here speak of the prelatical curates), without great reluctancy and grief of heart, even when the grounds of it are solid and valid, and the necessity unavoidable; therefore we reject these as insufficient grounds. Besides what are given already, 1. We cannot withdraw from a minister, for his infirmities or weakness, natural, spiritual, or moral. 2. Neither for personal faults and escapes: we expect a faithful, but not a sinless ministry. 3. Nor for every defect in faithfulness, through ignorance, want of courage, misinformation, or being biassed with affection for particular persons. We do not hold, that faults in members or defects in ministers, do pollute the ordinances, and so necessitate a separation; but agree with what Mr. Durham says on Revelations, chap. 2. lect. 6. p. 147. in quarto. Sincerity discovered will cover many faults. 4. Nor for every discovery of hypocrisy; though we may have ground to suspect a man's principle and motive be not right, yet if he be following duty unblameably, and have a lawful call, what then! "notwithstanding every way, whether in pretence or in truth, Christ is preached, therein we may rejoice," Phil. i. 18. 5. Nor yet for real scandals, not attended with obstinacy, if ministers will take reproof and admonition, and at least by doctrinal confessing, and practical forsaking them, satisfy the offended. 6. Yea, though his scandals be so gross, that we must discountenance him, when he persists in them: yet that is not a disowning of his ministry, or a rejecting his commission, but a discountenancing for his disorders, until they be removed. But the Apologet. Relat. sect. 14. p. 290, 291. says, (1.) 'There may be ministerial corruptions, that cut the very throat of the office, and make one no officer,----and it is past questioning, such may be shunned, without all hazard of separation. (2.) When personal faults are very gross and palpable, open and avowed, such may be shunned without any hazard of separation; because the man's being an officer, before God, is much to be questioned; and there is great probability, that by the very deed itself, he had forefaulted the same, though such should be the corruption in a church, that notwithstanding of all this he may be maintained. (3.) Separation is one thing, and not hearing such or such a man is a far other thing: there may be many just grounds of exception against a particular person, why people may refuse to countenance him, without any hazard of separation, or joining with separatists in their principles: separation is one thing, and refusing to attend the ministry of such a man is another thing; for a man may join with ordinances in another congregation, and so testify that he hath no prejudice at the ministry, but only against such a man in particular.' Whence it is an ignorant as well as malicious calumny, to say, that our withdrawing from the curates, and also from some ministers, whom otherwise we respect and reverence as godly ministers, for their offensive defections, is a disowning all the ministry of Scotland. Whereas, we do profess indeed a disowning of the curate's ministry, but for our reverend presbyterian ministers, though we do discountenance many of them with sad hearts, for not keeping the word of the Lord's patience in this hour of tentation, nor adhering to the principles and constitutions of the church of Scotland: yet this is not a disowning of their ministry, but a refusing to countenance them in their present administrations, in this disturbed state, till these offences be removed.

V. As to disown the ministry were hateful sectarianism; so to dissolve or break off communion with a true church, whereof we are members, were an unnatural schism, which is horrid sin. But because among all the various sufferings, wherewith the poor tossed and racked remnant now persecuted, have been exercised, this hath not been the lightest; that they have been on all hands stigmatized as schismatics and separatists, not only because they have maintained a resolved withdrawing from the curates, but also have discountenanced many presbyterian ministers, with whom they have been offended for their declining courses, and compliances with the times corruptions, and forsaking in a great measure the duty of this day: I shall distinguish some cases of separation, out of the writings of our approven authors, which will justify all their withdrawings. 1. Mr. Durham distinguishes these three, schism separating from the unity and communion of a true church, consisting not always in diversity of doctrine, but in divided practices, according to that of Augustine, it is not a different faith makes schismatics, but a broken society of communion: then separation, either in whole from a church as no church, or in part in some things wherein they cannot communicate with that corrupt church, which is lawful if it exceed not its ground; then, lastly, secession, a local removing to a better church. The first of these cannot be imputed to the persecuted wanderers: for they separate from no true church, whereof they were members, but these from whom they separate, will be found to be the schismatics. 2. The second of these, to wit separation, is either positive and active, or negative and passive. The first is, when a party not only leaves communion with a church whereunto they were formerly joined, but also gathers up new distinct churches, different from the former, under another government and ministry, and ordinances, disowning those they left. The latter is, when the faithful remnant of a declining church, standing still and refusing to concur with the backsliding part of the same church, after they have become obstinate in their defections, hold closely by, and adheres unto the reformation attained. This famous Mr. Rutherford, in his due right of presbyteries, p. 253, 254. sheweth to be lawful, and calleth it a non-union, as that in Augustine's time, when the faithful did separate from the Donatists; which is lawful and laudable. 3. 'Mr. Rutherford there proceeds to distinguish between a separation from the church in her worst and most part, and a separation from the best and least part: and these who separate from the worst and greatest part, do notwithstanding retain a part of, and a part in the visible church, because they do not separate from the church, according to the least and best part thereof; as the godly in England, who refused the popish ceremonies and antichristian bishops. Hence it will follow, that though people should now withdraw from communion with the greatest part of the church, which is now corrupted, they cannot be counted separatists, because they hold full communion with the better, though lesser part. Moreover he saith, p. 254, 255. That there may be causes of non-union with a church which are not sufficient causes of separation. Lastly, he tells us in the same place, p. 258. when the greatest part of a church makes defection from the truth, the lesser part remaining sound, the greatest part is the church of separatists; though the manyest and greatest part in the actual exercise of discipline be the church, yet in the case of right discipline the best, though fewest, is the church. For truth is like life, that retireth from the manyest members unto the heart, and there remaineth in its fountain in case of dangers. So that it is the major part which hath made defection, that are to be accounted separatists, and not such who stand to their principles, though they cannot comply or join with the corrupt majority.'

Thus the Apol. Relat. rehearsed his words, sect. 14. pag. 292. 293. 4. There may be a lawful withdrawing, where the ordinances and ministry are not cast at, as the Apol. Rel. saith ibid. 291. 'So then, so long as people do not cast at the ordinances, but are willing to run many miles to enjoy them: nor cast at the church as no church (thought they sadly fear, that God shall be provoked by this dreadful defection, which is carried on by these men and their favourers, to give her a bill of divorce) nor at the ministry, for they love those that stand to their principles dearly, and are most willing to hear them either in public or private. 5. It is granted by all that write against separatists, that separation from a church is lawful, when the case so falleth out, that union cannot be kept up with her without sin,' Voet. Polit. Eccles. p. 68. quest. 17. 6. The grave author of Rectius Instruendum Confut. 3 dial. chap. pag. 7. &c. 'Allows, every separation is not schism, even from the church which hath essentials; yea, and more than essentials: if it be from those (though never so many) who are drawing back from whatever piece of duty and integrity is attained; for this is still to be held fast, according to many scripture commands. So Elias, when God's covenant was forsaken, was as another Athanasius (I and I only am left) in point of tenacious integrity. 7. Next he says, If we separate in that which a national church hath commanded us as her members to disown, by her standing acts and authority, while those from whom we separate own that corruption. 8. Likewise he there asserts, there is a lawful forbearance of union and compliance with notorious backsliders, in that which is of itself sinful, or inductive to it: which is far from separation strictly taken. The commands of abstaining from all appearance of evil, and hating the garment spotted with the flesh, do clearly include this. 9. He adds, many things will warrant separation from such a particular minister or congregation; which will not warrant separation from the church national; nor infer it, by Mr. Durham's acknowledgment (on Scandal, pag. 129.) for if scandals become excessive, he allows to depart to another congregation. 10. Lastly, He says, There is a commanded withdrawing from persons and societies even in worship, the precepts, Rom. xvi. 17. 2 Cor. vi. 17. Prov. xix. 27. Acts ii. 40. will clearly import this by consequence.--Surely the ministers and professors, adhering to the reformation, must be the true church of Scotland, though the lesser number: these soldiers who keep the generals orders, are the true army, not the deserters of the same.'

But, Secondly, it being in part cleared by these assertions, what is our mind in this controversy, I shall lay down from scripture oracles, all the causes and cases justifying and warranting withdrawing from any ministers; with application of all of them to the curates, and accommodation of some of them to all that the wanderers withdraw from: with arguments endeavouring to evince the validity of them, and evidencing they are not new notions, but the same grounds which approven authors have improved in this controversy. I shall omit the ordinary criticisms in stating the question, in distinguishing betwixt hearing and joining in worship, and owning them as our ministers, and submitting to them, &c. And only essay to prove this thesis: we cannot, without sin, own church communion in gospel ordinances with the prelates or their curates, as our ministers, but must withdraw from them, and any other guilty of the like corruptions, which we can make out against them. I shall not resume what confirmations this thesis is strengthned with, from the testimonies, or church constitutions of former periods, which are permitted in the foregoing discourse; nor make any repetition of the circumstances of our present condition, represented above, which contributes to clear it: but shortly come to the arguments.

I. It is necessary that we must acknowledge them ministers of Christ, and his ambassadors clothed with his commission, from whom we receive the ordinances of the gospel. For otherwise they must be looked upon as thieves, robbers, usurpers, and strangers, whom Christ's sheep will not, nay must not hear, John x. 1, 5. And "how shall they preach," or be heard, "except they be sent," Rom. x. 15. For such whom we know may not lawfully preach, we cannot lawfully hear. These from whom we may receive the mysteries of God, we must account ministers of Christ, 1 Cor. iv. 1. and ambassadors for Christ, standing in his stead, beseeching us to be reconciled to God, 2 Cor. v. 20. Hence such as we doubt to acknowledge ministers of Christ, clothed with his commission, them we cannot hear without sin; but the prelatical curates are such as we doubt to acknowledge ministers of Christ, clothed with his commission: therefore we cannot hear them. The minor only needs probation. These who neither have nor can have the qualifications of a minister of Christ, cannot be acknowledged with confidence to be ministers of Christ clothed with his commission: but the prelatical curates are such: Ergo----First, they neither have, nor can have the qualifications of Christ's ministers; since few of them have the personal, as christians, far less the ministerial as officers, mentioned 1 Tim. iii. 2, 3. Tit. i. 6, 9. except it be to be "husbands of one wife," and if that do not make them ministers, they having nothing else, especially four are wanting in all of them. (1.) Blamelessness, and freedom from scandal, even such as affects the office (besides other gross disorders in their life and conversation, obvious to the view of onlookers, being men who have denied the faith; and therefore unfit to have the privilege of church members in any well governed church) being, in the experience of all that know them signalized under the characters of those that run unsent, and from whom we are commanded to withdraw: causing the people to err by their lies, and by their lightness, not sent of God, Jer. xxiii. making the heart of the righteous sad, and strengthening the hands of the wicked, Ezek. xiii. 22. See also Ezek. xxxiv. 2, 3. Such as we are commanded to beware of, Matth. vii. 15, 16. Such as we must mark and avoid, Rom. xvi. 17, 18. Phil. iii. 2. Disorderly walkers from whom we must withdraw, 2 Thess. iii. 6. Covenant breakers, from whom we are commanded to turn away, 2 Tim. iii. 3, 5. They are not then blameless: and in shewing how fitly these agree unto the persons now spoken of, time needs not be spent, such as know them can best judge. Hence, such as either are not fit to be church members, or have all the characters of such officers from whom we are to withdraw, cannot be acknowledged capable of the qualifications of the ministers of Christ; but such are the curates: Ergo----(2.) The qualification of vigilancy cannot be found with them for all that know them will acknowledge that they neither do, nor can in preaching the word be "instant in season and out of season," so as to make "full proof of their ministry," 2 Tim. vi. 1,--5. Nay, they can give no proof of their ministry at all, further than may be competent to dumb dogs that cannot bark, Isa. lvi. 10, 11. For they nor no man can say, That the diseased they have strengthened, or healed that which was sick, &c. Ezek. xxxiv. 4. And it is known to all that know them, that if ever there were any that assumed to themselves the name of Levites, who departed out of the way, and caused many to stumble at the law, and corrupted the covenant of Levi, and therefore were deservedly contemptible and base before all the people, (Mat. ii. 8, 9.) they are the men. Let any man judge then, whether they have the qualifications of the messengers of the Lord of hosts. Hence, they that can give no proof of their ministry, but that which proves them to be such whom the Lord condemns, and such who deserve to be contemned of all, cannot be acknowledged to be qualified as the Lord's ministers; but the prelatic curates can give no proof of their ministry, &c. Ergo----(3.) The qualification of aptness to teach is wanting; yea, incompatible with them, not only such of them as are noted for ignorance, of whom clearly that is verified, they are blind watchmen, they are all ignorant (Isa. lvi. 10.) but even their greatest clerks and rabbies may fitly be called after the name of their forefathers, whom Christ calls blind leaders of the blind, concerning whom he gives a command to let them alone, Mat. xv. 14. Either generally they are discovered to be such masters of Israel, as know not these things, John iii. 10. being men not exercised in religion, and have not learned the truth as it is in Jesus; or they are such, as if they have had gifts or grace, yet now they are palpably blasted of God, and so cannot profit the people at all, being such as do not stand in God's counsel, for then they should have turned the people from their evil way, and so they are not apt to teach others when they are not taught of God, but steal his words every one from their neighbour, clearly discovering they are not sent of him, Jer. xxiii. 21, 22, 30, 32. And because they do not stand in God's counsel, they cannot declare all the counsel of God, Acts xx. 27. For they can neither be apt to teach repentance towards God, since they cannot be supposed to be sensible of these sins to be repented of, for which the land perisheth, and is burnt up like a wilderness, Jer. ix. 12. For then they would first repent themselves of their own conformity with prelacy, of their breach of covenant, &c. All that they can do in such a subject is, to see vain and foolish things, and not to discover the land's iniquity, but to see false burdens, and causes of banishment, Lam. ii. 14. Nor can they be apt to teach faith, seeing in many things they teach otherwise than Christ hath taught us in his word, and consent not to wholesome words, and to the doctrine which is according to godliness, from such the command is to withdraw, 1 Tim. vi. 3,--5. whose mouths must be stopped when they teach things which they ought not, Tit. i. 9,--11. which is undeniable to all that know what sort of stuff they preach, contrary to the word of God, and the principles of our covenanted reformation. Hence if none of them be apt to teach, then none of them is fit to be heard; but none of them is apt to teach: Ergo----'It is true private christians may not judge of the endowments and qualifications of ministers; yet every private christian hath the judgment of discretion, and that way may judge such an one if he appear qualified according to the rule of the word; and may doubt if he be a qualified minister before God, wanting these qualifications which the word requireth,' Apol. Relat. sect. 15. p. 285. Secondly, They have not the lawful call of a minister of Christ, so much as an external call of his institution: which I prove thus. They that have presentations from patrons, and collations from prelates, and no more for a call, have no lawful call at all; but the curates have presentations from patrons, and collations from prelates, and no more for a call: Ergo they have no lawful call at all. The minor cannot be doubted: 'For, in this government, the minister's mission, call, ordination, and relation to such a people over whom he is to officiate, flows all from the prelate; the congregational eldership hath not the least interest in it: hence the presbyterian way of calling pastors was ranversed by the parliament, when prelacy was set up, and the old custom of patronages was restored,' Rectius Instru. Confut. of 1 Dial. chap. 4. p. 3. The major proposition may be proven by parts. First, Presentations from patrons cannot give a lawful call; for besides what other reasons might be given against this old relict of popish bondage of patronages, it destroys that privilege and liberty of the church in calling their own pastors, and makes all intruders, without the church's choice; whereas the flock are allowed a judgment of discretion, knowledge of, and consent to the admission of their pastors, to whom they intrust their soul's directions, before they be subject to, and obey him in the Lord, for otherwise he is a stranger that hath not come in at the door, and they must not, nor will not be imposed upon, John x. 1-5. They had an interest in choosing and nominating even the apostles, though there were other apostles of infallible knowledge, as to qualifications, present to ordain them; and they appointed two to be chosen by lot, Acts vi. 23. and even the deacons were looked out and chosen by the people, and appointed over the business, Acts vi. 3. 'Much less ought ministers to be thrust upon such a weighty employment, to pleasure great men who are patrons, since in their faithfulness the people are infinitely more concerned,' Rectius Instruen. ubi Supra. Hence, if the curates have no call but what destroys the people's privilege, they have no lawful call at all, neither ought they to be owned, or countenanced as called ministers; but by the presentation of patrons they have no call, but what destroys the people's privilege: Ergo--Next, collations from prelates cannot give a lawful call: for (1.) they cannot give that to others which they have not themselves; but they have not a lawful call themselves, because they are not lawful officers, as is clear, and may be proven afterwards. (2.) the only way of conveyance of an ordinary call to this office, is by the act of a presbytery, Tim. iv. 4. And, by ministers, their ordaining elders in every church, with the consent of that church; but a prelate's collation is not this act of a presbytery. (3.) That which only makes a man a prelate's depute, cannot give him a call to the ministry of Christ; but this collation only makes a man a prelate's depute. Or thus, a prelate's depute is no minister; but a curate is a prelate's depute: Ergo----That a prelate's depute is no minister, I prove; not only from that, that a prelate, as such, is not a servant of Christ, but an enemy; and therefore cannot confer upon another, that dignity to be Christ's servant; but from this, that the scripture allows no derivation of deputed officers. If no officers of Christ can have deputes of Christ's institution; then the deputes that they make cannot be Christ's officers of his institution; but no officers of Christ can have deputes by Christ's institution: every man that hath any piece of stewardship in God's family must ever see and execute it immediately by himself, and wait upon it, Rom. xii. 7, 8. That curates are prelates deputes is clear: for they are subject to them in order and jurisdiction, and derive all their power from them, and are accountable to them: therefore they cannot be acknowledged with confidence of conscience to be Christ's ministers. 'Because they have not such a visible evidence of the call of Christ, as, in reason and charity, doth oblige all men to receive the person so called, as truly sent: which things are so evident in themselves, that whoever denieth them, is obliged by the same consequence to affirm, that if Simon Magus had in his horrid wickedness, purchased the apostleship by money, the Christian world had been bound to receive him as an apostle,' Naphtali, p. 105, 106, first edition. That their ministry is the Lord's ordinance is plainly denied, Naphtali, p. 109. 'They have nothing like a solemn ordination, having no imposition of hands of the presbytry with fasting and prayer, according to the order of the gospel, but the sole warrant and mission of the prelate, and therefore it cannot be lawful to countenance such, and to look upon them as lawful ministers,' Apol. Relat. sect. 15. pag. 183. It will be objected here, 1. 'That then their baptism is no baptism, if they be no ministers.' Ans. '(1.) what sad consequences may follow upon the nulling of their office, let them see to it who either send such forth, or employ them.' Apol. Relat. ib. p. 294. the best way to avoid these inconveniences is not to countenance them. But (2.) the same answers may serve which are adduced for popish baptisms and ordinations: and the deed sometimes signifies, That it ought not to be done. Next it will be, Object. 2. That many of the curates were in the ministry before, therefore the argument is not stringent against them. Ans. The one half of it about the qualifications does still urge them, through the want of which, and their base treachery and betraying their trust, and perjuries in breaking covenant, they have really forefaulted their ministry, and loosed all from an obligation to hear them, or any other to whom these scripture-characters may be applied, and brings all under the guilt of partaking with them that hear them.

II. It is necessary also, that all whom we may lawfully hear as ministers and ambassadors of Christ, should not only have had a commission from Christ, sometimes conveyed to them in his orderly appointed way, by and from approven church officers; but they must have it then when we hear them, at this time when we own communion with them. For if they have sometimes had it, and forefaulted or changed it, by taking a new right another way, it is all one in point of owning them, as if they had none at all: and we must not meddle with such changelings, in things that they and we must not come and go upon, Prov. xxiv. 21. Now plain it is, that some curates sometimes had a commission from Christ, when they were presbyters; but now they have changed their holding, and taken a new right from them who are no officers of Christ, invested with power to confirm or convey a ministerial mission; and so they have forefaulted what they had. Mr. Durham, in a digression on this subject of hearing, shews, that ministers may forefeit, on Revel. chap. i. p. 55. in 4to. 'In matter of hearing (says he) it is not so hard to discern, who are to be counted to speak without God's commission; because ordinarily such have no warrantable call at all (no not in the outward form, and so cannot be counted but to run unsent) or by palpable defection from the truth, and commission given them in that call, they have forefeited their commission: and so no more are to be counted ambassadors of Christ, or watchmen of his flock, than a watchman of the city is to be accounted an observer thereof, when he hath publicly made defection to the enemy, and taken on with him.' Let the indulged and addressing ministers advert to this: and consider, whether or not the truly tender have reason to discountenance them, while they continue in their palpable defection. But undeniably this resells that objection of the curates ordination before they were curates; for they that change their holding of a right, and take a new right which is null, they forego and forefeit their old right, and all right; but the prelatic curates have changed their holding of their right, and taken a new one, which is null: therefore they have foregone and forefeited their old one. The minor I prove thus. They who had a right from Christ by conveyance of his officers, and take a new grant for the exercise of it, not from Christ, but by conveyance of such as are none of his officers, they change their holding, and take a new one, which is null. But the prelatic curates, who had a right by conveyance of his officers, have taken a new grant for the exercise of it, not from Christ, but by conveyance of the prelate, which is none of his officers; Therefore----The stress of all will ly in the probation of this, that the prelate is none of Christ's officers, and therefore the conveyance of a power from him is not from Christ. Which I prove, 1. Because his office is cross to the very nature of gospel church government, and therefore he cannot be a gospel church ruler. Christ discharged his officers to exercise dominion (or lordship, Luke xxii. 25.) or authority, as the Gentiles did, but that the chiefest should be only a minister, Matth. xxii. 25, 26. The apostle Paul disclaims dominion over the church, 2 Cor. i. ult. Peter exhorts the elders not to be lords over God's heritage, 1 Pet. v. 3. The authority of church-officers then is not a despotic power, but a ministerial stewardship. But the diocesan bishop is both a lordly title and power, having all authority in the diocese derived from him, as being as it were the universal pastor, and so taking upon him a power, which is neither commanded, nor can be discharged. Hence, he that subjects his ministry to the domination of a strange lord, inverting the nature of gospel church-government, cannot be owned in his ministry; but all curates subject their ministry, &c. Therefore----2. Because he is an officer distinct from, and superior to a presbyter or pastor; whereas the scripture makes a bishop and presbyter all one. The elders of the church of Ephesus are called episcopi or overseers, Acts xx. 17, 28. An ordained elder must be a blameless bishop, as the steward of God, Tit. i. 5, 7. Again, it cannot be shown, where the scripture mentions either name, qualification, work, duty, or ordination of an ordinary church-officer superior to presbyters, and which are not likewise appropriate to them who are called rulers, governors, bishops. In all the holy Ghost's purposed recitals of ordinary church-officers, there is not the least hint of a diocesan bishop; and yet a deacon is described the meanest officer in his work and qualifications. Hence then, if this diocesan prelate be such an uncouth beast, that neither in name nor nature is found in the word of God, all the power derived from him is null; but the first is true: therefore----3. Because every officer in the scripture relates to the flock (except the extraordinary officers, who were further extended, now ceased) bishops of Ephesus, were overseers over the flock, Acts xx. the elders that Peter writes to were over the flock. But this diocesan antiscriptural monster pretends to be over the shepherds, and invents new degrees and orders of superiority and inferiority of officers of the same kind, beside and against the scripture, which makes all apostles alike, and all evangelists, so all teachers; though there be a distinction and superiority in diverse kinds, yet not in same. God hath set some in the church, first apostles, secondarily prophets, thirdly teachers, 1 Cor. xii. 28. but not among teachers, some above others, in a power of order and jurisdiction. Hence, an officer over officers of the same kind, is not an officer of Christ's institution, and consequently any power conveyed from him is null; but a prelate pretends to be an officer, over officers of the same kind: therefore, 4. Because every officer in the church hath equally, and in perfect parity, equal power and authority allowed them of God in the exercise of both order and jurisdiction; all ruling elders may rule alike, and deserve equal honour; and all preaching elders have the like authority, and the like honour conferred upon them, 1 Tim. vi. 17. The scripture attributes both power of order and jurisdiction; to all preaching presbyters equally. They must oversee the flock (or as the word is, do the part of a bishop over them) Acts xx. 28. and they must also feed the flock, 1 Pet. v. 2. Subjection and obedience is due to them all alike: all that are over us and admonish us, we must esteem highly for their work's sake, 1 Thes. v. 12. and obey and submit ourselves to them that watch for our souls, Heb. xiii. 17. We find also excommunication belongs to all alike, 2 Cor. ii. 6. and ordination, 1 Tim. iv. 14. But the diocesan prelate takes from presbyters to himself power of ordination, assuming only his curates for fashion's sake, and the sole decisive power in church judicatories, wherein he hath a negative voice; like a Diotrephes, the first prelate who loved to have the pre-eminence, 3 John 9. the only precedent for prelacy in the scripture. Hence, he that would take all power to himself, which is undivided and equal to all officers by Christ's appointment, hath none by Christ's allowance, but is to be reckoned an usurping Diotrephes; but the Diocesan prelate would take all the power to himself, which is undivided and equal to all. By all which it appears, the prelate being no authorized church-officer of Christ's, no authority can be derived from him; and so that such as betake themselves to this pretended power, for warranting them in the function, can warrantably claim no deference thereupon, nor can be owned as ministers, whatever they were before. 'For this were an acknowledging of the power and authority of prelates (especially when the law commands our hearing as a submitting to them.) The reason is, because these men came forth from the prelate, having no other call or warrant but what the prelate giveth: and so a receiving of them will be a receiving of the prelate, as a refusing of them will be accounted a slighting of the prelate and his power,' Apol. Relat. 15. p. 272.

III. It is necessary also, that all with whom we own communion as ministers, should be Christ's ambassadors, having then, when we hear them, and holding still their commission from Christ as king, and only head of his church: conveyed not only from church-officers, in a way that he hath revealed as the prophet of his church, but in a way of dependence upon, and subordination to Christ as king, who ascending far above principalities and powers, appointed and gave the gifts of the ministry, Eph. iv. 8, 11. and set them in the church, 1 Cor. xii. 28. and gave them commission to go and teach the nations, by virtue of that all power that was given to him in heaven and earth, Matth. xxviii. 18, 19. If then they take a new holding, and close with a new conveyance of the ministry, and of the power to exercise the same, from a new architectonic usurped power in the church, encroaching on Christ's royal prerogative, we dare not homologate such an affront to Christ, as to give them the respect of his ambassadors, when they became the servants of men, and subject even in ministerial functions to another head than Christ, for then they are the ministers of men, and by men, and not by Jesus Christ, and God the Father, who raised him from the dead, because they do not hold the head, Col. ii. 19. Hence those that receive and derive their church power from, and are subordinate in its exercise to, another head than Christ Jesus, should not be received and subjected to as the ministers of Christ in his church; but the prelates and their curates do receive and derive their church power from, and are subordinate in its exercise to, another head than Christ: therefore they should not be received, &c. The first proportion cannot be denied, the second is proved thus: Those officers in the church, professing themselves such, that derive their church power from, and are subordinate in its exercise to, a power truly architectonic and supreme in the church (to wit the magistrate) beside Christ, do derive their power from, and are subordinate in its exercise to another head than Christ Jesus; but so it is that prelates and their curates do derive, &c. Therefore----The major is evident; for whosoever hath a supreme architectonic power in and over the church, must be a head to the same, and the fountain of all church-power. The minor is also clear, from the foregoing historical deduction, manifesting the present prelacy to be gross erastianism; for the disposal of the government of the church is declared by law to be the crown-right, and and an inherent perpetual prerogative, and thereupon the bishops are restored to the episcopal function; it is expressly declared, that there is no church power in the church office-bearers, but what depends upon, and is subordinate unto the supremacy, and authorized by the bishops, who are declared accountable to the king for the administration; by virtue of which ecclesiastic supremacy, he put excommunication, and spiritual censures, and consequently the power of the keys, into the hands of persons merely civil, in the act for the high commission. Hence it is clear, that as the fountain of all church government, he imparts his authority to such as he pleases, and the bishops are nothing else but his commissioners in the exercise of that ecclesiastic power, which is originally in himself, and that the curates are only his under clerks. All the stress will ly in proving, that this monster of a supremacy, from which the prelates and their curates have all their authority, is a great encroachment on the glory of Christ as king; which will appear, if we will briefly consider these particulars. 1. It usurps upon Christ's prerogative, who only hath all undoubted right to this architectonic and magisterial dominion over the church, his own mediatory kingdom; not only an essential right by his eternal Godhead, being the everlasting Father, whose goings forth hath been of old, from everlasting, Isa. ix. 6. Mic. v. 2. in recognizance of which, we own but one God the Father, and one Lord, by whom are all things, and we by him, 1 Cor. viii. 6. but also a covenant-right, by compact with the Father, to bear the glory and rule upon his throne, by virtue of the counsel of peace between them both, Zech. vi. 13. A donative right by the Father's delegation, by which he hath all power given in heaven and in earth, Mat. xxviii. 18. and all things given into his hand, John iii. 35. and all judgment and authority to execute it, even because he is the Son of man, John v. 22, 27. and to be head over all things to the church, Eph. 1. 22. An institute right, by the Father's inauguration, who hath set him as King in Sion, Psal. ii. 6. and appointed him governor, that shall rule over his people Israel, Matth. ii. 6. An acquisite right, by his own purchase, by which he hath merited and obtained, not only subjects to govern, but the glory of the sole sovereignty over them in that relation. A name above every name, Phil. ii. 9. which is, that he is the head of the church, which is as much his peculiar prerogative, as to be Saviour of the body, Eph. v. 23. A bellical right by conquest, making the people fall under him, Psal. xlv. 4. and be willing in the day of his power, Psal. cx. 3. and overcoming those that make war with him, Rev. xvii. 14. An hereditary right by proximity of blood and promogeniture, being the first born, higher than the kings of the earth, Psal. lxxxix. 27. and the first born from the dead, that in all things he might have the pre-eminence, Col. i. 18. An elective right, by his people's choice and surrender, having a crown wherewith his mother crowned him in the day of his espousals, Cant. iii. last verse. By all which undoubted titles, it is his sole incommunicable prerogative, without a co-partner or competitor, co-ordinate or subordinate, to be judge, and only lawgiver, and king in spirituals, Isa. xxxiii. 22. to be that one lawgiver, Jam. iv. 12. who only can give the power of the keys to his officers, (which comprehends all the power they have) Matth. xvi. 9. to be that one Master over all church officers, who are but brethren, Matth. xxiii. 8, 10. in whose name only they must perform all church acts, and all parts of their ministry, and not in the name of any mortal, Matth. xxviii. 18, 19. Matth. xviii. 20. from whom only they receive whatever they have to deliver to the church, 1 Cor. xi. 23. to be the only instituter of his officers, who hath set them in the church, 1 Cor. xii. 28. and gave them to the church, Eph. iv. 11. whose ambassadors only they are, 2 Cor. v. 20. from whom they have authority for edification of the church, 2 Cor. x. 8. 2 Cor. xiii. 10. in whose name only they are to assemble, and keep and fence their courts, both the least, Matth. xviii. 20. and the greatest, Acts xv. But now also this is usurped by one who is not so much as a church-member, let be a church-officer, as such: for the magistrate is neither, as he is a magistrate, otherwise all magistrates would be church-members. Hence they that have all their power from a mere usurper on Christ's prerogative, who is neither member nor officer of the church, have none at all to be owned or received as his lawful ambassadors; but the prelates and their curates have all their power from a mere usurper on Christ's prerogative, who is neither member nor officer of the church: Ergo----2. It confounds the mediatory kingdom of Christ with, and subjects it to, the kingly government of the world, removes the scripture land-marks and limits between civil and ecclesiastic powers in making the governors of the state to be governors of the church, and denying all church-government in the hands of church-officers, distinct from and independent upon the civil magistrate: which clearly derogates from the glory of Christ's mediatory kingdom, which is altogether distinct from, and not subordinate to the government of the world, both in the old testament and in the new. For, they have distinct fountains whence they flow; civil government flows from God Creator, church government from Christ the Lord Redeemer, Head and King of his church, whose kingdom is not of this world, John xviii. 36. though for this end he came into the world, that he should have a kingdom there, verse 37. They have distinct objects: civil government hath a civil object, the outward man; church government a spiritual object, men considered as Christians; in the old testament, the matters of the Lord are clearly distinguished from the matters of the king, 2 Chron. xix. last verse. In the new testament, there are matters of church cognizance which do not at all belong to the civil magistrate; as, in the case of offence, they must tell the church, not the civil magistrate, Matth. xviii. 15, 20. In the case of excommunication, the church is to act by virtue of the power of the Lord Jesus Christ, 1 Cor. v. 4, 5. not by the magistrate's power; in the case of absolution, the church is to judge what punishment is sufficient, and what evidence of repentance is sufficient to remove it, 2 Cor. ii. 6, 7. So in the case of trial and ordination of ministers, &c. None of those belong to the magistrate. They have distinct natures: the civil is a magisterial, the ecclesiastic is a ministerial government; the one is the power of the sword, the other of the keys; the one put forth in political punishments, the other in ecclesiastic censures: In the old testament, the magistrate's power was coactive, by death, banishment, confiscation, &c. Ezra vii. 26. the church, but putting out of the synagogue, interdiction from sacred things, &c. In the new testament, the magistrate's power is described, Rom. xiii. to be that of the sword by punishment; the power of the church only in binding and loosing, Matth. xvi, 19. They have distinct ends, the end of the one being the good of the commonwealth, the other the church's edification: In the old testament, the end of the civil government was one thing, and of the church another, to wit, to warn not to trespass against the Lord, in that forecited, 2 Chron. xix. 10. In the new testament, the end of magistratical power is to be a terror to evil works, and a praise to the good, Rom. xiii. 3. but the end of church power is edification, 1 Cor. v. 5. 2 Cor. x. 8. 2 Cor. xiii. 10. They have distinct courts of officers: in the old testament, the distinction of the civil and ecclesiastic Sanhedrim is known, where there were distinct causes, and persons set over them to judge them respectively, 2 Chron. xix. last verse. In the new testament, we find officers given unto the church, 1 Cor. xii. 28. with no mention of the civil magistrate at all, and church assemblies distinct from parliaments or senates (yea, when the magistrate was an enemy) determining questions that did not belong to the magistrate at all, Acts xv. we have rulers distinct from the rulers of the commonwealth, 1 Thess. v. 12. whom we are to obey and submit ourselves to as those who are accountable to Christ only, for to whom else can they give account of souls? Heb. xiii. 17. we have rulers inferior to labourers in word and doctrine, not to be honoured so much as they: sure these cannot be civil rulers, 1 Tim. v. 17. we have rulers commended for trying impostors, which were not magistrates, Rev. ii. 2. And others who are rebuked for suffering hereticks, ibid. ver. 14, 15, 20. which supposes they had authority to do it; yet distinct from and not depending on the magistrate. Besides it is from the confusion of the two governments together, and making the supreme magistrate to be supreme governor of the church, would follow many absurdities; as that they who are not church-members should be church-officers, even heathen magistrates; yea women should be church-officers; and none should be chosen for magistrates, but such as have the qualifications of church-officers. See Apol. Relat. Sect. 12. pag. 190. Rectius Instruen. Confut. 1. Dial. chap. 6. pag. 50. Hence, they that in deriving their authority do confound the two governments, civil and ecclesiastic, and take it all from a mere civil power, cannot be owned as having any authority of Christ's institution: but the prelates and their curates, in deriving their authority, do confound the two governments civil and ecclesiastic, and take it all from a mere civil power. This same argument equally militates against hearing the indulged ministers, who have taken a licence and warrant from the usurper of this supremacy: because it is highly injurious to Christ's headship; very contrary to presbyterian principles; clearly homologatory of the supremacy; plainly prejudicial to the power of the people; very much establishing erastianism; sadly obstructive and destructive to the good of the church; wronging our cause and ground of suffering; strengthening the prelates hands; contradictory to our covenants; prejudging the meetings of God's people; and heinously scandalous and offensive: as is clear by, and unanswerably proven in the history of the indulgence.

IV. There is a necessity that any man whom we may join with as a minister, must not only be a minister, and a minister clothed with Christ's commission then, when we join with him, but he must also have a right to administer there where we join with him. Else we can look upon him no otherwise than a thief and a robber, whom Christ's sheep should not hear, John x. 1-5. Now the prelates and curates, though they should be accounted and acknowledged ministers, yet they have not a right to officiate where they have intruded themselves. Hence we have several arguments, as 1. They who have no just authority, nor right to officiate fixedly in this church as the proper pastors of it, ought not to be received but withdrawn from: but the prelates and their curates have no just authority, or right to officiate in this church as her proper pastors: therefore they ought not to be received, but withdrawn from. All the debate is about the minor, which may thus be made good. They who have entered into and do officiate fixedly in this church, without her authority and consent, have no right so to do: but the prelates and their curates have entered into and officiate fixedly in this church, without her authority and consent: Ergo--The major is manifest: for if this church have a just right and power of electing and calling of ministers, then they who enter into and officiate fixedly in this church, without her authority and consent, have no just authority or right so to do: But this church hath a just right and power of electing and calling of ministers, as all true churches have. And, if it were not evident from what is said above, might be easily demonstrated from scripture. The minor, to wit, that the prelates and their curates have entered into and officiate fixedly in this church, without her authority and consent, is evident, from matter of fact: for there was no church-judicatory called or convocated, for bringing of prelates into this church; but on the contrary her judicatories were all cashiered and discharged, and all her officers turned out to let them in; and all was done immediately by the king and acts of parliament without the church; a practice wanting a precedent in this, and (for any thing we know) in all other churches: All that the curates can say is, that they came in by the bishop and patron, who are not the church, nor have any power from her for what they do; all their right and power is founded upon and derived from the supremacy, whereby the diocesan erastian prelate is made the king's delegate and substitute, only impowered thereto by his law. This is Mr. Smith's, 1st and 6th argum. If 'we suppose a particular congregation acknowledging their own lawful pastor, and a few violent persons arise and bring in a minister by plain force, and cast out their lawful pastor; are not the faithful in that church obliged to relinquish the intruder, and not only discountenance him, but endeavour his ejection?' This is our case, Naphtali, pag. 106. Sect. 5. first edition. 2. If we cannot submit to these curates, without consenting to the great encroachments made upon the privileges of this church, then we cannot submit to them without sin; but we cannot submit to them without consenting to the great encroachments made upon the privileges of this church: therefore we cannot submit to them without sin. The minor is all the question: but instances will make it out. As first, The robbing of the privilege of election of her pastors, and substituting the bondage of patrons presentations, is a great encroachment upon the privilege of this church: but accepting of curates as ministers lawfully called, notwithstanding that they want the election of the people, and have nothing for their warrant but a presentation from the patron, were a consenting to that robbery and wicked substitution. It will be of no force to say, Our forefathers did submit to this, and to a ministry who had no other call. This is answered above in the narrative; 'tis a poor consequence to say, The posterity may return backward, because their forefathers could not advance further forward. Secondly, The thrusting out of lawful ministers without any cause but their adhering to the covenanted work of reformation, and thrusting in others in their rooms who denied the same, is a great encroachment on the churches privileges; but embracing and encouraging curates by countenancing their pretended ministry, were a consenting to this violent extrusion and intrusion. The minor is proven thus. They who leave the extruded, and countenance the intruded, they consent to the extrusion and intrusion, and declare they confess the intruded's right is better than his who is extruded: but they who embrace and encourage curates by countenancing their pretended ministry, do leave the extruded, to wit, their old ministers, and countenance the intruded: Ergo----To say, that people, in this case, should protest against these encroachments is frivolous; for withdrawing is the best protestation: and if after their protestation they still countenance the encroachment, they should undo their own protestation. The same argument will militate against countenancing the indulged, or any that obtained authority to preach in any place by a power encroaching on the churches liberties. There is an objection to be removed here, from Matth. xxiii. 2, 3. The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses chair; therefore whatever they bid you observe, that observe and do; therefore they who, without a title, usurp the office, may be heard. Ans. 1. The case is no-ways alike; for then the Lord had no other church in the world but that, which was confined in its solemnities of worship to that place, where they intruded themselves: he had not yet instituted the New Testament form of administration in its ordinances and officers. Therefore the head of the church being present might give a toleration, during pleasure: but it is not so now. But, 2. Our Lord's words bear no command for the people to hear them at all, but only not to reject sound doctrine, because it came from them: surely he would not bid them hear such, as he calls plants that his Father had never planted, whom he bids let alone, Matth. xv. 13, 14. and who were thieves and robbers whom his sheep should not hear.

V. They must not only be ministers, and acknowledged as such then and there, when and where we join with them; but they must be such as we can own church communion with in the ordinances administrated by them, as to the matter of them. Otherwise if they pervert and corrupt their ministry, by preaching and maintaining errors, either in doctrine, worship, discipline, or government, contrary to the scriptures, our confessions, and principles of our covenanted reformation, and contradictory to our testimony founded thereupon, and agreeable thereunto, maintaining errors condemned thereby, or condemning truths maintained thereby, we must withdraw from them. For if any seek to turn us away from the Lord our God, we must put away that evil, and not consent nor hearken to them, Deut. xiii. 5, 8. We must cease to hear the instruction that causeth to err from the words of knowledge, Prov. xix. 27. We must have a care of these leaders that will cause us to err lest we be destroyed with them, Isa. ix. 16. we must mark these who contradict the doctrine that we have learned, and avoid them, Rom. xvi. 17. If any man teach otherwise we must withdraw ourselves from such, 1 Tim. vi. 3, 5. If there come any, and bring not this doctrine, we must not receive him, nor bid him God speed, in that work of his preaching or practising against any of the truths, we have received from the word, 1 John x. 11. Hence we must not hear false teachers, who, in preaching and prayer, bring forth false doctrine contrary to the principles of our reformation; but the curates are false teachers, who, in preaching and prayer, bring forth false doctrine, &c. Therefore we must not hear them. The minor is certain, in that not only many of them are tainted with points of Popery and Arminianism; but all of them do teach false doctrine tending to seduce the hearers: when in their preaching they cry up the lawfulness of prelacy, and vent bitter invectives against presbyterian government, condemn the work of reformation, and inveigh against the covenant, and so teach and encourage people to follow them in open perjury, and condemning all our testimony, as nothing but treason and sedition; which we are persuaded is truth, and that therefore they are blasphemers: and in their prayers, stuffed with error, and larded with blasphemy, they reproach the work of reformation, and the power of godliness, and pray for a blessing on the prelates, and on their courses which are cursed; besides their parasitick prayers for the king, to be blessed in his government when stated in opposition to Christ, and several other things that tender consciences cannot go along with them therein. And yet if they hear them, they must go along and actively concur with them, as their mouth to God. If it be objected here, that this doth not strike against all, nor against any at all times, because some preach always sound doctrine, and all preach sometime sound doctrine, and the like may be said of their prayers: therefore sometimes at least they may be heard. I answer 1. This may be alledged for all hereticks, who do all at sometimes preach sound doctrine, and yet these scriptures are stringent against them at all times, which I have adduced; for by these fruits which they bring forth at sometimes, they shew themselves to be such as we must beware of at all times. 2. We cannot know when they will preach sound doctrine, seeing by their subjection to that government, they are obliged to maintain prelacy, and impugn our covenanted constitution.

VI. They must not only be such as we can join with in the ordinances as to the matter of them, but in the manner also they must be such administrators, as we are obliged in charity to think the Lord will approve of them, and their administrations, and of us in our communion with them; or at least, that, in their manner of dispensing ordinances, they be not such as we find are under a recorded sentence of dreadful punishment, both against them and their partakers: for if it be so, it is as sufficient a ground to withdraw from them, as for men to withdraw from a company staying in a house, that they see will fall and smother them in its ruin; yea it is as warrantable to separate from them, as for Israel to separate themselves from the congregation of the rebels who were to be consumed in a moment, Numb. xvi. 21. or for the Lord's people to come out of Babylon, that they receive not of her plagues, Rev. xviii. 4. Now we find that not only the prophets of Baal, and enticers to idolatry, and leaders to error upon the matter are threatened, and the people for adhering to them, but we find also (as is observed by Rectius Instruendum confut. dial chap. 1. pag. 21.) many terrible charges and adjurations laid upon ministers, in reference to a faithful diligence in their ministerial function, and a suitable testimony concerning the sin and duty of the time, that they are commanded to cry aloud and shew the people their sin, Isa. lviii. 1. and as they would not have the blood of souls upon them, to give faithful warning touching the peoples case and hazard, sin and duty, especially in times of great sin and judgment, when God is terribly pleading his controversy with them, Ezek. iii. 17. therefore they must be instant in season and out of season, 2 Tim. iv. 2. And for their negligence and unfaithfulness herein, we find many scripture woes and threatenings thundered against them. When in the deceit of their own heart they promise assured peace, when the Lord is pleading against a generation, they are threatened to be consumed with sword and famine, and the people to whom they prophesy shall be cast out in the streets, Jer. xiv. 13, 15, 16. therefore we dare not admit them to prophesy to us. When they strengthen the hands, and harden the hearts of evil doers, that none doth return from his wickedness, the Lord threatens to feed them with wormwood, and commands not to hearken to them, Jer. xxiii. 14.-16. their blood shall be required at their hands, Ezek. iii. 18. one builds a wall, and another daubs it with untempered morter, then ye, O great hailstones shall fall, and they shall be consumed in the midst thereof, Ezek. xiii. 10, 11, 14, 18, 22. we dare not join with either builders or daubers of such a work, as is carried on to the dishonour of Christ and ruining of reformation, nor by our countenance and concurrence strengthen either builders or daubers; lest we also be consumed in the midst thereof. When there is a conspiracy of the prophets, and the priests violate the law, and profane holy things, and shew no difference between the unclean and the clean, then the Lord will pour out his indignation upon all, Ezek. xxii. 25,--to the end. We would endeavour to keep ourselves free of having any hand in that conspiracy. These scriptures do give the perfect pourtracture of our curates, in the conviction of all that know them. Hence we draw a complex argument: such ministers as can do no good by their ministry, but a great deal of hurt to their hearers, and expose themselves and them both to the indignation of a jealous God, are not to be heard; but the curates are such as can do no good by their ministry, but a great deal of hurt to their hearers, and expose themselves and them both to the indignation of the jealous Lord: therefore they are not to be heard. The connexion of the major is clear from what is said above. The minor is also evident from the application of these scriptures, thus: they that in the deceit of their own heart promise peace to, and strengthen the hands of evil doers, and give them not warning, but seduce them by daubing their wickedness, and shew no difference between the unclean and the clean, &c. are such as can do no good by their ministry, but a great deal of hurt to hearers, and expose themselves and them both to the indignation of God; but the curates are such, and all others, who are so unfaithful as to give no warning against, but justify the sins of the times. To be short, the minor of both these foregoing arguments is evident from the experience of all that go to the curates, who wrong thereby their own souls, mar their edification; and run to cisterns without water. What blessing can be expected upon the labours of such, who having perjured themselves in taking on with the prelates, are prosecuting that course of defection, and making themselves captains to lead the people back to Egypt, encouraging profanity and wickedness, being themselves patterns and patrons of the times corruptions? And seeing a blessing cannot be expected upon their labours, but rather a curse, as daily experience maketh good, when instead of any work of conversion or conviction among people, there is nothing seen but a fearful hardening in profanity, ignorance and atheism: so that many that seemed to have somewhat like religion before, through hearing of them, are turned loose and lax in all duties: yea never can it be instanced these twenty-seven years, that they have brought one soul to Christ, from darkness to light, and from the power of Satan unto God: but many instances might be given of their murdering souls, as indeed they cannot be free of it, who cannot warn nor declare the whole counsel of God. Hence these who cannot but be soul-murderers, may not be heard nor entertained as soul-physicians; but the curates cannot but be soul-murderers. Again, we can expect no good from them, but a great deal of hurt; seeing their ministry is not the Lord's ordinance, which he will approve, and no performances can be acceptable unto the Lord which are not, in manner as well as in matter, agreeable to his will: hence the wickedness even of the Lord's lawful priests, not only caused the people to abhor the offerings of the Lord, but even the Lord himself to abhor his sanctuary, and to account their incense an abomination, so that he could not away with the calling of their assemblies, which yet upon the matter were duties. Should not we then hate that which the Lord hates, and withdraw from that which he hath forsaken? But the meetings of the curates for administration of ordinances in their way, the Lord hates, and hath signally forsaken: therefore we should hate and forsake them. This is confirmed by what Mr. Durham says in that digression about hearing, Rev. 1. page 55. in quarto, 'Seeing edification is God's gift, can it be expected but in his way, or can that be accounted his way which he hath not warranted.'

VII. As we would not partake of their judgment in countenancing of their administration of ordinances, so we would keep ourselves free from all participation of their sin; for we must not be partakers with any in sin, nor have fellowship with the unfruitful works of darkness, that we must reprove, and that we find the Lord reproves and condemns, Eph. v. 7, 11. and not only ministers in ordaining, but people in hearing, may be in hazard of partaking of some mens sins, who enter into the ministry, 1 Tim. v. 22. we must keep at the greatest distance from sin: hence if we hear the curates without partaking of their sin, then we must not hear them; but we cannot hear the curates without partaking of their sin: therefore we must not hear them. The minor I prove. If hearing of them be a tessera of our incorporation with them, a test of our submission to them, a badge of our compliance with them, and sign of our approbation of them, then we cannot hear them without partaking of their sin; but hearing of them is such: the major cannot be denied, if prelacy and conformity therewith be sin, as is in part proven above: for if these be sins, then we must not incorporate with, nor submit to them, nor comply with them, nor approve them. The minor I prove by parts. 1. Hearing of curates is a tessera of our incorporation with them; for communion in sacred things doth infer an incorporation of the communicants or joiners in all cases, both in lawful and unlawful communions, 1 Cor. x. 17.-20. All partakers of the bread are one body, and they which eat of the sacrifices are partakers of the altar; and also they that partake of the sacrifice offered to devils, though they do not offer it so themselves, yet they are incorporate, and have fellowship with devils. And 2 Cor. vi. 14.-17. where they that do not come out, and are separate from unlawful communions, are expostulated with, as making an unequally yoked fellowship between righteousness and unrighteousness, light and darkness, Christ and Belial, the temple of God and idols: hence then, if we cannot partake of their sacred things, without partaking of their altar, and becoming one body with them, and making such an unequally yoked mixture with them, then we must be separate; but the first is true from these places. This argument concludes with equal force, against joining with any deeply engaged in the gross defections of the time. 2. Hearing of curates is a test of our submission to them, and compliance with them: for so it is required by law, as the acts themselves say, 'That a chearful concurrence, countenance, and assistance given to such ministers, and attending all the ordinary meetings for divine worship, is an evidence of a due acknowledgment of, and hearty compliance with his majesty's government ecclesiastical and civil, as now established by law within this kingdom,' Act of Parl. July 10, 1663. And themselves look on all such as obey this act as their friends. Hence, if this be sinful to submit to them, and comply with their establishment, in obedience to a sinful act of parliament, then it is sinful to hear them; but the former is true, as hath been shown: Therefore----3. Hence it follows, by native consequence, that hearing of curates is a sign of our approbation of them: for he that gives that which is required, and accepted, and interpreted as an evidence of a due acknowledgment, and of compliance with the government ecclesiastical, gives the sign of his approbation of it; but the hearer of curates does that in obedience to the act requiring accepting, and expresly interpreting it so: therefore, &c.

VIII. As we would be free of their sin, in approving of, and complying with their course; so we must endeavour to stand at the greatest distance from all appearance of sin in ourselves, either by commission or omission, in which our joining with them in these circumstances would involve us. For we must abstain from all appearance of evil, 1 Thess. v. 22. and from every thing that circumstances may make sinful: for otherwise, suppose a thing might be materially lawful and not sinfully sinful, yet circumstances may make it sinful, and a countenancing it so circumstantiated, doth infer a communion in these circumstances that makes it sinful. They that eat of the sacrifice are partakers of the altar, and if the altar be not of God's approbation, the thing offered, though otherwise lawful to be eaten, cannot justify the eaters, so circumstantiated. An idol is nothing, and that which is offered in sacrifice to idols is nothing, yet they who eat of it, when they know it is so circumstantiated, have fellowship with devils, 1 Cor. x. 18, 19, 20, 21. And it is called idolatry, comp. verse 14. which provokes the Lord to jealousy, verse 22. Especially when an action is so circumstantiated, that it would infer an omission of our duty, and a declining from or denying of our testimony, then it is clearly sinful. For whosoever shall deny the Lord before men, him will he deny before his Father, Matth. x. 33. And we must 'hold fast the profession of our faith without wavering,' Heb. x. 23. and 'keep the word of his patience,' if we would be kept in the hour of temptation, and hold it fast that no man take our crown, Rev. iii. 10, 11. 'All truth must be avowed, and practically avowed, on the greatest hazard: and as this testimony must be full so must it be also constant. It was Demas's shame, that the afflictions of the gospel made him forsake the apostle, after great appearances for Christ: and therefore whatever truth or duty is opposed, that becomes the special object of this testimony.' Rectius instruend. confut. 3. Dial. Chap. 1. Pag. 18, 19. Hence, if hearing of the curates would infer and involve us under the guilt both of commission of sin, and omission of duty, then we cannot hear them without sin; but the former is true; therefore also the latter. I prove the minor by parts. First, That it would infer and involve us under the guilt of commission of sin, all that is said above doth evince it; and besides, palpable breach of covenant, hereafter to be charged and cleared: and idolatry is a great sin of that nature; but the hearing of the curates doth infer this. Which may be made out thus; the breach of the second commandment is idolatry, (for to make the sins against that command odious, they are all comprehended under that odious name of worshipping images, as the sins against the seventh are called adultery, comprehending all unchaste thoughts, words, and actions); hearing of curates is a breach of the second command: Ergo----The minor I prove thus: Every worship, not according to Christ's appointment, is a breach of the second commandment; but hearing of curates is a worship not according to Christ's appointment. Which I prove thus: a worship enjoined by, and performed in obedience to a law, establishing a human ordinance in the church, besides and against the institution of Christ, is a worship not according to Christ's appointment; but the hearing of curates is a worship enjoined by, and performed in obedience to a law establishing a human ordinance, to wit Diocesan Erastian prelacy, with the curates their substitutes. Hence also the second doth follow by necessary consequence, that it would infer and involve us under the guilt of omission of duty. For, first, If reductively it may involve us under the guilt of idolatry and breach of the second commandment, then it will infer the guilt of omission of these necessary duties incumbent to the Lord's people with a reference to idolatry; to make no covenant with them nor with their gods, nor let them dwell in the land, lest they make us sin, Exod. xxiii. 32. 33. Exod. xxxiv. 14, 15. to overthrow their altars, and break their pillars, and destroy the names of them out of the place, Deut. xii. 3. Judg. ii. 2. I do not adduce these precepts, to stretch them to the full measure of the demerit of the grossest of idolaters: for as there are degrees of breaches of the commandment, some grosser, some smaller, so there are also degrees of punishment, and as to the manner of destroying and extirpating all pieces of idolatry; but that the commands being founded upon a moral ground, lest they be sins and snares unto us, do oblige us to some endeavour of expelling, extirpating and overthrowing all pieces of idolatry, according to the word and our covenants; 'and that the true and right zeal of God should and would not only inspire all with an unanimous aversion against the profane intruding curates, but animate us as one man to drive away these wolves and thieves, and to eradicate these plants which our heavenly Father never planted,' Naph. Prior edit. pag. 108. The least duty that can be inferred is that of the apostles, flee from idolatry, 1 Cor. x. 14. which idolatry, there mentioned to be avoided, is to eat of the sacrifices offered to idols: whence we infer, that if to eat of things consecrated to idols be idolatry, then also to partake of sacred things consecrated by idols must be idolatry; as the curates dispensing of ordinances is consecrated by, and hath all its sanction from an idol of Diocesan Erastian prelacy; but we see the apostle expresses the former: therefore we may infer the latter. Further, It will also infer a declining from, and denying a necessary testimony, in the case circumstantiated. Even the smallest matter is great, when a testimony is concerned in it, were it but the circumstance of an open window; Daniel durst not omit it upon the greatest hazard. And now this is clearly come to a case of confession, when there is no other way to exoner our 'consciences before God and the world, and declare our non-conformity to this course of backsliding, no getting of wrongs redressed, or corruptions in the ministry removed, but by this practice; and certainly some way we must give public testimony against these courses, and there is no other way so harmless and innocent as this, though suffering follow upon it,' Apol. Relat. Sect. 14. 272, 273. And now there is no other way apparent, whereby the difference shall be kept up betwixt such as honestly mind the covenanted work of reformation, and the corrupt prelatical and malignant enemies; but this argument also will infer the expediency of withdrawing from all ministers, with whom our circumstantiate joining would involve us in a participation with their defections.

IX. As we would endeavour to avoid sin in ourselves; so we must have a care to give no occasion of others sinning, by our taking liberty in a promiscuous joining in church communion, whereby we may offend and stumble the conscience of others: for to that, in this as well as in other things, we must have a special respect, and forbear things, not only for our own unclearness, but for the sake of others also. If therefore the hearing of curates be a scandal, we must refuse it, be the hazard what will: for 'whoso shall offend one of Christ's little ones, it were better for him that a milstone were hanged about his neck,' Matth. xviii. 6. 'No man must put a stumbling block, or an occasion to fall in his brother's way,' Rom. xiv. 13. They that 'sin so against the brethren, and wound their weak conscience, they sin against Christ,' 1 Cor. viii. 12. we must forbear some things for conscience sake. Conscience, I say, not our own, but of others, giving none offence, neither to the Jews, nor to the Gentiles, nor to the church of God,' 1 Cor. x. 28, 29, 32. and so 'cut off all occasion from them that desire occasion,' 2 Cor. xi. 12. 'These commands discharge whatever practice gives occasion of our brother's sinning, of calling truth in question, of acting with a doubting conscience, or which weakens his plerophory or assurance; and neither the lawfulness nor indifferency of the thing itself, nor mens authority commanding it, nor the weakness, yea, or wickedness of those in hazard to be stumbled, will warrant the doing of that out of which offence arises,' Rectius Instruend. Confut. 3. Dial. chap. 1. p. 19. Mr. Durham in that forecited place saith, 'It carries offence along with it; in reference to the party who runs unsent, it proves a strengthening and confirming of him, and so a partaking of his sin; in reference to others, either strengthens them by that example, to cast themselves in that snare, which possibly may be their ruin; or it grieves them, and makes them sad, who are tender of such things, or gives occasion to make all difference of that kind to be thought light of.' Hence, if hearing of the curates be an offence or scandal, both in reference to malignants, and in reference to the godly, and in reference to the posterity, then it must be avoided; but the former is true: which is evidenced by parts. First, in reference to malignants, it hardens and encourages them in their opposition to the work of God, and all backsliders and compliers with them in their apostacy; this strengthens their hands in their wicked courses, when they see how they are countenanced by all, and that there is no disrespect put upon them, nor dissatisfaction evinced against their courses, then they conclude that they are approven of all: and this hardeneth them, so that they never once think of the evil of their ways. Next, in reference to the godly, stumbles the truly tender, by encouraging them to do contrary to their light and conscience, even when they are not clear to hear them, then they are emboldened thereunto when they see others doing so; and so it tends to the wounding of their peace, and makes them halt in the ways of the Lord. Lastly, With reference to posterity, it would prejudge them very much: though now the honest party be not in a capacity to transmit the work of reformation unto their posterity, in such a manner as were to be wished: yet they should do something for keeping fresh the memory of the good old cause, by keeping up some footsteps of a standing controversy for Zion's interest against the common enemy: but now let all join with, and own the curates, what appearance of this shall the posterity see? shall not they conclude that the day is lost, and the cause is gone, when they see that this generation hath fled the fields, or rather sold and betrayed the cause, by owning, countenancing, and complying with the enemy, and no standing testimony against these corruptions? whereas if there were but this much of a standing difference, betwixt the people of God and the common enemies of God, to be seen, posterity shall in some measure be kept from being deceived, and shall see the interest of Christ not killed nor buried quick, but living, though in a bleeding condition, and this will occasion their engaging for Christ, and interesting themselves in the quarrel; and it is far better to see the cause of Christ owned, though by suffering and blood, than sold and betrayed by base flenching and complying with persecutors. This argument may also sound and infer a withdrawing from the addressing ministers, who, to the great scandal of presbyterians, give forth their addresses in the name of all of that persuasion.

X. Our duty to themselves, yea our greatest office of love we owe to them, in order to their conviction, does oblige us to withdraw from them. This may seem a paradox, yet it will be apparent, if we search the scriptures, to see what we owe to scandalous brethren. There we find it is a duty, to endeavour by all lawful means to shame them out of their sin; and it is an argument of hatred, when we do not rebuke our neighbour, or when we suffer sin upon him, Lev. xix. 17. If we consider them then as neighbours and friends, we must use endeavours to take away their sin from them; if we consider them not as such, but as enemies, then we must avoid them, and not be mingled with them, as I could adduce many scriptures for that. But I suppose all that will oppose my thesis, would have them considered as friends. Well then, if they be scandalous brethren, this is the way prescribed by the apostle to deal with them, in order not to suffer sin upon them, that we should withdraw from them our company; and if we must withdraw our company, then also a fortiori, we must deny them our religious communion: for that must either be included there, or necessarily inferred. He writes, not to keep company: If any man that is called a brother (mark that especially) be a fornicator, or covetous, or an idolater, or a railer, or an extortioner, with such an one no not to eat, 1 Cor. v. 11. And I presume they that know them best will grant, that it would not be hard to prove, that all the curates in Scotland were chargeable with some of these, or at least partakers with them; and that if they were all impartially impannelled, they would be rare ones, whom an honest jury would not bring in guilty of this libel. Then we are expresly commanded 'in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, to withdraw ourselves from every brother that walketh disorderly, and not after the received tradition. And if any man obey not the word, to note him, and have no company with him, that he may be ashamed,' 2 Thess. iii. 6, 14. Sure neither their office nor their innocency can exempt them from these rules. For either they must be considered as our brethren; or not; if not, then we own no church communion with them; for that is only among brethren that are so in sympathy and affection, and affinity, having one father and one mother, if they be brethren, then all scandalous brethren are to be withdrawn from; but they are scandalous brethren: therefore they are to be withdrawn from. The minor will not be doubted by any, but such as are strangers to them, who both in their ministerial and personal capacity are so scandalous to the conviction of all, that profaneness hath gone forth from them into all the land, and they as much as ever the profane sons of Eli, have made men to abhor the offering of the Lord, 1 Sam. ii. 17. But even strangers, that are unacquaint with their personal profligateness and ignorance, &c. cannot be altogether ignorant of the scandal of prelacy and erastianism, in which they are involved, of the scandal of apostasy, perjury, and breach of covenant, which is their brand, and the nation's bane, that hath countenanced them. And none can doubt, but if our church were duly constitute, and invested with the orderly power of Christ, and in capacity to exercise and improve it, they would soon be censured every soul of them as scandalous, as they have been also previously sentenced as such, by the acts of our general assemblies. This argument levels also against all complying, indulged, addressing ministers, who by these courses have incurred the character of disorderly brethren.

XI. Our faithfulness to God, and to one another, engaged in our covenants, doth oblige us to turn away from them who have broken it, and so classed themselves among these truce breaking traitors, who make our times perilous, from whom we must turn away, 2 Tim. iii. 1,--5. It appears from the foregoing deduction, how solemnly these nations were engaged, both to keep out and put out this generation of prelatists, now prevailing; the obligation of which yet lies upon all the inhabitants of the land, with a binding force, both in regard of their form, and object and end. Hence, if the curates be covenant-breakers, and we also in owning them, then we cannot own them without sin; but the curates are covenant-breakers, and we also in owning them: Ergo----The minor may be manifest by an induction of all the articles of the solemn league and covenant, broken by them, and all that own them. 1. That doctrine, worship, discipline and government in the 1st article, sworn to be preserved and propagated, was the presbyterian then established, which our church was in possession of, which they have opposed, and their owners refiled from, and have not maintained. 2. We are engaged in the 2d article, to endeavour the extirpation of prelacy, and its dependents; which is diametrically opposite to owning of curates: can we own them whom we are bound to abhor? and submit to them whom we are bound to extirpate? Surely this were to rebuild what we have destroyed, see Napht. p. 104. and since in relation to popery, heresy and schism, this article obliges us to disown, and not to hear papists and schismatics, why not also in relation to prelatists, who are greatest schismatics? 3. They have established and homologated an erastian supremacy, to the prejudice of true religion, and the liberties of the church and kingdom; and their owners have abetted and countenanced the same, and not preserved either the liberties of church or kingdom, contrary to the 3d article. 4. They have not only concealed and countenanced malignant enemies to this church and kingdom, but have themselves been real incendiaries, hindering the reformation of religion, making factions and parties among them contrary to this league and covenant: and their hearers are so far from bringing them to condign punishment, that they have strengthened their hands in their avowed opposition to the covenants, contrary to the 4th article. 5. They have broken our conjunction in firm peace and union, and yet their hearers have not marked and avoided these causers of divisions, contrary to scripture, and the 5th article. 6. Instead of assisting and defending all these that entered into this league and covenant, &c. they have been the greatest persecutors of all them that adhered to it; and their owners have suffered themselves, by combination, or persuasion, or terror, to be divided and withdrawn from their suffering brethren, and have made defection to the contrary part, and given themselves to a detestable indifferency in this cause, contrary to the 6th article. 7. Instead of humbling themselves for their sins, and going before others in the example of a real reformation, they have obstinately defended their breach of covenant, and have been patrons and patterns of all deformations; and their owners and hearers have not repented of that neither, when they countenance such covenant-breakers and profane persons, nor of their not labouring for the purity and power of the gospel when they seek it from such impure hands: neither do they go before others in reformation, when they are such bad examples of defection, contrary to the conclusion of the covenant. This argument will also strike against hearing of such ministers, that have made themselves guilty of the same, or equivalent breaches of covenant.

XII. Finally, for union's sake, and to avoid schism in the body, we must withdraw from them. This may seem another paradox; but it is apparent, if we consider, 'That there should be no schism in the body, but that the members should have the same care one for another,' 1 Cor. xii. 25. And that for to prevent and remeid this, the apostle 'beseeches us to mark them which cause divisions and offences, contrary to the doctrine which we have learned, and avoid them,' Rom. xvi. 17. Now then, if the prelates and their curates be schismatics and separatists, and dividers, then we must avoid and withdraw from them, but so it is, that the prelates and their curates are schismatics and separatists, and dividers: therefore we must avoid and withdraw from them. The minor I prove from all the constituents of a formed schism, separation and sinful division. 1. They that start out from under due relations to a church, and from her ministry, are schismatics, separatists and dividers; but the prelates and their curates have started out from under due relations to the covenanted church of Scotland, and from her ministry, in being so unnatural rebellious children, as have broken their mother's beauty and bands, order and union, and razed her covenanted reformation in doctrine, worship, discipline and government. 2. These who withdraw from the communion of a true church, and therefore are censurable by all her standing acts, are schismatical separatists; but the prelates and their curates have withdrawn from the communion of the true church of Scotland, and therefore are censureable by all her standing acts, in that they have made a faction and combination repugnant to the communion of this church, and all her established order. 3. Those who separate from a church, whose principles and practices are subservient to that church's true union and communion, and right establishment, are properly schismatics; but the prelates and their curates have separated from this church, whose principles and practices are subservient to its true union and communion, and right establishment: for they could never yet impeach or challenge any principle or practice, contrary to the word of God, or not subservient to true union and order, but their principles and practices are stated in opposition to her purity and reformation. Those who innovate the worship and government, owned and established in a true church, are schismatics; but the prelates and their curates have innovated the worship and government of the true church of Scotland, in bringing a doctrine new and odd, and not the voice of this church; and their worship, over and above the corruption adhering to it, is the worshipping of an innovating party, contrary to our church's established order. 5. They that make a rent in the bowels of the true and genuine church, are the schismatics; but the prelates and their curates have made a rent in the bowels of this church, and have caused all the divisions in this church. 6. Those that divide themselves from the fellowship of a pure church, either in her ministry, lawful courts and ordinances, are the schismatics; but the prelates and their curates have divided themselves from the fellowship of this pure church, in her ministry, lawful courts and ordinances, in that they have caused the ejection of her ministry, dissipation of her assemblies, and subversion of her pure ordinances. 7. Those that break union with such, to whom they were under obligations to adhere, are schismatical dividers; but the prelates and their curates have broken union with such to whom they were under obligations to adhere, both from the antecedent morally obliging duty, and from the superadded obligation of the covenants, neither could they ever pretend any thing that might loose the obligation. 8. That party in a reformed church, which having overturned her reformation, hath shut out, laid aside, and persecute away sound adherers thereunto, both ministers and professors, and will not admit ministers to officiate, but upon the sinful terms of compliance with their way, are schismatics; but the prelates and their curates are that party in this reformed church, which having overturned her reformation, hath shut out, laid aside, and persecute away sound adherers thereunto, &c. therefore they are the schismatics to be withdrawn from, and their way is the schism, which we are bound to extirpate in the covenant.

HEAD II.

The sufferings of many for refusing to own the tyrant's authority vindicated.

The other grand ordinance of God, magistracy, which he hath in his sovereign wisdom, justice, and goodness, appointed, ordained, and consecrated, for the demonstration, illustration, and vindication of his own glory, and the communication, conservation, and reparation of the peace, safety, order, liberty, and universal good of mankind, is next to that of the ministry of great concern: wherein not only the prudence, policy, property, and liberty of men, but also the conscience, duty, and religion of Christians, have a special interest. And therefore it is no less important, pertinent, profitable, and necessary for every one that hath any of these to care and contend for, keep and recover, to inquire into and understand something of the institution, constitution, nature, and boundaries of the sacred ordinances of magistracy, than into the holy ordinance of the ministry; so far at least as may consist with the sphere of every one's capacity and station, and may conduce to the satisfaction of every one's conscience, in the discharge of the duties of their relations. Every private man indeed hath neither capacity, concern, nor necessity, to study the politics, or search into the secrets, or intrigues of government, no more than he is to be versed in all the administrations of ecclesiastical policy, and interests of the ministry; yet every man's conscience is no less concerned, in distinguishing the character of God's ministers of justice, the magistrates, to whom he owes and owns allegiance, that they be not usurping tyrants, everting the ordinances of the magistracy, than in acknowledging the character of Christ's ministers of the gospel, to whom he owes and owns obedience, that they be not usurping prelates or impostors, perverting the ordinance of the ministry. The glory of God is much concerned, in our owning and keeping pure and entire, according to his will and word, both these ordinances. And our conscience as well as interest is concerned in the advantage or hurt, profit or prejudice, of the right or wrong, observation or prevarication, of both these ordinances; being interested in the advantage of magistracy, and hurt of tyranny in the state, as well as in the advantage of the ministry, and hurt of diocesan, or erastian supremacy in the church; in the advantage of liberty, and hurt of slavery in the state, as well as in the advantage of religion, and hurt of profaneness in the church; in the profit of laws, and prejudice of prerogative in the state, as well as in the profit of truth, and prejudice of error in the church; in the profit of peace and true loyalty, and prejudice of oppression and rebellion in the state, as well as in the profit of purity and unity, and prejudice of defection, and division or schism in the church. So that in confidence, we are no more free to prostitute our loyalty and liberty absolutely, in owning every possessor of the magistracy; than we are free to prostitute our religion and faith implicitly, in owning every pretender to the ministry. This may seem very paradoxical to some, because so dissonant and dissentient from the vulgar, yea almost universal and inveterate opinion and practice of the world, that hitherto hath not been so precise in the matter of magistracy. And it may seem yet more strange, that not only some should be found to assert this; but that any should be found so strict and strait laced, as to adventure upon suffering, and even to death, for that which hath hitherto been seldom scrupled, by any that were forced to subjection under a yoke, which they had no force to shake off, and wherein religion seems little or nothing concerned; for not owning the authority of the present possessors of the place of government: which seems to be a question not only excentric and extrinsic to religion, but such a state-question, as for its thorny intricacies and difficulties, is more proper for politicians and lawyers to dispute about, (as indeed their debates about this head of authority, have been as manifold and multiplied as about any one thing) than for private christians to search into, and suffer for, as a part of their testimony. But if we will cast off prejudices, and the tyranny of custom, and the bondage of being bound to the world's mind in our inquiries about tyranny, and suffer ourselves to ponder impartially the importance of this matter; and then to state the question right; we shall find religion and conscience hath no small interest in this business. They must have no small interest in it, if we consider the importance of this matter, either extensively, objectively, or subjectively. Extensively considered, it is the interest of all mankind to know and be resolved in conscience, whether the government they are under be of God's ordination, or of the devil's administration? Whether it be magistracy or tyranny? Whether it gives security for religion and liberty, to themselves and their posterity? Or whether it induces upon themselves, and entails upon the posterity, slavery as to both these invaluable interests? Whether they have matter of praise to God for the blessings and mercies of magistracy, or matter of mourning for the plagues and miseries of tyranny, to the end they may know both the sins and snares, duties and dangers, cases and crisis, of the times they live in? All men, that ever enjoyed the mercy of a right constitute magistracy, have experienced, and were bound to bless God for the blessed fruits of it: and, on the other hand, the world is full of the tragical monuments of tyranny, for which men were bound both to search into the causes, and see the effects of such plagues from the Lord, to the end they might mourn over both. And from the beginning it hath been observed, that as people's sins have always procured the scourge of tyranny; so all their miseries might be refounded upon tyrants encroachments, usurping upon or betraying their trust, and overturning religion, laws and liberties. Certainly mankind is concerned in point of interest and conscience, to inquire into the cause and cure of this epidemic distemper, that hath so long held the world in misery, and so habitually, that now it is become, as it were, natural to ly stupidly under it; that is, that old ingrained gangrene of the king's evil, or compliance with tyranny, that hath long afflicted the kingdoms of the world, and affected not only their backs in bearing the burden thereof; but their hearts into a lethargic stupor of insensibleness; and their heads in infatuating and intoxicating them with notions of the sacredness and uncontroulableness of tyranny; and their hands in infeebling and fettering them from all attempts to work a cure: or else it hath had another effect on many that have been sensible of a touch of it; even equivalent to that, which an ingenious author, Mr. Gee, in his preface to the divine right and original of the civil magistrate, (to which Mr. Durham is not absonant) expounds to be the effect of the fourth vial, Rev. xvi. 8, 9. when in these dog days of the world, power is given to the sun of imperial, especially popish, tyranny, by their exorbitant stretches of absolute prerogative, to scorch men with fire of furious oppressions, they then blaspheme the name of God which hath power over these plagues, in their male-content complaints, grumblings, grudgings, and murmurings under the misery, but they do not repent, nor give him glory, in mourning over the causes promeriting such a plague, and their own accession in exposing themselves to such a scorching sun, nakedly without a sconce. Certainly this would be the remedy that conscience would suggest, and interest would incite to, an endeavour either of allaying the heat or of subtracting from it under a shelter, by declining the oblique malignity of its scorching rays. But will the world never be awakened out of this dream and dotage, of dull and stupid subjection to every monster that can mount a throne? Sure at length it may be expected, either conscience from within as God's deputy, challenging for the palpable perversion of this his excellent ordinance, or judgments from without, making sensible of the effects of it, will convince and confute these old inveterate prejudices. And then these martyrs for that universal interest of mankind, who got the fore-start and the first sight of this, will not be so flouted as fools, as now they are. And who knoweth, what prelude or preparative, foreboding and presaging the downfal of tyranny, may be in its aspirings to this height of arbitrary absoluteness, and in the many questions raised about it, and by them imposed upon consciences to be resolved. If we consider the object of this question; as conscience can only clear it, so in nothing can it be more concerned. It is that great ordinance of God, most signally impressed by a very sacred and illustrious character of the glorious majesty of the Most High, who hath appointed magistracy; in which, considering either its fountain, or dignity, ends, or effects, conscience must have a very great concern. The fountain, or efficient cause of magistracy, is high and sublime. The powers that are, be of God, not only by the all-disposing hand of God in his providence, as tyranny is, nor only by way of naked approbation, but by divine in-institution; and that not only in the general, by at least a secondary law of nature, but also the special investiture of it, in institution and constitution, is from God; and therefore they are said to be ordained of God, to which ordinance we must be subject, not only for wrath, but also for conscience sake: which is the great duty required in the fifth commandment, the first commandment with promise; that hath the priority of place before all the second table, because the other commandments respect each some one interest, this hath a supereminent influence upon all. But tyrannical powers are not of God in this sense. And it were blasphemy to assert they were of the Lord's authorization, conscience cannot bind to a subjection to this. Again, the dignity of magistracy, ordained for the maintenance of truth and righteousness, the only foundations of people's felicity, whether temporal or eternal, including the bonds and boundaries of all obedience and subjection, for which they are intended, and to which they refer, is supereminent; as that epithet of higher, added to the powers that are of God, may be rendered; making them high and sublime in glory, whose highest prerogative is, That, being God's ministers, they sit in the throne of God, anointed of the Lord; judging not for man, but for the Lord, as the scripture speaks. To this conscience is concerned in duty to render honour as due, by the prescript of the fifth commandment; but for tyranny, conscience is bound to deny it, because not due, no more than obedience, which conscience dare not pay to a throne of iniquity, and a throne of the devil, as tyranny may be called, as really as magistracy is called the throne of God. Next, conscience is much concerned in the ends of magistracy, which are the greatest, the glory of God, and the good of mankind. And, in the effects of it, the maintenance of truth, righteousness, religion, liberty, peace, and safety, and all choicest external blessings; but the ends and effects of tyranny are quite contrary, domineering for pleasure, and destroying for profit. Can we think that conscience is nothing concerned here, that these great ends shall be subverted, and the effects precluded; and to that effect, that tyranny not only be shrouded under a privilege of impunity, but by our subjection and acknowledgement of it, as a lawful power, encouraged into all enormities, and licensed to usurp, not only our liberties, but God's throne by an uncontroulable sovereignty? But if we consider the subjective concern of conscience, it must be very graat, when it is the only thing that prompts to subjection, that regulates subjection, and is a bottom for subjection to lawful powers. If it were not out of conscience, men that are free born are naturally such lovers of liberty, and under corruption such lusters after licentiousness, that they would never come under the order of this ordinance, except constrained for wrath's sake: but now, understanding that they that resist the power, resist the ordinance of God, and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation, they must needs be subject, not only for wrath, but also for conscience sake. If conscience were not exercised in regulating our duty to magistrates, we would either obey none, or else would observe all their commands promiscuously, lawful or unlawful, and would make no difference either of the matter commanded, or the power commanding: but now, understanding that we must obey God rather than man, and that we must render to all their dues, fear to whom fear, honour to whom honour, conscience regulates us what and whom to obey. And without conscience there is little hope for government to prove either beneficial or permanent; little likelihood of either a real, regular, or durable subjection to it. The discernible standing of government upon conscientious grounds, is the only thing that can bring in conscience, and a conscientious submission to it; it being the highest and most kindly principle of, and the strongest and most lasting obligation to any relative duty. It will not be liberty of conscience, (as saith the late declaration for it) but reality of conscience, and government founded upon a bottom of conscience, that will unite the governed to the governors, by inclination as well as duty. And if that be, then there is needful a rule of God's revealed preceptive will, (the only cynosure and empress of conscience), touching the founding and erecting of government, that it have the stamp of God's authority. It must needs then follow, that conscience hath a very great concernment in this question in the general, and that before it be forced to an abandoning of its light in a matter of such moment, it will rather oblige people that are conscientious to suffer the worst that tyrants can do; especially when it is imposed and obtruded upon conscience, to give its sufferage and express acknowledgment that the present tyranny is the authority of God, which is so visible in the view of all that have their eyes open, that the meanest capacity that was never conversant in laws and politics can give this verdict that the constitution and administration of the government of the two royal brothers, under whose burden the earth and we have been groaning these twenty-seven years past, hath been a complete and habitual tyranny, and can no more be owned to be magistracy, than robbery can be acknowledged to be a rightful possession. It is so plain, that I need not the help of lawyers and politicians to demonstrate it, nor launch into the ocean of their endless debates in handling the head of magistracy and tyranny: yet I shall improve what help I find in our most approved authors who have enlarged upon this question, (though not as I must state it) to dilucidate the matter in Thesi, and refer to the foregoing deduction of the succession of testimonies against tyranny, to clear it in Hypothesi. Whence we may see the occasion, and clearly gather the solution of the question, which is this:

Whether a people, long oppressed with the encroachments of tyrants and usurpers, may disown their pretended authority; and, when imposed upon, to acknowledge it, may rather choose to suffer than to own it?

To clear this question: I shall premit some concessions, and then come more formally to resolve it.

1. It must be granted the question is extraordinary, and never so stated by any writer on this head; which makes it the more difficult and odious, because odd and singular, in the esteem of those who take up opinions rather from the number of votes than from the weight of the reasons of the asserters of them. It will also be yielded, that this was never a case of confession for Christians to suffer upon. And the reason of both is, because, before these seven years past, this was never imposed upon private and common subjects to give an account of their thoughts and conscience about the lawfulness of the government they lived under. Conquerors and usurpers sometimes have demanded an acknowledgment of their authority, from men of greatest note and stroke in the countries they have seized; but they never since the creation urged it upon common people, as a test of loyalty; but thought always their laws and power to execute them on offenders, did secure their subjection. Or otherwise to what purpose are laws made, and the execution of them committed to men in power, if they be not thought a sufficient fence for the authority that makes them; except it also have the actual acknowledgment of the subjects to ratify it? Men that are really invested with authority, would think it both a disparagement to their authority, and would disdain such a suspicion of the questionableness of it, as to put it as a question to the subjects, whether they owned it or not. But the gentlemen that rules us, have fallen upon a piece of unprecedented policy; wherein they think both to involve the nation in the guilt of their unparalelled rebellion against the Lord, by owning that authority that promotes it; and so secure their usurpations, either by the suffrage of all that own them, or by the extirpation of the conscientious that dare not, with the odium and obloquy of being enemies to authority; by which trick they think to bury the honour of their testimony. Yet in sobriety without prophesying it may be presumed, at the long run, this project will prove very prejudicial to their interest: and herein they may verify that Scots proverb, 'o'er fast o'er loose,' and accomplish these divine sayings, 'He disappointeth the devices of the crafty, he taketh the wise in their own craftiness, and the counsel of the froward is carried headlong.' For as they have put people upon this question, who would not otherwise have made such inquiries into it, and now finding they must be resolved in conscience to answer it, whenever they shall be brought before them; upon a very overly search, they see terrible tyranny written in legible bloody characters almost on all administrations of the government, and so come to be fixed in the verdict that their conscience and the word of God gives of it; so it may be thought, this question now started, for as despicable beginnings it hath, yet ere it come to a full and final decision, will be more enquired into through the world, and at length prove as fatal to tyranny, as ever any thing could be, and then they may know whom to thank. But however, though the question be extraordinary, and the sufferings thereupon be unprecedented, and therefore, among other contradictions that may be objected, that neither in history nor scripture we can find instances of private people's refusing to own the authority they were under, nor of their suffering for that refusal; yet nevertheless it may be duty without example. Many things may be done, though not against the law of God, yet without a precedent of the practice of the people of God. Though we could not adduce an example for it, yet we can gather it from the law of God, that tyranny must not be owned, this will be equivalent to a thousand examples. Every age in some things must be a precedent to the following, and I think never did any age produce a more honourable precedent, than this beginning to decline a yoke under which all ages have groaned.

2. It will be also granted, it is not always indispensibly necessary, at all times, for a people to declare their disclaim of the tyranny they are under, when they cannot shake it off; nor, when they are staged for their duty before wicked and tyrannical judges, is it always necessary to disown their pretended authority positively; when either they are not urged with questions about it, then they may be silent in reference to that; or when they are imposed upon to give their judgment of it, they are not always obligated, as in a case of confession, to declare all their mind, especially when such questions are put to them with a manifest design to entrap their lives, or intangle their conscience. All truth is not to be told at all times; neither are all questions to be answered when impertinently interrogate, but may be both cautiously and conscientiously waved. We have Christ's own practice, and his faithful servant Paul's example, for a pattern of such prudence and Christian caution. But yet it were cruel and unchristian rigour, to censure such as, out of a pious principle of zeal to God and conscience of duty, do freely and positively declare their judgment, in an absolute disowning of their pretended authority, when posed with such questions, though to the manifest detriment of their lives, they conscientiously looking upon it as a case of confession. For where the Lord hath not peremptorily astricted his confessors to such rules of prudence, but hath both promised, and usually gives his Spirit's conduct, encouraging and animating them to boldness, so as before hand they should not take thought how or what they shall speak, and in that same hour they find it given them, it were presumption for us to stint them to our rules of prudence. We may indeed find rules to know, what is a case of confession; but hardly can it be determined, what truth or duty we are questioned about is not, or may not be, a case of confession. And who can deny, but this may be in some circumstance, a case of confession, even positively to disown the pretended authority of a bloody court or council? when either they go out of their sphere, taking upon them Christ's supremacy, and the cognizance of the concerns of his crown, whereof they are judges noways competent; then they must freely and faithfully be declined. Or when, to the dishonour of Christ, they blaspheme his authority, and the sacred boundaries he hath prescribed to all human authority, and will assert an illimited absolute authority, refusing and discharging all offered legal and scriptural restrictions to be put thereupon, (as hath been the case of the most part of these worthy though poor martyrs, who have died upon this head) then they must think themselves bound to disown it. Or when they have done some cruel indignity and despite to the Spirit of God, and to Christ's prerogative and glory, and work of reformation, and people, in murdering them without mercy, and imposing this owning of their king, by whose authority all is acted, as a condemnation of these witnesses of Christ their testimony, and a justification of their bloody cruelties against them, which hath frequently been the case of these poor people that hath been staged upon this account: in this case, and several others of this sort that might be mentioned, then they may be free and positive in disowning this test of wicked loyalty, as the mark of the dragon of the secular beast of tyranny. And in many such cases, when the Lord gives the spirit, I see no reason but that Christ's witnesses must follow his pattern of zeal in the case of confession, which he witnessed before Pontius Pilate in asserting his own kingship, as they may in other cases follow his pattern of prudence. And why may we not imitate the zeal of Stephen who called the council before whom he was staged stiff-necked resisters of the Holy Ghost, persecutors of the prophets, and betrayers and murderers of Christ the just one, as well as the prudence of Paul? But, however it be, the present testimony against this pretended authority lies in the negative, which obliges always, for ever and for ever; that is to say, we plead, that it must never be owned. There is a great difference between a positive disowning and a not owning; though the first be not always necessary, the latter is the testimony of the day, and a negative case of confession, which is always clearer than the positive. Though we must not always confess every truth, yet we must never deny any.

3. It is confessed, we are under this sad disadvantage besides others, that not only all our brethren, groaning under the same yoke with us, will not take the same way of declining this pretended authority, nor adventure, when called, to declare their judgment about it, (which we do not condemn, as is said, and would expect from the rules of equity and charity, they will not condemn us when we find ourselves in conscience bound to use greater freedom) but also some when they do declare their judgment, give it in terms condemnatory of, and contradictory unto our testimony, in that they have freedom positively to own this tyranny as authority, and the tyrant as their lawful sovereign: and many of our ministers also are of the same mind. And further, as we have few expressly asserting our part of the debate, as it is now stated; so we have many famous divines expresly against us in this point, as especially we find in their comments upon, Rom. xiii. among whom I cannot dissemble my sorrow to find the great Calvin, saying, Saepe solent inquirere, &c. 'Men often enquire, by what right they have obtained their power who have the rule! it should be enough to us that they do govern; for they have not ascended to this eminency by their own power, but are imposed by the hand of the Lord.' As also Pareus saying too much against us. For answer to this, I refer to Mr. Knox's reply to Lethington, producing several testimonies of divines against him upon this very head; wherein he shews, that the occasions of their discourses and circumstances wherein they were stated, were very far different from those that have to do with tyrants and usurpers, as indeed they are the most concerned, and smart most under their scourge, are in best case to speak to the purpose. I shall only say, mens averment, in a case of conscience, is not an oracle, when we look upon it with an impartial eye, in the case wherein we are not prepossessed: it will bear no other value, than what is allayed with the imperfections of fallibility, and moreover is contradicted by some others, whose testimony will help us as much to confirm our persuasion, as others will hurt us to infirm it.

4. But now when tyrants go for magistrates, lest my plea against owning tyranny, should be mistaken, as if it were a pleading for anarchy, I must assert, that I and all those I am vindicating, are for magistracy, as being of divine original, institute for the common good of human and Christian societies, whereunto every soul must be subject, of whatsoever quality or character, and not only for wrath but also for conscience sake (though as to our soul and conscience, we are not subject) which whosoever resisteth, resisteth the ordinance of God, and against which rebellion is a damnable sin, whereunto (according to the fifth commandment, and the many reiterated exhortations of the apostles) we must be subject, and obey magistrates, and submit ourselves to every ordinance of man, for the Lord's sake, whether it be unto the king as supreme, &c. And we account it a hateful brand of them that walk after the flesh, to despise government, to be presumptuous, self-willed, and not afraid to speak evil of dignities: and that they are filthy dreamers, who despise dominion, and speak evil of dignities: and of those things which they know not. We allow the magistrate, in whatsoever form of government, all the power the scripture, laws of nature and nations, or municipal do allow him; asserting, that he is the keeper and avenger of both the tables of the law, having a power over the church, as well as the state, suited to his capacity, that is, not formally ecclesiastical, but objectively, for the church's good; an external power, of providing for the church, and protecting her from outward violence, or inward disorder, an imperate power, of commanding all to do their respective duties; a civil power of punishing all, even church-officers, for crimes; a secondary power of judicial approbation or condemnation; or discretive, in order to give his sanction to synodical results; a cumulative power, assisting and strengthening the church in all her privileges, subservient, though not servile, co-ordinate with church-power, not subordinate (though as a christian he is subject) in his own affairs, viz. civil; not to be declined as judge, but to be obeyed in all things lawful, and honoured and strengthened with all his dues. We would give unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's; but to tyrants, that usurp and pervert both the things of God and of Caesar, and of the peoples liberties, we can render none of them, neither God's, nor Caesar's, nor our own: nor can we from conscience give him any other deference, but as an enemy to all, even to God, to Caesar, and the people. And in this, though it doth not sound now with court-parasites, nor with others, that are infected with royal indulgencies and indemnities, we bring forth but the transumpt of old principles, according to which our fathers walked when they still contended for religion and liberty, against the attemptings and aggressions of tyranny, against both.

5. It must be conceded, it is not an easy thing to make a man in the place of magistracy a tyrant: for as every escape, error, or act of unfaithfulness, even known and continued in, whether in a minister's entry to the ministry, or in his doctrine, doth not unminister him, nor give sufficient ground to withdraw from him, or reject him as a minister of Christ: so neither does every enormity, misdemeanor, or act of tyranny, injustice, perfidy, or profanity in the civil magistrate, whether as to his way of entry to that office, or in the execution of it, or in his private or personal behaviour, denominate him a tyrant or an usurper, or give sufficient ground to divest him of magistratical power, and reject him as the lawful magistrate. It is not any one or two acts contrary to the royal covenant or office, that doth denude a man of the royal dignity, that God and the people gave him. David committed two acts of tyranny, murder and adultery; yet the people were to acknowledge him as their king (and so it may be said of some others, owned still as kings in scripture) the reason is, because though he sinned against a man or some particular persons, yet he did not sin against the state, and the catholic good of the kingdom, subverting law; for then he would have turned tyrant, and ceased to have been lawful king. There is a great difference between a tyrant in act, and a tyrant in habit; the first does not cease to be a king. But on the other hand, as every thing will not make a magistrate to be a tyrant; so nothing will make a tyrant by habit a magistrate. And as every fault will not unminister a minister; so some will oblige the people to reject his ministry, as if he turn heretical, and preach atheism, Mahometanism, or the like, the people, though they could not formally depose him, or through the corruption of the times could not get him deposed; yet they might reject and disown his ministry: so it will be granted, that a people have more power in creating a magistrate, than in making a minister; and consequently they have more right, and may have more light in disowning a king, as being unkinged; than in disowning a minister, as being unministred. It will be necessary therefore, for clearing our way, to fix upon some ordinary characters of a tyrant, which may discrimate him from a magistrate, and be ground of disowning him as such. I shall rehearse some, from very much approved authors; the application of which will be as apposite to the two brothers, that we have been burdened with, as if they had intended a particular and exact description of them. Buchanan de jure regni apud Scotos, shews, 'That the word tyrant was at first honourable, being attributed to them that had the full power in their hands, which power was not astricted by any bonds of laws, nor obnoxious to the cognition of judges; and that it was the usual denomination of heroes, and thought at first so honourable, that it was attributed to the gods: but as Nero and Judas were sometimes among the Romans and Jews names of greatest account, but afterwards by the faults of two men of these names, it came to pass, that the most flagitious would not have these names given to their children, so in process of time, rulers made this name so infamous by their wicked deeds, that all men abhorred it, as contagious and pestilentious, and thought it a more light reproach to be called hangman than a tyrant.' Thereafter he condescends upon several characters of a tyrant. 1. 'He that doth not receive a government by the will of the people, but by force invadeth it, or intercepteth it by fraud, is a tyrant; and who domineers even over the unwilling (for a king rules by consent, but a tyrant by constraint) and procures the supreme rule without the peoples consent, even tho' for several years they may so govern, that the people shall not think it irksome.' Which very well agrees with the present gentleman that rules over us, who, after he was by public vote in parliament secluded from the government, of which the standing laws of both kingdoms made him incapable for his murders, adulteries and idolatries, by force and fraud did intercept first an act for his succession in Scotland, and then the actual succession in England, by blood and treachery, usurping and intruding himself into the government, without any compact with, or consent of the people; though now he studies to make himself another Syracusan Hiero, or the Florentine Cosmo de medices, in a mild moderation of his usurped power; but the west of England, and the west of Scotland both, have felt the force of it. 2. He does not govern for the subjects welfare, or public utility, but for himself, having no regard to that, but to his own lust, 'acting in this like robbers, who cunningly disposing of what wickedly they have acquired, do seek the praise of justice by injury, and of liberality by robbery; so he can make some shew of a civil mind; but so much the less assurance gives he of it, that it is manifest, he intends not hereby the subjects good, but the greater security of his own lusts, and stability of empire over posterity, having somewhat mitigated the peoples hatred, which when he had done, he will turn back again to his old manners; for the fruit which is to follow, may easily be known, both by the seed and by the sower thereof.' An exact copy of this we have seen within these two years, oft before in the rule of the other brother.

After God hath been robbed of his prerogatives, the church of her privileges, the state of its laws, the subjects of their liberty and property, he is now affecting the praise, and captating the applause of tenderness to conscience, and love of peace, by offering now liberty after all his cruelties; wherein all the thinking part of men do discern he is prosecuting that hellish project, introducing popery and slavery, and overturning religion, law, and liberty. 3. The kingly government is according to nature, the tyrannical against it; principality is the kingly government of a freeman amongst freemen; the tyrannical a government of a master over slaves. Tyranny is against nature, and a masterly principality over slaves. Can he be called a father, who accounts his subjects slaves; or a shepherd, who does not feed, but devours his flock? or a pilot, who doth always study to make shipwreck of the goods, and strikes a leak in the very ship where he fails? 'What is he then that bears command, not for the people's advantage, but studies only himself, who leadeth his subjects into manifest snares? He shall not verily be accounted by me either commander, emperor, or governor.' King James VI. also, in a speech to the parliament in the year 1609, makes this one character of a tyrant, when he begins to invade his subjects rights and liberties. And if this be true, then we have not had a king these many years: the foregoing deduction will demonstrate, what a slavery we have been under. 4. What is he then, who doth not contend for virtue with the good but to exceed the most flagitious in vices? 'If you see then any usurping the royal name, and not excelling in any virtue, but striving to exceed all in baseness, not tendering his subjects good with native affection, but pressing them with proud domination, esteeming the people committed to his trust, not for their safeguard, but for his own gain, will you imagine this man is truly a king, albeit he vapours with a numerous levee guard, and makes an ostentation of gorgeous pomp?' The learned Althusius likewise in his politics, chap. 38. Num. 15. (as he is cited by Jus Populi, chap. 16. p. 347.) makes this one character of a tyrant, that 'living in luxury, whoredom, greed and idleness, he neglecteth, or is unfit for his office.' How these suit our times we need not express; what effrontery of impudence is it, for such monsters to pretend to rule by virtue of any authority derived from God, who pollute the world with their adulteries and incests, and live in open defiance of all the laws of the universal king; with whom to exceed in all villanies is the way to purchase the countenance of the court, and to aspire to preferment? No Heligobaldus, &c. could ever come up the length in wickedness, that our rulers have professed. 5. He can transfer unto himself the strength of all laws, and abrogate them when he pleases. King James VI. in that forecited speech saith, a king degenerateth into a tyrant, when he leaveth to rule by law. Althusius also, in the forecited place, saith, 'There is one kind of tyranny, which consisteth in violating, changing, or removing of fundamental laws, specially such as concern religion; such, saith he, Philip the king of Spain, who, contrary to the fundamental Belgic laws, did erect an administration of justice by force of arms; and such was Charles IX. of France, that thought to overturn the Salic law.' All that knoweth what hath been done in Britain these twenty-seven years, can attest our laws have been subverted, the reformation of religion overturned, and all our best laws rescinded; and now the penal statutes against papists disabled and stopped, without and against law. 6. He can revoke all things to his nod, at his pleasure. This is also one part of King James VI.'s character of a tyrant, when he sets up an arbitrary power; and of Althusius, in the forecited place, 'when he makes use of an absolute power, and so breaks all bonds for the good of human society.' We allow a king an absolute power taken in a good sense, that is, he is not subaltern, nor subordinate to any other prince, but supreme in his own dominions: or if by absolute he meant perfect he is most absolute that governs best, according to the word of God; but if it be to be loosed from all laws, we think it blasphemy to ascribe it to any creature. Where was there ever such an arbitrary and absolute power arrogated by any mortal, as hath been claimed by our rulers these years past? especially by the present usurper, who, in this liberty of conscience now granted to Scotland, assumes to himself an absolute power, which all are to obey without reserve, which carries the subjects slavery many stages beyond whatever the grand Signior did attempt. 7. For by a tyrant strangers are employed to oppress the subjects: 'they place the establishment of their authority in the people's weakness, and think that a kingdom is not a procuration concredited to them by God, but rather a prey fallen into their hands; such are not joined to us by any civil bond, or any bond of humanity, but should be accounted the most capital enemies of God, and of all men.' King James, as above says, he is a tyrant that imposes unlawful taxes, raises forces, makes war upon his subjects, to pillage, plunder, waste, and spoil his kingdoms. Althusius as above, makes a tyrant, who by immoderate exactions, and the like, exhausts the subjects, and cites scripture, Jer. xxii. 13, 14. Ezek. xxxiv. 1. Kings xii. 19. Psal. xiv. 4.' It is a famous saying of Bracton, he is no longer king, than while he rules well, but a tyrant whensoever he oppresseth the people that are trusted to his care and government. And Cicero says, he loseth all legal power in and over an army or empire, who by that government and army does obstruct the welfare of that republic. What oppressions and exactions by armed force our nation hath been wasted with, in part is discovered above. 8. Althusius in the place above quoted, makes this another mark, 'When he keepeth not his faith and promise, but despiseth his very oath made unto the people.' What shall we say of him then, who not only brake, but burnt, and made it criminal to assert the obligation of the most solemnly transacted covenant with God and with the people, that ever was entered into, who yet upon these terms of keeping that covenant only was admitted to the government? And what shall we say of his brother succeeding, who disdains all bonds, whose professed principle is, as a papist, to keep no faith to heretics? 9. In the same place he makes this one character: 'A tyrant is he, who takes away from one or more members of the commonwealth the free exercise of the orthodox religion.' And the grave author of the impartial enquiry into the administration of affairs in England, doth assert, p. 3. 4. 'Whensoever a prince becomes depraved to that degree of wickedness, as to apply and employ his power and interest, to debauch and withdraw his subjects from their fealty and obedience to God, or sets himself to extirpate that religion which the Lord hath revealed and appointed to be the rule of our living, and the means of our happiness, he doth by that very deed depose himself; and instead of being owned any longer for a king, ought to be treated as a rebel and traitor against the supreme and universal sovereign.' This is the perfect portracture of our princes; the former of which declared an open war against religion, and all that professed it: and the latter did begin to prosecute it with the same cruelty of persecution, and yet continues without relenting against us; though to others he tolerates it under the notion of a crime, to be for the present dispensed with, until he accomplish his design. 10. Ibid. he tells us, 'That whoso for corrupting of youth erecteth stage plays, whore-houses, and other play-houses, and suffers the colleges and other seminaries of learning to be corrupted.' There were never more of this in any age, than in the conduct of our court, which, like another Sodom, profess it to be their design to debauch mankind into all villanies, and to poison the fountains of all learning and virtue, by intruding the basest of men into the place of teachers, both in church and university, and precluding all access to honest men. 11. Further he says. 'He is a tyrant who doth not defend his subjects from injuries when he may, but suffereth them to be oppressed, (and what if he oppress them himself?)' It was one of the laws of Edward the confessor, if the king fail in the discharge of his trust and office, he no longer deserves nor ought to enjoy that name. What name do they deserve then, who not only fail in the duty of defending their subjects, but send out their lictors and bloody executioners to oppress them, neither will suffer them to defend themselves! But Althusius makes a distinct character of this. 12. Then, in fine he must certainly be a tyrant, who will not suffer the people, by themselves nor by their representatives, to maintain their own rights, neither by law nor force; for, saith my author forecited, 'He is a tyrant who hindereth the free suffrages of members of parliament, so that they dare not speak what they would; and chiefly he who takes away from the people all power to resist his tyranny, as arms, strengths, and chief men, whom therefore, though innocent, he hateth, afflicteth, and persecuteth, exhausts their goods and livelihoods, without right or reason.' All know that our blades have been all along enemies to parliaments; and when their interest forced to call them, what means were used always to paque and prelimit them, and overawe them, and how men, who have faithfully discharged their trust in them, have been prosecuted with the height of envy and fury, and many murdered thereupon; and how all the armed force of the kingdoms have been inhanced into their hand, and the people kept so under foot, that they have been rendered incapable either to defend their own from inrestine usurpers, or foreign invaders. All that is said amounts to this, that when ever men in power to evert and subvert all the ends of government, and intrude themselves upon it, and abuse it, to the hurt of the commonwealth, and the destruction of that for which government was appointed; they are then tyrants, and cease to be magistrates. To this purpose I shall here append the words of that forecited ingenious author of the Impartial Inquiry, pag. 13, 14. 'There can be nothing more evident from the light of reason as well as scripture, than that all magistracy is appointed for the benefit of mankind, and the common good of societies; God never gave any one power to reign over others for their destruction, (unless by his providence when he had devoted a people for their sins to ruin,) but on whomsoever he confers authority over cities or nations, it is with this conditional proviso and limitation, that they are to promote their prosperity and good, and to study their defence and protection; all princes are thus far pactional----And whosoever refuseth to perform this fundamental condition, he degrades and deposes himself; nor is it rebellion in any to resist him; whensoever princes cease to be for the common good, they answer not the end they were instituted unto, and cease to be what they were chosen for.'

6. It will not be denied, but when the case is so circumstantiate, that it would require the arbitration of judgment to determine, whether the king be a tyrant or not, that then people are not to disown him: for if it be a question, whether the people be really robbed of their rights and liberties, and that the king might pretend as much reason to complain of the people's doing indignity to his sovereignty, as they might of his tyranny; then it were hard for them to assume so far the umpirage of their own cause, as to make themselves absolute judges of it, and forthwith to reject his authority upon these debatable grounds. But the case is not so with us; no place being left for doubt or debate, but that our fundamental rights and liberties civil and religious, are overturned, and an absolute tyranny, exactly characterized as above, is established on the ruins thereof. Hence we have not disowned the pretended authority, because we judged it was tyrannical, but because it was really so. Our discretive judgment in the case was not our rule, but it was our understanding of the rule, by which only we could be regulated, and not by the understanding of another, which cannot be better, nor so good, of our grievances, which certainly we may be supposed to understand best ourselves, and yet they are such as are understood every where. To the question then, who shall be judge between these usurping and tyrannizing rulers and us? We answer briefly and plainly. We do not usurp a judgment in the case pretending no more authority over them in our private capacity, than we allow them to have over us, that is none at all? Nor can we admit that they should be both judges and party; for then they might challenge that prerogative in every case, and strengthen themselves in an uncontrollable immunity and impunity to do what they pleased. But we appeal to the fundamental laws of the kingdom, agreeable to the word of God, to judge, and to the whole world of impartial spectators to read and pronounce the judgment. Lex Rex, Quest. 24. pag. 213. saith in answer to this, 'There is a court of necessity no less than a court of justice; and the fundamental laws must then speak, and it is with the people in this extremity as if they had no ruler. And as to the doubtsomeness of these laws, he saith, (1.) As the scriptures in all fundamentals are clear, and expound themselves, and in the first instance condemn heresies; so all laws of men in their fundamentals, which are the law of nature and nations, are clear. (2.) Tyranny is more visible and intelligible than heresy, and it is soon discerned----The people have a natural throne of policy in their conscience, to give warning, and materially sentence against the king as a tyrant;--where tyranny is more obscure, and the thread small, that it escape the eye of man, the king keepeth possession, but I deny that tyranny can be obscure long.'

7. I shall grant that many things are yieldable even to a grassonant dominator, and tyrannical occupant of the place of magistracy; as 1. There may be some cases, wherein it is lawful for a people to yield subjection to a lawless tyrant, when groaning under his overpowering yoke, under which they must patiently bear the indignation of the Lord, because they have sinned against him, until he arise and plead his own cause, and execute judgment in the earth, (Mic. vii. 9.) until which time they must kiss the rod as in the hand of God, and own and adore the holiness and sovereignty of that providence that hath subjected them under such a slavery; and are not to attempt a violent ejection or excussion, when either the thing attempted is altogether impracticable, or the means and manner of effectuating it dubious and unwarrantable, or the necessary concomitants and consequents of the cure more hurtful or dangerous than the disease, or the like. As in many cases also a man may be subject to a robber prevailing against him; so we find the people of Israel in Egypt and Babylon, &c. yielded subjection to tyrants. But in this case we deny two things to them, (1.) Allegiance or active and voluntary subjection, so as to own them for magistrates. (2.) Stupid passive obedience, or suffering without resistance. For the first, we owe it only to magistrates, by virtue of the law, either ordinative of God, or constitutive of man. And it is no argument to infer; as a man's subjecting himself to a robber assaulting him, is no solid proof of his approving or acknowledging the injury and violence committed by the robbery, therefore a person's yielding subjection to a tyrant a public robber does not argue his acknowledging or approving his tyranny and oppression. For, the subjection that a tyrant requires, and which a robber requires, is not of the same nature; the one is legal of subjects, which we cannot own to a tyrant; the other is forced of the subdued, which we must acknowledge to a robber. But to make the parallel; if the robber should demand, in our subjecting ourselves to him, an owning of him to be no robber but an honest man, as the tyrant demands in our subjecting ourselves to him in owning him to be no tyrant, but a magistrate, then we ought not to yield it to the one no more than to the other. For the second, to allow them passive obedience is unintelligible nonsense and a mere contradiction; for nothing that is merely passive can be obedience as relative to a law; nor can any obedience be merely passive; for obedience is always active. But not only is the inaccuracy of the phrase excepted against, but also that position maintained by many, that, in reference to a yoke of tyranny, there is a time which may be called the proper season of suffering, that is, when suffering (in opposition to acting or resisting) is a necessary and indispensible duty, and resisting is a sin: for if the one be an indispensible duty, the other must be a sin at the same time, but this cannot be admitted. For, though certainly there is such a season of suffering, wherein suffering is lawful, laudable and necessary, and all must lay their account with suffering, and little else can be attempted, but which will increase sufferings; yet even then we may resist as well as we can: and these two, resistance and suffering, at the same time, are not incompatible: David did bear most patiently the injury of his son's usurpation, when he said, 'Let the Lord do to me as seemeth him good,' 2 Sam. xv. 26. chap. x. 12. and betaketh himself to fervent prayers, Psal. iii. and yet these were not all the weapons he used against him; neither did he ever own him as a magistrate. We are to suffer all things patiently as the servants of the Lord, and look to him for mercy and relief, (Psal. cxxiii. 2.); but we are not obliged to suffer even in that season, as the slaves of men. Again, suffering in opposition to resistance, does never fall under any moral law of God, except in the absolutely extraordinary case of Christ's passive obedience, which cannot fall under our deliberation or imitation; or in the case of a positive law, as was given to the Jews to submit to Nebuchadnezzar, which was express and peculiar to them, as shall be cleared. That can never be commanded as indispensible duty, which does not fall under our free will or deliberation, but the enemies will, as the Lord permits them, as the case of suffering is. That can never be indispensible duty, which we may decline without sin, as we may do suffering, if we have not a call to it; yea, in that case, it were sin to suffer; therefore, in no case it can be formally and indispensibly commanded, so as we may not shift it, if we can without sin. Suffering simply the evil of punishment, just or unjust, can never be a conformity to God's preceptive will, but only to his providential disposal; it hath not the will of the sign for its rule, but only the will of well-pleasing. All the commands that we have for suffering, are either to direct the manner of it, that it be patiently and cheerfully, when forced to it wrongfully, 1 Pet. ii. 19, 20, or comparatively, to determine our choice in an unavoidable alternative, either to suffer or sin; and so we are commanded, rather to suffer, than to deny Christ, Matth. xiii. 33. and we are commanded upon these terms to follow Christ, to take up his cross, when he lays it on his providence, Matth. xvi. 24. See at length this cleared, Lex Rex, Q. 30. page 317-320 otherwise in no case subjection, even passive, can be a duty; for it is always to be considered under the notion of a plague, judgment and curse, to be complained of as a burden, never to be owned as a duty to magistrates.

As we find the Lord's people resenting it as a servitude, under which they were servants even in their own land, which did yield increase unto the kings whom the Lord had set over them, because of their sins, Neh. ix. 36, 37. 2. In divers cases there may be some compliance with a mere occupant, that hath no right to reign; as upon this account the noble marquis of Argyle and lord Warriston suffered for their compliance with the usurper Cromwell. Such may be the warrantableness, or goodness, or necessity, or profitableness of a compliance, when people are by providence brought under a yoke which they cannot shake off, that they may part with some of their privileges, for the avoidance of the loss of the rest, and for the conveniency and profit, peace and safety of themselves and their country, which would be in hazard, if they did not comply; they may do whatsoever is due from them to the public weal, whatsoever is an office of their station or place, or which they have any other way a call unto, whatsoever may make for their own honest interest, without wronging others, or the country's liberties in their transactions with these powers, even though such a compliance may be occasionally to the advantage of the usurpers, seeing good and necessary actions are not to be declined for the ill effects that are accidental to them, and arise from the use which others make of them. But though this may be yielded in some cases to such usurpers, especially conquerors, that have no right of occupying the empire, but are capable of it by derivation from the people's consent: yet it must not be extended to such usurpers as are also tyrants, that have no right of their own, nor are capable of any, and that overturn all rights of subjects. To such we can yield no compliance, as may infer either transacting with them, or owning them as magistrates. We find indeed the saints enjoyed places under these, who were not their magistrates; as Nehemiah and Mordecai and Esther was queen to Ahasuerus. But here was no compliance with tyrants (for these heathens were not such) only some of them were extraordinary persons, raised up by an extraordinary spirit, for extraordinary ends in extraordinary times, that cannot be brought to an ordinary rule, as Esther's marriage; and all of them in their places kept the law of their God, served the work of their generation, defiled not themselves with their customs, acted against no good, and engaged to no evil, but by their compliance promoted the welfare of their country, as Argyle and Warrriston did under Cromwel. Again, we find they paid custom to them, as Neh. ix. 36, 37. and we read of Augustus' taxation universally complied with, Luke ii. 1-5. and Christ paid it. This shall be more fully answered afterwards. Here I shall only say (1.) It can never be proven that these were tyrants. (2.) Christ paid it with such a caution, as leaves the title inflated; not for conscience (as tribute must be paid to magistrates, Rom. xiii. 5, 6.) but only that he might not offend them. (3.) Any other instances of the saints taxations are to be judged forced acts, badges of their bondage, which, if they had been exacted as tests of their allegiance, they would not have yielded. Strangers also, that are not subjects, use to pay custom in their trafficking, but not as tests of their allegiance. 3. There may be also, in some cases, obedience allowed to their lawful commands because of the lawfulness of the thing commanded, or the coincidency of another just and obligging authority commanding the same. We may do many things which a tyrant commands, and which he enforces; and many things also whether he will or not; but we must do nothing upon the consideration of his command, in the acknowledgement of obedience, due by virtue of allegiance, which we own of conscience to a lawful magistrate. We must do nothing, which may seem to have an accessoriness to the tyrant's unlawful occupancy, or which depends only on the warrant of his authority to do it, or may entrench on the divine institution of magistracy, or bring us into a participation of the usurper's sin. In these cases we can neither yield obedience in lawful things, nor in unlawful: 'nor can we own absolute subjection, no more than we can absolute obedience; for all subjection is enjoined, in order to obedience: and to plead for a privilege in point of obedience, and to disclaim it in point of subjection, is only the flattery of such, as having renounced with conscience all distinction of obedience, would divest others of all privileges, that they may exercise their tyranny without controul, Naphtali, p. 28. prior edit.'] 4. There may be addresses made to such as are not rightful possessors of the government, for justice, or mercy, or redress of some intolerable grievances, without scruple of accepting that which is materially justice or mercy, or seeking them at the hand of any who may reach them out to us, though he that conveys them to us be not interested in the umpirage of them. Thus we find Jeremiah supplicated Zedekiah for mercy, not to return to prison; and Paul appealed to Caesar for justice. But in these addresses we may not acknowledge the wicked laws that brought on these grievances, nor conceal the wickedness, no more than the misery of them which we have endured; nor may we own the legal power of them that we address, to take them off, nor signify any thing, in the matter and manner of our representations, that may either import a declining our testimony, for which we have suffered these grievances, or a contradiction to our declinature of their pretended authority: only we may remonstrate, what cruelties we have endured, and how terrible it will be to them to be guilty of, or accessory to our blood, in not pitying us; which was all that Jeremiah did. And as for Paul's appeal, we find he was threatened to be murdered by his countrymen, Acts xxiii. 14. from whose hands he was rescued, and brought before the judicatory of Festus the Roman deputy, not voluntarily; thence also they sought to remand him to Jerusalem, that they might kill him, Acts xxv. 3. whereupon he demands in justice that he might not be delivered to his accusers and murderers, but claims the benefit of the heathens own law, by that appeal to Caesar, which was the only constrained expedient of saving his own life, Acts xxviii. 19, by which also he got an opportunity to witness for Christ at Rome. But, as shall be cleared further afterwards, Caesar was not an usurper over Judea; which not obscurely is insinuated by Paul himself, who asserts, that both his person, and his cause criminal, of which he was accused (it was not an ecclesiastical cause, and so no advantage hence for the supremacy) appertained to Caesar's tribunal, and that not only in fact, but of right, Acts xxv. 10. 'I stand at Caesar's judgment-seat, where I ought to be judged.' We cannot say this of any tribunal; fenced in the name of them that tyrannize over us. 5. I will not stand neither upon the names and titles of kings, &c. to be given to tyrants and usurpers, in speaking to them or of them, by way of appellation or compellation: for we find even tyrants are called by these names in scripture, being kings in fact, though not by right and indeed not impertinently, kings and tyrants for the most part are reciprocal terms. But in no case can we give them any names or titles, which may signify our love to them whom the Lord hates, or who hate the Lord, 2 Chron. xix. 2. or which may flatter them, whom Elihu durst not give, for fear his Maker should take him away, Job xxxii. 22. or which may be taken for honouring of them, for that is not due to the vilest of men, when exalted never so high, Psal. xii. ult. a vile person must be contemned in our eyes, Psal. xv. 4. nor which may any way import or infer an owning of a magistratical relation between them and us, or any covenant-transaction or confederacy with them, which is no terms with them, as such, we will say or own. Isa. viii. 12. Hence many sufferers upon this head forbear to give them their titles.

8. It will be yielded very readily by us, that a magistrate is not to be disowned, merely for his differing in religion from us: yea, though he were a heathen. We do not disown our pretended rulers merely upon that account, but cheerfully do grant and subscribe to that truth in our Confession of Faith, chap. xxiii. sect. 4. That infidelity, or difference in religion, doth not make void the magistrate's just and legal authority, nor free the people from their due obedience to him: on which our adversaries have insulted, as if our principle and practice were thereby disproved. But it is easy to answer, 1. Let the words be considered, and we are confident, 'That no sober man will think, the acknowledgement of just and legal authority, and due obedience a rational ground to infer, that tyranny is thereby either allowed or privileged,' Napht. p. 60 prior edition. 2. Though infidelity or difference of religion, does not make void authority, where it is lawfully invested; yet it may incapacitate a person, and lawfully seclude him from authority, both by the word of God, which expressly forbids to set a stranger over, who is not our brother, Deut. xvii. 15. which includes as well a stranger of a strange religion, as one of a strange country, and by the laws of the land, which do incapacitate a papist of all authority, supreme or subordinate. And so, if this James VII. II. had been king before he was a Roman Catholic, if we had no more to object, we should not have quarrelled his succession. 3. We both give and grant all that is the confession, to wit, that dominion is not founded in grace: yet this remains evident, that a prince, who not only is of another religion, but an avowed enemy to, and overturner of the religion established by law, and intending and endeavouring to introduce a false, heretical, blasphemous and idolatrous religion, can claim no just and legal authority, but in this case the people may very lawfully decline his pretended authority; nay, they are betrayers of their country and posterity, if they give not a timeous and effectual check to his usurpings, and make him sensible that he hath no such authority. Can we imagine, that men in the whole of that blessed work so remarkably led of God, being convocate by a parliament of the wisest and worthiest men that ever were in England, whom they did encourage, by writing and preaching, and every way to stand fast in their opposition to the then king displaying a banner for his prerogative (a court dream) against religion and liberty, should be so far left, as to drop that as a principle and part of our religion, which would sacrifice religion itself to the lust of a raging tyrant? Must we believe, that a religion destroying tyrant is a righteous ruler? And must we own him to be a nursing father to the church? Shall we conclude, that the common bounds and limits, whereby the Almighty hath bounded and limited mankind, are removed by an article of our Confession of Faith, which hereby is turned into a court creed: Then welcome Hobs de cive, with all the rest of Pluto's train, who would babble us into a belief, that the world is to be governed according to the pleasure of wicked tyrants. I would fain hope at length the world would be awakened out of such ridiculous dreams, and be ashamed any more to own such fooleries. And it may be, our two royal brothers have contributed more to cure men of this moral madness than any who went before them. And this is the only advantage, I know, that the nations have reaped by their reign.

9. Though we deny that conquest can give a just title to a crown; yet we grant, in some cases, that by the peoples after-consent it may be turned into a just title. It is undeniable, when there is just ground of the war, if a prince subdue a whole land, who have justly forfeited their liberties, when by his grace he preserves them, he may make use of their right now forfeited, and they may resign their liberty to the conqueror, and consent that he be their king, upon fair and legal, and not tyrannical conditions. And even when the war is not just, but successful on the invading conquerors side, this may be an inducement to the conquered, if they be indeed free and unengaged to any other, to a submission, dedition, and delivery up of themselves to be the subjects of the victor, and to take him for their sovereign: as it is like the case was with the Jews in Caesar's time, whose government was translated by dedition to the Roman power; in the translation, when a-doing, there was a fault, but after it was done, it ceased; though the beginning was wrong, there was a post-fact, which made it right, and could not be dissolved, without an unjust disturbance of public order. Whence, besides what is said above, in answer to that much insisted instance of Christ's paying tribute, and commanding it to be paid to Caesar, the difficulty of that instance may be clearly solved. That tribute which he paid, Matth. xvii. 14. &c. and that about the payment whereof he was questioned, Matth. xxii. 21. seem to be two different tributes. Many think, very probably, they were not one and the same tribute. It is a question, for whom, and by whom that of Matth. xvii. was gathered; it is most likely, it was gathered by the officers of the temple for its service: however, the payment was made, with such caution (tacitely declining the strict right to exact it from him, but to avoid offence, in an act in itself unobliging) that their claim is left as much in the dark, as if the question had never been moved. The other, Matth. xxii. was exacted for Caesar: but to that captious question our Lord returns such an answer, as might both solve it, and evade the snare of the propounder, giving a general rule of giving to God and to Caesar each their own, without defining which of them had the right to the payment in question; whether Caesar should have it, or whether it should be paid only for the temple's use: upon which they marvelled, which they needed not do, if they had understood in his words an express and positive declaration of an obligation to make that payment to Caesar; for then they would have obtained one of their ends, in making him odious to the people, who were not satisfied with the payment of it. But however, the knot is loosed, by considering that they were now lawfully subject to the Roman Emperors, as their governors, to whom they were obliged (I do not say Christ was) to pay tribute. For they had yielded themselves unto, and owned the Roman dominion in Pompey, Caesar Augustus and Tiberius, ere this question about tribute paying was proposed to our Saviour; and therefore they who stuck at the payment of it, were a seditious party, dissenting from the body of the nation; else it is not supposeable readily, that their dominion in Judea could have been exercised long without some consent, sufficient to legitimate it to the present rulers; and this is the more likely, if we consider the confession of the Jews themselves, disavowing the power of capital punishment. It is not lawful for us to put any man to death, and owning Caesar as their king, with an exclusive abrenunciation of all other, we have no king but Caesar; as Paul also acknowledges, he ought to be judged at Caesar's bar, in his appeal to Caesar. It is also acknowledged by very good authors, that this was the tribute which Judas the Galilean stood up to free the people from; and that the sedition of those Jews that followed him, mentioned Acts v. 37. who mutinied upon this occasion, was, according to Gamaliel's speech, disallowed by that Sanhedrim, or council of the Jews. And it may be gathered out of Josephus, that the Jews of Hircanus' party came under the Roman power by consent and dedition, while they of Aristobulus' party looked upon the Romans as usurpers. Which difference continued till our Saviour's time, when some part of them acknowledged the Caesarean authority, some part looked upon it as an usurpation; and of this generally were the Pharisees. To confirm this, Calvin's testimony may be adduced, upon Matth. xxii. who saith, 'The authority of the Roman emperors was by common use approved and received among the Jews, whence it was manifest, that the Jews had now of their own accord imposed on themselves a law of paying the tribute, because they had passed over to the Romans the power of the sword.' And Chamiers panstrat. tom. 2 lib. 15. cap. 16. p. 635. 'What then? if Caesar's authority was from bad beginnings, did therefore Christ untruly say it was from above? Can no power, at first unjust, afterward become just? if that were so, then either none, or very few kingdoms would be just.'

10. As tyranny is a destructive plague to all the interests of men and Christians; to anarchy, the usual product of it, is no less pernicious, bringing a community into a paroxysm as deadly and dangerous. We must own government to be absolutely necessary, for the constitution and conservation of all societies. I shall not enter into a disquisition, let be determination of the species or kind of magistracy, whether monarchy aristocracy or democracy, be preferable. My dispute, at present, is not levelled against monarchy, but the present monarch: not against the institution of the species (though I believe, except we betake ourselves to the divine allowance and permission; we shall be as puzzled to find out the divine original of it, as cosmographers are in their search of the spring of Nilus, or theologues of the Father of Melchizedeck) but the constitution of this individual monarchy established among us, which, in its root and branch, spring and streams, in its original, nature, ends and effects, is diametrically opposite to religion and liberty; and because its contagion, universally converting and corrupting all the ends and orders of magistracy, doth affect and infect all the subordinate officers, deriving their power from such a filthy fountain; we must also subtract and deny their demanded acknowledgments as any way due, so long as they serve the pride and projects of such a wicked power: and do not reckon ourselves obliged by covenant, or any otherwise (though, in the third article of the solemn league, we are bound to preserve the rights and privileges of our parliaments, and consequently the honour and deference that's due to our peers, or other parliament-men, acting according to the trust committed to them, but not when they turn traitors engaged in a conspiracy with the tyrant) to own or defend a soulless shadow of a court cabal, made up of persons who have sold themselves to work wickedness, in conspiring with this throne of iniquity against the Lord, which is all we have for a parliament, whom we can in no ways own as our representatives, but must look upon them as perjured and perfidious traitors to God and their country, which they have betrayed into the hands of a tyrant; and therefore divested of that power and authority, which they had of the people as their representatives, which now is returned to the fountain. And therefore we must act as we can against them, and also what is necessary for securing of ourselves, religion and liberty, without them. We would think nobles, ennobled with virtue, a great mercy and encouragement; and if they would concur in the testimony for religion and liberty, we would be glad that they should lead the van, and prove themselves to be powers appointed by God, in acting for him in his interest. But for the want of their conduct, we must not surcease from that duty that they abandon, nor think that the concurrence of peers is so necessary to legitimate our actions, as that without that formality our resolutions to maintain the truth of God on all hazards, in a private capacity, were unlawful in the court of God and nature: but, on the contrary, must judge that their relinquishing or opposing their duty, which before God they are obliged to maintain, preserve, and promove, is so far from loosing our obligation, or exeeming us from our duty that it should rather press us to prosecute it with the more vigour, without suspending it upon their precedency. For now they can pretend to no precedency, when they do not answer the end of their own private advantage, they cease to be the ministers of God and of the people, and become private persons. And reason will conclude, 'That when the Ephori or trustees betray their trust, and sell, or basely give away the liberties and privileges of the people, which they were entrusted with, the people cannot be brought into a remediless condition; if a tutor waste and destroy the pupils estate, the law provides a remedy for the pupil, Jus popu. vind. cap. 15. page 335, 336.' 'The remedy, in this case, can only be, as every one must move in his own sphere, while all concur in the same duty; so if any, in higher place, become not only remiss, but according to the influence of their power would seduce others into their apostasy, it is their duty to resist and endeavour their reformation or removal: and if these more eminently entrusted shall turn directly apostates, and obstructive and destructive to common interests, the people of an inferior degree may step forward to occupy the places, and assert the interests, which they forefault and desert. Neither is this a breach of good order; for order is only a mean subordinate to, and intended for the glory of God, and the peoples good, and the regulation thereof must only be admitted as it is conducible, and not repugnant to these ends. A general's command to his soldiers in battle, does not impede the necessity of succession, in case of vacancy of any charge, either through death or desertion, even of such as in quality may be far inferior to those whose places they step into, Naphtali, page 151. first edition.' I do not assert this for private peoples aspiring into the capacity of primores of peers; but that they may do that which the peers desert, and dare not, or will not do, if the Lord put them in a capacity to do it. And more plainly I assert, that if the peers of the land whose duty it is principally to restrain and repress tyranny, either connive at it, or concur with it, and so abandon or betray their trust, then the common people may do it; at least are obliged to renounce, reject, and disown allegiance to the tyrant, without the peers. For which I offer these reasons. 1. Because all men have as much freedom and liberty by nature as peers have, being no more slaves than they; because slavery is a penal evil contrary to nature, and a misery consequent of sin, and every man created according to God's image, is a sacred thing; and also no more subjects to kings, &c. than they; freedom being natural to all (except freedom from subjection to parents, which is a moral duty, and most kindly and natural, and subjection of the wife to the husband, &c.) but otherwise as to civil and politic subjection, man, by nature, is born as free as beasts; no lion is born king of lions, nor no man born king of men; nor lord of men, nor representative of men, nor rulers of men, either supreme or subordinate; because none, by nature, can have those things that essentially constitute rulers, the calling of God, nor gifts and qualifications for it, nor the election of the people. 2. The original of all that power, that the primores or representatives can claim, is from the people, not from themselves; from whence derived they their being representatives, but from the people's commission or compact? when at the first constitution of parliaments, or public conventions for affairs of state, necessity put the people, who could not so conveniently meet all, to confer that honour and burden upon the best qualified, and who had chief interest by delegation. Hence, if the people give such a power, they may wave it when perverted, and act without their own impowered servants. 3. The people's power is greater than the power of any delegated or constituted by them; the cause is more than the effect; parliament-men do represent the people, the people do not represent the parliament: they are as tutors and curators unto the people, and in effect their servants deputed to oversee their public affairs, therefore if their power be less the people can act without them. 4. It were irrational to imagine, the people committing the administration of their weighty affairs unto them, did denude themselves of all their radical power; or that they can devolve upon them, or they obtain any other power but what is for the good and advantage of the people; therefore they have power to act without them, in things which they never resigned to them; for they cannot be deprived of that natural aptitude, and nature's birth-right, given to them by God and nature, to provide the most efficacious and prevalent means for the preservation of their rights and liberties. 5. As the people have had power before they made peers, and have done much without them; so these primores could never do without them, therefore in acts of common interest, the peers depend more upon the people than the people do upon them. 6. All these primeve rights, that gave rise to societies, are equal to both people and peers, whereof the liberty to repress and reject tyranny is a chief one. The people as well as peers have a hand in making the king, and other judges also, as is clear from Deut. xvii. 14. Judg. ix. 6. 1 Sam. xi. 15. 2 Kings xiv. 21. therefore they may unmake them as well as they. To seek to preserve the ends of government, when they are overturned, is essentially requisite to all societies, and therefore common and competent to all constituents of these societies, superiors or inferiors. The glory of God and security of religion, the end of all Christian government, doth concern all equally. As every one equally is bound to obey God rather than man, so violence in this case destroys both the commonwealth, and maketh the end and means of government, and the injured persons obligation thereto to cease; and this equally to every man of private or public capacity. In the concern of religion at least, we must not think because we are not nobles, or in authority, that the care of it, or reformation thereof does nothing pertain to us; nay in that, and carrying on the work thereof, there is an equality: as in the erection of the Old Testament tabernacle, all the people were to contribute alike half a shekel, Exod. xxx. that it might be for a remembrance before the Lord. Hence it follows, if we disown the supreme ruler, and the inferior confederate with him, and cannot have the concurrence of others: 'now through the manifest and notorious perversion of the great ends of society and government, the bond thereof being dissolved, we liberated therefrom, do relapse into our primeve liberty and privilege: and accordingly, as the similitude of our case, and exigence of our cause doth require, may, upon the very same principles, again join and associate, for our better defence and preservation, as we did at first enter into societies,' Nap. p. 150. yet, whatever we may do in this case, we are not for presumptuous assumptions of authority which maleversers have forefaulted: neither are we for new erections of government, but are for keeping the society, of which we are members, entire, in an endeavour to have all our fellow members united unto God, and to one another, in religion and liberty, according to the bond of the solemn league and covenant. Certain it is, that greater societies, under one government, may in some cases make a secession, and divide into lesser, without sedition: or else, how would there be so many distinct commonwealths in the world? seeing at first all was under one head: and how comes it to pass, that there are so many kingdoms in Europe, when it can be instanced, when all, or the most part, were under one Roman emperor? But this, in our circumstance, is noway expedient, neither was it ever in projection. But our aim is to abstract ourselves inoffensively, and maintain our rights that remain unrobbed, and to adhere closely to the fundamental constitutions, laws, and laudable practices of our native kingdom.

II. We own the obligation of our sacred covenants, unrepealably and indispensibly binding to all the duties of christian subjection to magistrates. But we deny, that hereby we are bound either to maintain monarchy, especially thus perverted; nor to own the authority of either of the two monarchs that have monarchized or tyrannized over us these twenty-seven years past. For as to the first, we assert, That that which is in its own nature mutable, cannot be simply sworn unto to be maintained and preserved, but hypothetically at most, else it were simply sinful; since it were to make things in their own nature, and in the providence of God changeable, unchangeable; yea it were a downright swearing not to comply with, but to spurn against, the various vicissitudes of divine providence, the great rector of the universe. And it is unquestionable, that when things alterable and unalterable are put in the same oath, to make the engagement lawful the things must be understood, as they are in their own nature, and no otherwise: else both the imposer and the taker grievously transgress; the former, in taking upon him what is in the power of no mortal, and a contradiction to the prerogative of the immortal God; and the other, in owning that power as just. Hence when these two fall to be in the same oath, they must be so understood as it may not be made a snare to the conscience of the swearer. For it may fall so out in the providence of God, that the preservation of both is in all respects made impossible: and an adhesion to the one, may so far interfere with the preservation of the other, as if the mutable and that which hath no objective obligation to be stuck to the other, which with the loss of all interests we are to maintain, must be abandoned; yea, that which was sworn to be maintained as a mean only, and a mutable one too, may not only cease to be a mean, but may actually destroy the main end, and then it is to be laid aside, because then it inverts the order of things. Hence also it may be questioned, if it were not more convenient, to leave out those things that are alterable in themselves, out of the same oath with things unalterable, and put them in a distinct oath or covenant by themselves; as we see Jehojadah did 2 Kings xi. 17. 'He made a covenant between the Lord, and the king, and the people, that they should be the Lord's people; between the king also and the people.' Here are two distinct covenants; the one made with God, about things eternally obligatory, wherein the king and people engage themselves upon level ground to serve the Lord, and Joash the king, his treacherous dealing with God in that matter, brought the curse of that covenant upon him: the other covenant was civil, about things alterable relating to points of government and subjection. And as he, by virtue of that prior covenant, had obliged himself, under the pain of the curse thereof, to carry as one covenanted to God with the people, and so not to tyrannize over his brethren: so, the people, by virtue of that same covenant, were to yield obedience, but in nothing to acknowledge him, as having power or authority to countermand God's command; neither had it been an act of disloyalty, to have broken down his groves, which he had, with the addition of the guilt of perjury, set up, and to have bound his ungrateful hands from the blood of the gracious Zechariah: a perfect parallel to our case under the former dominator, save that it was outdone as to all dimensions of wickedness by him. To speak more plainly, the religious part of our covenant is of an eternal obligation; but as to the civil part, it is impossible it can ever be so, unless it be well and cautiously understood; that is, unless instead of any species of government, as monarchy, &c. we put in magistracy itself. For this is that power which is of God; but monarchy, &c. is only a human creature, about the creation whereof men take a liberty, according to what suits them best in their present circumstances. And as to this species of monarchy; men are never left at liberty to clothe therewith any inept or impious person. And they are perfectly loosed from it. 1. When that species of government becomes opposite to the ends of government, and is turned tyranny, especially when a legal establishment is pretended, then it affects with its contagion the very species itself: the house is to be pulled down, when the leprosy is got into the walls and foundation. 2. When it is exercised, it is turned inept for answering the ends of its erection, and prejudicial to the main thing for which government is given, to wit, the gospel and the coming of Christ's kingdom: hence it is promised to the church, Isa. xlix. 23. 'Kings shall be nursing fathers to the church:'----And Isa. lii. 15. It is promised to the Mediator that 'Kings shall shut their mouths,'----i.e. never a word in their head, but out of reverence and respect to his absolute sovereignty, they shall take the law from him, without daring to contract, far less to take upon them to prescribe in the house of God, as they in their wisdom think fit. 3. When providence, without any sinful hand, makes that species impossible to be kept up, without the ruin of that for which it was erected: when things comes to this push, whosoever are clothed with the power, are then under an obligation to comply with that alteration of providence, for the safety of the people; else they declare themselves unworthy of rule, and such who would sacrifice the interest of their people to their particular interest; in which case the people may make their public servant sensible, he is at his highest elevation but a servant. Hence now, when this species named in the covenant, viz. monarchy, is by law so vitiate, as it becomes the mean and instrument of the destruction of all the ends of that covenant, and now by law transmitted to all successors as a hereditary, pure, perfect and perpetual opposition to the coming of Christ's kingdom, so that as long as there is one to wear that crown, (but Jehovah will in righteousness execute Coniah's doom upon the race, Jer. xxii. ult. 'Write this man childless'----) and enter heir to the government as now establishment, he must be an enemy to Christ; there is no other way left, but to think on a new model moulded according to the true pattern. As to the second, we are far less obliged to own and acknowledge the interest of any of the two monarchs, that we have been mourning under these many years, from these sacred covenants. For, as to the first of them, Charles II. Those considerations did cassate his interest, as to any covenant obligation to own him. 1. In these covenants we are not sworn absolutely to maintain the king's person and authority, but only conditionally, in the preservation and defence of religion and liberties. Now, when this condition was not performed, but, on the contrary, professedly resolved never to be fulfilled; and when he laid out himself to the full of his power and authority, for the destruction of that reformed religion and liberties of the kingdom, which he solemnly swore to defend when he received the crown, only in the terms that he should be a loyal subject to Christ, and a true and faithful servant to the people, in order to which a magistrate is chosen, and all his worth, excellency, and valuableness, consists in his answering that purpose; for the excellency of a mean, as such, is to be measured from the end, and its answerableness thereunto: we were not then obliged, to maintain such an enemy to these precious interests. 2. Because, as the people were bound to him, so he was bound to them by the same covenant, being only on these terms entrusted with the government, all which conditions he perfidiously broke, whereupon only his authority and our allegiance were founded; and thereby we were loosed from all reciprocal obligation to him by virtue of that covenant. 3. Though he and we stood equally engaged to the duties of that covenant, only with this difference, that the king's capacity being greater, he was the more obliged to have laid out that power, in causing all to stand to their covenant engagements, as Josiah did, 2 Chron. xxxiv. 31, 32, 33. (but alas! there was never a Josiah in the race,) yet he rose up to the height of rebellion against God and the people, in heaven daring insolency, and not only brake, but burnt that covenant, and made laws to cass and rescind it, and made a not-concurring in this conspiracy, a note of incapacity for any trust in church or state.

Therefore to plead for an owning of him in this case, were only concludent of this, that the generation had dreamed themselves into such a distraction, as may be feared will be pursued with destruction, and make such dreamers the detestation of posterity, and cause all men proclaim the righteousness of God, in bringing ruin upon them by that very power and authority they owned in such circumstances. 4. It is a known maxim, 'He that does not fulfil the conditions, falls from the benefit of it, and whoso remits the obligation of the party obliged upon condition, cannot exact it afterwards.' So then it is evident, that the subjects of Scotland were by king Charles II. his consent, yea express command, disengaged from so much of that covenant as could be alledged in favours of himself: so that all that he did, by burning and rescinding these covenants, and pursuing all who endeavoured to adhere to them, was a most explicit liberating his subjects from, and remission of their allegiance to him, (and in this we had been fools if we had not taken him at his word;) yea he rescinded his very coronation, by an act of his first parliament after his return, which did declare null and void all acts, constitutions and establishments, from the year 1633 to that present session, not excepting those for his own coronation, after which he was never recrowned, and therefore we could not own that right, which himself did annul. But as for his royal brother, James the VII. and II. we cannot indeed make use of the same reasons and arguments to disown him, as we have now adduced; yet, as we shall prove afterwards, this covenant does oblige to renounce him. So it is so clear, that it needs no illustration, that there lies no obligation from this covenant to own him. 1. Because, as he is an enemy to the whole of our covenant, and especially to these terms upon which authority it is to be owned therein: so he will not come under the bond of this covenant, nor any other compact with the people, but intrude himself upon the throne, in such a way as overturns the basis of our government, and destroys all the liberties of a free people, which by covenant we are bound to preserve, and consequently, as inconsistent therewith, to renounce his usurpation. For, a prince that will set himself up without any transactions with the people, or conditions giving security for religion and liberty, is an usurping tyrant, not bounded by any law but his own lusts. And to say to such an one, reign thou over us, is all one as to say, come thou and play the tyrant over us, and let thy lust and will be a law to us: which is both against scripture and natural sense. If he be not a king upon covenant terms, either expresly or tacitely, or general stipulations according to the word of God, and laws of the land, he cannot be owned as a father, protector, or tutor, having any fiduciary power entrusted to him over the common wealth, but as a lawless and absolute dominator, assuming to himself a power to rule or rage as he lists: whom to own were against our covenants: for there we are sworn to maintain his majesty's just and lawful authority, and by consequence not to own usurpation and tyranny, stated in opposition to religion and liberty, which there also we are engaged to maintain. Sure, this cannot be lawful authority which is of God, for God giveth no power against himself; nor can it be of the people, who had never power granted them of God to create one over them, with a liberty to destroy them, their religion and liberty, at his pleasure. 2. As he is not, nor will not be our covenanted and sworn king (and therefore we cannot be his covenanted and sworn subjects;) so he is not nor cannot be our crowned king, and therefore we must not be his liege subjects, owning fealty and obedience to him. For, 'according to the national covenant, as all lieges are to maintain the king's authority, consistent with the subjects liberties; which, if they be innovated or prejudged, such confusion would ensue, as this realm could be no more a free monarchy;--so for the preservation of true religion, laws and liberties of this kingdom, it is statute by the 8th act, parl. 1. repeated in the 99th act, parl. 7th, ratified in the 23d act, parl. 11th, and 14th act, parl. 12th of king James VI, and 4th act. of king Charles I. that all kings and princes, at their coronation and reception of their princely authortity, shall make their faithful promise by their solemn oath, in the presence of the eternal God, that enduring the whole time of their lives, they shall serve the same eternal God, to the uttermost of their power, according as he hath required in his most holy word, contained in the Old and New Testaments; and according to the same word, shall maintain the true religion of Christ Jesus, the preaching of his holy word, the due and right ministration of the sacraments, now received and preached within this realm (according to the confession of faith immediately preceding) and shall abolish and gainst and all false religion, contrary to the same; and shall rule the people committed to their charge, according to the will and command of God, revealed in his foresaid word, and according to the laudable law and constitutions received in this realm, no ways repugnant to the said will of the eternal God; and shall procure, to the uttermost of their power, to the kirk of God, and whole Christian people, true and perfect peace in all time coming, and that they shall be careful to root out of their empire all hereticks, and enemies to the true worship of God, who shall be convicted by the true kirk of God of the foresaid crimes.' Now, this coronation oath he hath not taken, he will not, he cannot take; and therefore cannot be our crowned king according to law. As there be also many other laws, incapacitating his admission to the crown, being a professed papist, and no law for it at all, but one of his own making, by a packed cabal of his own complices, a parliament, wherein himself presided as commissioner, enacting materially his succession, and rescinding all these ancient laws: which act of succession (which is all the legal right he can pretend to in Scotland) because it cannot be justified, therefore his right cannot be owned, which is founded upon the subversion of our ancient laws. But as he cannot be our legally crowned king, so he is not so much as formally crowned. And therefore before his inauguration, whatever right to be king (whom the representatives may admit to the government) he may pretend to, by hereditary succession, yet he cannot formally be made king, till the people make a compact with him, upon terms for the safety of their dearest and nearest liberties, even though he were not disabled by law. He might, as they say, pretend to some right to the thing, but he could have no right in the thing. The kings of Scotland, while uncrowned, can exercise no royal government; for the coronation in concrete, according to the substance of the act, is no ceremony (as they, who make conscience itself but a ceremony, call it) nor an accidental ingredient in the constitution of a king, but as it is distinctive, so it is constitutive: it distinguished Saul from all Israel, and made him from no king to be a king; it is dative, and not only declarative; it puts some honour upon him that he had not before. 3. Though the laws should not strike against his coronation, and though the representatives legally should take the same measures with him that they took with his brother, and admit him upon the terms of the covenant; yet after such doleful experiences of such transactions with these sons of Belial, who must not be taken with hands, nor by the hand, it were hard to trust, or entrust them with the government, even though they should make the fairest professions; since they, whose principles is to keep no faith to heretics (as they call us) and who will be as absolute in their promises as they are in their power, have deservedly forfeited all credit and trust with honest men; so that none could rationally refer the determination of a half crown reckoning to any of them, far less own them and their government in the management of the weightiest affairs of state, since their malversations are written in such bloody characters, as he that runs may read them. At least it were wisdom, and is our duty, to take our measures from the general assembly's procedure with the other brother, before his admission to the government, to suspend our allegiance to him, until authority be legally devolved upon him, and founded upon, and bounded by terms, giving all security for religion and liberty.

12. As I said, before wary prudence, in waving such an impertinent and ticklish question, cannot be condemned; since whatever he may be in conscience, no man in law can be obliged, so far to surrender the common privilege of all mankind, to give an account of all his inward thoughts, which are always said to be free. And as in nothing they are more various, so in nothing they can be more violented, than to have our opinion and sentiments of the current government extorted from us, a declining of which declaration of thoughts, where no ouvert act in project or practice can be proven against it, cannot be treason in any law in the world: so a cautelous answer, in such a ticklish, and intrapping imposition, cannot be censured in point of lawfulness or expediency, even though much be conceded, to stop the mouths of these bloody butchers, gaping greedily after the blood of the answerer; if he do not really own, but give them to understand, he cannot approve of this tyranny. But as these poor faithful witnesses, who were helped to be most free, have always been honoured with the most signal countenance of the Lord in a happy issue of their testimony: so those that used their prudentials most, in seeking shifts to shun severity, and studying to satisfy these inquisitors with their stretched concessions, were ordinarily more exposed to snares, and found less satisfaction in their sufferings even though they could say much to justify, or at least extenuate their shiftings. I knew one, who had proof of this, who afterwards was ashamed of this kind of prudence. A short account of whose managing of answers to this question, because it may conduce somewhat to the explication of it, may here be hinted. The question moved after the usual form, was, do ye own the authority of king James VII. In answer to which, he pleaded first, for the immunity of his thoughts, which he said were not subject to theirs or any tribunal. When this could not be an evasion from their extortions, he objected the ambiguity of the terms in which the question was conceived, being capable of divers senses: and enquired, what they meant by authority? What, by owning authority? By authority, whether did they mean the administration of it as now improved? If so, then he was not satisfied with it: or the right, as now established? If so, then he was not clear to give his opinion of it, as being neither significant nor necessary; and that it was fitter for lawyers and those that were better acquaint with the secrets of government, than for him to dispute it.

Again he asked, what they meant by owning? Either it is passive subjection, that he did not decline; or active acknowledgment of it and that he said he looked upon as all the suffrage he could give to its establishment in his station, which he must demur upon some scruple. The replies he received were very various, and some of them very rare, either for ignorance or imposture. Sometimes, it was answered: to own the king's authority, is to take the oath of allegiance; this he refused. Some answered, it is to engage never to rise in arms against the king, upon any pretence whatsoever; this he refused likewise. Others explained it to be, to acknowledge his right to be king: to his he answered, when the authority is legally devolved upon him by the representatives of both kingdoms, it was time enough for him to give account of his sentiments. Others defined it, to own him to be a lawful king by succession. To this he answered, he did not understand succession could make a man formally king, if there were not some other way of conveyance of it; it might put him in the nearest capacity to be king, but could not make him king.

Some did thus paraphrase upon it, that he must own him to be his sovereign Lord under God, and God's vicegerent, to be obeyed in all things lawful. To this he answered, whom God appoints, and the people choose according to law, he would own. When those shifts would not do, but from time to time being urged to a categorical answer; he told them, he was content to live in subjection to any government providence set up; but for owning the present constitution as of God, and according to law, he durst not acknowledge it, nor own any mortal as his lawful sovereign, but in terms consistent with the covenant securing religion and liberty. This not satisfying, when he came to a more pinching trial; he declared, he owned all lawful authority according to the word of God, and all authority that was the ordinance of God by his preceptive will, and he could be subject to any; but further to acknowledge it, he behoved to have more clearness; for sometimes a nation might be charged with that, 'Ye have set up kings, and not by me,' &c. Further he conceded, he owned his providential advancement to the throne; he owned as much as he thought did oblige him to subject himself with patience; he owned him to be as lawful, as providence possessing him of the throne of his ancestors, and lineal succession, as presumed next in blood and line, could make him: but still he declined to own him as lawful king, and alledged that was all one, whether he was lawful or not, he refused not subjection, distinguishing it always from allegiance.

But all these concessions did not satisfy them, and alledged he might say all this of a tyrant; and therefore commanded him to give it under hand, to own not only the lineal, but the legal succession of king James VII. to the crown of Scotland; which he did, upon a fancy, that legal did not import lawful, but only the formality of their law; withal protesting, he might not be interpreted to approve of his succession. But this was a vain protestation against fact. However, by this we see, what is owning this authority, in the sense of the inquisitors.

The result of all is, to acknowledge allegiance to the present possessor, and to approve his pretended authority as lawful, rightful and righteous; which indeed is the true sense of the words, and any other, that men can forge or find out, is strained. For, to speak properly, if we own his authority in any respect, we own it to be lawful: for every authority, that is owned to be authority indeed, is lawful; authority always importing authorization, and consisting in a right or call to rule, and is formally and essentially contradistinct to usurpation: where ever the place of power is merely usurped, there is no authority but according to his word; a stile without truth, a barely pretended nominal equivocal authority, no real denomination: if we then own this man's authority, we own it to be lawful authority: and if we cannot own it so, we cannot own it all. For it is most suitable, either to manly ingenuity, or Christian simplicity, to speak properly, and to take words always in the sense, that they to whom they are speaking will understand them, without equivocating.

These preliminaries being thus put by, which do contribute to clear somewhat in this controversy, and both furnish us with some arguments for, and solutions in most of the objections against my thesis, in answer to the questions above stated. I set it down thus: A people long oppressed with the encroachments of tyrants and usurpers, may disown all allegiance to their pretended authority, and when imposed upon to acknowledge it, may and must rather chuse to suffer, than to own it. And consequently we cannot, as matters now stand, own, acknowledge, or approve the pretended authority of king James VII. as lawful king of Scotland; as we could not, as matters then stood, own the authority of Charles II. This consequence is abundantly clear from the foregoing deduction, demonstrating their tyranny and usurpation. In prosecuting of this general thesis, which will evince the particular hypothesis, I shall, 1. Adduce some historical instances, whence it may be gathered, that this is not altogether without a precedent, but that people have disowned allegiance to tyrants and usurpers before now. 2. Deduce it from the dictates of reason. 3. Confirm it by scripture arguments.

I. Albeit, as was shewed before, this question, as now stated, is in many respects unprecedented; yet the practice, which in our day hath been the result of it, to disown, or not to own prevailing dominators usurping the government, or abusing it, is not so alien from the examples of history, but that by equivalency or consequence it may be collected from and confirmed by instances.

1. To begin at home, besides many passages related already for confirmation, we may add, (1.) That for about 1025 years, the people had in their choice whom to own, or admit to succeed in the government, 'Even though the kingdom was hereditary; and used to elect, not such who were nearest in blood and line, but these that were judged most fit in government, being of the same progeny of Fergus,' Buchanan's History of Scotland, book vi. pag. 195. in the life of Kenneth III. This continued until the days of Kenneth III. who to cover his villainous murder of his brother's son Malcolm, and prevent his, and secure his own son's succession, procured this charter for tyranny, the settlement of the succession of the next in line from the parliament: which, as it pretended the prevention of many inconveniencies, arising from contentions and competitions about the succession; so it was limited by laws, precluding the succession of fools or monsters, and preserving the people's liberty to shake off the yoke when tyranny should thereby be introduced: otherwise it would have been not only an irrational surrender of all their own rights, and enslaving the posterity, but an irreligious contempt of providence, refuting and anticipating its determination in such a case. However it is clear, before this time, that as none but the fittest were admitted to the government; so if any did usurp upon it, or afterwards did degenerate into tyranny, they took such order with him, as if he had not been admitted at all; as is clear in the instances of the first period, and would never own every pretender to hereditary succession. (2.) As before Kenneth's days, it is hard to reckon the numerous instances of kings that were dethroned, or imprisoned, or slain, upon no other account than that of their oppression and tyranny; so afterwards they maintained the same power and privilege of repressing them, when ever they began to encroach. And although no nation hath been more patient towards bad kings, as well as loyal towards good ones; yet, in all former times, they understood so well the right they had, and the duty they owed to their own preservation, as that they seldom failed of calling the exorbitantly flagitious to an account. And albeit, instead of condoling or avenging the death of the tyrannous, they have often both excused and justified it, yet no kingdom hath inflicted severer punishments upon the murders of just and righteous princes: and therefore, though they did neither enquire after, nor animadvert upon those that slew James III. a flagitious tyrant, yet they did, by most exquisite torments, put them to death who slew James the I. a virtuous monarch. Hence, because these and other instances I mind to adduce of deposing tyrants, may be excepted against, as not pertinent to my purpose, who am not pleading for exauctoration and deposition of tyrants, being impracticable in our case: I shall once for all remove that, and desire it may be considered, (1.) That though we cannot formally exauctorate a tyrant; yet he may, by law itself, fall from his right, and may exauctorate himself, by his laws by whom kings reign; and this is all we plead for as a foundation of not owning him. (2.) Though we have not the same power, yet we have the same grounds, and as great and good, if not greater and better reasons to reject and disown our tyrant, as they, whose example is here adduced, had to depose of their tyrannizing princes. (3.) If they had power and ground to depose them, then a fortiori, they had power and ground to disown them; for that is less, and included in the other, and this we have. (4.) Though it should be granted, that they did not disown them before they were deposed; yet it cannot be said that they did disown them only because they were deposed: for it is not deposition that makes a tyrant; it only declares him to be justly punished for what he was before. As the sentence of a judge does not make a man a murderer or thief, only declares him convict of these crimes, and punishable for them; it is their own committing them that makes him criminal: and, as before the sentence, having certain knowledge of the fact, we might disown the man's innocency or honesty; so a ruler's acts of tyranny and usurpation make him a tyrant and usurper, and give ground to disown his just and legal authority; which he can have no more than a murderer or thief can have innocency or honesty. (3.) We find also examples of their disowning kings undeposed; as king Baliol was disowned with his whole race, for attempting to enslave the kingdom's liberties to foreign power. And if this may be done for such an attempt, as the greatest court parasites, and sycophants consent; what then shall be done for such as attempt to subject the people to domestic or intestine slavery? shall we refuse to be slaves to one without, and be, and own ourselves contented slaves to one within the kingdom? It is known also that king James the I. his authority was refused by his subjects in France, so long as he was a prisoner to the English there, though he charged them upon their allegiance, not to fight against the party who had his person prisoner: they answered, They owned no prisoner for their king, nor owned no allegiance to a prisoner. Hence princes may learn, though people submit to their government; yet their resignation of themselves to their obedience is not so full, as that they are obliged to own allegiance to them, when either morally or physically they are incapacitate to exercise authority over them. They that cannot rule themselves cannot be owned as rulers over a people.

2. Neither hath there been any nation, but what at one time or other hath furnished examples of this nature. The English history gives account, how some of their kings have been dealt with by their subjects, for impieties against the law and light of nature, and encroachments upon the laws of the land. Vortigern was dethroned for incestuously marrying his own sister. Neither did ever blasphemies, adulteries, murders, plotting against the lives of innocents, and taking them away by poison or razor, use to escape the animadversion of men, before they were priest-ridden unto a belief that princes persons were sacred. And if men had that generosity now this man that now reigns might expect some such animadversion. And we find also king Edward, and Richard the II. were deposed, for usurpation upon laws and liberties, in doing whereof the people avowed, They would not suffer the laws of England to be changed.

Surely the people of England must now be far degenerate, who having such laws transmitted to them from their worthy ancestors, and they themselves being born to the possession of them without a change, do now suffer them to be so encroached upon, and mancipate themselves, and leave their children vassals to popery, and slaves to tyranny.

3. The Dutch also, who have the best way of guiding of kings of any that ever had to do with them (witness their having so many of them in chains, now in Batavia in the East Indies) are not wanting for their part to furnish us with examples. When the king of Spain would not condescend to govern them according to their ancient laws, and rule for the good of the people, they declared him to be fallen from the seigniory of the Netherlands, and so erected themselves into a flourishing common-wealth. It will not be amiss to transcribe some of the words of the edict of the states general to this purpose. It is well known, (say they) 'That a prince and lord of a country is ordained, by God, to be sovereign and head over his subjects, to preserve and defend them from all injuries, force, and violence; and that if the prince therefore faileth therein, and instead of preserving his subjects, doth outrage and oppress them, depriveth them of their privileges and ancient customs, commandeth them, and will be served of them as slaves; they are no longer bound to respect him as their sovereign lord, but to esteem of him as a tyrant, neither are they bound to acknowledge him as their prince, but may abandon him, &c.' And with this agrees the answer William, prince of Orange, to the edict of proscription, published against him by Philip the II. There is, says he, 'A reciprocal bond betwixt the lord and his vassal; so that if the lord break the oath, which he hath made unto his vassal, the vassal is discharged of the oath made unto his lord.' This was the very argument of the poor suffering people of Scotland, whereupon they disowned the authority of Charles the II.

4. The monarchy of France is very absolute; yet there also the state hath taken order with their tyrants; not only have we many instances of resistances made against them, but also of disowning, disabling, and invalidating their pretended authority, and repressing their tyranny. So was the two Childerici served: so also Sigebertus, Dagabertus, and Lodowick the II. kings of France.

5. The great body of Germany moves very slowly, and is inured to bear great burdens: yet there also we find Joanna of Austria, mother of Charles V. was put to perpetual imprisonment: which example is adduced by the earl of Morton, in his discourse to the queen of England (whereof I rehearsed a part before) vindicating the deposing and disowning queen Mary of Scotland. 'If, saith he, we compare her with Joanna of Austria--what did that poor wretch commit, but that she could not want a little lustful pleasure as a remedy necessary for her age? and yet, poor creature, she suffered that punishment, of which our dame, convicted of most grievous crimes, now complains.'--Buchanan's History of Scotland, book xx. p. 748. The duke of Saxon, the landgrave of Hesse, and the magistrates of Magdeburgh, joined in a war against her son Charles V. and drew up a conclusion by resolution of lawyers, wherein are these words----'Neither are we bound to him by any other reason, than if he keep the conditions on which he was created emperor. By the laws themselves it is provided, That the superior magistrate shall not infringe the right of the inferior, and if the superior magistrate exceed the limits of his power, and command that which is wicked, not only we need not obey him, but if he offer force we may resist him.' Which opinion is confirmed by some of the greatest lawyers, and even some who are patrons of tyranny, Grotius none of the greatest enemies of tyrants, de jure belli. lib. 1. chap. 4. p. 11. saith out of Barclaius, and with him, That the king doth lose his power when he seeketh the destruction of his subjects. It was upon the account of the tyranny of that bloody house of Austria over the Helvetians, that they shook off the rule and government of that family, and established themselves into a republic. And at this present time, upon the same accounts, the tyranny and treachery of this imperial majesty, the Hungarians have essayed to maintain and justify a revolt in disowning the emperor, now for several years.

6. Poland is an elective kingdom, and so cannot but be fertile of many instances of casting off tyrants. Henricus Valesius, disowned for fleeing, and Sigismundus for violating his faith to the states, may suffice. Lex Rex, q. 24. p. 217.

7. In Denmark, we find Christiernus their king, was, for his intolerable cruelty, put from the kingdom, he and all his posterity, and after twenty years did end his life in prison.

8. In Swedland, within the compass of one century, the people deposed and banished the two Christierns, and dethroned and imprisoned Ericus, for their oppressions and tyranny, and for pursuing the destruction of their subjects.

9. The Portuguese, not many years ago, laid aside and confined Alphonsus their king, for his rapines and murders.

10. Some dukes of Venice have been so disowned by these commonwealths men, that laying aside their royal honours as private men, they have spent their days in monasteries. Buchan. de jure regni apud Scotos.

11. If we will resolve the old Roman histories, we shall find no small store of such examples, both in the time of their kings, consuls, and emperors. Their seventh king Tarquinius Superbus was removed by the people, for his evident usurpation: saith Livius, 'That is, for he had nothing for a right to the government, but mere force, and got the rule neither by the people's consent and choice, nor by the authority of the senators.' So afterwards the empire was taken from Vitellius, Heliogabulus, Maximinus, Didius, Julianus, Lex Rex, ubi supra.

12. But it will be said, Can there be any instances of the primitive christians adduced? Did ever they, while groaning under the most insupportable tyranny of their persecuting emperors, disown their authority, or suffer for not owning it? To this I answer, 1. What they did, or did not of this kind, is not of moment to enquire.: seeing their practice and example, under such disadvantages, can neither be known exactly, nor what is known of it be accommodated to our case: for (1.) They were never forced to give their judgment, neither was the question ever put to them, whether they owned their authority or not? If they transgressed the laws, they were liable to the punishment, they craved no more of them. (2.) They confess themselves to be strangers, that had no establishments by law; and therefore they behoved to be passively subject, when in no capacity to resist; there was no more required of them. Yet Lex Rex Quest. 35. page 371. cites Theodoret affirming, 'Then evil men reigned through the unmanliness of the subjects.' (3.) Their examples are not imitable in all things; they were against resistance, which we doubt not to prove is lawful against tyrannical violence: many of them refused to flee from the fury of persecutors: they ran to martyrdom, when neither cited nor accused; and to obtain the crown thereof they willingly yielded up their lives and liberties also to the rage of tyrants. We cannot be obliged to all these. 2. Yet we find some examples not altogether unapplicable to this purpose. When Barochbach, the pretended king of the Jews, after the destruction of Jerusalem, set himself as king in Bitter, a city in Arabia; the Christians that were in his precincts, refused to own him as king; which was one great cause of his persecuting them. It is true he persecuted them also for other things, as for their not denying Christ; so are we persecuted for many other things, than for our simple disowning of the king: yet this is reckoned as a distinct cause of their suffering, by Mr. Mede, on the Revel. Part. 1. Page 43. Gees Magist. Origin. Chap. 10. Sect. 7. Page 361. The same last cited author shews, that when Albinus, Niger, and Cassius, successively usurped the empire, having none of them any legal investiture, the Christians declined the recognition of their claim, and would not own them; and that upon this Tertullian says, That is, the Christians could never be found to be Albinians, or Nigrians, or Cassians, meaning they were never owners of these men for magistrates. And so may we say, We may be ashamed to be found amongst the Charlites and Jacobites of these times. Not unlike is the passage of Ambrose, who, in favours of Valentinian the rightful governor, contested against Maximus the tyrant, and not only disowned him, but excommunicated him, for which he was threatened with death. And yet it is observable, that when Maximus offered to interpose his power in defence of Ambrose, that he might not be banished by Justina the empress, he would not accept of the help of Maximus, whose power he disallowed and disowned. Whence I observe, that it is not without a precedent for a minister to disown a tyrant, to refuse favour from him: yea, and to excommunicate him, yea, even without the concurrence of his fainting brethren; for all which some of our faithful ministers have been much condemned in our day, especially Mr. Donald Cargil for excommunicating Charles the II, and James, Duke of York, as if such a thing had never been done before: whereas, we see what Ambrose did to Maximus. And this same faithful minister, Ambrosius minister at Milan, in Italy, did also hold out of the assembly of the Christians Theodosius the emperor, though a most virtuous prince, for that grievous scandal committed by him, against the innocent people at Thessalonica in killing so many of them in a passionate transport. But, 3. since this objection of primitive Christians is much insisted on, both against this and the head of defensive arms: I shall further take notice of several distinctions, that do make the difference between their case and ours very vast. (1.) There is a great difference betwixt a prince of the common religion of his subjects, but distinct from some of them, whom yet he does not seek to entice to his religion, but gives them liberty, and the benefit of the law as other subjects: which was the case of many in these primitive times sometimes. And a prince, by all means, both foul and fair, pressing to a revolt from the true, and to embrace a false religion. In this case (which is ours with a witness) it must be granted we should be wary, that we neither engage with him, nor own allegiance to him, when he would withdraw us from our allegiance to God. (2.) There is a great difference betwixt a prince persecuting the true religion, which only a few of his subjects here and there did profess, who in regard of their paucity were never in capacity to be looked upon as the body of the people, impowering him as their public servant; (which was their case) and a prince persecuting that religion, which was professed by the body of the nation, when they set him up. In this latter case, men of great sense have denied he should be owned for a prince, because then he is stated against the common good. This was our case under the former king, and yet under this, though all professors be not now persecuted, the public religion and ancient reformation is persecuted in a few, whom he intends to destroy, and in their destruction to bury it. (3.) There is a difference betwixt a prince persecuting religion, publicly owned and received of his subjects, yet never approved nor confirmed by law (as it was not in the primitive times) and a prince persecuting religion ratified and established by the laws of the land, which is our case. It will seem clear to every soul, not benighted with court darkness, that he then of course, and by law, falleth from his right in this case, because now he is not only stated against the common good, but against the very laws by which the subjects must be ruled. Then he ruleth not as a prince, to whom the law giveth his measures and bounds, but rageth as a tiger and tyrant, and ought to be carried towards as such. (4.) There is a difference betwixt a prince suppressing that religion established by law, which he never professed, nor never gave his consent to these laws (as might be the case of some of the Arian emperors) though it be unlawful for any people to set up any mortal over them, who is not in this case bound to the good behaviour; and a prince, opposing and oppressing that religion, which himself hath professed, and is ratified by laws with his own consent: which was our case under the former king, who did give the most solemn ratification of them that ever was given, but afterwards most perfidiously retracted it.

As also this apostate papist, did sometime profess himself protestant, and consented to the laws establishing it, and the penal statutes against papists, though now he is going about to raze all, and ruin that alone valuable treasure of our nation, religion. (5.) There is a difference betwixt a prince consenting to laws establishing religion which he now persecuteth (which might have been the case of Julian the apostate) and a prince, who not only consented to these laws, but who did upon these very terms, and no other, get and receive his crown and sceptre, that he should preserve the religion as reformed, and protect as a father the professors thereof, and maintain the laws establishing it, which yet he, perfidiously, being once settled in the government, breaks, casts, cassates and overturns (which was done by Charles) or, and a prince who will be bounded by the laws consented to, nor be bound to the observation of any laws whatsoever; but challenges it as his prerogative royal, to be absolute above all laws, and denying all security upon terms, is free to destroy religion and liberty, and all the valuable interests of the nation, when he pleases. This is James's character. (6.) There is a difference betwixt a prince breaking the main and only article of his covenant, in a fit of fury and rage being transported upon some mistakes (which was the case of Theodosius the emperor) and a prince not only violating this upon deliberation, but plainly declaring, that neither oath nor declaration can or will bind him; but these being made void, he will destroy without restraint all these covenanted privileges (this was the case of Charles) or, and a prince who, as he never will come under the bond of a covenant with his people: so tho' he makes never so many fair promises with the greatest solemnities, maintains a principle, that he will keep no promises, but when, and with whom he pleases, and can get a dispensation to break all when he likes. (This is James's ingenuity.) Sure in this case, such as are characterized, declare themselves so far from being princes, that they profess before the world, they are no more men to be conversed with: for if neither their words, writs, vows, promises, oaths, declarations, nor protections can bind them, what society can be had with them? Are they not to be looked upon, and carried towards as common enemies of morality, religion, righteousness, liberty, humanity, yea even of mankind itself? Now then, let the world be judge, if the people of Scotland can be judged in conscience, reason, prudence, policy, or any imaginable way, bound to own their authority, being so stated, and by the act rescissory all human ground rescinded, that ever it shall be otherwise; let them go seek other slaves where they can find them, for we will not sell ourselves and posterity to tyrants as slaves, nor give up our religion and the exercise of it to the mouldings of the court.

II. In the second place, it being clear from these forementioned instances, that tyrants and usurpers have been disowned; and it being also as clear as light can make any thing, from the foregoing account of their government, and all the characters of truculency, treachery and tyranny, conspicuously relucent therein, that these two gentlemen, whose authority we are pressed to own, were tyrants and usurpers: it remains therefore to prove from all dictates of reason about government, that their pretended authority could not nor cannot be owned.

For the argument runs thus; the authority of tyrants and usurpers cannot be owned; but the authority of Charles and James was and is the authority of tyrants and usurpers, therefore their authority cannot be owned. Now it is the major of this syllogism that I undertake to prove, the minor being so clear from their history, that to prove it by witnesses were to do what is already done.

1. All authority to be owned of men must be of God, and ordained of God: for so the apostle teacheth expresly, Rom. xiii. 1. &c. which is the alone formal reason of our subjection to them, and that which makes it a damnable sin to resist them; because it is a resisting the ordinance of God. The Lord owns himself to be the author of magistrates, Prov. viii. 15. By me kings reign and princes decree justice.

As he is the author of man, and hath made him a sociable creature, so he is the author of the order of human society, which is necessary for the preservation of mankind, he being the God of order and not of confusion.

And this must hold not only of the supreme authority, but of subordinate magistrates also; for they must be included in the higher powers, to whom we must be subject, Rom. xiii. and they that resist them, resist God's ordinance too. Their judgment is God's, as well as the judgment of the supreme magistrate, Deut. i. 17. 2 Chron. xix. 6, 8. They are called gods among whom the Lord judgeth, Psal. lxxxii. 1. He speaketh not there of a congregation of kings.

We are to be subject to them for the Lord's sake, as well as to the supreme magistrate, 1 Pet. ii. 13. therefore all magistrates, superior and inferior, are ordained of God in the respective places. It is true, Peter calls every degree of magistracy an ordinance of man, not that he denies it to be an ordinance of God for so he would contradict Paul, Rom. xiii. but terms it so emphatically, to commend the worth of obedience to magistrates, though but men, when we do it for the Lord's sake: not effectively, as an invention of men, but subjectively, because exercised by men, and created and invested by human suffrages, considered as men in society, and objectively, for the good of man, and for the external peace and safety of man, thereby differenced from the ministry, an ordinance of Christ, for the Spiritual good of mens souls. Hence, those rulers that are not of God, nor ordained of God, cannot be owned without sin; but tyrants and usurpers are the rulers, that are not of God, nor ordained of God, but are set up, and not by him, &c. Hos. viii. 1.-4. therefore they cannot be owned without sin.

I refer it to any man of conscience and reason to judge, if these scriptures, proving magistracy to be the ordinance of God, for which alone is to be owned, can be applied to tyrants and usurpers. How will that, Rom. xiii. read of tyrants? Let every soul be subject to tyrants, for they are ordained of God as his ministers of justice, &c. and are a terror to good works, and a praise to the evil. Would not every man nauseate that as not the doctrine of God? Again, how would that sound, Prov. viii. By me tyrants reign, and usurpers decree injustice? Harsh to Christian ears. Can they be said to be gods among whom the Lord judgeth? If they be, they must be such as the witch of Endor saw, gods coming out of the earth, when she raised the devil; in a very catechrestical meaning, as the devil is called the god of this world. And indeed they have no more power, nor otherwise to be owned, than he hath: for this is a truth, tyranny is a work of satan, and not from God; because sin, either habitual or actual, is not from God; tyranny is sin in habit and act: therefore----The magistrate, as magistrate, is good in nature and end, being the minister of God for good, a tyrant as a tyrant, is quite contrary. Lex Rex saith well, 'A power ethical, politic or moral, to oppress, is not from God, and is not a power, but a licentious deviation of a power, and no more from God, but from sinful nature, and the old serpent, than a licence to sin,' quest. 9. p. 59. Hence sin, a licence to sin, a licentious sinning, cannot be from God; but tyranny, usurpation, absolute power enaroaching upon all liberties, laws, divine and human, is sin, a licence to sin, a licentious sinning: therefore----But, to make this clear, and to obviate what may be said against this, let it be considered, how the powers that be are of God, and ordained of God. Things are said to be of God and ordained of God, two ways; by his purpose and providence, and by his word and warrant.

Things may be of God, either of his hand working, or bringing them about, ordaining and ordering them to be to his glory, either by a holy over-ruling providence, as Samson's desire of a wife was of God, Judg. xiv. 4. and Amaziah's insolent and foolish rejection of Joash's peaceable overture, 2 Chron. xxv. 20. or by a powerful effective providence; so Rom. xi. 36. Of him and through him are all things, 1 Cor. viii. 6. One God, of whom are all things. Or things be of God, of his word warranting and authorizing. So we are commanded to try the spirits; whether they be of God (1 John iv. i.) So in this sense, sin, tentation, lust, corruptions of the world are not of God, Jam. i. 13, 1 John ii. 16.

Again, things are ordained of God, ether by the order of his counsel or providential will; either effectively, by way of production, or direction; or permissively, by way of non-impedition: or they are ordained by the order of his word and preceptive will. The former is God's rule, the latter is ours: the former is always accomplished, the latter is often contradicted: the former orders all actions, even sinful; the latter only that which is good and acceptable in the sight of God: by the former Israel rejected Samuel, by the latter they should have continued Samuel's government, and not sought a king: by the former Athaliah usurped the government, by the latter she should have yielded obedience, and resigned the government to the posterity of Ahaziah: by the former, all have a physical subordination to God at creatures, subject to his all disposing will; by the latter, those whom he approves have a moral subordination to God, as obedient subjects to his commanding will. Now magistrates are of God, and ordained by him both these ways, tyrants but one of them. I say, magistrates, the higher powers, to whom we owe and must own subjection, are of God both these ways; both by his purpose and providence; and that not merely eventual, but effective and executive of his word, disposing both of the title and right, and possession of the power, to them whom he approves, and bringing the people under a conscientious subjection, and by his word and warrant. So Adonijah the usurper (though he had the pretence of hereditary right, and also possession by providence) was forced to own king Solomon in these terms, upon which only a magistrate may be owned: 'the kingdom' says he, 'was mine, and all Israel set their faces on me that I should reign: howbeit the kingdom is turned about, and become my brother's, for it was his from the Lord,' 1 Kings ii. 15. He had both providence turning about the kingdom to him, and also the warrant of the Lord's approbative and preceptive will. But tyrants and usurpers are only of God, and ordained of God, by his over-ruling purpose and permissive providence, either for performing his holy purpose towards themselves, as Rehoboam's professing he would be a tyrant, and refusing the lawful desires of the people was of God, 2 Chron. x. 15. or for a judgement and vengeance upon them that are subject to them, Zech. xi. 6. whereby they get a power in their hand, which is the rod of the Lord's indignation, and a charge and commission against a hypocritical nation, Isa. x. 5, 6. This is all the power they have from God, who 'gives Jacob to the spoil, and Israel to the robbers, when they sin against him,' Isa. xlii. 24. This doth not give these robbers any right, no more than they whose 'tabernacle prosper, into whose hand God bringeth abundantly,' Job xii. 6. Thus all robbers, and the great legal robbers, tyrants and their authorized murderers, may be of God, viz. by his providence. Hence those that are not ordained of God's preceptive will, but merely by his providential will; their authority is not to be owned; but tyrants and usurpers are not ordained of God's preceptive, but merely by his providential will. The minor needs no proof, yet will be cleared by many following arguments, the major will be afterwards more demonstrated. Here I shall only say, they that have no other ordination of God impowering them to be rulers, than the devil hath, must not be owned; but they that have no other than the ordination of providence, have no other ordination of God impowering them to be rulers, than the devil hath: therefore they that have no other than the ordination of providence, must not be owned.

2. But let us next consider what is comprehended in the ordination of that authority which is to be owned as of God: and it may be demonstrated, there are two things in it, without which no authority can be owned as of God, viz. institution and constitution so as to give him, whom we must own as God's minister, authority both in the abstract and concrete, that is, that he should have magistracy by God's ordination, and be a magistrate by and according to the will of God. All acknowledge that magistracy hath God's institution, for the powers that be are ordained of God: which contains not only the appointment of it, but the qualification and form of it. That government is appointed by divine precept all agree, but whether the precept be moral natural, or moral positive, whether it was appointed in the state of innocency, or since disorder came into the world, whether it be primario or secundario, from the law of nature, is not agreed upon. It may possibly be all these ways; government in the general may be from the law and light of nature appointed in innocency, because all its relative duties are enjoined in the fifth command, and all nations naturally have an esteem of it, without which there could be no order, distinction, or communion in human societies but the specification or individuation may be by a postnate, positive and secondary law, yet natural too, for though there be no reason in nature why any man should be king and lord over another, being in some sense all naturally free, but as they yield themselves under jurisdiction the exalting of David over Israel is not ascribed to nature, but to an act of divine bounty, which took him from following the ewes, and made him feeder of the people of Israel, Psal. lxxviii. 70, 71. yet nature teacheth, that Israel and other people should have a government, and that this should be subjected to. Next, not only is it appointed to be, but qualified by institution, and the office is defined, the end prescribed, and the measures and boundaries thereof are limited, as we shall hear. 'Again, the forms of it though politically, they are not stinted, that people should have such a form and not another; yet morally, at least negatively, whatever be the form it is limited to the rules of equity and justice, and must be none other than what hath the Lord's mould and sanction. But there is no institution any of these ways for tyranny. Hence, that power hath no institution from God, cannot be owned as his ordinance; but the power of tyrants is that power, being contrary in every respect to God's institution, and a mere deviation from it, and eversion of it: Ergo--To the minor it may be replied; though the power which tyrants may exercise, and usurpers assume, may be in concrete contrary to God's institution, and so not to be owned; yet, in the abstract, it may be acknowledged of God. It is but the abuse of the power, and that does not take away the use. We may own the power, though we do not own the abuse of it. I answer, 1. I acknowledge the distinction as to magistrates is very pertinent; for it is well said by the congregation in a letter to the nobility, Knox's History of Scotland, Book 2. 'That there is a great difference betwixt the authority, which is God's ordinance, and the persons of these who are placed in authority; the authority and ordinance of God can never do wrong, for it commandeth that vice be punished, and virtue maintained; but the corrupted person placed in this authority may offend.'

It is certain, higher powers are not to be resisted; but some persons in power may be resisted. The powers are ordained of God; but kings commanding unjust things are not ordained of God to do such things; but to apply this to tyrants, I do not understand. Magistrates in some acts may be guilty of tyranny, and yet retain the power of magistracy; but tyrants cannot be capable of magistracy, nor any one of the scripture-characters of righteous rulers. They cannot retain that which they have forfeited, and which they have overturned; and usurpers cannot retain that which they never had. They may act and enact some things materially just, but they are not formally such as can make them magistrates, no more than some unjust actions can make a magistrate a tyrant. A murderer, saving the life of one and killing another, does not make him no murderer: once a murderer ay a murderer, once a robber ay a robber, till he restore what he hath robbed: so once a tyrant ay a tyrant, till he makes amends for his tyranny, and that will be hard to do. 2. The concrete does specificate the abstract in actuating it, as a magistrate in his exercising government, makes his power to be magistry; a robber, in his robbing, makes his power to be robbery; an usurper in his usurping makes his power to be usurpation; so a tyrant in his tyrannizing, can have no power but tyranny. As the abstract of a magistrate is nothing but magistracy, so the abstract of a tyrant is nothing but tyranny. It is frivolous then to distinguish between a tyrannical power in the concrete, and tyranny in the abstract; the power and the abuse of the power: for he hath no power as a tyrant, but what is abused. 3. They that object thus, must either mean, that power in it general notion is ordained of God, but this particular power abused by tyrants, and assumed by usurpers, is not ordained: or they must mean, that the very power of tyrants and usurpers is ordained of God, but the way of holding it and using it, is not of God. If the first be said, they grant all I plead for; for though the power in general be ordained, yet what is this to tyrants and usurpers? would not this claim be ridiculous for any man to soy, God hath ordained governments to be, therefore I will challenge it? God hath ordained marriage, therefore any may cohabit together as man and wife, without formal matrimony. If the second be alledged, that the power of these prevailing dominators is ordained, but not their holding and using of it: this is nonsense, for how can a power be ordained, and the use of it be unlawful? For the abuse and use of tyrannical power is all one and reciprocal: an usurper cannot use his power but by usurpation.

Again, is it not plain, that the abstract and the concrete, the act or habit, and the subject wherein it is, cannot have a contrary denomination? if drunkenness and theft, lying or murder, be of the devil; then the drunkard, the thief, the liar, and the murderer, are of the devil too: so if tyranny and usurpation, or the use or abuse of tyrants and usurpers be of the devil, then most the tyrants and usurpers also be of him: none can say, the one is of the devil, and the other of God. Wherefore it is altogether impertinent to use such a distinction, with application to tyrants or usurpers, as many do in their pleading for the owning of our oppressors; for they have no power, but what is the abuse of power.

3. As that authority which is God's ordinance must have his institution; so it must have his divine constitution from himself and by the people. Wherever then there is authority to be owned of men, there must be these two, constitution from God and constitution from the people. For the first, God hath a special interest in the constitution of authority, both immediately and mediately. Immediately, he declares such and such forms of government to be lawful and eligible, and does order whom, and who, and how people shall direct governors. And so, he confers royal graces, and endowments, and gifts for government on them, as on Joshua and Saul: so they become the Lord's anointed, placed and set on the throne of the Lord, 1 Chron. xxix. 23. and honoured with majesty, as his deputes and vicegerants, having their crown let on by God, Psal. xxi. 3. But in regard now he doth not by any special revelation determine, who shall be the governors in this or that place; therefore he makes this constitution by meditation of men, giving them rules how they shall proceed in setting them up. And seeing, by the law of nature, he hath enjoined government to be, but hath ordered no particular in it with application to singulars he hath committed it to the positive transaction of men, to be disposed according to certain general rules of justice. And it must needs be so; for first, without this constitution, either all or none would be magistrates: if he hath ordained civil power to be, and taken no order in whom it shall be, or how it shall be conveyed, any might pretend to it; and yet none would have it, more than another. If then he hath affixed it to a peculiar having and holding, by virtue whereof this man is enstated and entitled to the office, and not that man, there must be a law for constituting him in authority, which will discover in whom it is. 2. If it were not so, then resisting of a particular magistrate would not be a resisting of the ordinance of God, if a particular magistrate were not constitute of God, as well as magistracy is institute of God: for still it would be undetermined, who were the owner; and so it would be left as free and lawful for the resister to take the place, as for the resisted to hold it; the institution would be satisfied if any possessed it: therefore there must be constitution to determine it. 3. No common law of nature can put in practice, without particular constitution regulating it. That wives and children own their superior relations, is the law of nature; but there must be such a relation first fixed by human transaction, before they can own them; there must be marriage authorized of God, there must be children begotten, and then the divine ordination of these relative duties take place. So the judges of Israel for four hundred and fifty years were given of God, Acts xiii. 20. not all by an immediate express designation, but a mediate call from God by men, as Jephthah; Judg. xi. 6, 11. Inferior judges also are magistrates appointed by God, yet they have their deputation from men. Our Saviour speaks of all magistrates, when he applies that of the 82 psalm to them, I said ye are gods; and shews how they were gods, because unto them the word of God came, John x. 35. that is, by his word and warrant he authorized them, not by immediate designation in reference to the most of them, but the word of God comes to them, or his constitution is past upon them, who are advanced by men according to his word. When men therefore do act according to the divine rule, in the moulding and erecting of government and governors, there the constitution is of God, though it be not immediate. And where this is not observed, whatever power (so named or pretended) there may be, or whatsoever persons there be that take upon them to be the power, and are not thereto appointed or therein instated, and do exercise such a power as God hath not legitimated, they are not a power ordained of God. Hence, whatsoever power hath no constitution from God, either immediate or mediate, cannot be owned: but the authority of tyrants and usurpers, is a power that hath no constitution from God, either immediate or mediate; therefore it cannot be owned. The major is cleared above. The minor is also undeniable: for, either they must pretend to an immediate constitution by revelation, that James duke of York a vassal of antichrist, had, by all his plots and pranks, merited the crown of Britain, and therefore must be constitute king; and this I hope they will not pretend to, except the Pope hath gotten such a revelation from Pluto's oracle; or they must have recourse to the mediate constitution by men: and if so, then either this mediate constitution of God is left undetermined, indefinitely and absolutely giving way to any that will assume what power they please and can: and then, I confess tyrants may have a constitution; but this constitution cannot be of God; or else it is fixed by a rule, regulating the succession or constitution of the governors, and obliging the people to own the government so constituted, with exclusion and disallowance of any other. And so, if in that constitution there be a substantial deviation from the rule, as when incompetent or unallowed persons be the advancers of themselves, or others, into that place by illegal and sinistrous means, in as much as in that case there is the divine disapprobation, it may be said there is no ordinance of God, but a contradiction and contra-ordination to God's order. Gee's magist. origin. chap. 5. sect. 4. subject 3 page 135. This will shake off this of ours, and all other tyrants and usurpers, that come into the government, and hold it not according to God's rule.

4. It is clear also in the second place, that the authority which we can own out of conscience, must have constitution by the people. The special way by which men should be called into the place of sovereign power, may perhaps not be found so expresly defined in scripture, as mens call to the other ordinance of the ministry is; yet in this two things are essentially necessary to the constitution of a magistrate, the peoples consent and compact either formal and virtual. And without these we can own conscientious subjection and allegiance to no man living. That the first is necessary will be evident, from the law of nature and nations, and from scripture. First, The light and law of nature dictates, that the right and interest of constituting magistrates is in the elective vote or suffrage of the people. This will appear, 1. If we consider the original of government among men, especially after they were so multiplied, that there was a necessity of a reduction into diverse communities; which, whatever was before the flood, yet after it, behoved to be by a coalition with consent under an elective government. The scripture makes it more than probable, that the partition of commonwealths was in Peleg's days, in whole time the earth was divided, Gen. x. 2. occasioned by the confusion of "languages at Babel, which did dissolve their union, and scatter them abroad upon the face of all the earth," Gen. xi. 9.

Then was it that we may conceive, as Buchanan says, de jure regni apud Scot. 'The time was when men dwelt in cottages and caves, and as strangers did wander to and fro without laws, and such as could converse together of the same language, assembled together as their humours did lead them or as some common utility did allure them, a certain instinct of nature did oblige them to desire converse and society.' But this confusion of languages, and communion of language, in several divided parcels, could not incorporate these several parties into communities; that behoved to be the effect of some other cause: and what should that be, but the joint will, consent and agreement of the severally languaged? It could not be by consanguinity; for there is no direction from nature for a confinement of that into such and such degrees, to make out the bonds of a common-wealth, or possibility of knowing all within such degrees; besides all within these degrees might not be of the same language. Now, the scripture says, they "were divided every one after his tongue, after their families, in their nations," Gen. x. 5. Next, it could not be by cohabitation: for how that must go to be the boundaries of a common-wealth, inclusively, or exclusively, is not defined by nature, nor can it be otherwise determined, than by human choice. Then, it could not be by mens belonging to such a sovereign: for, after that division and confusion, they could not all be under one sovereign, nor under the same that they were subject to before; and a sovereign cannot be before the aggregation of the subjects whereof he is head, they must first be a commonwealth before they can belong to it. Again, it cannot be founded upon the right of fatherhood: for, in that scattering, such a right could not be uninterruptedly preserved: and then Noah should also have been the universal magistrate, which he could not be in these multiplied secessions. And further, if it be refounded on the right of fatherhood, either every company had one common father over all, or every father made a commonwealth of his own children: the latter cannot be said, for that would multiply commonwealths in infinitum: neither can the first be said; for, if they had one common father, either this behoved to be the natural father of all the company, which none can think was so happily ordered by Babel's confusion: or else the eldest in age, and so he might be incapable for government, and the law of nature does not direct that the government should alway be astricted to the eldest of the community: or else, finally, he behoved to be their political father, by consent. For, before this consent, they were unengaged as to common order of government; none of the community having any legal claim to sovereignty more than the rest. When therefore they were forced to conclude upon association, for their mutual preservation, they must be thought to act rationally, and not to make their condition worse, but rather better by that conclusion; and if they found it worse, to resume their radical right which they had conferred upon men subject to law, not to tyrannize over them: and in this case, certainly they had the power of choosing what kind of government suited most to their advantage, and would best preserve their liberties, and how far this should be extended, and who should be affirmed into this combination; still with a reservation of the privilege to their own safety, if their associates should not do their duty: and so they might also reserve to themselves a liberty to alter the form, when they found it productive of more prejudice than advantage, and never to leave their condition remediless; and to pitch upon this way of succession, and not another, the way of free election of every successor, or of definite election limited to one line, or to the nearest in line; and e contra, with a reserve still of their primeve privileges, to secure themselves from the inconveniences of that determination, or to change it; and to make choices of such a family and line, and not another, and whether the eldest always of that family, or the fittest is to be chosen; and however it be, yet still by the peoples consent: and in all this to have respect to some good, great and necessary ends, which, if they should be disappointed of, and find these means useless or destructive to, they were to be loosed from their obligation to use or to own them. See Jus populi vindicat. chap. 5. p. 80, &c. 2. If we consider how nature determines the peoples interest in the constitution of governors: whence comes it that this man, and not that man, this race and family, and not that, is invested with that title? It will be found there is no title on earth now to the crowns, to families, to persons, but the peoples suffrage: for the institution of magistracy in general does not make James Stewart a king, no more than John Chamberlain: neither do qualifications make one, otherwise there might be many better than is this day extant; for there are many men better qualified: and there is no prophetical or immediate callings to kingdoms now: and as for conquest without consent, and having no more for a title, it is no better than royal Latrociny.

It is certain, God would not command us to obey kings, and leave us in the dark, that we should not know him that hath a real call to it. And if he have not the peoples call, where shall we find another? It remains therefore they must have it from the people, who have it to give radically and virtually, having a power to preserve themselves, and to put it in the hands of one or more rulers, that they may preserve themselves by them. All men are born alike as to civil power (no man being born with a crown on his head) and yet men united in society may give it to this man, and not to that man; therefore they must have it virtually, for they cannot give what they have not. And as cities have power to choose their magistrates, so many cities have power to create an universal ruler over them all. The people also have power to limit the magistrates power with conditions; so that the present ruler shall not have so much prerogative as his predecessor, as royalists cannot deny, therefore they must have given that power which they can limit. See Lex Rex, quest. 4. p. 10. &c. 2dly, The scripture also gives light in this particular. 1. In giving directions and rules about their orderly calling their governors, impowering them to "take wise men, and understanding, and known among their tribes, to be made rulers," Deut. i. 13. "To make judges and officers in all their gates," Deut. xvi. 18. "To set one among their brethren king over them, and not a stranger," Deut. xvii. 15. To what purpose are these rules given them, if they had no interest to choose their magistrates? Would God command them to set a king over them, if they had not power to do it? And to set such a man over them, and not such an one, if they had no influence in making one at all? And accordingly that wise statist says very well, 2 Sam. xvi. 18. Hushai to Absalom, nay, but whom the Lord and this people, and all the men of Israel choose, his will I be, and with him will I abide. Which will also hold in the negative, whom the Lord and the people, and all the men of the kingdom do not choose, his we will not be, nor with him will we abide. 2. The scripture expressly attributeth the making of kings to the people. All the people of Judah took Azariah, and made him king, instead of his father Amaziah, whom they had executed, 2 Kings xiv. 21. They came with a perfect heart to make David king in Hebron, 1 Chron. xii. 38. So they made Joash king, 2 Chron. xxiii. 11. 3. Even these that were particularly designed of God, and chosen to be rulers, yet were not formally invested with power, before the people conferred it upon them. Gideon was called of God to it, but was not judge, till the people said, Rule thou over us, both thou and thy son, giving him an hereditary right for his children, Judg. viii. 12. Saul was appointed to be king, and therefore Samuel honoured him, because he was marked out of God to be king, 1 Sam. ix. 24. and anointed him with oil, 1 Sam. x. 1. after which he was gifted and qualified for government. God gave him another heart, vers. 9. yet all this did not make him king, till the people met for his inauguration, vers. 17. &c. and crowned him, and made him king in Gilgal, 1 Sam. xi. last verse. David was anointed by Samuel, and yet was a persecuted fugitive for several years, and never acknowledged formally king, till the men of Judah came and anointed him, 2 Sam. ii. 4. for if he had been king before, then there were two kings in Israel at one time, and David failed of his royal duty, in not punishing the murderer Saul; whereas himself says, he would not touch the Lord's anointed. Therefore the people made all kings, and that by choice and consent, without which they were no kings. Hence I argue, if the consent and choice of the people be so essentially necessary to the making of kings, then they who set up themselves against the consent of the body of the land, and without the choice of any, must be usurpers, not to be acknowledged for lawful kings; but the former is true, as is proven above: therefore.----Now plain it is, that this duke set up himself against the consent of the body, being excluded from the government by the representatives of England, and generally hated of all; who disdaining to wait upon the formal choice of any, but after he had paved his passage to the throne upon his brother's blood, did usurp the title without all law.

5. The second thing necessary for the legal constitution of a king by the people, is their compact with him: which must either be express or tacit, explicit or implicit. Two things are here to be proven, that will furnish an argument for disowning both the brothers. First, that there must be a conditional reciprocally obliging covenant between the sovereign and the subjects, without which there is no relation to be owned. Secondly, that when this compact is broken in all or its chiefest conditions by the sovereign, the peoples obligation ceases. The first I shall set down, in the words of a famous author, our renowned countryman Buchanan, in his dialogue 'de jure regni apud scotos. There is then (or there ought to be) a mutual compact between the king and his subjects', &c. That this is indispensibly necessary and essential to make up the relation of sovereign and subjects, may be proved both from the light of nature and revelation.

First, It may appear from the light of natural reason. 1. From the rise of government, and the interest people have in erecting it by consent and choice (as is shewed above) if a king cannot be without the peoples making, then, all the power he hath must either be by compact or gift: if by compact, then we have what we proposed: and if by gift: then if abused, they may recal it; or if they cannot recover it, yet they may and ought to hold their hand, and give him no more that they may retain, that is, no more honour or respect, which is in the honourer before the honoured get it. Can it be imagined, that a people acting rationally, would give a power absolutely, without restrictions, to destroy all their own rights? Could they suppose this boundless and lawless creature, left at liberty to tyrannize, would be a fit mean to procure the ends of government? for this were to set up a rampant tyrant to rule as he listeth, which would make their condition a great deal worse than if they had no ruler at all, for then they might have more liberty to see to their safety. See jus populi, chap. 9. pag. 96, 97. 2. This will be clear from the nature of that authority, which only a sovereign can have over his subjects; which, whatever be the nature of it, it cannot be absolute, that is against scripture, nature, and common sense, as shall be proven at more length.

That is to set up a tyrant, one who is free from all conditions, a roaring lion and a ranging bear to destroy all if he pleases. It must be granted by all, that the sovereign authority is only fiduciary, entrusted by God and the people with a great charge: a great pledge is impawned and committed to the care and custody of the magistrate, which he must take special care of, and not abuse, or waste, or alienate, or sell: (for in that case, royalists themselves grant he may be deposed.) He is by office a patron of the subjects liberties, and keeper of the law both of God and man, the keeper of both tables. Sure, he hath no power over the laws of God, but a ministerial power, he may not stop and disable them as he pleases; of the same nature is it, over all other parts of his charge. He is rather a tutor, than an inheritor and proprietor of the commonwealth, and may not do what his pupil's interest, what he pleases. In a word, the nature and whole significancy of his power lies in this, that he is the nation's public servant, both objectively in that he is only for the good of the people, and representatively in that the people hath impawned in his hand all their power to do royal service. The scripture teaches this, in giving him the titles of service, as watchmen, &c. allowing him royal wages for his royal work, Rom. xiii. he is God's minister attending continually on this thing.

There is his work, for this cause pay you tribute also. There is his wages and maintainance. He is called so in that transaction with Rehoboam; the old men advised him to be a servant unto the people, then they should be his servants, 1 Kings xii. 7. There was a conditional bargain proposed: as to be a servant, or tutor, or guardian upon trust, always implies conditions and accountableness to them that entrust them. 3. It must needs be so, otherwise great absurdities would follow. Here would be a voluntary contracted relation, obliging us to relative duties, to a man that owed none correlative to us, and yet one whom we set over us. It were strange, if there were no condition here; and no other voluntarily suscepted relations can be without this, as between man and wife, master and servant, &c. This would give him the disposal of us and ours, as if both we and what we have were his own, as a man's goods are, against which he does not sin whatever he doth with them. So this would make a king that could not sin against us; being no ways obliged to us, for he can no otherwise be obliged to us, but upon covenant conditions; he may be obliged and bound in duty to God otherwise, but he cannot be bound to us otherwise: and if he be not bound, then he may do what he will, he can do no wrong to us to whom he is noways bound. This also is point blank against the law of God, which is the second way to prove it, by the light of revelation or scripture. 1. In the very directions about making and setting up of kings, the Lord shews what conditions shall be required of them, Deut. xvii. 15. &c. and in all directions for obeying them, the qualifications they should have are rehearsed, as Rom. xii. 3, 4. Therefore none are to be set up but on these conditions, and none are to be obeyed but such as have these qualifications. 2. In his promises of the succession of kings, he secures their continuation only conditionally, to establish the kingdom, if they be constant to do his commandments and judgments, 1 Chron. xxviii. 7. There shall not fail a man to sit upon the throne, yet so that they take heed to their way to walk in God's law, as David did, 2 Chron. vi. 16.

Now he was not otherwise to perform these promises, but by the action and suffrage of the people setting him up, (which he had appointed to be the way of calling kings to thrones,) if therefore the Lord's promise be conditional, the people's actions also behoved to be suspended upon the same conditions. 3. We have many express covenants between rulers and subjects in scripture. Jephthah was fetched from the land of Tob, and made the head of the Gileadites by an explicit mutual stipulation, wherein the Lord was invocated as a witness, Judg. xi. 6, 8, 9, 10, 11. So all the elders of Israel came to make David king; and king David made a league with them in Hebron before the Lord, and then they anointed him over Israel, 2 Sam. v. 3. he made there a covenant with them before the Lord, 1 Chron. xi. 3.

He was no king before this covenant, and so it was a pactional oath between him and the kingdom, upon terms according to the law, Deut. xvii. He was only a king in fieri; one who was to be king, but now actually inaugurate a covenanted king upon terms that sanctified them. It is true, they came to recognosce Rehoboam's rights, and came to Shechem to make him king, 1 Kings xii. 1. and yet when he would not enter in covenant-terms with them, to satisfy their just demands, the people answered the king, saying, what portion have we in David, neither have we inheritance in the son of Jesse, to your tents, O Israel, vers. 16. They refused to acknowledge such an usurper, and we find no prophets ever condemning them for it. So when Jehoash or Joash was crowned, Jehoiada made a covenant between the Lord and the king and the people, between the king also and the people, 2 Kings xi. 17. 2 Chron. xxiii. 11, 16. From all these reasons and scriptures, it is clear, there must be a mutual compact between the subjects and every sovereign they own subjection to, which if he refuse, and usurp the sword, they are under an anterior obligation to subtract their allegiance, and to make use of their sword, if they be in capacity to pull it out of his hands, and use it against him. And of this we are put in mind by the motto of our old coronation pieces, which have these words about the sword, 'for me, but, if I deserve, against me:' and surely to him that hath it now in his hands, it may be said, thou hast deserved, and as yet deserves. We see then, the allegiance that this usurper alledges is his due, wants a bottom, to wit, a compact with the people. Whence I argue, if there must of necessity be a compact between the king and the people, when he is advanced to the government: then he that advances himself, without and against this compact, is an usurper not to be owned; but the former is true: therefore he that advances himself without and against this compact, is an usurper not to be owned. And who more notoriously deserving such a signature, than James VII. and II. who hath made horns of his own strength, or the Pope's bulls, to push his brother out and himself into the throne, upon no terms at all, or any security for religion and liberty. One objection is to be removed here: can the customs of the Jews be binding to all nations? The kings of Judah made such covenants, shall therefore all kings do so? Answ. Why not this custom, as well as crowning, which they used likewise? These rules are not typical or ceremonial, nor only so judicial as to be peculiarly judicial, but are matters of moral equity, bearing a standing reason founded upon that law, Deut. xvii. 15. &c. limiting the prince to stand to conditions. If we cast at divine laws for rules of government where will we find better laws? It is recorded of the first of the British kings who was Christian, that writing to Eleutherius bishop of Rome, (before Antichrist took that seat) for the Roman laws, he received this answer: 'By divine clemency ye have received the law and faith of Christ, you have the Old and New Testaments, out of them in God's name by counsel of your states take laws, and govern your kingdom.' And of another, that he began his laws thus. God spake all these words, &c. And so repeated the laws of God. The second thing I undertook to prove, is that assertion of Buchanan ubi supra, de Jure Regni. 'There being a paction between the king and subjects, he who first recedes from what is covenanted, and doth counteract what he hath covenanted, he looses the contract; and the bond being loosed which did hold fast the king with the people, whatever right did belong to him by virtue of that compact, he looses it, and the people are as free as before the stipulation.' Which is also asserted by the author of Jus populi, chap. 6. pag. 112. 'It is no less clear, that when the sovereign doth not perform the principal, main, and most necessary conditions, condescended and agreed upon, by right he falleth from his sovereignty: and pag. 117. when the prince doth violate his compact, as to all its conditions, or as to its chief, main, and most necessary condition, the subjects are by right free from subjection to him, and at liberty to make choice of another.' This is so clear that it needs no labour to prove it, that, upon this head, we were loosed from all allegiance to the former tyrant, who was admitted upon terms of an explicit covenant, the conditions whereof he did as explicitly break.

There are two cases wherein subjects are loosed from covenanted allegiance to their princes. 1. When the prince remits the obligation of the subjects, and refuses allegiance upon that basis; then he can no more demand it by virtue of that compact. He that remits, and will not have that allegiance, that the subjects covenanted upon such and such conditions to him, these subjects should not give it that they so covenanted, for they should not prostitute it to a refuser and remitter: but Charles the II. remitted and would not have that allegiance, which we covenanted upon such and such conditions, viz. upon the terms of the covenant, which he cassed and annulled and made criminal to own: therefore to him we should not have given it, which we so covenanted. 2. When the prince doth enter into a mutual covenant with the people upon mutual conditions, and does not only cease to perform the conditions, but simply denies all obligation to do it, and makes it a quarrel to insinuate so much, yea persecutes all who dare assert the obligation of that covenant; and yet demands allegiance, not upon the obligation of that covenant which he hath remitted, but absolutely upon the grounds of his prerogative: in this case it will be evident also, the subjects are not bound either to own their formerly covenanted allegiance to him, or that which he demands on other grounds. Grotius de Jure belli, is clear as to this, lib. 1. cap. 4. num. 12. 'If there be such a clause or condition in the very devolution of the government upon a prince, as if he do so and so, the subjects shall be loosed from all bonds of obedience, then, when he does so, he becomes a mere private person.' Grotius there supposes the power is transferred upon a resolutive condition; that is, if he transgress the condition, the power shall be resolved into its first fountain: much more if it be transferred expresly also upon a suspensive condition, that he shall continue to maintain the ends of the covenant, defend religion and the liberties of the subjects, in the defence whereof we shall own allegiance to him, otherwise not. In that case, if he do not maintain these ends, plain it is, our obligation ceases; for how can it stand upon a conditional obligation, when his performance of the condition sists? But whatever be the conditions mutual, it flows natively from the nature of a mutual compact, 'That he who doth not perform the conditions agreed upon, hath no right to the benefit granted upon condition of performance of these conditions; especially if he perform not, or violate these conditions upon supposition whereof he would not have gotten the benefit: it were very absurd to say in a mutual conditional compact, one party shall still be found to perform his conditions, though the other perform none, but break all. Were it the act of rational creatures to set up a sovereign, upon conditions he shall not play the tyrant, and yet be bound to him though he tyrannize never so much? We have the name of mutual compacts in the spies covenant with Rahab, Josh. ii. 20. "If thou utter this our business, then we will be quit of thine oath, which thou hast made us to swear:" if she should break, condition, then the obligation on their part should cease. But next, all the stress will ly in proving that the covenant, on such and such conditions between a prince and subjects, doth equally and mutually oblige both to each other: for if it equally oblige both, then both are equally disengaged from other by the breach on either side, and either of them may have a just claim in law against the other for breach of the conditions. But royalists and court slaves alledge, that such a covenant obliges the king to God, but not to the people at all: so that he is no more accountable to them, than if he had none at all. But the contrary is evident: for, (1.) If the compact be mutual, and if it be infringed on one side, it must be so in the other also; for in contracts, the parties are considered as equals, whatever inequality there may be betwixt them otherwise: I speak of contracts among men. (2.) If it be not so, there is no covenant made with the people at all: and so David did no more covenant with Israel, than with the Chaldeans: for to all with whom the covenant is made it obliges them to it. Otherwise it must be said, he only made the covenant with God, contrary to the text: for he made it only before the Lord as a witness, not with him as a party. Joash's covenant with the Lord is expresly distinguished from that with the people. (3.) If it be not so, it were altogether nonsense to say, there were any covenant made with the king on the other hand: for he is supposed to be made king on such and such terms: and yet, by this, after he is made king he is no more obliged unto them, than if there had been no compact with him at all. (4.) If he be bound as king, and not only as a man or Christian, then he is bound with respect to the people; for with respect to them he is only king: but he is bound as king, and not only as a man or Christian, because it is only with him as king that the people covenant, and he must transact with them under the same consideration. Next, that which he is obliged to, is the specifical act of a king, to defend religion and liberty, and rule in righteousness; and therefore his covenant binds him as a king. Again, if he be not bound as king, then as a king he is under no obligation of law or oath, which is to make him a lawless tyrant; yea, none of God's subjects. It would also suppose that the king as king could not sin against the people at all, but only against God: for as king he could be under no obligation of duty to the people, and where there is no obligation, there is no sin; by this he would be set above all obligations to love his neighbour as himself, for he is above all his neighbours, and all mankind, and only less than God; and so by this doctrine, he is loosed from all duties of the second table, or at least he is not so much obliged to them as others. But against this it is objected: both prince and people are obliged to perform their part to each other, and both are obliged to God, but both are not accountable to each other; there is not mutual power in the parties to compel one another to perform the promised duty; the king hath it indeed over the people, but not the people over the king, and there is no indifferent judge superior to both, to compel both, but God. Ans. 1. What if all this should be granted? Yet it doth not infringe the proposition: what if the people have not power to compel him? Yet, if by law, he may fall from his sovereignty, though, indeed, he is not deposed: he loses his right to our part, when he breaks his part. 2. There is no need of a superior arbiter: for as in contracting they are considered as equal, so the party keeping the contract is superior to the other breaking it. 3. There may be mutual co-active power, where there is no mutual relation of superiority and inferiority: yea, in some cases, inferiors may have a co-active power by law, to compel their superiors failing in their duty to them; as a son wronged by his father, may compel him to reparation by law; and independent kingdoms, nothing inferior to each other, being in covenant together, the wronged may have a co-active power to force the other to duty, without any superior arbiter. 4. The bond of suretiship brings a man under the obligation to be accountable to the creditor, though the surety were never so high, and the creditor never so low: Solomon says, in general, without exception of kings; yea, including them because he was a king that spake it, Prov. vi. 1, 2. "My son, if thou be surety for thy friend,----thou art snared with the words of thy mouth." Now a king's power is but fiduciary; and therefore he cannot be unaccountable for the power concredited to him. And if this generation had minded this, our stewards should have been called to an account for their stewardship ere now. Hence I argue, if a covenanted prince, breaking all the conditions of his compact, doth forfeit his right to the subjects allegiance, then they are no more to own him as their sovereign; but the former is proved, that a covenanted prince, breaking all the conditions of his compact, doth forfeit his right to the subjects allegiance: Therefore----And consequently when Charles II. expresly bound by covenant to defend and promote the covenanted reformation and liberties of the kingdom, to whom only we were bound in the terms of his defending and promoting the same, did violently and villainously violate and vilify these conditions, we were no more bound to them. Somewhat possibly may be objected here, 1. If this be the sense of the covenant, then it would seem that we were not bound to own the king, but only when and while he were actually promoting and carrying on the ends of the covenant. Ans. It does not follow, but that we are obliged to preserve his person and authority in these necessary intervals, when he is called to see to himself as a man; for we must preserve him as a mean, because of his aptitude and designation for such an end, albeit not always formally prosecuting it: we do not say, that we are never to own him, but when actually exercised in prosecuting these ends: but we say, we are never to own him, when he is tyrannically and treacherously abusing his authority for destroying and overturning these ends, and violating all the conditions of his compact. It may be. Object. 2. Saul was a tyrant, and a breaker of his royal covenant, and persecutor of the godly, and murderer of the priests of the Lord, usurper upon the priest's office, and many other ways guilty of breaking all conditions: and yet David and all Israel owned him as the anointed of the Lord. Ans. 1. Saul was indeed a tyrant, rejected of God, and to be ejected out of his kingdom in his own time and way, which David, a prophet knowing, would not anticipate. But he was far short, and a mere bungler in acts of tyranny in comparison of our grassators: he broke his royal covenant in very gross particular acts, but did not cass and rescind the whole of it, did not burn it, did not make it criminal to own its obligation, nor did he so much as profess a breach of it, nor arrogate an absolute prerogative, nor attempt arbitrary government, nor to evert the fundamental laws, and overturn the religion of Israel, and bring in idolatry as ours have done: he was a persecutor of David upon some private quarrels, not of all the godly upon the account of their covenanted religion: he murdered 85 priests of the Lord, in a transport of fury, because of their kindness to David; but he did not make laws adjudging all the ministers of the Lord to death, who should be found most faithful in their duty to God and his church, as ours have done against all field preachers: he usurped upon the priest's office, in one elicit act of sacrificing: but he did not usurp a supremacy over them, and annex it as an inherent right of his crown. 2. He was indeed such a tyrant, as deserved to have been dethroned and brought to condign punishment, upon the same accounts that Amaziah and Uzziah were deposed for afterwards: and in this the people failed in their duty, and for it they were plagued remarkably. Shall their omission be an argument to us? 3. As the question was never put to the people, whether they owned his authority as lawful, or not? So we do not read, either of their universal owning him, or their positive disowning him: however, that is no good argument, which is drawn from a not doing to a doing; because they did it not, therefore it must not be done. 4. They owned him; but how? As the minister of God, not to be resisted or revolted from under pain of damnation? (as all lawful magistrates ought to be owned, Rom. xiii. 2, 4.) This I deny: for David and his six hundred men resisted him resolutely; and though the body of the nation did long lazily ly and couch as asses under his burden, yet, at length, weary of his tyranny, many revolted from under him, and adjoined themselves to David at Ziklag, "while he kept himself close, because of Saul the son of Kish," 1 Chron. xii. 1. who are commended by the Spirit of God for their valour, verse. 2. &c. "and many out of Manasseh fell to him, when he came with the Philistines against Saul, to battle," verse 19. This was a practical disowning of the tyrant, before the Lord deposed him. 5. David did indeed pay him and his character some deference, as having been the anointed of the Lord; yet perhaps his honouring him with that title, the Lord's anointed, 1 Sam. xxiv. 1 Sam. xxvi. and calling him so often his Lord the King, cannot be altogether justified, no more than his using that same language to Achish king of Gath, 1 Sam. xxix. 8. I shewed before how titles might be allowed; but this so circumstantiate, does not seem so consistent with his imprecatory prayer, for the Lord's avenging him on him, 1 Sam. xxiv 12. and many other imprecations against him in his Psalms. In some of which he calls the same man, whom here he called, Psal. lix. 63, 14. and the evil, violent and wicked man, Psal. cxl. 1, 4. and the vilest of men, Psal. xii. ult. However it be, there can be no argument from hence, to own the authority of tyrants and usurpers.

6. Though this necessary conditional compact, which must always be in the constitution of lawful rulers, be not always express and explicit, so that a written authentic copy of it cannot be always produced; yet it is always to be understood, implicitly at least, transacted in the ruler's admission to the government, wherein the law of God must regulate both parties; and when he is made ruler, it must be understood that it is upon terms to be a father, feeder, and protector, and not a tyrant, murderer and destroyer. All princes are so far pactional, that they are obliged by the high and absolute Sovereign from whom they derive their authority, to reign for the peace and profit of the people. This is fixed unalterably by the laws of the supreme legislator, and solemnly engaged unto at the coronation: and whosoever declines or destroys this fundamental condition, he degrades and deposes himself. It is also not only the universal practice, but necessary for the constitution and conservation of all commonwealths, to have fundamental laws and provisions about government, both for the upholding, and transmitting and transferring it, as occasion calls, and preventing and punishing violations thereof, that there be no invasion or intrusion upon the government; and if there be any entrance upon it not according to the constitution, that it be illegitimated, and the nation's liberties always secured. This doth infer and regulate a conditional compact with all that are advanced to the government, albeit it should not be expressed. For it is undeniable that in the erection of all governors, the grand interests of the community must be seen to, by legal securities for religion and liberty, which is the end and use of fundamental laws. Now, how these have been unhinged and infringed, by the introduction and present establishment by law of that monster of the prerogative, enacted in Parliament anno 1661, the apologetic relation doth abundantly demonstrate, lect. 10. Concerning the King's civil supremacy, enhancing all the absoluteness that ever the Great Turk could arrogate, and yet far short of what hath been usurped since, and impudently proclaimed to the world; especially by him who now domineers, in his challenges of sovereign authority, prerogative royal, and absolute power, which all are to obey without reserve; whereby the whole basis of our constitution, and bulwark of our religion, laws and liberty, is enervated, and we have security of no law but the king's lust. Hence I argue, those princes that, contrary to their virtual compact (at least) at their coming to the crown, overturned all fundamental laws: Ergo they cannot be owned. The major is plain; for they that overturn fundamental laws are no magistrates; thereby all the ends of government being subverted, and the subverter cannot be owned as a father or friend, but an open enemy to the commonwealth, nor looked upon as magistrates doing their duty, but as tyrants, seeking themselves with the destruction of the commonwealth. And in this case, the compact, the ground of the constitution, being violated, they fall from their right, and the people are liberated from their obligation; and they being no magistrates, the people are no subjects; for the relation is mutual, and so is the obligation, Jus populi, chap. 9. page 183. The minor is manifest, both from the matter of fact, and the mischiefs framed into laws, by the sovereign authority, prerogative royal, and absolute power foresaid: whereby what remains of our fundamental constitutions, either in religious or civil settlements, unsubverted as yet, may be subverted when this absolute monarch pleases. Which absolute authority we cannot in conscience own, for these reasons, taken both from reason and scripture. First, It is against reason, 1. A power contrary in nature cannot be owned; absolute power is such: for that which takes away, and makes the people to give away their natural power of preserving their lives and liberties, and sets a man above all rule and law, is contrary to nature: such is absolute power, making people resign that which is not in their power to resign, an absolute power to destroy and tyrannize. 2. A power contrary to the first rise of its constitution cannot be owned; absolute power is such: for the first rise of the constitution is a people's setting a sovereign over them, giving him authority to administer justice over them: but it were against this, to set one over them with a power to rage at random, and rule as he lists. It is proven before, a king hath no power but what the people gave him; but they never gave, never could give an absolute power to destroy themselves. 3. That power which is against the ends of government cannot be owned; absolute power is such: for that which will make a people's condition worse than before the constitution, and that mean which they intended for a blessing to turn a plague and scourge to them, and all the subjects to be formal slaves at the prince's devotion, must needs be contrary to the ends of government; but absolute power is such: for against the exorbitance thereof, no means would be left to prevent it obstructing all the fountains of justice, and commanding laws and lawyers to speak; not justice, righteousness, and reason; but the lust and pleasure of one man, turning all into anarchy and confusion: certainly it could never be the intention either of the work or workers, at the constitution of government, to set up a power to enslave the people, to be a curse to them, but their ends were to get comfort, safety and liberty, under the shadow of government. 4. That power which invalidates, and is inconsistent with the king's compact with the people, cannot be owned; absolute power is such: for the tenor of that is always to secure laws and liberties, to rule according to law; but to be absolute invalidates, and is inconsistent with that: that which were an engagement into contradictories cannot consist with that compact; but to engage to be absolute, and yet to rule by law, is an engagement into contradictories, which no people could admit for a security. It is inconsistent with this compact, to give the king absolute power to overturn religion and liberty; and to assume that which was never given, were to invalidate this compact, and to make himself no king; but to restore unto the people the power they conferred upon him for the defence of religion and liberty. 5. That power which is not from God, nor of God, cannot be owned; but absolute power is not of God; because it is a power to tyrannize and sin, which, if it were of God, he should be the author of sin; for if the moral power be of God, so must the acts be; but the acts of absolute power being lawless, cannot be from God: Ergo, neither the moral power to commit these acts. 6. That ruler who cannot be God's minister for the people's good, cannot be owned; (for that is the formal reason of our conscientious subjection to rulers, Rom. xiii. 4, 5.) But absolute sovereigns are such as cannot be God's ministers for the people's good; for if they be God's ministers for good, they must administer justice, preserve peace, rule by law, take directions from their master; and if so, they cannot be absolute. 7. A tyrant in the signal act and exercise cannot be owned; but an absolute prince is such; being a power that may play the tyrant if he pleases, and by law as king; and so if kings be by action tyrants, then people are by action slaves; and so royal power cannot be a blessing to them; yea, a lawless breaker of all bonds, promises, and oaths, cannot be owned as lawful power; but absolute power is such: for, it cannot be limited by these obligations, at least people cannot have any security by them. 8. A lawless power is not to be owned; an absolute power is a lawless power: ergo, not to be owned. The major is plain. Cicero says, lib. 2. 'The reason of making laws was the same, as of the creation of kings.' And Buchanan, de Jure Regni, very excellently, when 'the lust of kings was instead of laws, and being vested with an infinite and immoderate power, they did not contain themselves within bounds.----The insolency of kings made laws to be desired; for this cause laws were made by the people, and kings constrained to make use, not of their licentious wills in judgment, but of that right and privilege which the people had conferred upon them, being taught by many experiences, that it was better that their liberty should be concredited to laws, than to kings; better to have the law, which is a dumb king, than a king, who is not a speaking law.' If then laws be necessary for the making of kings, and more necessary than kings, and the same cause requires both, then a king without laws is not to be owned. A king must be a speaking and living law, reducing the law to practice. So much then as a king hath of law, so much he hath of a king; and he who hath nothing of the law, hath nothing of a king. Magna charta of England saith, 'The king can do nothing but by law, and no obedience is due to him but by law.' Buchanan rehearses the words of the most famous emperors, Theodosius and Valentinianus, to this effect, 'It is,' say they, 'a word worthy of the majesty of a king, to confess he is a tied prince to the laws; and indeed it is more to submit a principality to the laws, than to enjoy an empire.' But now that an absolute power must be a lawless power, is also evident; for that is a lawless power that makes all laws void, needless and useless; but such is absolute power: for it cannot be confined to the observance of laws. 9. That power which is destructive to the people's liberties cannot be owned; absolute power is such: for such a licentious freedom as is absolute cannot consist with the people's liberties; for these may infringe when he pleases. Now these, in their own nature, and in all respects, being preferable to the king's prerogative, and it being no prerogative which is not consistent with, yea in its own nature adapted to, the precious interests of religion and liberty: when the king's absolute authority is stated in contradictory terms to these, we cannot own that authority; for now he hath another authority than could be given him for the preservation of these interests; in the preservation whereof he can only have an authority to be owned, seeing he claims a power to destroy them, if he please. 10. If we should own absolute authority, then we should own a royal prerogative in the king to make and dispense with laws: now that cannot be owned; for, it would infer that the king had a masterly dominion over his subjects, to make laws, and inflict penalties without their consent.

And plain it is, they that make kings must have a co-ordinate power to make laws also; but the people, in their representatives, make kings, as is proven. Next, a prerogative to dispense with laws, except such laws as are in their own nature dispensable, without prejudice to any law of God or liberties of men, cannot be owned: for any power to dispense with reason and law, not grounded on any other reason but mere will and absolute pleasure, is a brutish power. It cannot be a right annexed to the crown, to do so; for a king, as a king, can do nothing but what he may do by law. Nay, this is not only a brutish power, but a blasphemous power, making him a kind of god on earth, illimited, that can do what he pleases: and to dispute it further, were to dispute whether God hath made all under him slaves by their own consent? or, whether he may encroach on the prerogative of God or not? By this prerogative, he arrogates a power to dispense with the laws of God also, in pardoning murderers, &c. which no man hath power to do; the law of God being so peremptorily indispensible. Gen. ix. 6. "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed." Numb. xxxv. 30, 31. "Whoso killeth any person, the murderer shall be put to death----Moreover, ye shall take no satisfaction for the life of a murderer, but he shall be surely put to death." These pardons are acts of blood to the community. If the judgment be God's, as it is, Deut. i. 17. and not for man, but for the Lord, 2 Chron. xix. 6. then no king can arrogate a power to dispense with it, no more than an inferior judge can dispense with the king's laws; for the king is but a minister, bearing the sword, not in vain, but as a revenger, to execute wrath upon them that do evil, Rom. xiii. 4. They are but bastard kings who give out sentences out of their own mouth, contrary to God's mind.

And if he may do acts of grace by prerogative above law, then may he also do acts of justice (so pretended) by the same prerogative; and so may murder innocents, as well as pardon murderers; he may condemn the just, as well as justify the wicked; both which are alike abomination to the Lord, Prov. xvii. 15. This power cannot be owned in any man. 11. To own absolute power, were to recognosce the king as the proper and sole interpreter of the law. This Buchanan shews to be very absurd, 'When you grant the interpretation of laws to a king, you give him such a license, that the law should not speak what the lawgiver meaneth, but what is for the interpreter's interest; so that he may turn it to all actions, as a Lesbian rule, for his own advantage; and so what he pleases the law shall speak, and what he will not, it shall not speak.' Now the king's absolute pleasure can no more be the sense of the law, than it can be the law itself: he is king by law, but he is not king of law; no mortal can make a sense to a law, contrary to the law; for it involves a contradiction: the true meaning is only the law. This also would take away the use of all laws; for they could not declare what were just and unjust, but as the king pleased: their genuine sense could not be the rule. 12. If we own the law to be above the king, then we cannot own the king to be absolute; but the former is true; for he must be under it several ways: (1.) Under its directive power; that will not be denied. (2.) Under its constitutive power; he is not a king by nature, but by constitution and law: therefore the law is above the king; because it is only from the law that there is a king, and that such a man and not another is king, and that the king must be so and so qualified, and they that made him a king, may also unmake him by the same law. (3.) Under its limiting and restrictive power, as a man he cannot be absolute, nor as a king by law. (4.) Under its co-active power. A lawmaker, said king James the VI. should not be a law-breaker: but if he turn an overturner of the fundamental laws, that law or covenant that made him king, doth oblige to unmake him. Whatever power he hath, it is only borrowed fiduciary power, as the nation's public servant: and that which was lent him in pledge or pawn may be reclaimed, when abused by him.

Especially if he turn parricide, kill his brother, murder his nobles, burn cities, then he may and ought to be punished by law. Otherwise God should have provided better for the safety of the part than of the whole, though that part be but a mean for the safety of the whole: for if he turn a tyrant in his absoluteness, the people must be destroyed, if they may not repress him: thus he is secured, and the whole exposed to ruin. Yea, if he be a man, as well as a king, he must be under rule of law; and when he transgresses, either his transgressions are punishable by men, or they are not transgessions with men. See many arguments to this purpose in Lex Rex, quest. 14, 19, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27. But secondly, I prove it by scripture, 1. Even as a king he is regulated by law, not to multiply horses, nor wives, nor money, but to keep the words of the law, and not lift up himself above his brethren, Deut. xvii. 16, 17, 19, 20. he must observe to do according to the law, and not turn from it to the right hand or to the left, Josh. i. 7. therefore he must not be absolute. 2. He is certainly under that law, Matth. vii. 12. Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do you even so to them: which is the universal fundamental law. If then he would have us keeping in our line of subordination to him, he must keep his line, and so cannot be absolute. 3. What is God's due and peculiar prerogative, can be owned in no mortal; but absolute power is God's due and peculiar prerogative. He alone does whatsoever pleases him, Psal. cxv. 3. He alone worketh all, things after the counsel of his own will, Eph. i. 11. Acts or commands founded upon the sole pleasure of the agent, are proper to God. It is God's will and not the creature's that can make things good or just. It is blasphemy therefore to ascribe absolute power to any creature. 4. That which the Spirit of God condemned as a point of tyranny in Nebuchadnezzar, that is no prerogative to be owned; but the Spirit of God condemned this in him, proceeding from absolute power, that whom he would he slew, and whom he would he kept alive, whom he would he set up, and whom he would he put down. And his heart was lifted up, Dan. v. 19, 20. 5. That which God condemns and threatens in tyrants in the word in general, cannot be owned; but absolute power God condemns and threatens in the word in general; that they "turned judgment into gall," and said, "Have we not taken to us horns by our own strength?" Amos vi. 12, 13. 6. The word of God speaks nothing of the king's absolute prerogative, to make laws as he will. It is plain the king of Judah had it not: but the Sanhedrim had a great part of the legislative power, and of the punitive power in a special manner: the princes and people had it by Jeremiah's acknowledgement, Jer. xxvi. 14. And Zedekiah confesses to them, The king is not he that can do any thing against you, Jer. xxxviii. 5. 7. We find the king in scripture had not an absolute power, to expone or execute the law as he would; Saul made a law, 1 Sam. xiv. 24. Cursed be the man that eats any food until the evening. But exponing it, and thinking to execute it after a tyrannical manner, he was justly resisted by the people, who would not let him kill innocent Jonathan. 8. Nor had he the sole power of interpreting it; for inferior judges were interpreters, who are no less essential judges than the king who are set to judge for the Lord, and not for the king, 2 Chron xix. 6. and therefore they were to expone it according to their own conscience, and not the king's. They were to speak righteousness and judge uprightly, Psal. lviii. 1. hence called gods as well as kings, Psal. lxxxii. 1.

There was no essential difference between a king of God's approving, and a judge; there being but one law to both, Deut. xvii. 9. He was subject to judgment as well as others: for being but a brother, even while on the throne, who was not to lift up his heart above his brethren, Deut. xvii. ult. When this cause was to be judged, his person, though never so great, was not to be respected: nor were they to be afraid of the face of man, for the judgment was God's, Deut. i. 17. therefore the judges were to give out sentence in judgment, as if the Lord were to give it out: there was no exception of kings there. Yea we find, according to common law, they judged and punished offending kings, as shall be made appear: 10. If they were under church censures, then they were not absolute; but we find kings were under church censures; not only rebuked sharply to their face, of which we have many instances; but also subjected to church discipline, as Uzziah shut up for his leprosy.

And certainly at all times this must be extended to all: for the king is either a brother, or not: if not, then he should not be king, according to the scripture, Deut. xvii. 15. then also he is not a Christian, nor can he say the Lord's prayer: if he be, then if a brother offend, he is subject to the church, Matth. xviii. there is no exceptions of kings there. The objection from Eccles. viii. 3, 4.--he doth whatsoever pleaseth him, where the word of a king is, there is power, and who may say unto him, What dost thou? is of no significancy here. For, 1. This argument will enforce absolute obedience, if the power be to be taken absolutely; for it is obedience that is there commanded: and so we must not only own the absolute authority, but obey it without reserve, which never any yet had the impudence to plead for, until James the unjust claimed it in a Scots proclamation: but we answer, It is better to obey God than man. 2. If he may do whatsoever pleases him, then he may turn priest, then he may kill whom he pleases, and take possession; and yet for Saul's usurpation Samuel could say more than what dost thou? even to tell him, he had done foolishly, and his kingdom should not continue, 1 Sam. xiii. 13, 14. And for Ahab's tyranny, Elijah could tell him, the dogs shall lick thy blood, even thine, 1 Kings xxi. 19, And Ezekiel, thou profane wicked prince of Israel, Ezek. xxi. 25. 3. The meaning is then only this; that a righteous king's just power may not only be controlled: he is armed with power that may not be resisted, for he beareth not the sword in vain, and therefore we must not stand in an evil matter against them. I conclude then this argument, with the word of an ingenious author, upon this same subject, both in thesi and hypothesi: 'Whosoever shall offer to rule arbitrarily, does immediately cease to be king by right, seeing by the fundamental, common and statute laws of the realm, we know none for supreme magistrate and governor but a limited prince, and one who stands circumscribed and bounded in his power and prerogative. Ill effects of animosities,' page 17.

7. From what is said, this is the result, that it is essentially necessary to a moral power and authority, to have a right and title, without which we can own none, but as a tyrant without a title. For what is authority, but a right to rule? if then it have not a right, it is not authority. This will be undeniable, if we consider, that as private dominion, or property, consists in a right to enjoy; so public dominion, in a right to rule. Some things indeed are exposed to the common and arbitrary use of every man, and also at the beginning, by reason of the fewness of mankind, dominion was not reduced to distinct property; yet now, upon the multiplication of occupants, of necessity it must be stated by peculiar appropriation, from the law of nature, and by the grant of the supreme king, who hath given the earth to the children of men, Psal. cxv. 16. not to be catched up as the food of beasts, which the stronger seize, and the weaker get only what the other leave them, but divided by right as an inheritance, by him who separated the sons of Adam, and set the bounds of the people, Deut. xxxii. 8. Especially public dominion cannot be without a foundation, for its relation to the subjected, and must be so tied up, that it may be said, this man is to command, and these are to obey. I shew, that authority is from God, both by institution and constitution; so that the subjects are given to understand, such an one is singled out by God to sustain this authority, by prescribing a rule for men's entry into the authoritative relation, whereby he communicates that power to them which is not in others, and which otherwise would not be in them. Hence it is, that orderly admittance that must give the right, and upon men's having or not having such an entrance to it, depends the reality or nullity of the power they challenge.

Where therefore there is no lawful investiture, there is no moral power to be owned; otherwise John of Leyden's authority might have been owned: the unlawfulness of such a power consists in the very tenor itself; and if we take away the use or holding of it, we take away the very being of it: it is not then the abuse of a power lawfully to be used, but the very use of it is unlawful. But in the usurpation of this man, or monster rather, that is now mounted the throne, there is no lawful investiture in the way God hath appointed as is shewed above; therefore there is no moral power to be owned. To clear this a little further, it will be necessary to remove the ordinary pretences, pleaded for a title to warrant the owning of such as are in power, which are three chiefly, to wit, possession, conquest, and hereditary succession. The first must be touched more particularly, because it hath been the originate error, and spring of all the stupid mistakes about government, and is the pitiful plea of many, even mal contents, why this man's authority is to be owned, asserting, that a person attaining and occupying the place of power (by whatsoever means) is to be owned as the magistrate. But this can give no right: for, 1. If providence cannot signify God's approbative ordination, it can give no right; for without that there can be no right; but providence cannot signify his approbative ordination, because that, without the warrant of his word, cannot signify either allowance or disallowance, it is so various, being often the same to courses directly contrary, and oftentimes contrary to the same course; sometimes savouring it, sometimes crossing it, whether it be good or bad, and the same common providence may proceed from far different purposes, to one in mercy, to another in judgment; and most frequently very disproportionable to men's ways. Providence places sometimes "wickedness in the place of judgment, and iniquity in the place of righteousness," Eccl. iii. 16. that is, not by allowance. By providence it happens to the just according to the work of the wicked, and to the wicked according to the work of the righteous, Eccl. viii. 14. No man knoweth either love or hatred by all that is before them. All things come alike to all, there is one event to the righteous and to the wicked, Eccl. ix. 1, 2. It were a great debasing of the Lord's anointed, to give him no other warrant than sin hath in the world, or the falling of a sparrow. 2. Either every providential possession, in every case, gives a title; or, God hath declared it as a law, that it shall be so in this particular matter of authority only.

The first cannot be said: for that would justify all robbery: nor the second, for where is that law found? Nay, it were impious to alledge it; for it would say, there is no unjust possessor or disorderly occupant, but if he were once in the possession, he were right enough, and then usurpation would be no sin. 3. If none of the causes of magistracy be required to the producing of this possessory power, then it cannot give or have any right; for without the true causes it cannot be the true effect, and so can have no true right to be owned: but none of the causes of magistracy are required to the production of this; neither the institution of God, for this might have been, if magistracy had never been instituted; nor the constitution of men, for this may usurp without that. 4. That which must follow upon the right, and be legitimated by it, cannot be owned as the right, nor can it give the title: but the possession of the power, or the exercise thereof, must follow upon its right, and be legitimated by it: therefore.----A man must first be in the relation of a ruler, before he can rule; and men must first be in the relation of subjects, before they obey.

The commands of public justice, to whom are they given but to magistrates? They must then be magistrates, before they can be owned as the ministers of justice: he must be a magistrate, before he can have the power of the sword: he cannot, by the power of the sword, make himself magistrate. 5. That which would make every one in the possession of the magistracy a tyrant, cannot be owned: but a possessory occupation giving right, would make every one in possession a tyrant; for, that which enervates, and takes away that necessary distinction between the king's personal capacity and his legal capacity, his natural and his moral power, will make every king a tyrant (seeing it makes every thing that he can do as a man, to be legally done as a king) but a possessory occupation giving right, would enervate and take away that distinction: for how can these be distinguished in a mere possessory power? The man's possession is all his legal power; and if possession give a right, his power will give legality. 6. What sort or size of possession can be owned to give a right? Either it must be partial or plenary possession: not partial, for then others may be equally entitled to the government, in competition with that partial possessor, having also a part of it: not plenary, for then every interruption or usurpation on a part, would make a dissolution of the government. 7. Hence would follow infinite absurdities; this would give equal warrant, in case of vacancy, to all men to step to, and stickle for the throne, and expose the commonwealth as a booty to all aspiring spirits: for they needed no more to make them sovereigns, and lay a tie of subjection upon the consciences of people, but to get into possession: and in case of competition, it would leave people still in suspense and uncertainties whom to own; for they behoved to be subject only to the uppermost, which could not be known until the controversy be decided: it would cassate and make void all pre-obligations, cautions, and restrictions from God about the government: it would cancel and make vain all other titles of any, or constitutions, or provisions, or oaths of allegiance: yea, to what purpose were laws or pactions made about ordering the government, if possession gave right, and laid an obligation on all to own it? Yea, then it were sinful to make any such provisions, to fence in and limit the determination of providence, if providential possession may authorize every intrusive acquisition to be owned: then also in case of competition of two equal pretenders to the government, there would be no place left for arbitrations.

If this were true, that he has the power that is in possession, the difference were at an end; no man could plead for his own right then; in this also it is inconsistent with itself, condemning all resistance against the present occupant, yet justifying every resistance that is but successful to give possession. 8. That which would oblige us to own the devil and the pope, cannot be a ground to own any man; but if this were true, that possession gave right, it would oblige us to own the devil and the pope. Satan we find claiming to himself the possession of the world's kingdoms, Luke iv. 6. which as to many of them is in some respect true, for he is called the god of this world, and the prince of this world, John xiv. 30. 2 Cor. iv. 4. Are men therefore obliged to own his authority? or shall they deny his, and acknowledge his lieutenant, who bears his name, and by whom all his orders are execute, I mean the man that tyrannizes over the people of God? For he is the devil that casts some into prison, Rev. ii. 10. Again, the pope, his captain-general, lays claim to a temporal power and ecclesiastic both, over all the nations, and possesses it over many; and again, under the conduct of his vassal the duke of York, is attempting to recover the possession of Britain: shall he therefore be owned. This cursed principle disposes men for popery, and contributes to strengthen popery and tyranny both on the stage, to the vacating of all the promises of their dispossession. 9. That which would justify a damnable sin, and make it a ground of a duty, cannot be owned; but this fancy of owning a very power in possession would justify a damnable sin and make it the ground of a duty; for, resistance to the powers ordained of God is a damnable sin, Rom. xiii. 2. But the resisters having success in providence, may come to the possession of the power, by expelling the just occupant; and, by this opinion, that possession would be ground for the duty of subjection for conscience sake. 10. If a self-created dignity be null and not to be owned, than a mere possessory is not to be owned; but the former is true: as Christ saith, John viii. 54. If I honour myself my honour is nothing. 11. That which God hath disallowed possession without right, Ezek. xxi. 27. I will overturn, overturn, overturn it, until he come whose right it is, Hos. viii. 4. They have set up kings and not by me, Matth. xxvi. 52. All they that take the sword shall perish with the sword; by this the usurper of the sword is differenced from the true owner. 12. Many scripture examples confute this; shewing that the possession may be in one, and the power with right in another.

David was the magistrate, and yet Absalom possessed the place, 2 Sam. xv. xvi. xvii. xviii. xix. chap. Sheba also made a revolt and usurped the possession in a great part, and yet David was king, 2 Sam. xx. 2. Adonijah got the start in respect of possession, exalting himself saying, I will be king: yet the kingdom was Solomon's from the Lord, 1 Kings 1. The house of Ahaziah had not power to keep still the kingdom, 2 Chron. xxii. 9. and Athaliah took the possession of it, yet the people set up Joash, xxiii. 3. Next we have many examples of such who have invaded the possessor, witness Jehoram and Jehoshaphat's expedition against Mesha, king of Moab, Elisha being in the expedition, 2 Kings, iii. 4, 5. Hence we see the first pretence removed.

The second is no better; which Augustine calls Magnum Latrocinium, a great robbery; I mean conquest, or a power of the sword gotten by the sword; which, that it can give no right to be owned, I prove That which can give no signification of God's approving will, cannot give a title to be owned: but mere conquest can give no signification of God's approving will, as is just now proven about possession: for then the Lord should have approven all the unjust conquests that have been in the world. 2. Either conquest as conquest must be owned, as a just title to the crown, and so the Ammonites, Moabites, Philistines, &c. prevailing over God's people for a time, must have reigned by right, or as a just conquest. In this case, conquest is only a mean to the conquerors seizing and holding that power, which the state of the war entitled him unto; and this ingress into authority over the conquered, is not grounded on conquest but on justice, and not at all privative, but inclusive of the consent of the people; and then it may be owned; but without a compact, upon conditions of securing religion and liberty, and posterity, cannot be subjected without their content; for whatever just quarrel the conqueror had with the present generation, he could have none with the posterity, the father can have no power to resign the liberty of the children. 3. A king as king, and by virtue of his royal office, must be owned to be a father, tutor, protector, shepherd, and patron of the people; but a mere conqueror, without consent cannot be owned as such.

Can he be a father and a patron to us against our will, by the sole power of the sword? A father to these that are unwilling to be sons? An head over such as will not be members? And a defender thro' violence? 4. A king, as such, is a special gift of God, and blessing, not a judgment: but a conqueror, as such, is not a blessing, but a judgment, his native end being not peace, but fire and sword. 5. That which hath nothing of a king in it, cannot be owned to make a king; but conquest hath nothing of a king in it: for it hath nothing but violence and force, nothing but what the bloodiest villain that was never a king may have, nothing of God's approving and regulating will, nothing of institution or constition; and a plain repugnancy to the ordination of God, for God hath said, Thou shalt not kill; conquest says, I will kill, and prosper, and reign. 6. A lawful call to a lawful office may not be resisted; but a call to conquest, which is nothing but ambition or revenge, ought to be resisted; because not of God's preceptive will, otherwise he should be the author of sin. 7. That power which we must own to be the ordinance of God, must not be resisted, Rom. xiii. 2.

But conquest may be resisted in defence of our king and country: therefore it must not be owned to be the ordinance of God. 8. That which God condemns in his word, cannot be owned; but dominion by the sword God condemns in his word, Ezek. xxxii. 26. "Ye stand upon the sword,----and shall possess the land," Amos vi. 13. "Ye rejoice in a thing of naught, which say, Have we not taken to us horns by our own strength?" Habbak. ii. 5, 6.----"Wo to him that encreaseth that which is not his, how long," &c. 9. We have many examples of invading conquerors; as Abraham, for the rescue of Lot, pursued the conquering kings unto Dan, Gen. iv. 4. "Jonathan smote a garrison of the conquering Philistines," 1 Sam. xiii. 3. The Lord owning and authorising them so to do. The people did often shake off the yoke of their conquerors in the history of the judges: but this they might not do to their lawful rulers. What is objected from the Lord's people conquering Canaan, &c. is no argument for conquest: for he, to whom belongs the earth and its fulness, disponed to Israel the land of Canaan for their inheritance, and ordained that they should get the possession thereof by conquest; it followeth not therefore, that kings now, wanting any word of promise, or divine grant to any lands, may ascend to the thrones of other kingdoms than their own, by no better title than the bloody sword. See Lex Rex, quest. 12. The third pretence of hereditary succession remains to be removed; which may be thus disproven, 1. This classes with the former, though commonly asserted by royalists.

For either conquest gives a right, or it does not; if it does, then it looses all allegiance to the heirs of the crown dispossessed thereby: if it does not give a right, then no hereditary succession founded upon conquest can have any right, being founded upon that which hath no right: and this will shake the most part of hereditary successions that are now in the world. 2. If hereditary succession have no right but the people's consent; then of itself it can give none to a man that hath not that consent; but the former is true. For, it is demanded, how doth the son or brother succeed? By what right? It must either be by divine promise; or by the father's will, or it must come by propagation from the first ruler, by a right of the primogeniture; but none of these can be. For the first, we have no immediate divine constitution tying the crown to such a race, as in David's covenant: it will easily be granted, they fetched not their charter from heaven immediately, as David had it, a man of many peculiar prerogatives, to whose line the promise was astricted of the coming of the Messias, and Jacob's prophecy that the sceptre should not depart from Judah until his coming, Gen. xlix. 10. was restricted to his family afterwards: wherefore he could say, The Lord God of Israel chose me before all the house of my father, to be king over Israel for ever; for he hath chosen Judah to be the ruler; and of the house of Judah, the house of my father; and among the sons of my father, he liked me to make me king over Israel; and of all my sons he hath chosen Solomon, 1 Chron. xxviii. 4, 5. All kings cannot say this; neither could Saul say it, tho' immediately called of God as well as David: yet this same promise to David was conditional, if his children should keep the Lord's ways, 2 Chron. vi. 16. Next, it cannot be said this comes from the will of the father; for according to the scripture, no king can make a king, though a king may appoint and design his son for his successor, as David did Solomon, but the people make him. The father is some way a cause why his son succeedeth, but he is not the cause of the royalty conferred upon him by line: for the question will recur, who made him a king, and his father, and grandfather, till we come up to the first father? Then, who made him a king? Not himself; therefore it must be resounded upon the people's choice and constitution: and who appointed the lineal succession, and tied the crown to the line, but they? It is then, at the best, the patrimony of the people, by the fundamental law of the kingdom, conferred upon the successor by consent.

And generally it is granted, even where the succession is lineal, he that comes to inherit, he does not succeed by heritage, but by the force of law; the son then hath not his kingdom from his father, but by law, which the people made and stand to, as long as it may consist with the reasons of public advantage, upon which they condescended to establish such a family over them. Neither can it be said, it is by a right of primogeniture, propagated from the first ruler; for this must either be Adam the first of the world or Fergus for example, the first of this kingdom. It could not come from Adam as a monarch and father of all: for that behoved to be, either by order of nature, or his voluntary assignment: it could not be transferred by order of nature; for besides the difficulty to find out Adam's successor in the universal monarchy, and the absurdity of fixing it on Cain, (who was a cursed vagabond, afraid of every man and could not be an universal monarch, yet Adam's first born.) It will be asked, how this passed from him unto others? Whether it went by fatherhood to all the sons, fathers to their posterity? Which would multiply as many commonwealths, as there have been fathers since: or if it went, by primogeniture, only to the first-born, that he alone could claim the power which would infer the necessity of an universal monarchy, without multiplication of commonwealths.

If it was by his voluntary assignment, to whom, and in what proportion, he pleased; then the universal monarchy died with himself, and so could not be conveyed at all: for, either he behoved to give each son a share, to be conveyed downwards to their children in that proportion; or whole and solid to one: so also the former dilemma recurs, for if the first be said, it will make as many little kingdoms as there have been sons of Adam; if the second, the world should be but still one kingdom. But however it be, this could never be the way that God appointed, either for raising a magistratical power where it is wanting, or deriving a right to any in being; considering the multiplication, division, confusion, and extinction of families that have been. If it be from Fergus the first of his line; then either it comes from him as a king, or as a father: not the first, for the reason above hinted: nor as a father; for a father may defraud his son of the heritage, a king cannot divide the kingdom among his sons; it must then be length refounded on the peoples consent. 3. If even where lineal succession is constituted by law, for eviting the inconveniencies of frequent elections, people are not tied to admit every first born of that line; then that birth-right, where there is no more, cannot make a king; but the former is true; for they are tied only conditionally, so he be qualified, and have a head to sit at the helm, and not a fool or monster; neither are they free to admit murderers or idolaters by the laws of God, and of the land: it is not birth then, but their admission being so qualified, that makes kings. Hence, 4. That which takes away the peoples birth-right, given them of God to provide for their liberties in the fittest government, and that is not to be owned; but to make birth alone a title to the crown, takes away the peoples birth-right given them of God of providing for their liberties in the fittest government, fetters their choice to one destructive to these. Certainly where God hath not bound the conscience, men may not bind themselves nor their posterity; but God hath never fettered men to a choice of a government or governing line; which, contrary to the intention of the oath, may prove destructive to the ends thereof. Nor can the fathers leave in legacy, by oath, any chains to fetter the after wits of posterity to a choice destructive to religion and liberty. Israel was bound, by covenant, not to destroy the Gibeonites; but if they had risen to cut off Israel, Who can doubt but they were loosed from that obligation? For to preserve cut-throats was contrary to the intention of the oath: so when either monarchy, or the succeeding monarch, proves destructive to the ends of government, the choice, law, or oath of our fathers, cannot bind us. 5. If we are tied to the hereditary succession, not for the right the successor hath by birth, but for our covenanted allegiance to them whose successor he is; then cannot his birth-right be the ground of our allegiance, and consequently hereditary succession cannot make a king; but the former is true; for in hereditary crowns, the first family being chosen by the suffrages of the people, for that cause the hereditary successor hath no privilege or prerogative, but from him who was chosen king: therefore the obligation to the son, being no greater than the obligation to the father, which is the ground of that, if the father then was owned only because he was chosen, and qualified for government, the son cannot be owned for any other cause, but as chosen in him, and also qualified and admitted with consent. We cannot choose the father as qualified, and tie ourselves to the successors, be what they will. 6. If a king be not born heir of a kingdom, then is he not king by birth; but he is not born heir of a kingdom; for, a mean cannot be born to inherit the end, the king is but a mean for the kingdom's preservation. If the kingdom be his, by birth, as an inheritance, why may he not upon necessary occasions sell his inheritance? But if he sell it, then all confess he is no more king. 7. If that which makes a king cannot be transmitted from father to son; then succession, by birth, cannot make a king; but the former is true. The royal faculty of governing cannot be transmitted: Solomon asked it from God, he had it not from his father: nor can he be born to the honour of a king, because not born with either the gift or honour to be a judge. God maketh high and low, not birth. Nor can the call and constitution of a king, according to the will of God, be transferred from father to son, for that cannot be in God's way without the intervening consent of the people, that cannot make him a born king. 8. If no dominion can come by nature, as is proven before, then can no man be a born king: nature and birth cannot give them a sceptre in their hand, nor kingly majesty, they must have that alone from God and the people, and may only expect honour from their own good government: kings (as Plutarch says) must be like dogs that are best hunters, not these who are born of best dogs. 9. The peculiar prerogative of Jesus Christ must not be ascribed to any other; but this is his peculiar prerogative, to be born a king, of whom it might be truly said, Where is he that is born king of the Jews? And for this end was he born, who came out of the womb with a crown on his head, which no creature can bear. 10. In scripture we find that a king was to be so and so qualified, not a stranger, but a reader of God's word, &c. Deut. xvii. 15, &c. he was not qualified by naked birth. Hence, if all the qualifications requisite in an heir cannot make a king qualified according to the institution of God, then his being heir cannot make him king: but the first is true, an heir may be an heir without these qualifications. 11. We find in the scripture, the people were to make the kings by that law, Deut. xvii. 15. Thou shalt choose him whom the Lord chooseth: yea, neither Saul nor David were kings, till the people met to make them: therefore birth never made them kings, even though the kingdom was tied to David's line. That was only a typical designment by special promise, because Christ was to come of that line; it was therefore established in David's family for typical reasons, that cannot be now alledged. 12. We find in the disposal of government among brethren, this birth order was not seldom inverted; as when Jacob was preferred before Esau, Judah before all the elder sons of Jacob, Ephraim before Manasseh, Solomon before Adonijah. Hence if this gentleman, now regnant, have no better pretences than these now confuted, we cannot recognize his right to reign; yea, though this last were valid, yet he cannot plead it, it being expresly provided in our laws against the succession of a papist. But there is one grand objection against all this. The Jews and other nations are commanded to bring their necks under the yoke of the king of Babylon, and to serve him, and yet he had no other right to these kingdoms; than the Lord's providential disposal, because the Lord had "given all these lands into his hand," Jer. xxvii. 6, 7, 12. Ans. 1. He was indeed an unjust usurper, and had no right but the Lord's providential gift; which sometimes makes "the tabernacles of robbers prosper, into whose hand God bringeth abundantly, Job xii. 6. And gives Jacob sometimes for a spoil, and Israel to the robbers, Isa. xlii. 24. And giveth power to the beast to continue forty and two months, and to have power over all kindreds, and tongues, and nations," Rev. xiii. 5, 7. His tyranny also was very great extensively, in respect of his oppressions and usurpations by conquest; but it was not so great intensively, as our robbers and spoilers may be charged with; he was never such a perverter of all the ends of government, nor a treacherous overturner of all conditions, he was never a persecutor of the Jewish religion, he never oppressed them upon that account, nor endeavoured its extirpation, he never enacted such mischiefs by law. The Lord only made use of him to bring about the holy ends of the glory of his justice and wisdom, in which respect alone he is called his servant, as elsewhere his rod and hammer, having given him a charge against an hypocritical nation, to trample them down in his holy providence; and accordingly there was no resistance could prevail, they must be trampled upon, no help for it; but no subjection was required, acknowledging his magistratical right by divine ordinance, but only a submissive stooping to the holy disposal of divine providence; no owning was exacted either of the equity of that power, or of fealty to the administrator. 2. This behoved to be a particular command, by positive revelation given at that time, not binding to others in the like condition; which I refer to the judgment of the objectors: put the case, and make it run parallel, if the king of England were in league with the king of France, and breaking that league, should provoke that aspiring prince, growing potent by many conquests to discover his designs, make preparations and give out threatnings for the conquest of England and all Britain; were the people of England bound to surrender themselves as servants and tributaries to him for 70 years, or for ever, under pain of destruction, if they should not? This were one of the most ridiculous inferences that ever was pleaded; nay, it would make all refusal of subjection to invaders unlawful. 3. I will draw an argument from this to confirm my plea: for these commands of subjection to Babylon, were not delivered, until after the king of Judah had surrendered to Nebuchadnezzar, and entred into covenant with him to be subject to him, 2 Kings xxiv. chap. in keeping which covenant the kingdom might have stood, and after he had rebelled against him, and broken that covenant, "when lo, he had given his hand," after which he could "not prosper, or escape, or be delivered," Ezek. xviii. 14, 15, 18, 2 Chron. xxxvi. 13. Then the commandment came, that they should disown their own king Zedekiah, now forfeiting his right by breach of covenant, and be subject to Nebuchadnezzar, whence I argue, if people are commanded to disown their covenant-breaking rulers, and subject themselves to conquerors, then I have all I plead for; but the former is true, by the truth of this objection: therefore also the latter. There is a 2d Objection from Rom xiii. 1. "Let every soul be subject to the higher powers, the powers that be are ordained of God;" yet the Roman emperor, to which they were to be subject, was an usurper. Ans. It cannot be proven, that the apostle intendeth here the Roman emperor as the higher power: there were at this time several competitions for the empire, about which Christians might have their own scruples whom to own; the apostle does not determine their litigations, nor interest himself in parties but gives the general standard of God's ordinance they had to go by. And the best expositors of the place do alledge, the question and doubt of Christians then was not so much in whom the supremacy was, as whether Christians were at all bound to obey civil power, especially Pagan? Which the apostle resolves, in giving general directions, to obey the ordinance of magistracy, conform to its original, and as it respects the end for which he had and would set it up: but no respect is there had to tyrants. 2. It cannot be proven, that the supreme power then in being was usurped, there being then a supreme Senate, which was a lawful power; nor that Nero was then an usurper, who came in by choice and consent, and with the good liking of the people. 3. The text means of lawful powers, not unlawful force, that are ordained of God by his preceptive will, not merely by his providential disposal, and of conscientious subjection to magistracy, not to tyranny, describing and characterizing the powers there, by such qualifications as tyrants and usurpers are not capable of. But I mind to improve this text more fully hereafter, to prove the quite contrary to what is here objected.

8. From the right of magistracy, flows the magistratical relation, which is necessary to have a bottom, before we can build the relative duties thereon. This brings it under the fifth commandment, which is the rule of all relative duties between inferiors and superiors, requiring honour to be given to fathers, masters, husbands, &c. and to rightful magistrates, who are under such political relations, as do infer the same duties; and prohibiting not only the omission of these duties, but also the committing of contrary sins; which may be done, not only by contrary acts, as dishonouring and rebelling against fathers, magistrates, &c. but also by performing them to contrary objects, as by giving the father's due to the father's opposite, and the magistrates due to tyrants who are their opposites. Certainly this command, prescribing honour, does regulate to whom it should be given; and must be understood in a consistency with that duty and character of one that hath a mind to be an inhabitant of the Lord's "holy hill," Psal. xv. 4. "In whose eyes a vile person is contemned, but he honoureth them that fear the Lord." So that we sin against the fifth command, when we honour them that we are obliged to contemn by another command. Hence I argue, if owning or honouring of tyrants be a breach of the fifth command, then we cannot own their authority: but the former is true: therefore the latter. I prove the assumption: a honouring the vile, to whom no honour is due, and who stand under no relation of fathers as fathers, is a breach of the fifth command; but the owning of tyrants authority is a honouring the vile, to whom no honour is due, and who stand under no relation of fathers, and is yet a honouring them as fathers: therefore the owning of tyrants authority is a breach of the fifth command. The major is clear: for if the honouring of these to whom no honour is due, were not a breach of the fifth command, that precept could neither be kept at all or broken at all. It could not be kept at all; for, either it must oblige us to honour all indefinitely, as fathers, and other relations, which cannot be; or else it must leave us still in suspense and ignorance, who shall be the object of our honour; and then it can never be kept: or finally, it must astrict our honouring to such definite relations, to whom it is due; and then our transgression of that restriction shall be a breach of it. Next, if it were not so, it could not be broken at all: for if prostituting and abusing honour be not a sin, we cannot sin in the matter of honour at all; for if the abuse of honour be not a sin, then dishonour also is not a sin: for that is but an abuse of the duty, which is a sin as well as the omission of it. And what should make the taking away of honour from the proper object to be sin, and the giving it to a wrong object to be no sin? Moreover, if this command do not restrict honour to the proper object, we shall never know who is the object. How shall we know who is our father, or what we owe to him, if we may give another his due? The minor also is manifest: for if tyrants be vile, then no honour is due to them, according to that, Psal. xv. 4. and yet it is a honouring them as fathers; if they be owned as magistrates; for magistrates are in a politic sense fathers; but certain it is, that tyrants are vile, as the epithets and characters they get in scripture prove. But because, in contradiction to this, it may be said, though fathers be never so wicked, yet they are to be honoured, because they are still fathers; and though matters be never so vile and froward, yet they are to be subjected unto, 1 Pet. ii. 18-20. and so of other relations, to whom honour is due by this command; therefore though tyrants be never so vile, they are to be owned under these relations, because they are the higher powers in place of eminency, to whom the apostle Paul commands to yield subjection, Rom. xiii. and Peter to give submission and honour, 1 Pet. ii. 13, 17. Therefore it must be considered, that as the relative duty of honouring the relations to whom it is due, must not interfere with the moral duty of contemning the vile, who are not under these relations; so this general moral of contemning the vile, must not cassate the obligation of relative duties, but must be understood with a consistency therewith, without any prejudice to the duty itself. We must contemn all the vile, that are not under a relation to be honoured, and these also that are in that relation, in so far as they are vile. But now tyrants do not come under these relations at all, that are to be honoured by this command. As for the higher powers that Paul speaks of, Rom. xiii. they are not those which are higher in force, but higher in power, not in authority, but in power, not in a celsitude of prevalency, but in a pre-excellency of dignity; not in the pomp and pride of their posterity, and possession of the place, but by the virtue and value of their office, being ordained of God not to be resisted, the ministers of God for good, terrors to evil doers, to whom honour is due; those are not tyrants but magistrates. Hence it is a word of the same root which is rendered authority, or an authorized power, 1 Tim. ii. 2. and from the same word also comes that supreme, to whom Peter commands subjection and honour, 1 Pet. ii. 13. Now these he speaks of have the legal constitution of the people, being the ordinance of man, to be subjected to for the Lord's sake, and who sends other inferior magistrates for the punishment of evil doers, and for the praise of them that do well, who are to be honoured as kings or lawful magistrates; this cannot be said of tyrants. But more particularly, to evince that tyrants and usurpers are not to be honoured according to this command, and that it is a breach of it so to do; let us go through all these relations of superiority, that come under the obligation of this command, and we shall find tyrants and usurpers excluded out of all. First, They cannot come under the parental relation: we are indeed to esteem kings as fathers, though not properly, but by way of some analogy, because it is their office to care for the people, and to be their counsellors, and to defend them, as fathers do for children: but roaring lions and ranging bears, as wicked rulers are, Prov. xxviii. 15. cannot be fathers. But kings cannot properly be owned under this relation, far less tyrants (with whom the analogy of fathers cannot consist) there being so many notable disparities betwixt kings and fathers. 1. A father may be a father to one child; but a king cannot be a king or politic father to one only, but his correlate must be a community; a tyrant can be a father to none at all in a politic sense. 2. A father is a father by generation to all coming out of his loins; a king not so, he doth not beget them, nor doth their relation flow from that; a tyrant is a destroyer, not a pro-creator of people. 3. A father is the cause of the natural being of his children, a king only of the politic well being of his subjects; but tyrants are the cause of the ill being of both. 4. A father, once a father, as long as his children live, retains still the relation, though he turn mad and never so wicked; a king turning mad may be served as Nebuchadnezzar was, at least all will grant in some cases the subjects may shake off the king; and if in any case, it is when he turns tyrant. 5. A father's relation never ceases, whithersoever his children go; but subjects may change their relation to a king, by coming under another king in another kingdom; a tyrant will force all lovers of freedom to leave the kingdom where he domineers. 6. A father's relation never changes, he can neither change his children, nor they change their father; but a king may naturalize new subjects, and subjects may also change their sovereign. Royalists will grant a state or commonwealth may make a king, and there is great reason sometimes that a monarchy be turned into a commonwealth; but a tyrant changes those that are under him, expels the natives, brings in foreigners, and all good patriots do pant for a change of him every day. 7. A father hath no power of life and death over his children; a king hath it over his subjects according to law; a tyrant usurps it over the innocent against law. 8. A father is not a father by consent of his children; as a king is by consent of his subjects; a tyrant is neither a father with it nor without it. 9. A father is not made by the children, as a king is by his subjects, as was shewed: a tyrant is neither a natural, nor by compact, but a self created power. 10. A father is not chosen conditionally upon compact, as a king is by the free suffrages of the community; a tyrant in this differs from a king that he is not chosen, and in tyranny from a father. 11. Children wanting a father cannot choose whom they will to be their father; as subjects wanting a king may choose whom they will, and what form they please; but though they can, yet if they be rational, they will never choose a tyrant, nor a tyrannical form of government. 12. Children cannot restrict their father's power to what degrees they please; as subjects may limit their kings, at their first erection; but a tyrant, though he ought, yet he will not be limited, and if he might, he should be restrained. 13. Children cannot set bounds how long they will have their fathers to continue; subjects may condescend upon the time, in making laws how long such an one shall be their sovereign, during life, or while faultless, according as the fundamental law is made at first; tyrants ought every day to be repressed that they should not continue at all. Yet giving and not granting, that a king were to be owned under the relation of a father; though every man be bound to own and maintain his father's parental authority, yet let the case be put, that the father turns a robber, murderer, an avowed enemy to God and the country, is his person and authority in that case to be owned, to the dishonour of God, and hurt and hazard of the country? or ought he not rather to be delivered up even by the son to justice? Much more then will it follow, that a king who turns the more dangerous, because the more powerful robber, and legal murderer, and enemy to God and the country, cannot be owned seeing the relation between father and son is stronger and stricter as having another original, than can be betwixt king and subjects, and stands unremoved as long as he is father, though turning such, they ought to contribute, (in moral duty, to which their relative duty must cede) that he should no more be a father, nor no more a living man, when dead by law. Secondly, They cannot come under the herile or masterly relation, though analogically also sometimes they are stiled so, and subjects are called servants, by reason of their subjection, and because it is the office of kings to command, and subjects to obey, in this there is some analogy. But kings cannot properly be owned under this relation, as masters over either persons or goods of subjects, far less tyrants, yea kings assuming a masterly power turn tyrants. Now that the magistratical relation is not that of a master, is clear from many disparities and absurdities, whether we consider the state of hired servants or slaves. For hired servants, the difference is vast betwixt them and subjects. 1. The hired servant gets reward for his service, by compact; the subjects none, but rather gives the royal reward of tribute to the king for his service; the tyrant exacts it to maintain his tyranny. 2. The hired servant is maintained by his master; the subjects maintain the king; the tyrant robs it from them by force. 3. The hired servant bargains only for a time, and then may leave him; the subject cannot give up his covenanted allegiance, at that rate and for these reasons as the servant may his service; a tyrant will make nor keep no such bargain. 4. The hired servant must have his master's profit mainly before his eyes, and his own secondarily; but the magistrates power is primarily ordinated to the public good of the community and only consequentially to the good of himself. 5. The master hath a greater power over the hired servant, to make and give out laws to him, which if they be lawful he must obey; than the king hath over the nation, to which he is the sole lawgiver, as is shewed. 6. The hired servant's subjection is mercenary and servile; but the subject's subjection is civil, free, voluntary, liberal, and loving to a lawful king. Again for slaves, the difference between them and subjects is great. 1. Slavery, being against nature, rational people would never choose that life, if they could help it; but they gladly choose government and governors. 2. Slavery would make their condition worse than when they had no government, for liberty is always preferable; neither could people have acted rationally in setting up government, if to be free of oppression of others they had given themselves up to slavery, under a master who may do what he pleases with them. 3. All slaves are either taken in war, or bought with money, or born in the house where their parents were slaves, as Abraham and Solomon had of that sort; but subjects are neither captives, nor bought, nor born slaves.--4. Slavery is not natural, but a penal fruit of sin, and would never have been if sin had not been; but government is not so, but natural and necessary. 5. Slaves are not their master's brethren, subjects are the king's brethren, "over whom he must not lift up himself," Deut. xvii. 20. 6. Masters might purchase and sell their slaves, Abimelech took sheep and men servants and gave them unto Abraham, Gen. xx. 14. Jacob had maid-servants, and men-servants, and asses, Gen. xxx. 43. no otherwise than other goods, Solomon got to himself servants and maidens, and servants born in his house, Eccles. ii. 7. a king cannot do so with his subjects. 7. Princes have not this power to make the people slaves, neither from God, nor from the people: from God they have none, but to feed and to lead them, 2 Sam. v. 2. to rule them so as to feed them, 1 Chron. xi. 2. Psal. lxxviii, 71, 72. From the people they have no power to make slaves, they can give none such. 8. Slavery is a curse: it was Canaan's curse to be a servant of servants, Gen. ix. 25. but to have magistrates is a promised blessing, Jer. xvii. 25. 9. To be free of slavery is a blessing, as the redemption from Egypt's bondage is every where called, and the year of redemption was a jubilee of joy, so the freedom of release every seven years a great privilege, Jer. xxxiv. 9. but to be free of government is a judgment, Isa. iii. 4, 5. 'tis threatened, "Israel shall abide without a king and without a prince;" Hos. iii. 4. In the next place, they cannot be owned as masters or proprietors over the goods of the subjects; though in the case of necessity, the king may make use of all goods in common, for the good of the kingdom; for, 1. The introduction of kings cannot overturn nature's foundation; by the law of nature property was given to man, kings cannot rescind that. 2. A man had goods ere ever there was a king; a king was made only to preserve property, therefore he cannot take it away. 3. It cannot be supposed that rational people would choose a king at all, if he had power to turn a great robber to preserve them from lesser robberies and oppressions; would rational men give up themselves for a prey to one, that they might be safe from becoming a prey to others? 4. Then their case should be worse, by erecting of government, if the prince were proprietor of their goods, for they had the property themselves before. 5. Then government should not be a blessing, but a curse, and the magistrate could not be a minister for good. 6. Kingdoms then should be among the goods of fortune, which the king might sell and dispone as he pleased. 7. His place then should not be a function, but a possession. 8. People could not then, by their removes, or otherwise, change their sovereigns. 9. Then no man might dispose of his own goods without the king's consent, by buying or selling, or giving alms; nay, nor pay tribute, for they cannot do these things except they have of their own. 10. This is the very character of a tyrant, as described, 1 Sam. viii. 11. "He will take your sons," Zeph. iii. 3. "Her princes are roaring lions, her judges are evening wolves." 11. All the threatnings and rebukes of oppression condemn this, Isa. iii. 14, 15, Ezek. xlv. 9. Mic. iii. 2, 3. Ahab condemned for taking Naboth's vineyard. 12. Pharaoh had not all the land of Egypt, till he bought it, Gen. xlii. 20. So the land became Pharaoh's not otherwise. Yet giving, and not granting that he were really a master in all these respects; notwithstanding if he turn to pursue me for my life, because of my fidelity to my master and his both, and will withdraw me from the service of the supreme universal master, I may lawfully withdraw myself from his, and disown him for one, when I cannot serve two masters. Sure he cannot be master of the conscience. Thirdly, they cannot come under the conjugal relation, though there may be some proportion between that and subjection to a lawful ruler, because of the mutual covenant transacted betwixt them; but the tyrant and usurper cannot pretend to this, who refuse all covenants.

Yet hence it cannot be inferred, that because the wife may not put away her husband, or renounce him, as he may do her in the case of adultery; therefore the people cannot disown the king in the case of the violation of the royal covenant. For the king's power is not at all properly a husband's power, 1. The wife, by nature, is the weaker vessel, but the kingdom is not weaker than the king. 2. The wife is given as an help to the man; but here the man is given as an help to the common-wealth. 3. The wife cannot limit the husband's power; as subjects may limit their sovereigns. 4. The wife cannot prescribe the time of her continuing under him; as subjects may do with their sovereigns. 5. The wife cannot change her husband; as a kingdom can do their government. 6. The husband hath not power of life and death; but the sovereign hath it over malefactors. Yet giving, and not granting, his power were properly marital: if the case be put, that the man do habitually break the marriage-covenant, or take another wife, and turn also cruel and intolerable in compelling his own wife to wickedness; and put the case also, that she should not get a legal divorce procured, who can doubt but she can disown him, and leave him? For this case is excepted out of that command, 1 Cor. vii. 10. Let not the wife depart from her husband, meaning for mere difference in religion, or other lesser causes; but adultery doth annul the marriage relation. See Pool's Synopsis critic, in locum. So when a prince breaks the royal covenant and turns tyrant, or without any covenant commits a rape upon the common-wealth, that pretended relation may and must be disowned. Hence, we see, there is no relation can bring a king or ruler under the object of the duty of the fifth command, except it be that of a fiduciary patron, or trustee, and public servant: for we cannot own him properly either to be a father, or a master, or a husband. Therefore what can remain, but that he must be a fiduciary servant? Wherefore if he shall either treacherously break his trust, or presumptuously refuse to be entrusted, upon terms and conditions to secure and be accountable for, (before God and man) religion and liberty, we cannot own his usurped authority. That metaphor which the learned Buchanan uses, de jure regni, of a public and politic physician, is not a relation different from this of a fiduciary servant; when he elegantly represents him as entrusted with the preservation and restoration of the health of the politic body, and endowed with skill and experience of the laws of his craft. If then he be orderly called unto this charge, and qualified for it, and discharges his duty faithfully, he deserves, and we are obliged to give him the deference of an honoured physician; but if he abuse his calling, and not observe the rules thereof, and instead of curing, go about wilfully to kill the body he is entrusted with, he is no more to be owned for a physician: but for a murderer.

9. If we enquire further into the nature of this relation between a king, (whose authority is to be owned) and his subjects; we can own it only as it is reciprocal in respect of superiority and inferiority; that is, whereby in some respects the king is superior to the people, and in some respects the people is inferior to him. The king is superior and supreme as he is called, 1 Pet. ii. 13. In respect of formal sovereignty, and executive authority, and majestic royal dignity, resulting from the peoples devolving upon him that power, and constituting him in that relation over themselves, whereby he is higher in place and power than they, and in respect of his charge and conduct is worth ten thousands of the people, 2 Sam. xviii. 3. and there is no formally regal tribunal higher than his; and though he be lesser than the whole community, yet he is greater than any one, or all the people distributively taken; and though he be a royal vassal of the kingdom, and princely servant of the people; yet he is not their deputy, because he is really their sovereign, to whom they have made over their power of governing and protecting themselves irrevocably, except in the case of tyranny; and in acts of justice, he is not accountable to any, and does not depend on the people as a deputy.

But, on the other hand, the people is superior to the king, in respect of their fountain power of sovereignty, that remains radically and virtually in them, in that they make him their royal servant, and him rather than another, and limit him to the laws for their own good and advantage, and though they give to him a politic power for their own safety; yet they keep a natural power which they cannot retract, the power of justice to govern righteously, yet it is not so irrevocably given away to him, but that when he abuseth his power to the destruction of his subjects, they may wrest a sword out of a mad man's hand, though it be his own sword, and he hath a just power to use it for good, but all fiduciary power abused may be repealed. They have not indeed sovereignty, or power of life and death formally; yet, in respect, they may constitute a magistrate with laws, which if they violate they must be in hazard of their lives, they have this power eminently and virtually. Hence, in respect, that the king's power is, and can be only fiducial, by way of trust reposed upon him, he is not so superior to the people, but he may and ought to be accountable to them in case of tyranny; which is evident from what is said, and now I intend to make it further appear. But, first, I form the argument thus; we can own no king that is not accountable to the people: ergo, we cannot own this king. To clear the connexion of the antecedent and consequent, I add; either he is accountable to the people, or he is not: if he be accountable to all, then he is renouncible by a part, when the community is defective as to their part, it is the interest of a part, that would, but cannot, do their duty, to give no account to such as they can get no account from for his maleversations. This is all we crave: if he be not accountable, then we cannot own him, because all kings are accountable: for these reasons, 1. The inferior is accountable to the superior; the king is inferior, the people superior: ergo, the king is accountable to the people. The proposition is plain; if the king's superiority make the people accountable to him in case of transgressing the laws; then, why should not the peoples superiority make the king accountable to them, in case of transgressing the laws? Especially, seeing the king is inferior to the laws: because the law restrains him, and from the law he hath that whereby he is king; the law is inferior to the people, because they are as it were its parent, and may make or unmake it upon occasion: and seeing the law is more powerful than the king, and the people more powerful than the law, we may see before which we may call the king to answer in judgment, Buchan. jure regni apud Scot. That the king is inferior to the people is clear on many accounts: for these things which are institute for others sake, are inferior to those for whose sake they are required or sought; a horse is inferior to them that use him for victory; a king is only a mean for the peoples good; a captain is less than the army, a king is put a captain over the Lord's inheritance, 1 Sam. x. 1. He is but the minister of God for their good, Rom. xiii. 4. Those who are before the king, and may be a people without him: let the king be considered either materially as a mortal man, he is then but a part inferior to the whole; or formally under the reduplication as a king, he is no more but a royal servant, obliged to spend his life for the people, to save them out of the hand of their enemies, 2 Sam. xix. 9: A part is inferior to the whole, the king is but a part of the kingdom: a gift is inferior to them to whom it is given, a king is but a gift given of God for the peoples good: that which is mortal, and but accidental, is inferior to that which is eternal, and cannot perish politically; a king is but mortal, and it is accidental to government that there be a succession of kings; but the people is eternal, one generation passeth away, and another generation cometh, Eccl. i. 4. especially the people of God, the portion of the Lord's inheritance, is superior to any king, and their ruin of greater moment than all the kings of the world; for, if the Lord for their sake smite great kings, and slay famous kings, as Sihon and Og, Psal. cxxxvi. 17,--20. if he give kings and famous kingdoms for their ransom, Isa. xliii. 3, 4. then his people must be so much superior than kings, by how much his justice is active to destroy the one, and his mercy to save the other. All this proves the people to be superior in dignity; and therefore, even in that respect, it is frivolous to say, the king cannot be accountable to them, because so much superior in glory and pomp; for they are superior every way in excellency; and though it were not so, yet judges may be inferior in rank considered as men, but they are superior in law over the greatest as they are judges, to whom far greater than they are accountable.

The low and mean condition of them to whom belongs the power of judgment, does not diminish its dignity; when the king then is judged by the people, the judgment is of as great dignity as if it were done by a superior king; for the judgment is the sentence of the law. 2. They are superior in power: because every constituent cause is superior to the effect, the people is the constituent cause, the king is the effect, and hath all its royalty from them, by the conveyance God hath appointed; so that they need not fetch it from heaven, God gives it by the people, by whom also his power is limited, and, if need be, diminished from what they gave his ancestors: hence, if the people constitute and limit the power they give the king, then they may call him to an account, and judge him for the abuse of it; but the first is true, as is proven above: ergo.----The major is undeniable, for sure they may judge their own creature, and call him to an account for the power they gave him, when he abuses it, though there be no tribunal formally regal above him, yet, in the case of tyranny, and violating his trust, there is a tribunal virtual eminently above him, in them that made him, and reposed that trust upon him, as is said. 3. The fountain power is superior to the power derived: the people, though they constitute a king above them, yet retain the fountain power, he only hath the derived power: certainly the people must retain more power eminently, than they could give to the king, for they gave it, and he receives it with limitations; if he turn mad or incapable, they may put curators or tutors over him; if he be taken captive, they may appoint another to exercise the power; if he die, then they may constitute another, with more or less power; so then if they give away all their power, as a slave selleth his liberty, and retain no fountain power or radical right, they could not make use of it to produce any of these acts: they set a king above them only with an executive power for their good, but the radical power remains in the people, as in an immortal spring, which they communicate by succession to this or that mortal man, in the manner and measure they think expedient; for otherwise, if they gave all their power away, what shall they reserve to make a new king, if this man die? What if the royal line surcease, there be no prophets now sent to make kings; and if they have power in these cases, why not in the case of tyranny? 4. If the king be accountable by law, for any act of tyranny done against one man, then much more is he accountable for many against the whole state: but the former is true; a private man may go to law before the ordinary judges, for wronging his inheritance, and the king is made accountable for the wrong done by him. Now, shall the laws be like spiders webs, which hold flies, but let bigger beasts pass through? Shall sentence be past for petty wrongs against a man, and none for tyrannizing over religion, laws, and liberties of the kingdom? Shall none be past against parricide or fratricide, for killing his brother, murdering the nobles, and burning cities? Shall petty thieves be hanged for stealing a sheep; and does the laws of God or man give impunity for robbing a whole country of the nearest and dearest interests they have, to crowned heads, for the fancied character of royalty, which thereby is forfeited? 5. If there be judges appointed of God independently, to give out and execute the judgment of the Lord on all offenders, without exception of the highest; then the king also must be subject to that judgment; but there are judges appointed of God independently, to give out and execute the judgment of the Lord on all offenders, without exception of the highest. Two things must be here proved; first, that in giving judgment they do not depend on the king, but are the immediate vicars of God. Secondly, that the king is not excepted from, but subject to their judgment, in case he be criminal.

First, They cannot depend upon the king, because they are more necessary than the king; and it is not left to the king's pleasure whether there be judges or not. There may be judges without a king, but there can be no king without judges, nor no justice, but confusion; no man can bear the people's burden alone, Numb. xi. 14, 17. If they depended on the king, their power would die with the king; the streams must dry up the fountain; but that cannot be, for they are not the ministers of the king, but of the kingdom, whose honour and promotion, though by the king's external call, yet comes from God, as all honour and promotion does, Psal. lxxv. 7. The king cannot make judges whom he will, by his absolute power, he must be tied to that law, Deut. i. 13. To take wise men and understanding, and known: neither can he make them during pleasure; for if these qualifications remain, there is no allowance given for their removal. They are gods, and the children of the most high, appointed to defend the poor and fatherless, as well as he, Psal. lxxxii. 3, 6. They are ordained of God for the punishment of evil doers, in which they must not be resisted, as well as he, Rom. xiii. 1, 2. By me (saith the Lord) rule--all the judges of the earth, Prov. viii. 16. To them we must be subject for conscience sake, as being the ministers of God for good; they must be obeyed for the Lord's sake, as well as the king; though they are sent of him, yet they judge not for man, but for the Lord, 2 Chron. xix. 6. hence they sit in his room, and are to act as if he were on the bench; the king cannot say, the judgment is mine, because it is the Lord's; neither can he limit their sentence (as he might, if they were nothing but his deputies) because the judgment is not his: nor are their consciences subordinate to him, but to the Lord immediately; otherwise if they were his deputies, depending on him, then they could neither be admonished, nor condemned for unjust judgment, because their sentence should neither be righteous nor unrighteous, but as the king makes it; and all directions to them were capable of this exception, do not so or so, except the king command you; crush not the poor, oppress not the fatherless, except the king command you; yea, then they could not execute any judgment, but with the king's licence, and so could not be rebuked for their not executing judgment.

Now all this is contrary to scripture, which makes the sentence of the judges undeclinable, when just, Deut. xvii. 11. The Lord's indignation is kindled, when he "looks for judgment, and behold oppression, for righteousness, and behold a cry," Isa. v. 7. Neither will it excuse the judges to say, the king would have it so; for even they that are subservient to "write grievousness, to turn aside the needy from judgment," &c. are under the wo, as well as they that prescribe it, Isa. x. 1, 2. The Lord is displeased when "judgment is turned away backward, and judgment stands afar off,"----and when there is no judgment, whatever be the cause of it, Isa. lix. 14, 15. The Lord threatens he will be "avenged on the nation," when a man is "not found to execute judgment," Jer. v. 1, 9. And promises, if they "will execute judgment and righteousness, and deliver the spoiled out of the hand of the oppressor," he will give them righteous magistrates, Jer. xxii. 3, 4. but if they do not, he will send desolation, ibid. He rebukes those that "turn judgment to wormwood, and leave off righteousness in the earth," Amos v. 7. He resents it, when "the law is slacked, and judgment doth not go forth" freely, without overawing or over-ruling restraint, Hab. i. 4.

Can these scriptures consist with the judges dependence on the king's pleasure, in the exercise and execution of their power? therefore, if they would avoid the Lord's displeasure, they are to give judgment, though the king should countermand it. Secondly, That the king is not excepted from their judgment, is also evident from the general commands, Gen. ix. 6. "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed:" there is no exception of kings or dukes here: and we must not distinguish where the law distinguisheth not, Numb. xxxv. 30, 31. Whoso killeth any person, the murderer shall be put to death by the mouth of witnesses,--ye shall take no satisfaction for the life of a murderer which is guilty of death, but he shall be surely put to death. What should hinder then justice to be awarded upon a murdering king? Shall it be for want of witnesses? It will be easy to adduce thousands. Or, shall this be satisfaction for his life, that he is a crowned king? The law saith, there shall be no satisfaction taken. The Lord speaketh to under judges, Levit. xix. 5. Ye shall do no unrighteousness in judgment, thou shalt not respect the person of the poor, nor honour the person of the mighty. If kings be not among the mighty, how shall they be classed? Deut. i. 17. Ye shall not respect persons in judgment, but you shall hear the small as well as the great; you shall not be afraid of the face of man, for the judgment is God's. If then no man's face can outdare the law and judgment of God, then the king's majestic face must not do it; but as to the demerit of blood, he must be subject as well as another. It is no argument to say, the Sanhedrim did not punish David for his murder and adultery; therefore it is not lawful to punish a king for the same; a reason from not doing is not relevant. David did not punish Joab for his murder, but authorized it, as also he did Bathsheba's adultery; will that prove, that murders connived at, or commanded by the king, shall not be punished? Or that whores of state are not to be called to an account? Neither will it prove, that a murdering king should not be punished; that David was not punished, because he got both the sin pardoned, and his life granted from the Lord, saying to him by the mouth of the prophet Nathan, Thou shalt not die. But as for the demerit of that fact, he himself pronounced the sentence out of his own mouth, 2 Sam. xii. 15. "As the Lord liveth, the man that hath done this thing shall surely die." 'So every king condemned by the law, is condemned by his own mouth: for the law is the voice of the king. Why then do we so much weary ourselves concerning a judge, seeing we have the king's own confession, that is, the law?' Buchanan de jure regni.

And there needs be no other difficulty to find a tribunal for a murdering king, than to find one for a murderer; for a judgment must acknowledge but one name, viz. of the crime. If a king then be guilty of murder, he hath no more the name of a king, but of a murderer, when brought to judgment; for he is not judged for kingship, but for his murder; as when a gentleman is judged for robbery, he is not hanged, neither is he spared, because he is a gentleman, but because he is a robber. See Buchanan above. 6. If the people's representatives be superior to the king in judgment, and may execute judgment without him, and against his will, then they may also seek account of him; for if he hath no power but from them, and no power without them to act as king, (no more than the eye or hand hath power to act without the body) then his power must be inferior, fiduciary, and accountable to them; but the former is true, the peoples representatives are superior to the king in judgment, and may execute judgment without him, and against his will. In scripture we find the power of the elders and heads of the people was very great, and in many cases superior to the king; which the learned Dr. Owen demonstrates in his preliminary exercitations on the epistle to the Hebrews, and proves out of the Rabbins, that the kings of the Jews might have been called to an account, and punished for transgressing of the law. But in the scripture we find, (1.) They had a power of judgment with the supreme magistrate in matters of religion, justice and government. Hamor and Shechem would not make a covenant with Jacob's sons, without the consent of the men of the city, Gen. xxxiv. 20. David behoved to consult with the captains of thousands, and every leader, if it seemeth good to bring again the ark of God, 1 Chron. xiii. 1, 2, 3. So also Solomon could not do it without them, 1 Kings viii. 1. Ahab could not make peace with Benhadad against the consent of the people, 1 Kings xx. 8. The men of Ephraim complain that Jephthah, the supreme magistrate, had gone to war against the children of Ammon without them, and threatned to burn his house with fire, which he only excuses by the law of necessity, Judges xii. 1, 2, 3. The seventy elders are appointed of God, not to be the advisers only and helpers of Moses, but to bear a part of the burden of ruling and governing the people, that Moses might be eased, Numb. xi. 14, 17. Moses upon his sole pleasure, had not power to restrain them in the exercise of judgment given of God.

They were not the magistrate's depending deputies, but in the act of judging, they were independent, and their consciences as immediately subjected to God as the superior magistrate, who was to add his approbative suffrage to their actings, but not his directive nor imperative suffrage of absolute pleasure, but only according to the law; he might command them to do their duty, but he could do nothing without them. (2.) They had power, not derived from the prince at all, even a power of life and death. The rebellious son was to be brought to the elders of the city, who had power to stone him, Deut. xxi. 18, 24. They had power to punish adultery with death, Deut. xxii. 21. They had power to cognosce whom to admit into, and whom to seclude from the cities of refuge: so that if the king had commanded to take the life of an innocent man, they were not to deliver him, Josh. xx. throughout. But besides the elders of cities, there were the elders and heads of the people, who had judicial power to cognosce on all criminal matters, even when Joshua was judge in Israel we find they assumed this power, to judge of that matter of the two tribes and the half, Josh. xxii. 30. And they had power to make kings, as Saul and David, as was shewed: and it must needs follow, they had power to unmake them in case of tyranny. (3.) They had power to conveen, even without the indiction of the ruler, as in that, Josh. xxii. They conveen without him; and without advice or knowledge of Samuel, the ruler, they conveen to ask a king, 1 Sam. viii. And without any head or superior, they conveen and make David king, notwithstanding of Ishbosheth's hereditary right. Without and against tyrannous Athaliah's consent, they conveen and make Joash king, and cared not for her Treason, treason, 2 Kings xi. But now the king alone challenges the prerogative power of calling and dissolving parliaments as he pleases, and condemns all meetings of estates without his warrant, which is purely tyrannical; for, in cases of necessity, by the very law of nature, they may and must conveen. The power is given to the king only by a positive law, for order's sake; but otherwise, they have an intrinsical power to assemble themselves. All the forecited commands, admonitions, and certifications, to execute judgment, must necessarily involve and imply a power to conveen, without which they could not be in a capacity for it: not only unjust judgment, but no judgment, in a time when truth is fallen in the streets, and equity cannot enter, is charged as the sin of the state; therefore they must conveen to prevent this sin, and the wrath of God for it: God hath committed the keeping of the commonwealth, not to the king's only, but also to the people's representatives and heads. And if the king have power to break up all conventions of this nature, then he hath power to hinder judgement to proceed, which the Lord commands: and this would be an excuse, when God threatens vengeance for it. We would not execute judgment, because the king forbade us. Yet many of these forementioned reproofs, threatnings, and certifications were given, in the time of tyrannous and idolatrous kings, who, no doubt, would inhibit and discharge the doing of their duty; yet we see that was no excuse, but the Lord denounces wrath for the omission. (4.) They had power to execute judgment against the will of the prince. Samuel killed Agag against Saul's will, but according to the command of God, 1 Sam. xv. 32. Against Ahab's will and mind Elijah caused kill the priests of Baal, according to God's express law, 1 Kings xviii. 40. It is true it was extraordinary, but no otherwise than it is this day; when there is no magistrate that will execute the judgment of the Lord, then they who have power to make the magistrate, may and ought to execute it, when wicked men make the law of God of none effect. So the princes of Judah had power, against the king's will, to put Jeremiah to death, which the king supposes, when he directs him what to say to them, Jer. xxxviii. 25. They had really such a power, though in Jeremiah's case it would have been wickedly perverted. See Lex Rex, q. 19, 20. (5.) They had a power to execute judgment upon the king himself, as in the case of Amaziah and Uzziah, as shall be cleared afterwards. I conclude with repeating the argument: if the king be accountable, whensover this account shall be taken, we are confident our disowning him for the present will be justified, and all will be obliged to imitate it: if he be not, then we cannot own his authority, that so presumptuously exalts himself above the people.

10. If we will further consider the nature of magistracy, it will appear what authority can conscientiously be owned, to wit, that which is power, not authorised power, not might or force; moral power, not merely natural. There is a great difference betwixt these two: natural power is common to brutes, moral power is peculiar to men; natural power is more in the subjects, because they have more strength and force; moral power is in the magistrate, they can never meet adequately in the same subject; natural power can, moral only may warrantably exercise rule; natural power is opposed to impotency and weakness, moral to illicitness or unlawfulness; natural power consists in strength, moral in righteousness; natural power may be in a rout of rogues making an uproar, moral only in the rulers; they cannot be distinguished by their acts, but by the principle from which the acts proceed; in the one from mere force, in the other from authority. The principle of natural power is its own might and will, and the end only self; moral hath its rise from positive constitution, and its end is public safety. The strength of natural power lies in the sword, whereby its might gives law; the strength of moral power is in its word, whereby reason gives law, unto which the sword is added for punishment of contraveeners: natural power takes the sword, Matth. xxvi. 52. Moral bears the sword, Rom. xiii. 4. In natural power the sword is the cause; in moral it is only the consequent of authority; in natural power the sword legitimates the sceptre; in moral the sceptre legitimates the sword: the sword of the natural is only backed with metal, the sword of the moral power is backed with God's warrant: natural power involves men in passive subjection, as a traveller is made to yield to a robber; moral power reduces to conscientious subordination. Hence the power that is only natural, not moral authority, not power, cannot be owned; but the power of a tyrant's and usurper's is only natural, not moral, authority, not power: Ergo it cannot be owned. The major cannot be denied; for it is only the moral power that is ordained of God, unto which we must be subject for conscience sake. The minor also; for the power of tyrants is not moral, because not authorized, nor warranted, or ordained of God by his preceptive ordinance, and therefore no lawful magistratical power. For the clearer understanding of this, let it be observed, there are four things required to the making of a moral or lawful power; the matter of it must be lawful, the person lawful, the title lawful, and the use lawful. 1. The matter of it, about which it is exerted, or the work to be done by it, must be lawful and warranted by God: and if it be unlawful it destroys its moral being. As the pope's power, in dispensing with divine laws, is null and no moral power; and so also the king's power, in dispensing with both divine and human laws is null. Hence that power, which is, in regard of matter unlawful, and never warranted by God, cannot be owned; but absolute power, which is the power of tyrants and usurpers, (and particularly of this of ours) is in regard of matter unlawful, and never warranted by God: Ergo--2. The person holding the power must be such as not only is capable of, but competent to the tenure of it, and to whom the holding of it is allowed; and if it be prohibited, it evacuates the morality of the power. Korah and his company arrogated to themselves the office of the priesthood, this power was prohibited to them, their power then was a nullity. As therefore a person that should not be a minister, when he usurps that office is no minister; so a person that should not be a magistrate, when he usurps that office, is no magistrate. Hence, a person that is incapable and incompetent for government cannot be owned for a governor; but the duke of York is such a person, not only not qualified as the word of God requires a magistrate to be, but by the laws of the land declared incapable of rule, because he is a papist, a murderer, an adulterer, &c. 5. There must be a moral power, a lawful title and investiture, as is shewed above; which, if it be wanting, the power is null, and the person but a scenical king, like John of Leyden. This is essentially necessary to the being of a magistrate; which only properly distinguishes him from a private man; for when a person becomes a magistrate, what is the change that is wrought in him? what new habit or endowment is produced in him? he hath no more natural power than he had before, only now he hath the moral power, right and authority to rule, legally impowering him to govern. Let it be considered, what makes a subordinate magistrate, whom we own as such; it must be only his commission from a superior power, otherwise we reject him; if one come to us of his own head, taking upon him the stile and office of a bailiff, sheriff or judge, and command our persons, demand our purses, or exact our oaths; we think we may deny him, not taking ourselves to owe him any subjection, not owning any bond of conscience to him; why? because he hath no lawful commission. Now, if we require this qualification in the subordinate, why not in the supreme? Hence, that magistrate, that cannot produce his legal investiture, cannot be owned; but the duke of York cannot produce his legal investiture, his admission to the crown upon oath and compact, and with the consent of the subjects, according to the laws of the land, as is shewed above: therefore----4. There must also be the lawful use of the power; which must be not only legal for its composure, but right for its practice; its course and process in government must be just, governing according to law, otherwise it is mere tyranny: for what is government, but the subjecting of the community to the rule of governors, for peace and order's sake, and the security of all their precious interests? and for what end was it ordained, and continued among men, but that the stronger may not domineer over the weaker? and what is anarchy, but the playing the rex of the natural power over the moral? Hence, that power which is contrary to law, evil and tyrannical, can tie none to subjection; but the power of the king, abused to the destruction of laws, religion and liberties, giving his power and strength unto the beast, and making war with the Lamb, Rev. xvii. 13, 14. is a power contrary to law, evil and tyrannical: therefore it can tie none to subjection: wickedness by no imaginable reason can oblige any man. It is objected by some, from Rom. xiii. 1. There is no power but of God; the usurping power is a power: therefore it is of God, and consequently we owe subjection to it. Ans. 1. The original reading is not universal, but this: for there is no power if not from God: which confirms what I plead for, that we are not to own any authority, if it be not authorized by God.

The words are only relative to higher powers, in a restricted sense and at most are but indefinite, to be determined according to the matter; not all power simply, but all lawful power. 2. It is a fallacy from what is said according to a certain thing, there is no power but of God, that is no moral power, as universal negatives use to be understood, Heb. v. 4. No man taketh his honour unto himself, but he that is called of God; which is clear, must not be understood for the negation of the fact, as if no man at all doth or ever did take unto himself that honour, for Korah did it, &c. but, no man taketh it warrantably, with a moral right and God's allowance without God's call: so also the universal imperative, in that same text, must not be taken absolutely without restriction; for if every soul without exception were to be subject, there could be none left to be the higher powers; but it is understood with restriction to the relation of a subject. So here, no power but of God, to be understood with restriction to the relation of a lawful magistrate. It is also to be understood indiscriminately, in reference to the divers species, sorts and degrees of lawful power, supreme and subordinate, whether to the king as supreme, or to governors, &c. as Peter expresses it: or whether they be Christian or pagan; it cannot be meant of all universally, that may pretend to power, and may attain to prevailing potency; for then by this text, we must subject ourselves to the papacy now intended to be introduced; and indeed if we subject ourselves to this papist, the next thing he will require will be that. 3. To the minor proposition, I answer, the usurping power is a power; it is power, I grant, that it is power, or authority, I deny.

Therefore it is of God by his providence, I concede; by his ordinance, I deny. Consequently we owe subjection to it, I deny. We may be subject passively, I grant. Actively, out of conscience, I deny. But some will object, 2. Though the power be usurped, and so not morally lawful in all these respects; yet it may do good, its laws and administrations may be good. Answ. I grant all is good that ends well, and hath a good beginning. This cannot be good which hath a bad principle, good from the entire cause. Some government for constitution good, may, in some acts, be bad; but a government for constitution bad cannot, for the acts it puts forth, be good. These good acts may be good for matters but formally they are not good, as done by the usurper: they may be comparatively good, that is better so than worse; but they cannot be absolutely, and in a moral sense good: for to make a politic action good, not only the matter must be warrantable, but the call also. It may indeed induce subjects to bear and improve to the best, what cannot be remedied; but cannot oblige to own a magistratical relation.

II. The nature of the power thus discovered, let us see the nature of that relative duty, which we owe and must own as due to magistrates, and what sort of owning we must give them; which, to inquire a little into, will give light to the question. All the duty and deference the Lord requires of us, towards them whom we must own as magistrates, is comprehended in these two expressions, honour required in the fifth command, and subjection required in Rom. xiii. 1. &c. 1 Pet. ii. 13. &c. Whomsoever then we own as magistrates, we must own honour and subjection as due to them: and if so be, we cannot, upon a conscientious ground, give them honour and subjection, we cannot own them as magistrates. The least deference we can pay to magistrates is subjection, as it is required in these words; Let every soul be subject to the higher powers, and, submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake. But this cannot be given to tyrants and usurpers; therefore no deference can be paid to them at all: and consequently they cannot be owned. That this subjection, which is required to the higher powers, cannot be owned to tyrants, will be apparent, if we consider, 1. The subjection required is orderly subjection to an orderly power, that we be regularly under him that is regularly above; but usurpation and tyranny is not an orderly power, orderly placed above us; therefore we cannot be orderly under it. This is gathered from the original language, where the powers to be subjected to, are ordained of God and the ordinance of God, and he that resisteth the power is counter-ordered, or contrary to his orderly duty; so the duty is to be subject. They are all words coming from one root, which signifies to order; so that subjection is to be placed in order under another relative to an orderly superiority; but, to occupy the seat of dignity unauthorized, is an ataxy, a breaking of order, and bringing the commonwealth quite out of order. Whereby it may appear, that, in relation to an arbitrary government, there can be properly no orderly subjection. 2. The thing itself must import that relative duty which the fifth command requires; not only a passive stooping endurance, or a feigned counterfeit submission, but a real active duty including obedience to lawful commands; and not only so, but support and maintenance; and that both to the acts of his administration, and to his standing and keeping his station, assisting him with all our abilities, both human and Christian; and not only as to the external acts of duties, but the inward motions of the heart, as consent, love, reverence, and honour, and all sincere fealty and allegiance.

But can a subjection of this extent be paid to a tyrant or usurper? Can we support those we are bound to suppress? Shall we love the ungodly, and help those that hate the Lord? Can we consent, that we and our posterity should be slaves? Can we honour them who are vile, and the vilest of men; how high soever they be exalted? 3. The ground of this subjection is for conscience sake, not for wrath, that is, so far and so long as one is constrained by fear, and, to avoid a greater evil, to stoop to him, but out of conscience of duty, both that of piety to God who ordained magistracy, and that of equity to him who is his minister for good, and under pain of damnation if we break this orderly subjection, Rom. xiii. 2, 5. But can it be imagined, that all this is due to a tyrant and usurper? Can it be out of conscience, because he is the Lord's minister for good? The contrary is clear, that he is the devil's drudge serving his interest: Is resistance to tyrants a damnable sin? I hope to prove it to be a duty. 4. If subjection to tyrants and usurpers will inveigle us in their snares, and involve us in their sin and judgment, then it is not to be owned to them; but the former is true; therefore the latter. In the foregoing head I drew an argument, for withdrawing from and disowning the prelatic ministers, from the hazard of partaking in their sin, and of being obnoxious to their judgment, because people are often punished for their pastor's sins; Aaron and his sons polluting themselves, would have brought wrath upon all the people, Lev. x. 6. because the teachers had transgressed against the Lord, therefore was Jacob given to the curse, and Israel to reproaches, Isa. xliii. 27, 28. and all these miseries lamented by the church, were inflicted for the sins of her prophets, and the iniquities of her priests, Lam. iv. 13. the reason was, because they owned then, followed them, countenanced them, complied with them, or connived at them, or did not hinder, or else disown them. The same argument will evince the necessity of withdrawing our subjection from, and disowning, usurping, and tyrannical rulers, when we cannot hinder their wickedness, nor give any other testimony against them, to avert the wrath of the Lord. If the defections of ministers will bring on the whole nation desolacing judgments; then much more have we reason to fear it, when both magistrates and ministers are involved in, and jointly carrying on, and caressing and encouraging each other in promoting a woful apostasy from God: when the heads of the house of Jacob and princes of the house of Israel, abhor judgment, and pervert all equity. The heads judge for reward, and the priests teach for hire, and the prophets divine for money, and yet lean upon the Lord, and say, is not the Lord among us: none evil can come upon us. Then we can expect nothing, but that Zion for their sake shall be plowed as a field, and Jerusalem become heaps, and the mountain of the house as the high places of the forest, Mic. iii. 9, 11, 12. Certain it is, that subjects have smarted sore for the sins of their rulers: for Saul's sin, in breaking covenant with the Gibeonites, the land suffered three years famine, 2 Sam. xxi. 1. and the wrath of the Lord could not be appeased, till seven of his sons were hanged up unto the Lord. What then shall appease the wrath of God, for the unparalleled breach of covenant with God in our days? For David's sin of numbering the people, 70,000 men died by the pestilence, 2 Sam. xxiv. 5. For Jeroboam's sin of idolatry, who made Israel to sin, the Lord threatens to give Israel up, because of the sins of Jeroboam, I Kings xiv. 16. only they escaped this judgment, who withdrew themselves and fell into Judah. For Ahab's sin of letting go a man whom the Lord had appointed to utter destruction, the Lord threatens him, thy life shall go for his life, and thy people for his people, 1 Kings xx. 42. Because Manasseh, king of Judah, did many abominations, therefore the Lord threatened to bring such evil upon Jerusalem and Judah, that whosoever heard it, his ears should tingle, &c. 2 Kings xxi. 11, 12. and notwithstanding of his repentance and the reformation in the days of Josiah, notwithstanding the Lord turned not from the fierceness of his great wrath, wherewith his anger was kindled against Judah, because of all the provocations that Manasseh had provoked him withal, 2 Kings xxiii. 26. which was accomplished by the hands of the Chaldeans, in Jehoiakim's time. Surely, at the commandment of the Lord, came this upon Judah, to remove them out of his sight, for the sins of Manasseh according to all that he did, and also for the innocent blood which he shed,----which the Lord would not pardon, 2 Kings xxiv. 3, 4. And Jeremiah further threatens, that they should be removed into all kingdoms of the earth, because of Manasseh for that which he did in Jerusalem, Jer. xv. 4. Certainly passages were recorded for our learning, Rom. xv. 4. and for our examples, to the intent we should not do as they did, 1 Cor. x. 6. and for our admonition, ver. 11. Whence we may be admonished, that it is not enough to keep ourselves free of public sins of rulers; many of those then punished, were free of all actual accession to them; but they became accessory to, and involved in the guilt of them, when they did not endeavour to hinder them, and bring them to condign punishment for them, according to the law of God, which respecteth not persons; or, at least, because they did not revolt from them, as Libnah did: there might be other provocations on the peoples part, no doubt, which the Lord did also punish by these judgments; but when the Lord specifies the sin of rulers as the particular procuring cause of the judgment; it were presumption to make it the occasion only of the Lord's punishing them: for plain it is, if these sins of rulers had not been committed, which was the ground of the threatening and execution, the judgment would have been prevented; and if the people had bestirred themselves as became them, in repressing and restraining such wickedness, they had not so smarted; and when that sin, so threatened and punished, was removed, then the judgment itself was removed or deterred. It is just and necessary, that the subjects, being jointly included with their rulers in the same bond of fidelity to God, be liable to be punished for their rebellion and apostacy, when they continue under the bond of subjection to them. But how deplorable were our condition, if we should stand obnoxious to divine judgments, for the atheism, idolatry, murders, and adulteries of our rulers, and yet be neither authorized nor capacitated to hinder it, nor permitted to withdraw ourselves from subjection to them? But it is not so; for, the Lord's making us responsible for their debt, is an impowering us either to repress their wickedness when he gives us capacity, or at least to save ourselves harmless from their crimes, by disowning them; that being the only way of standing no longer accountable for their souls.

12. It remains to consider the ends for which government was institute by God, and constitute by men; from whence I argue, that government, that destroys the ends of government, is not to be owned; but tyranny, and especially this under which we howl, destroys all the ends of government; therefore it is not to be owned. The minor I prove thus, That government, that destroys all religion and safety, destroys all the ends of government; but this popish and arbitrary absolute power, destroys religion and safety; therefore--it is evident, both from the laws of nature and revelation, that the ends of government are the glory of God, and the good of mankind. The first is the glory of God, the ultimate end of all ordinances; to which whatever is opposite, is not to be owned by them that fear him: whatever power then is destructive to religion, and is applied and employed against the glory of the universal King, and for withdrawing us from our fealty and obedience to him, is nothing but rebellion against the supreme Lord and Lawgiver, and a traiterous conspiracy against the Almighty, and therefore not to be owned: and they are enemies to religion, or strangers to it, who are not sensible this hath been the design of the present government, at least these twenty-seven years, to overturn the reformed covenanted religion, and to introduce popery. Hence, seeing a king at his best and highest elevation, is only a mean for preserving religion, and for this end only chosen of the people to be keeper of both tables of the law, he is not to be regarded, but wholly laid aside, when he not only moves without his sphere, but his motion infers the ruin of the ends of his erection, and when he employs all his power for the destruction of the cause of Christ, and advancement of antichrist, giving his power to the beast; he is so far from deserving the deference of the power ordained of God, that he is to be looked upon, and treated as a traitor to God, and stated enemy to religion and all righteousness. The second end of government is the good of the people, which is the supreme and cardinal law; the safety of the people is the supreme law. Which cannot be denied, if it be considered, 1. For this only the magistrate is appointed of God to be his minister for the people's good, Rom. xiii. 4. and they have no goodness but as they conduce to this end: for all the power they have of God is with this proviso, to promote his people's prosperity. (It were blasphemy to say, they are his authorised ministers for their destruction) to which if their conduct degenerate, they degrade themselves, and so must be disowned. He is therefore, in his institution, no more than a mean for this end; and himself cannot be either the whole or half of the end; for then he should be both the end and the mean of government; and it is contrary to God's mould to have this for his end, to multiply to himself silver and gold, or lift up himself above his brethren, Deut. xvii. 17, 20. If therefore he hath any other end than the good of the people, he cannot be owned as one of God's moulding, 2. This only is the highest pitch of good princes ambition, to postpone their own safety to the peoples safety. Moses desired, rather than the people should be destroyed, that his name should be razed out of the book of life. And David would rather the Lord's hand be on him and his father's house, than on the people, that they should be plagued, 1 Chron. xxi. 17. But he that would seek his own ambitious ends, with the destruction of the people, hath the spirit of the devil, and is to be carried towards as one possessed with that malignant spirit. 3. Originally their power is from the people, from whom all their dignity is derived, with reserve of their safety, which is not the donative of kings, nor held by concession from them, nor can it be resigned or surrendered to the disposal of kings; since God hath provided, in his universal laws, that no authority make any disposal, but for the good of the people. This cannot be forfeited by the usurpation of monarchs, but being always fixed in the essential laws of government, they may reclaim and recover it when they please. Since then we cannot alienate our safety, we cannot own that authority which is inconsistent with it. 4. The attaining this end was the main ground and motive of peoples deliberating to constitute a government, and to choose such a form, because they thought it most conducible for their good; and to admit such persons as fittest instuments for compassing this end; and to establish such a conveyance, as they thought most contributive for this end. When therefore princes cease to be what they could be constitute for, they cease to have an authority to be owned; but ceasing to answer these ends of government, they cease to be what they could be constitute for. 5. For no other end were magistrates limited with conditions, but to bound them, that they might do nothing against the peoples good and safety.

Whosoever then breaking through all legal limitations, shall become injurious to the community, lists himself in the number of enemies, and is only to be looked upon as such. 6. For this end all laws are ratified or rescinded, as they conduce to this end, which is the soul and reason of the law: then it is but reason, that the law establishing such a king, which proves an enemy to this, should be rescinded also. 7. Contrary to this end no law can be of force; if then, either law or king be prejudicial to the realm, they are to be abolished. 8. For this end, in cases of necessity, kings are allowed sometimes to neglect the letter of the laws, or private interests, for the safety of the community: but if they neglect the public safety, and make laws for their own interests, they are no more trustees but traitors. 9. If it were not for this end, it were more eligible to live in desarts, than to enter into societies. When therefore a ruler, in direct opposition to the ends of government, seeks the ruin, not only of religion, but also of the peoples safety, he must certainly forfeit his right to reign. And what a vast, as well as innocent number, have, for religion, and their adherence to their fundamental rights, been ruined, rooted out of their families possessions, oppressed, persecuted, murdered, and destroyed by this and the deceased tyrant, all Scotland can tell, and all Europe hath heard. If ever the ends of government were perverted and subverted in any place. Britain is the stage where this tragedy has been acted.

13. I may argue from the covenant, that to own this authority is contrary to all the articles thereof. 1. That authority which overturns the reformation of religion in doctrine, worship, discipline and government, which we are sworn to preserve against the common enemies thereof, in the first article, cannot be owned; but the present pretended authority overturned (and continues more to overturn) the reformation of religion, &c. therefore it cannot be owned. For against what common enemy must we preserve it, if not against him that is the chief enemy thereof? And how can we own that authority, that is wholly employed and applied for the destruction of religion? 2. If we are obliged to extirpate popery, without respect of persons, lest we partake in other mens sins; then we are obliged to extirpate papists without respect of persons; and consequently the head of them. (For how otherwise can popery be extirpated? Or how otherwise can we cleanse the land of their sins?) But in the 2d article we are obliged to extirpate popery without respect of persons, lest we partake in others mens sins: therefore we are obliged to extirpate papists without respect of persons, and consequently the crowned Jesuit, and therefore cannot own him: for how can we own him, whom we are bound to exstirpate? 3. If we be engaged to preserve the rights and liberties of parliaments, and the liberties of the kingdoms, and the king's authority only in the preservation and defence of the true religion and liberties of the kingdoms, then we cannot own his authority, when it is inconsistent with, opposite to, and destructive of all these precious interests, as now it is with a witness. But in the 3d article we are engaged to preserve the rights and privileges of parliaments, and the liberties of the kingdoms, and the king's authority only in the preservation and defence of the true religion and liberties of the kingdoms: therefore all allegiance that we can own to any man, must stand perpetually thus qualified, in defence of religion and liberty; that is, so far as it is not contrary to religion and liberty, and no further; for if it be destructive of these, it is null. If we should then own this man, with this restricted allegiance, and apply into his own authority (as we must apply it to all authority that we can own) it were to mock God and the world, and own contradictions: for can we maintain the destroyer of religion, in defence of religion, and the destroyer of all our rights and liberties, and all our legal securities for them, in the preservation of these rights and liberties? That were pure nonsense. 4. If we be obliged to endeavour, that all incendiaries and malignants, &c. be brought to condign punishment, then we cannot own the authority of the head of these incendiaries and malignant enemies; but in the fourth article, we are obliged to endeavour, that all incendiaries and malignants, &c. be brought to condign punishment: therefore----The connexion of the major cannot well be doubted, for is it imaginable, that the head of that unhallowed party, the great malignant enemy, who is the spring, and gives life unto all these abominations shall be exempted from punishment, or owned for a sacred majesty? shall we be obliged to discover, and bring to justice the little petty malignants, and this implacably stated enemy to Christ escape with a crown on his head? Nay, we are by this obliged, if ever we be in case, to bring these stated enemies to God and the country to condign punishment, from the highest to the lowest: and this we are to do, as we would have the anger of the Lord turned away from us, which cannot be, without hanging up their heads before the Lord against the sun, as was done in the matter of Peor, Numb. xxv. 4. For hath not he and his accomplices made the kingdom a curse? and we, with our own consent, have made ourselves obnoxious to it, if we do not procure, each in our capacities, and pursue these traitors and rebels, that the judgment of the Lord be executed upon the accursed. 5. No wilful opposer of peace and union between the kingdoms is to be owned; but, according to the 5th article, we are obliged to endeavour, that justice be done upon him: but this man and his brother have been wilful opposers of peace and union between the kingdoms, all true peace and union, except an union in confederacy against the Lord; for they have taken peace from both the kingdoms, and destroyed and annulled that which was the bond of their union, to wit, the solemn league and covenant. 6. If we are obliged to assist and defend all those that enter into this league and covenant, in the maintaining and pursuing thereof, and never to suffer ourselves to be divided, to make defection to the contrary part, &c. According to the 6th article then, we must not owt the butcher of our covenanted brethren, who hath imbrued his hands in their blood, in maintaining and pursuing thereof, and would have us withdrawn into so detestable a defection; for we cannot both own him as he requires to be owned, and as God requires every magistrate to be owned (so as not to resist him under pain of damnation, Rom. xiii. 2.) and assist our brethren too in refilling his murders: and our owning of him were a dividing of ourselves from our brethren that oppose him, into a defection to the contrary part, whereof he is head and patron. Lastly, In the conclusion, we are obliged to be humbled for the sins of these kingdoms, and to amend in a real reformation; whereof this is one to be mourned for, that after the Lord had delivered us from the yoke of this tyrannical family, we again joined in amity with the people of these abominations, and took these serpents into our bosom again, which hath bit us so sore, and wherewith the Lord hath scourged us severely. And if it was our sin to engage with them at first, then it is our sin to continue under their subjection; and is not consistent with that repentance, that the Lord's contendings call for, to continue owning that power which was our sin to own at first.

III. In the third place, I promised to confirm my thesis from more express scripture arguments. Therefore I shall endeavour to gather them as briefly as may be. 1. From scripture inferences, nearly and natively consequential. 2. From scripture assertions. 3. From scripture precepts. 4. From scripture practices. 5. From scripture promises. 6. From scripture threatnings. 7. From scripture prayers.

First, I shall offer some arguments deduced by way of immediate inference, from the grounds laid before us in scripture about government: wherein I shall confine my self to these particulars.

1. Let us consider the characters of a magistrate, laid down in scripture; and we may infer, if tyrants and usurpers are not capable of these characters, then they cannot be owned for magistrates. For if they be not magistrates, they cannot be owned as magistrates; but if they be not capable of the characters of magistrates, they are not magistrates: Ergo, if they be not capable of the characters of magistrates, they cannot be owned as magistrates. To find out the characters of magistrates, we need seek no further than that full place, Rom. xiii. Which usually is made a magazine of objections against this truth; but I trust to find store of arguments for it from thence, not repeating many that have been already deduced therefrom. We find, in this place, many characters of a magistrate, that are all incompatible with a tyrant or usurper. 1. He is the higher power, verse 1. Authorities supereminent, signifying such a pre-excellency as draweth towards it a recognition of honour; but this is not competent to tyrants and usurpers; for they are the vilest of men, let them be never so high exalted, Psal. xii. last verse, and if they be vile then they are to be contemned, Psal. xv. 4. and no more to be regarded than Herod was by Christ, when he called him a fox, Luke xiii. 32. But more particularly, let us consider what is the highness, or dignity of magistrates, set forth in scripture. They are stiled gods, not to be reviled, Exod. xxii. 28. among whom God judgeth, Psal. lxxxii. 1. so called, because the word of God came unto them, John x. 35. But tyrants are rather devils, as one of them is called Lucifer, Isa. xiv. 12. and they that persecute and imprison the people of God, because actuated by the devil, and acting for him, do bear his name, Rev. ii. 10. They are devils that cast the Lord's witnesses into prison. The magistrate's judgment is God's judgment, Deut. i. 17. because it is not for man, but for the Lord, 2 Chron. xix. 6. and therefore Solomon is said to have sat on the throne of the Lord, 1 Chron. xxix. 23. But it were blasphemy to say, That tyrants judgment, usurping the place without his warrant, and giving forth judgment against his laws, and cause, and people, is the Lord's judgment, or for him, or that they sit on the throne of the Lord. A throne of iniquity is not the throne of the Lord, for he hath no fellowship with it; the tyrant's throne is a throne of iniquity, Psal. xciv. 20. Magistrates are truly to be subjected to and obeyed, as principalities and powers, Tit. iii. 1. it is a sin to speak evil of them, verse 2. for it is presumption to despise dominion, and speak evil of dignities, 2 Pet. ii. 10. Jude 8. But tyrants are very catechrestically and abusively principalities and powers, no otherwise then the devils are so termed, Eph. vi. 12. and there is no argument to own or obey the one more than the other: for if all principalities and powers are to be subjected to and owned, then also the devil must, who gets the same title. To speak truth of tyrants indignities, cannot be a speaking evil of dignities; for truth is no evil, nor is tyranny a dignity. Hence they that are not capable of the dignity of rulers, as these places prove: Ergo----Against this it is objected. That Paul did apply this character to the tyrannical high priest Ananias, whom, after he had objurated for manifest injustice, he honours with that apology, that he wist not that he was the high priest, for it is written, thou shalt not speak evil of the ruler of thy people, Acts xxiii. 5. Ans. Though all should be granted that is in this objection, yet our argument would not be enervated: for grant we should not speak evil of tyrants, that does not evince that we should hold them us rulers; for we should bless our persecutors, Rom. x. 14. and speak evil of no man, Tit. iii. 2. that does not say, We should hold every man, or our persecutors, to be rulers. The meaning must be, he knew not that he was the high-priest; that is, he did not acknowledge him to be either high priest or ruler, he could acknowledge or observe nothing like one of that character in him: for as the high-priest's office was now null and ceased, so this Ananias was only an usurper of the office, in place of Ismael and Joseph, who had purchased it by money: and Paul had learned from his master Gamaliel, Tit. Talmud. of the Sanhedrim. That a judge who hath given money for purchasing this honour, is neither a judge, nor to be honoured as such, but to be held in place of an ass. And it was common among the Jews to say, If such be gods, they are silver gods, not to be honoured, as is quoted by Pool's synopsis criticorum, &c. on the same place. And that this must be the sense of it is plain; for he could not be ignorant that he was there in place of a judge, being called before him, and smitten by him authoritatively, whom therefore he did threaten with the judgment of God; it were wicked to think, that he would retract that threatning which he pronounced by the Spirit of God. And therefore this place confirms my thesis: if a tyrannical judge, acting contrary to law, is not to be known or acknowledged to be a ruler, but upbraided as a whited wall; then a tyrant is not to be known or acknowledged as such; but the former is true, from this place: therefore also the latter. Paul knew well enough he was a judge, and knew well enough what was his duty to a judge, that he should not be reviled; but he would not acknowledge this priest to be a judge, or retract his threatning against him.

2. He is of God, and ordained of God; I proved before, tyrants are not capable of this; yea, it were blasphemy to say, They are authorized, or ordained of God, by his preceptive will. Hence, take only this argument. All rulers that we must own are ordained of God, do reign, and are set up by God, Prov. viii, 15. (for that and this place are parallel) but tyrants do not reign, nor are set up by God, Hos. viii. 4. They are set up (saith the Lord) but not by me: Ergo, we cannot own them to be ordained of God. 3. Whosoever resisteth this power ordained of God, resisteth the ordinance of God, and they that resist, shall receive to themselves damnation, verse 2. This cannot be owned of a tyrant, that it is a damnable sin to resist him, for it is duty to resist, and also repress him, as is proven already, and shall be afterwards. Hence, whatsoever authority we own subjection to, we must not resist it; but we cannot own that we must not resist this authority: therefore we cannot own it at all. Again, That cannot be the power not to be resisted, which is acquired and improved by resisting the ordinance or God; but the power of usurpers and tyrants is acquired and improved by resisting the ordinance of God: Ergo, their power cannot be the power not to be resisted. The major is manifest; for when the apostle says, The resisting of the power brings damnation to the resister, certainly that resistance cannot purchase dominion instead of damnation: and if he that resists in a lesser degree, be under the doom of damnation; then certainly he that does it in a greater degree, so as to complete it, in putting himself in place of that power which he resisted, cannot be free. The minor is also undeniable; for, if usurpers acquire their power without resistance forcible and sensible, it is because they that defend the power invaded, are wanting in their duty; but however morally the tyrant or usurper is always, or in contrary order to a lawful power. 4. Rulers are not a terror to good works, but to the evil, and they that do that which is good, shall have praise of the same, verse 3. This is the character and duty of righteous magistrates, though it be not always their administration; but an usurper and tyrant is not capable or susceptible of this character; but, on the contrary, is, and must be a terror to good works, and a praise to the evil: for he must be a terror to them that would secure their rights and liberties in opposition to his encroachments, which is a good work; and he must be a tutor, patron, and protector of such, as encourage and maintain him in his usurpation and tyranny, which is an evil work: and if he were a terror to the evil, then he would be a terror to himself and all his accomplices, which he cannot be. Therefore, that power which is not capable of the duties of magistrates, cannot be owned; but the power of tyrants and usurpers is such: Ergo--We find in scripture the best commentary on this character, where the duties of a magistrate are described; they must justify the righteous, and condemn the wicked, Deut. xxvii. 1. They must, as Job did, deliver the poor that cry, and put on righteousness as a clothing,----and be eyes to the blind, and feet to the lame, and a father to the poor----and break the jaws of the wicked, Job xxix. 12, 17. Their throne must be established by righteousness, Prov. xvi. 12. A king sitting on the throne of judgment must scatter away all evil with his eyes----then mercy and truth will preserve him, and his throne is upholden by mercy, Prov. xx. 8, 28. But tyrants have a quite contrary character; the throne of iniquity frames mischief by a law, and condemns the innocent blood, Psal. xciv. 20, 21. They judge not the fatherless, neither doth the cause of the widow come unto them, Isa. i. 23. They build their house by unrighteousness, and their chambers by wrong, and use their neighbours service without wages, Jer. xxii. 13. They oppress the poor, and crush the needy, Amos iv. 1. They turn judgment to gall, and the fruit of righteousness to hemlock, and say, have we not taken horns to us by our own strength, Amos vi. 12, 13. These contrary characters cannot consist together. 5. He is the minister of God for good, verse 4. not by providential commission, as Nebuchadnezzar was, and tyrants may be eventually, by the Lord making all things turn about for the good of the church; but he hath a moral commission from God, and is entrusted by the people, to procure their public and political good at least.

Now, then tyranny and usurpation, are together inconsistible; for if tyrants and usurpers were ministers for good, then they would restore the public and personal rights, and rectify all wrongs done by them; but then they must surrender their authority, and resign it, or else all rights cannot be restored, nor wrongs rectified. Hence, these that cannot be owned as magistrates of God for good, cannot be owned as magistrates; but tyrants and usurpers, (and in particular this man) are such as cannot be owned as ministers of God for good: Ergo----Again, if magistracy be always a blessing, and tyranny and usurpation always a curse, then they cannot be owned to be the same thing, and the one cannot be owned to be the other; but magistracy, or the rightful magistrate, is always a blessing; tyranny and usurpation, or the tyrant and usurper, always a curse: Ergo----That the former is true, these scriptures prove it. God provides him for the benefit of his people, 1 Sam. xvi. 1. A just ruler is compared to the light of the morning, when the sun riseth, even a morning without clouds, 2 Sam. xxiii. 4. So the Lord exalted David's kingdom, for his people Israel's sake, 2 Sam. v. 12. Because the Lord loved Israel for ever, therefore made he Solomon king, to do judgment and justice, 1 Kings x. 9. When the righteous are in authority the people rejoice----The king by judgment stablished the land,----Prov. xxix. 2, 4. The Lord promises magistrates as a special blessing, Isa. i. 26. Jer. xvii. 25. And therefore their continuance is to be prayed for, that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life, in all godliness and honesty, 1 Tim. ii. 2. And they must needs be a blessing, because to have no ruler is a misery: for when Israel had no king, every man did that which was right in his own eyes, Judges xvii. 6. And the Lord threatens it as a curse to take away the stay and the staff----the mighty man, and the man of war, the judge and the prophet, &c. Isa. iii. 1, 2. &c. And that the children of Israel shall abide many days without a king, and without a prince, Hos. ii. 4. But on the other hand, tyrants and usurpers are always a curse, and given as such: it is threatened among the curses of the covenant, that the stranger shall get up above Israel very high----and that they shall serve their enemies, which the Lord shall send against them----and he shall put a yoke of iron upon their neck, until he hath destroyed them, Deut. xxviii. 43, 48. As a roaring lion and a ranging bear, so is a wicked ruler over the poor people, Prov. xxviii. 15. and therefore, when the wicked beareth rule the people mourn, Prov. xxix. 2. The Lord threatens it as a curse, that he will give children to be their princes, and babes shall rule over them, Isa. iii. 4. And if unqualified rulers be a curse, much more tyrants. They are the rod of his anger, and the staff in their hand is his indignation, his axe, and sawe, and rod, Isa. x. 5, 15. It is one thing to call a man God's instrument, his rod, axe, sword, or hammer; another thing to call him God's minister; there is a wide difference betwixt the instruments of God's providence, and the ministers of his ordinance; those fulfil his promises only, these do his precepts. Such kings are given in the Lord's anger, Hos. xiii. 11. therefore they cannot be owned to be ministers of God for good. 6. He beareth not the sword in vain, for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil, verse 4. The apostle doth not say, He that beareth the sword is the ruler, but he is the ruler that beareth the sword. This is not every sword, for there is the sword of an enemy, the sword of a robber, the sword of a common traveller; but this as a faculty of political rule, and authoritative judgment. It is not said, He takes the sword (as the Lord expresses the usurpation of that power, Matth. xxvi. 52.) but he beareth the sword, hath it delivered him into his hand by God, by God's warrant and allowance, not in vain; to no end or without reason, or without a commission, as Paraeus upon the place expounds it. He is a revenger to execute wrath, not by private revenge, for that is condemned by Paul before, Rom. xi. 19. not by providential recompense, for when a private person so revengeth, it is the providential repayment of God; but as God's minister, by him authorized, commissionated, and warranted to this work. Now this cannot agree with a tyrant or usurper, whose sword only legitimates his sceptre, and not his sceptre his sword, who takes the sword rather than bears, and uses it without reason or warrant from God, in the execution of his lustful rage upon him that doth well, and hath no right to it from God. Hence, he that beareth the sword no other way but as it may be said of a murderer, cannot be a magistrate bearing the sword; but a tyrant and usurper beareth the sword no other way but as it may be said of a murderer: Ergo.----So much for the characters of a magistrate, which are every way inapplicable to tyrants and usurpers, and as inapplicable to this of ours as to any in the world.

2. If we consider the scripture resemblances, importing the duty of magistrates, and the contrary comparisons, holding forth the sin, vileness, and villainy of tyrants and usurpers; we may infer, that we cannot own the last to be the first. First, From the benefit they bring to the commonwealth, magistrates are stiled, 1. Saviours, as Othniel the son of Kenaz is called, Judges iii. 9. and Jehoahaz in his younger years, 2 Kings xiii. 5. and all good judges and magistrates, Neh. ix. 27. But tyrants and usurpers cannot be such, for they are destroyers, whom the Lord promises to make go forth from his people, Isa. xlix. 17. The Chaldean tyrant is called the destroyer of the Gentiles, Jer. iv. 7. and the destroyer of the Lord's heritage, Jer. l. 11. where they can no more be owned to be magistrates, than Abaddon or Apollyon can be owned to be a saviour. 2. From their paternal love to the people, they are stiled fathers, and therefore to be honoured according to the fifth command. So Deborah was raised up a mother in Israel, Judges v. 7. Kings are nursing fathers by office, Isa. xlix. 23. But that tyrants cannot be such, I have proved already; for they can no more be accounted fathers, than he that abuseth or forceth our mother. 3. From the protection and shelter that people find under their conduct, they are called shields, Psal. xlvii. ult. The princes of the people, the shields of the earth, belong unto God. But tyrants cannot be such, because they are the subverters of the earth. 4. From the comfort that attends them, they are resembled to the morning light, and fruitful showers of rain, 2 Sam. xxiii. 4. They waited for me, as for the rain, saith Job xxix. 23. But tyrants cannot be resembled to these, but rather to darkness, and to the blast of the terrible ones, Isa. xxv. 4. as a storm against the wall. If darkness cannot be owned to be light, then cannot tyrants be owned to be magistrates. 5. From their pastoral care and conduct and duty, they are feeders. The judges of Israel are commanded to feed the Lord's people, 1 Chron. xvii. 6. David was brought to feed Jacob his people, and Israel his inheritance, Psal. lxxvii. 71. But tyrants are wolves, not shepherds. 6. By office they are physicians, or healers, Isa. iii. 7. That tyrants cannot be such, is proven above. Secondly, On the other hand, the vileness, villainy, and violence of tyrants and usurpers, are held forth by fit resemblances, being compared to these unclean creatures. 1. Tyrants are wicked dogs, as they who compass about Christ, Psal. xxii. 16, 20. Saul is called Dog there, and in that golden psalm, Psal. lix. 6. Saul and his accomplices watching the house to kill David, make a noise like a dog, and go round about the city. 2. They are pushing bulls, Psal. xxii. 12. and crushing kine of Bashan, that oppress the poor, Amos iv. 1. They have need then to have their horns cut short. 3. They are roaring lions, that are wicked rulers over the poor people, Prov. xxviii. 15. Zeph. iii. 3. So Paul calls Nero the lion, out of whose mouth he was delivered, 2 Tim. iv. 17. 4. They are ranging bears, Prov. xxvii. 15. So the Persian monarch is emblemized Dan. vii. 5. 5. They are leviathan, the piercing serpent and dragon, Isa. xxvii. 1. and have great affinity in name and nature with the apocalyptick dragon. So also, Isaiah li. 9. the Egyptian tyrant is called dragon and Nebuchadnezzar swallowed up the church like a dragon, Jer. li. 34. See also Ezek. xxix. 3. 6. They are wolves, ravening for the prey, Ezek. xxii. 27. Evening wolves, that gnaw not the bones till the morrow, Zeph. iii. 3. 7. They are leopards; so the Grecian tyrants are called, Dan. vii. 6. and antichrist, Rev. xiii. 2. 8. They are foxes; so Christ calls Herod, Luke xiii. 32. 9. They are devils, who cast the Lord's people into prison, Rev. ii. 10, 13. Now, can we own all these abominable creatures to be magistrates? Can these be the fathers we are bound to honour in the fifth commandment? They must be esteemed sons of dogs and devils that believe so, and own themselves sons of such fathers.

If we further take notice, how the Spirit of God describes tyranny, as altogether contradistinct and opposite unto the magistracy he will have owned; we may infer hence, tyrants and usurpers are not to be owned. What the government instituted by God among his people was, the scripture doth both relate in matter of fact, and describes what it ought to be by right, viz. That according to the institution of God, magistrates should be established by the constitution of the people, who were to make them judges and officers in all their gates, that they might judge the people with just judgment, Deut. xvi. 18. But foreseeing that people would affect a change of that first form of government, and, in imitation of their neighbouring nations, would desire a king, and say, I will set a king over me, like all the nations that are about me, Deut. xvii. 14. The Lord, intending high and holy ends by it, chiefly the procreation of the Messias from a kingly race, did permit the change, and gave directions how he should be moulded and bounded, that was to be owned as the magistrate under a monarchical form; to wit, that he should be chosen of God, and set up by their suffrages, that he should be a brother, and not a stranger; that he should not multiply horses, nor wives, nor money, (which are cautions all calculated for the people's good, and the security of their religion and liberty, and for precluding and preventing his degeneration into tyranny) and that he should write a copy of the law in a book, according to that which he should govern, verse 15. to the end of the chapter, yet the Lord did not approve the change of the form, which that luxuriant people was long affecting, and at length obtained: for, long before Saul was made king, they proffered an hereditary monarchy to Gideon, without the boundaries God's law required: which that brave captain knowing how derogatory it was to the authority of God's institution, not to be altered in form or frame without his order, generally refused, saying, I will not rule over you, neither shall my son rule over you; the Lord shall rule over you, Judges viii. 23. But his bastard, the first monarch and tyrant in Israel, Abimelech, by sinistrous means being advanced to be king by the traiterous Sechemites, Jotham, and other of the godly, disowned him; which, by the Spirit of God, Jotham describes parabolically significantly holding out the nature of that tyrannical usurpation, under the apologue of the trees itching after a king, and the offer being repudiate by the more generous sort, embraced by the bramble: signifying, that men of worth and virtue would never have taken upon them such an arrogant domination, and that such a tyrannical government, in its nature and tendency, was nothing but an useless, worthless, sapless, aspiring, scratching, and vexing shadow of a government, under subjection to which there could be no peace nor safety. But this was rather a tumultuary interruption than a change of the government; not being universally either desired or owned; therefore, after that the Lord restored the pristine form, which continued until, being much perverted by Samuel's sons, the people unanimously and peremptorily desired the change thereof, and, whether it were reason or not, would have a king; as we were fondly set upon one, after we had been delivered from his father's yoke: and the Lord gave them a king with a curse, and took him away with a vengeance, Hos. xiii. 11. as he did our Charles II. Yet he permitted it, but with a protestation against and conviction of the sin, that thereby they had "rejected the Lord," 1 Sam. viii. 7. and with a demonstration from heaven, which extorted their own confession, that they "had added unto all their sins this evil to ask a king," 1 Sam. xii. 17, 18, 19. And to deter and dissuade from such a conclusion, he appoints the prophet to shew them the "manner of the king" that should reign over them, 1 Sam. viii. 9. to declare before hand, what sort of a ruler he would prove, when they got him; to wit, a mere tyrant, who would take their sons and appoint them for himself, for his chariots, and for horsemen, and to run before his chariots, and make them his soldiers, and labourers of the ground, and instrument makers, and household servants, and he would take their fields and vineyards--the best of them, and give unto his servants. In a word, to make all slaves; and that in the end, when this should come to pass, they should cry out because of their king, but the Lord would not hear them, ver. 11-18. All which, as it is palpable in itself, so we have sensibly felt in our experience to be the natural description of tyranny, but more tolerable than any account of ours would amount to. It is both foolishly and falsely alledged by royalists or tyrannists, that here is a grant of uncontroulable absoluteness to kings to tyrannize over the people without resistance, and that this manner of the king is in the original Mishphat, which signifies right or law; so that here was a permissive law given to kings to tyrannize, and to oblige people to passive obedience, without any remedy but tears; and therefore it was registered, and laid up before the Lord in a book, 1 Sam. x. 25. But I answer, 1. If any thing be here granted to kings, it is either by God's approbation, directing and instructing how they should govern; or it is only by permission and providential commission to them, to be a plague to the people for their sin of choosing them, to make them drink as they have brewed, as sometimes he gave a charge to the Assyrian rod to trample them down as the mire of the streets: if the first be said, then a king that does not govern after that manner, and so does not make people cry out for their oppression, would come short of his duty, and also behoved to tyrannize and make the people cry out; then a king may take what he will from his subjects, and be approved of God: this were blasphemy absurd, for God cannot approve of the sin of oppression. If the second be said, then it cannot be an universal grant, or otherwise all kings must be ordained for plagues; and if so, it were better we wanted such nursing fathers. 2. Though Mishphat signifies right or law, yet it signifies also, and perhaps no less frequently, manner, course, or custom: and here it cannot signify the law of God, for all these acts of tyranny are contrary to the law of God; for to make servants of subjects is contrary to the law of God, Deut. xvii. 20. Forbidding to lift up himself so far above his brethren; but this was to deal with them as a proud Pharaoh; to take so many for chariots and horsemen, is also contrary to the law, Deut. xvii. 15. "He shall not multiply horses;" to take their fields and vineyards is mere robbery, contrary to the moral and judicial law, whereof he was to have always a copy, ver. 18. And contrary to Ezek. xlvi. 18. "The prince shall not take of the peoples inheritance," &c. This would justify Ahab's taking Naboth's vineyard, which yet the Lord accounted robbery, and for which tyrants are called "companions of thieves," Isa. i. 23. and "robbers," Isa. xlii. 24. into whose hands the Lord sometimes may give his people for a spoil in judicial providence; but never with his approbation and grant of right: to make them cry out, is oppression, which the Lord abhors, Isa. v. 7, 8. And if this be all the remedy, it is none; for it is such a cry, as the Lord threatens he will not hear. 3. It is false, that this manner of the Lord was registred in that book mentioned, 1 Sam. x. 25. for that was the law of the kingdom, accordingly the copy of which the king was to have for his instruction containing the fundamental laws, point blank contrary to this which was the manner of the king; there is a great difference between the manner of the kingdom, which ought to be observed as law, and the manner of the king, what he would have as lust. Would Samuel write in a book the rules of tyranny, to teach to oppress, contrary to the law of God? He says himself, he would only teach both king and people "the good and the right way," 1 Sam. xii. 23, 25. 4. Nothing can be more plain, than that this was a mere dissuasive against seeking; for he protests against this course, and then lays before them what sort of a king he should be, in a description of many acts of tyranny; and yet in the end it is said, 1 Sam. vii. 19. "Nevertheless the people refused to obey the voice of Samuel, and said, Nay, but we will have a king."

Now, what else was the voice of Samuel, than a dissuasion? I am not here levelling this argument against monarchy in the abstract, that does not ly in my road; but I infer from thence, 1. If God was displeased with this people for asking and owning a king, who was only to become a tyrant and dissuades from the choice, by a description of his future tyranny; then certainly he was displeased with them, when they continued owning, when he was a tyrant indeed, according to that description; but the former is true, therefore also the latter. The consequence is clear: for continuing in sin is sin; but continuing in owning that tyrant, which was their sin at first, was a continuing in sin; therefore----The minor is confirmed thus: continuing is counteracting the motives of God's dissuasion, especially when they are sensibly visible, is a continuing in sin; but their continuing in owning Saul after he became a tyrant, was a continuing in counteracting the motives of God's dissuasion, when they were sensibly visible. I do not say, because it was their sin to ask Saul, therefore it was not lawful to own him, while he ruled as a magistrate: and so if Charles II. had ruled righteously, it would not have been sin to own him; but after the Lord uses dissuasives from a choice of such an one, and these are signally verified, if it was to make the choice, then it must be sin to keep it. 2. If it was their sin to seek and set up such an one before he was tyrant, who yet was admitted upon covenant terms, and the manner of it registred; then much more is it a sin to seek and set up one, after he declared himself a tyrant, and to admit him without any terms at all, or for any to consent or give their suffrage to such a deed; but the former is true, therefore the latter: and consequently, to give our consent to the erection of the duke of York, by owning his authority, was our sin. 3. If it be a sin to own the manner of the king there described, then it is a sin to own the pretended authority, which is the exact transumpt of it; but it is a sin to own the manner of the king there described, or else it would never have been used as a dissuasive from seeking such a king. 4. To bring ourselves under such a burden, which the Lord will not remove, and involve ourselves under such a misery, wherein the Lord will not hear us, is certainly a sin, ver. 18. But to own or choose such a king, whose manner is there described, would bring ourselves under such a burden and misery, wherein the Lord would not hear us: therefore it were our sin.

4. We may add the necessary qualifications of magistrates, which the Lord requires to be in all, both superior and inferior: and thence it may be inferred, that such pretended rulers, who neither have nor can have these qualifications, and are not to be owned as ministers, who have no qualifications for such a function. We find their essentially necessary qualifications particularly described. Jethro's counsel was God's counsel and command; that rulers must be able men such as fear God, men of truth, hating covetousness, Exod. xviii. 21. Tyrants and usurpers have none, nor can have any of these qualifications, except that they may have ability of force, which is not here meant: but that they be morally able for the discharge of their duty: surely they cannot fear God, nor be men of truth; for then they would not be tyrants. It is God's direction, that the man to be advanced and assumed to rule, must be a man in whom is the spirit, Numb. xxvii. 18. as is said of Joshua; what spirit this was, Deut. xxxiv. 9. explains, he was full of the spirit of wisdom, that is, the spirit of government; not the spirit of infernal Jesuitical policy, which tyrants may have, but they cannot have the true regal spirit, but such a spirit as Saul had when he turned tyrant, an evil spirit from the Lord. Moses saith, They must be wise men, and understanding, and known among the tribes, Deut. i. 13. for if they be children or fools, they are plagues and punishments, Isa. iii. 2, 3, 4. &c. not magistrates, who are always blessings. And they must be known men of integrity, not known to be knaves or fools, as all tyrants are always. The law of the king is, Deut. xvii. 15. he must be one of the Lord's chusing. Can tyrants and usurpers be such? No, they are set up, but not by him, Hos. viii. 4. He must be a brother, and not a stranger, that is, of the same nation, and of the same religion: for though infidelity does not make void a magistrate's authority; yet both by the law of God and man, he ought not to be chosen, who is an enemy to religion and liberty. Now it were almost treason, to call the tyrant a brother; and I am sure it is no reason, for he disdains it, being absolute above all. That good king's testament confirms this, the God of Israel said, the rock of Israel spake, he that ruleth over men must be just, ruling in the fear of God, 2 Sam. xxiii. 3. But tyrants and usurpers cannot be just: for if they should render every one their right, they would keep none to themselves, but behoved to resign their robberies in the first place, and then also they must give the law its course, and that against themselves. These scriptures indeed do not prove, that all magistrates are in all their administrations so qualified, nor that none ought to be owned, but such as are so qualified in all respects. But as they demonstrate what they ought to be, so they prove, that they cannot be magistrates of God's ordaining, who have none of these qualifications: but tyrants and usurpers have none of these qualifications. Much more do they prove, that they cannot be owned to be magistrates who are not capable of any of these qualifications: but usurpers are not capable of any or these qualifications. At least they conclude, in so far as they are not so qualified, they ought not to be owned, but disowned; but tyrants and usurpers are not so qualified in any thing: therefore in any thing they are not be owned, but disowned. For in nothing are they so qualified as the Lord prescribes.

Secondly, I shall offer some reasons from scripture assertions.

1. It is strongly asserted in Elihu's speech to Job, that he that hateth right should not govern, where he is charging Job with blasphemy, in accusing God of injustice; of which he vindicates the almighty, in asserting his sovereignty and absolute dominion, which is inconsistent with injustice, and shews both that if he be sovereign, he cannot be unjust: and if he be unjust, he could not be sovereign: which were horrid blasphemy to deny. And in the demonstration of this, he gives one maxim in a question, which is equivalent to an universal negative, Job xxxiv. 17, 18. Shall even he that hateth right govern? And wilt thou condemn him that is most just? Is it fit to say to a king, thou art wicked; and to princes ye are ungodly? In which words, the scope makes it clear, that if Job made God a hater of right, he should then deny his government; and if he took upon him to condemn him of injustice, he should blasphemously deny him to be king of the world. For it is not fit to say to any king, that he is wicked, or so ungodly, as to be a hater of right; for that were treason, lese majesty, and in effect a denying him to be king; much less is it fit to say to him that is King of kings. Here then it is affirmed, and supposed to hold good of all governors, that he that hateth right should not govern, or bind, as it is in the margin; for Habash signifies both to bind and to govern, but all to one sense; for governors only can bind subjects authoratively, with the bonds of laws and punishments. I know the following words are alledged to favour the uncontroulableness and absoluteness of princes, that it is not fit to say to them, they are wicked. But plain it is, the words do import treason against lawful kings, whom to call haters of right were to call their kingship in question; as the scope shews, in that these words are adduced to justify the sovereignty of God by his justice, and to confute any indirect charging him with injustice, because that would derogate from his kingly glory, it being impossible he could be king, and unjust too. So in some analogy, though every and of injustice do not unking a prince; yet to call him wicked, that is habitually unjust, and a hater of justice, were as much as to say, he is no king, which were intolerable treason against lawful kings. But this is no treason against tyrants; for truth and law can be no treason: now this is the language of truth and law, that wicked kings are wicked; and they that are wicked and ungodly ought to be called so, as Samuel called Saul, and Elijah, Ahab, &c. However it will hold to be a true maxim, whether we express it by way of negation or interrogation.

Shall even he that hateth right govern? But are not tyrants and usurpers haters of right? Shall therefore they govern? I think it must be answered, they should not govern. If then they should not govern, I infer, they should not be owned as governors. For if it be their sin to govern (right or wrong, it is all one case, for they should not govern at all) then it is our sin to own them in their government: for it is always a sin to own a man in his sinning.

The royal prophet, or whoever was the penman of that appeal for justice against tyranny, Psal. xciv. 20. does tacitly assert the same truth, in that expostulation, shall the throne of iniquity have fellowship with thee, that frameth mischief by a law? Which is as much as if he had said, the throne of iniquity shall not, no, cannot have fellowship with God; that is, it cannot be the throne of God that he hath any interest in, or concern with, by way of approbation: he hath nothing to do with it, except it be to suffer it a while, till he take vengeance on it in the end. And shall we have fellowship with that throne, that God hath no fellowship with, and that is not his throne, but the devil's, as it must be, if God doth not own it? Much may be argued from hence; but in a word, a throne which is not of God, nor ordained of God, but rather of the devil, cannot be owned (for that is the reason of our subjection to any power, because it is of God, and ordained of God, Rom. xiii. 1. And that is the great dignity of magistracy, that its throne, is the throne of God, 1 Chron. xxix. 23.) But a throne of tyranny and usurpation, is a throne which is not of God, nor ordained of God, but rather of the devil: Ergo----. The minor is proved: a throne of iniquity, &c. is a throne which is not of God, nor ordained of God, but rather of the devil; but a throne of tyranny and usurpation is a throne of iniquity: Ergo, it is not of God, and so not to be owned.

3. The Lord charges it upon Israel as a transgression of his covenant, and trespass against his law, that they had set up kings, and not by him, and had made princes and he knew it not, Hos. viii. 4. and then taxes them with idolatry, which ordinarily is the consequent of it, as we have reason to fear will be in our case. He shews there the apostasy of that people, in changing both the ordinances of the magistracy and of the ministry, both of the kingdom and of the priesthood, in which two the safety of that people was founded: so they overturned all the order of God, and openly declared they would not be governed by the hand of God, as Calvin upon the place expounds it. Whereas, the Lord had commanded, if they would set up kings, they should set none up but whom he choosed, Deut. xvii. 15. yet they had no regard to this, nor consulted him in their admission of kings, but set them up, and never let him to wit of it, without his knowledge; that is, without consulting him, and without his approbation, for it can have no other sense. I know, it is alledged by several interpreters, that here is meant the tribes secession from the house of David, and their setting up Jeroboam. I shall confess that the ten tribes did sin in that erection of Jeroboam, without respect to the counsel or command of God, without waiting on the vocation of God, as to the times and manner, and without covenanting with him for security for their religion and liberty; but that their secession from David's line, which by no precept or promise of God they were astricted to, but only conditionally, if his children should walk in the ways of God, or that their erecting of Jeroboam was materially their sin, I must deny; and assert, that if Jeroboam had not turned tyrant and apostate from God (for which they should have rejected him afterwards, and returned to the good kings of David's line) he would have been as lawful a king as any in Judah, for he got the kingdom from the Lord the same way, and upon the same terms that David did, as may be seen expressly in 1 Kings xi. 38. It must be therefore meant, either generally of all tyrants whom they would set up without the Lord's mind, as at first they would have kings on any terms though they should prove tyrants, as we have seen in Saul's case. Or particularly Omri whom they set up, but not by the Lord; 1 Kings xvi. 16. And Ahab his son, and Shallum, Menaham, Pekah, &c. who were all set up by blood and treachery, the same way that our popish duke is now set up, but not by the Lord, that is by his approbation. Hence I argue, those kings that are not owned of God, nor set up by him, must not be owned by us (for we can own none for kings but those that reign by him, Prov. viii. 15. and are ordained of him, Rom. xiii. 1.) But tyrants and usurpers are not owned of God as kings, nor are set up by him: Ergo----Again, if it be a sin to set up kings, and not by God, then it is a sin to own them when set up: for, that is a partaking of, and continuing in the sin of that erection, and hath as much affinity with it, as resetting hath with theft; for if they be the thieves, they are the resetters who receive them and own them.

4. The prophet Habakkuk, in his complaint to God of the Chaldean tyranny, asserts that God hath made righteous, as the fishes of the sea, as the creeping things, that have no ruler over them, Habak. i. 14. Now how were they said to be without a ruler, when the Chaldean actually commanded, and absolutely ruled over them? yea, how can the fishes and reptiles have no ruler over them? If domineering be ruling, they want not that; when the weaker are over-mastered by the stronger, and by them made either to be subject, or to become their prey. But the meaning is, these creatures have no ruler over them by order of nature: and the Jews had then no ruler over them by order of law, or ordination from God, or any that was properly their magistrate by divine institution, or human orderly constitution.

We see then it is one thing for a people to have an arbitrary or enthralling tyranny; another to have true magistracy or authority to be owned over them; without which kingdoms are but as mountains of prey, and seas of confusion. Hence I argue, if the Jews having the Chaldean monarch tyrannizing over them, had really no ruler over them, then is a tyrant and usurper not to be owned for a ruler: but the former is true: therefore also the latter.

5. Our Saviour Christ delivers this as a commonly received, and a true maxim, John viii. 54. "He that honoureth himself, his honour is nothing." The Jews had objected that he had only made himself Messias, ver. 53. To whom he answers, by way of concession, if it were so indeed, then his claims were void, if I honour my self, my honour is nothing: and then claims an undubitable title to his dignity, It is my father that honoureth me. Here is a twofold honour distinguished, the one real, the other suppositious and null, the one renounced, the other owned by Christ, self-honour, and honour which is from God. Hence I argue, a selfcreated dignity is not to be owned; the authority of tyrants and usurpers is a self created dignity: Ergo----. This was confirmed above.

Thirdly, I shall offer some other considerations confirming this truth, from those scriptures which I class among precepts. And these I find of divers sorts touching this subject.

1. I shew before that the greatest of men, even kings, are not exempted from punishment, if guilty of capital crimes; for where the law distinguisheth not, we ought not to distinguish. There is one special and very peremptory law, given before the law for regulating kings, which, by that posterior law, was neither abrogated nor limited even as to kings, Deut. xiii. 6-9. If thy brother (and a king must be a brother, Deut. xvii. 15.)--entice thee secretly, saying, let us go and serve other gods--Thou shalt not consent unto him, nor hearken unto him, neither shall thine eye pity him. How famous Mr. Knox improved this argument, is shewed in the third period. That which I take notice of here is only, that kings are not excepted from this law; but if they be open enticers to idolatry, by force or fraud, persecution or toleration, as this idolater now reigning is palpably doing, they are obnoxious to a legal animadversion. As it cannot be supposed, that secret enticers should be liable to punishment, and not open avouchers of a desire and design to pervert all the nation to idolatry: that a private perverter of one man, though never so nearly and dearly related, should be pursued and brought to condign punishment, and a public subverter of whole nations, and introducer of a false and blasphemous idolatrous religion, should escape scot free. Let the punishment inflicted be in a judicial way, and of what measures it pleases the judge to determine, I shall not controvert here; only I plead, that idolatrous tyrants are not excepted from this law: and infer, that if they ought to be punished, they ought to be deposed; and if they ought to be deposed, they cannot be owned, when undeniably guilty of this capital crime, as was urged above.

To this I may add that part of that prophetical king's testament; who, being about to leave the world, under some challenges of maladministration in his own government, (for which he took himself to the well ordered everlasting covenant, for pardon and encouragement,) after he had shewn what rulers should be, he threatens, by antithesis, tyrannical pretenders, in these severe words, which do also imply a precept, and a direction how to deal with them, 2 Sam. xxiii. 6, 7. "But they of Belial shall be all of them as thorns thrust away, because they cannot be taken with hands, but the man that shall touch them must be fenced with iron, and the staff of a spear, and they shall be utterly burnt with fire in the same place." Let these words be understood as a threatning against all the wicked in general, who are to be quenched as the fire of thorns; or particularly of the promoters of antichrist's kingdom, in opposition to Christ's, as some interpreters judge; it will not weaken, but confirm my argument, if kings who are ringleaders of that gang be not excepted.

I know some do understand this of rebels against righteous rulers: which though indeed it be a truth, that they that are such should be so served, and roughly handled with iron, and the staff of a spear; yet it is not so consonant to the scope and connexion of this place, shewing the characters of righteous rulers, and of usurping tyrants, making an opposition between rulers that are just, ruling in the fear of God, and those that are rulers of Belial, promising blessing upon the government of the one, and contempt and rejection to the other, and shewing how both should be carried towards: neither does it agree with the words themselves, where the supplement in our translation is redundant; for it is not in the Hebrew. The sons of Belial, only they of Belial, clearly relative to the rulers of whom he was speaking before. And indeed the word Belial, in its etymology is not more applicable to any than to tyrants; for it comes from beli not, and Hhall above, because they will have none above them, or from beli not, and Hhol a yoke, because they cannot suffer a yoke, but cast away the yoke of laws and the yoke of Christ, saying, Let us burst his bands, &c. Nor is it always agreeable to truth, to understand it only of rebels against righteous rulers, that they can never be taken with hands: For as very rarely righteous rulers have any rebels to be the objects of their rigour and rage; so when there are any, discreet and wise rulers will find many ways to take and touch them, and quath or quiet them. But it is always true of tyrants, for they can never be taken with hands, neither in a friendly manner, taken by the hand and transacted within any bargain as other men, for they that would do so, will find them like pricking and jagging briers, which a man cannot handle without hurt to himself: nor can they be any other way repressed or restrained, or touched, but by hands fenced with iron, that is, with the sword of necessity, or axe of justice. And this is insinuated as duty, so to endeavour to extirpate and eradicate such thorns, as pester the commonwealth; but if it cannot be done, it must be duty and wisdom both not to meddle with them, nor own them, no more than Jotham, who would not subject himself, nor come under the shadow of the bastard bramble. I confess it is commonly taken as a threatning of the Lord's judgment against these sons of Belial: And so it is. But it teacheth also what men are called to, when they have to do with such, to wit, to take the same course with them as they would to clear the ground of thorns and briers. And that it is restricted to the Lord's immediate way of taking them off, is not credible: for, it can have no tolerable sense to say, they shall be thrust away, because they cannot be taken with the Lord's hands: neither is there need, that he should be fenced with iron, &c. And let iron, &c. be taken tropically for the Lord's sword of vengeance; yet how can it be understood, that he must be fenced therewith? or that he will thrust them away, as a man must be fenced against thorns? What defence needs the Lord against tyrants! It is only then intelligible, that the Lord, in his righteous judgment, will make use of men and legal means, and of those who cannot take them with hands, in his judicial procedure against them. Hence I argue, if tyrants are to be dealt with as thorns, that cannot be taken with hands, but to be thrust away by violence, then, when we are not in case to thrust them away, we must let them alone, and not meddle nor make with them, and so must not own them, for we cannot own them without meddling, and without being pricked to our hurt; but the former is true: therefore,--Of this same nature, another threatning confuting the pretence of the prince's impunity, may be subjoined out of Psal. lxxxii. 6, 7. "I have said, ye are gods, and all of you are children of the most high, but ye shall die like men, and fall as one of the princes." From which words the learned author of the history of the Douglasses, Mr. David Hume of Godscraft, in his discourse upon Mr. Craig's sermon, upon the words, doth strongly prove, that the scope is to beat off all kings, princes and rulers, from the conceit of impunity for their tyrannical dominations; that they must not think to domineer and do what they list, and overturn the foundations or fundamental laws of kingdoms, because they are gods; as if they were thereby uncontroulable, and above all law and punishment: no, they must know, that if they be guilty of the same transgressions of the law, as other capital offenders, they shall die like other men, and fall as princes, who have been formerly punished. It is not to be restricted to a threatning of mortality; for that is unavoidable, whether they judge justly or unjustly, and the fear thereof usually hath little efficacy to deter men from crimes punishable by law: neither can it be understood only of the Lord's immediate hand taking them away, exclusive of men's legal punishment; for expressly they are threatned to die like common men, and to be liable to the like punishment with them: now, common men are not only liable to the Lord's immediate judgment, but also to men's punishment. Hence, if tyrants and overturners of the foundations of the earth must be punished as other men, then when they are such, they cannot be looked upon as righteous rulers, for righteous rulers must not be punished; but the former is true: therefore,--According to these scriptures, which either express or imply a precept to have no respect to princes in judgment, when turning criminals, we find examples of the people's punishing Amaziah, &c. which is recorded without a challenge, and likewise Athaliah.

2. There is a precept given to a humbled people, that have groaned long under the yoke of tyranny and oppression, enjoining them, as a proof of their sincerity in humiliation, to bestir themselves in shaking off those evils they had procured by their sin, Isa. lviii. 6. "Is not this the fast that I have chosen, to loose the bands of wickedness, to undo the heavy burdens, and to let the oppressed go free, and that ye break every yoke?" which are all good works of justice and mercy, and more acceptable to God, than high flown pretences of humiliation, under a stupid submission, and hanging down the head as a bulrush. We see it then a duty to relieve the oppressed, and to repress tyranny, and break its yoke. If it be objected, (1.) That these are spiritual bonds and yokes, that are here commanded to be loosed and broken; or if any external be meant, they are only the yokes, of their exactions and usuries. For Answ. I grant, that it is the great duty of a people humbling themselves before the Lord, "to break off their sins by righteousness, and their iniquity, by shewing mercy to the poor," Dan. iv. 27. but that this is the genuine and only sense of this place, cannot be proved, or approved by the scope; which is, to press them to those duties they omitted, whereby the poor oppressed people of God might be freed from the yokes of them that made them to howl, and to bring them to the conviction of those sins for which the Lord was contending with them, whereof this was one, that they exacted all their labours, or things wherewith others were grieved (as the margin reads) or suffered the poor to be oppressed. (2.) If it be alledged, that this is the duty proper to rulers to relieve the oppressed, &c. I answer, it is so; but not peculiar to them: yet most commonly they are the oppressors themselves, and cast out the poor, which others must take into their houses. But the duty here is pressed upon all the people, whose sins are here cried out against (ver. 1.) upon all who professed the service of God, and asked the ordinances of justice (ver. 2.) upon all who were fasting and humbling themselves, and complained they had no success (ver 3.) the reasons whereof the Lord discovers (ver. 4, 5.) whereof this was one, that they did not loose those bands, nor break these yokes, nor relieved the oppressed; and those works of justice (ver. 6) are pressed upon the same grounds, that the works of mercy are pressed upon (ver. 7.) sure these are not all, nor only rulers. Hence I argue, if it be a duty to break every yoke of oppression and tyranny, then it is a duty to come out from under their subjection; but the former is true: therefore also the latter.

3. In answer to that grand objection of the Jews subjection to Nebuchadnezzar, I shewed what little weight or force there is in it. And here I shall take an argument from that same passage. The Lord commands his people there, to desert and disown Zedekiah, who was the possessor of the government at present, and says, it was the way of life to fall to the Chaldeans, Jer. xxi. 8, 9. which was a falling away from the present king. Either this commanded subjection to the Chaldeans is an universal precept; or it is only particular at that time. If it be universal, obliging people to subject themselves to every conqueror, then it is also universal, obliging people to renounce and disown every covenant-breaking tyrant, as here they were to fall away from Zedekiah: if it be only particular, then the owners of tyranny have no advantage from this passage. And I have advantage, so far as the ground of the precept is as moral, as the reason of that punishment of Zedekiah, which was his perfidy and perjury. Hence, if the Lord hath commanded to disown a king breaking covenant, then at least it is not insolent or unprecedented to do so; but here the Lord hath commanded to disown a king: therefore,--

Fourthly, We may have many confirmations of this truth from scripture practices approven.

1. I was but hinting before, how that after the death of that brave captain and judge Gideon, when Abimelech, the son of his whore, did first aspire into a monarchy, which he persuaded the silly Shechemites to consent to, by the same argument, which royalists make so much of, for asserting the necessity of an hereditary monarchy, (whether it is better for you, either that all the sons of Jerubbaal----reign over you, or that one reign over you?) and by bloody cruelty did usurp a monarchical or rather tyrannical throne of domination, founded upon the blood of his seventy brethren, (as we know, whose throne is founded upon the blood of all the brethren he had,) Jotham, who escaped, scorned to put his trust under the shadow of such a bramble, and they that did submit, found his parable verified, a mutual fire reciprocally consuming both the usurping king and his traiterous subjects; neither did all the godly in Israel submit to him. See Pool's Synopsis Critic. on the place, Jud. ix. Here is one express example of disowning a tyrant and usurper.

2. I shewed before, how, after the period of that theocracy, which the Lord had maintained and managed for some time in great mercy and majesty in and over his people, they itching after novelties, and affecting to be neighbour-like, rejected the Lord in desiring a king; and the Lord permitting it, gave them a king in wrath, (the true original and only sanction of tyrannical monarchy,) when the characters of his tyranny, presaged by Samuel, were verified in his aspiring into a great deal of absoluteness especially in his cruel persecuting of David, not only the 600 men that were David's followers stood out in opposition to him, but, in the end, being weary of his government, many brave and valiant men, whom the Spirit of God commends and describes very honourably, fell off from Saul, even when he was actually tyrannizing, before he was dead, 1 Chron. xii. 1. &c. They came to David to Ziklag, while he yet kept himself close, because of Saul the son of Kish, (N.B. now he is not honoured with the name of king,) they were armed with bows, and could use both the right hand and the left. And of the Gadites, there separated themselves unto David men of might, fit for the battle, that could handle shield and buckler, whose faces were as the faces of lions, ver. 8. And the Spirit came upon Amasai chief of the captains, saying, thine are we David, and on thy side, thou son of Jesse. Here was a formed revolt from Saul unto David before he was king; for after this he was made king in Hebron, and there could not be two kings at once. Hence I argue, if people may separate themselves from, and take part with the resister, against a tyrant; then they may disown him, (for if they own him still to be the minister of God, they must not resist him, Rom. xiii. 2.) But here is an example that many people did separate themselves from Saul, and took part with the resister David: therefore----Here two of the first monarchs of Israel were disowned, Abimelech and Saul.

3. The first hereditary successor was likewise disowned, as was hinted above likewise. The ten tribes offer to covenant with Rehoboam, in terms securing their rights and liberties. They desired nothing on the matter, but that he would engage to rule over them according to the law of God; to which, when he answered most tyrannically, and avowed he would tyrannize over them, and oppress them more than any of his predecessors, they fell away from, and erected themselves into a new commonwealth, 1. Kings xii. 16. So when Israel saw that the king hearkened not unto them, they answered, what portion have we in David? Neither have we inheritance in the son of Jesse; to your tents, O Israel; now see to thine own house David, 2 Chron. x. 16. Now, however the event of this declared revolt proved sorrowful, when they and their new king made defection unto idolatry, yet if they had stated and managed it right, the cause was good, justifiable, and commendable. For, (1.) We find nothing in all the text condemning this. (2.) On the contrary, it is expressly said, the cause was from the Lord, that he might perform his saying, which he spake by Ahijah, 1 Kings xii. 15. 2 Chron. x. 15. And (3.) When Rehoboam was preparing to pursue his pretended right, he was reproved and discharged by Shemaiah, ye shall not go up, nor fight against your brethren, for this thing is from me, 1 Kings xii. 24. 2 Chron. xi. 4. (4.) Whereas it is alledged by some, that this was of God only by his providence, and not by his ordinance; the contrary will appear, if we consider how formally and covenant-wise the Lord gave ten tribes to Jeroboam, 1. Kings xi. 35, 37, 38. "I will take the kingdom out of his son's hand, and I will give it unto thee, even ten tribes; and I will take thee, and thou shalt reign according to all that thy soul desireth, and shalt be king over Israel; and it shall be, if thou wilt hearken unto all that I command thee, and wilt walk in my ways, and do that which is right in my sight, to keep my statutes and commandments, as David my servant did, that I will be with thee, and build thee a sure house, as I built for David, and will give Israel unto thee."

Where we see the kingdom was given unto him on the same terms and conditions, that it was given to David. He may indeed give kingdoms to whom he will, by providential grant, as unto Nebuchadnezzar, and others; but he never gave them a kingdom upon these conditions, and, by way of covenant, that does always imply and import his word, warrant, and ordinance. (5.) If we consider the cause of the revolt, we will find it very just: for after the decease of the former king, they enter upon terms of a compact with the successor, upon a suspensive condition, to engage into fealty and allegiance to him as subjects, if he would give them security for their liberties and privileges. A very lawful, laudable and necessary transaction, founded upon moral equity, and upon the fundamental constitutions of that government, and suitable to the constant practice of their predecessors, in their covenanting with Saul and David. As for that word, 1 Kings xii. 19. So Israel rebelled against the house of David: it is no more than in the margin, they fell away or revolted; and no more to be condemned than Hezekiah's rebellion, 2 Kings xviii. 7. The Lord was with him, and he rebelled against the king of Assyria. That was a good rebellion. Hence if it be lawful for a part of the people to shake off the king, refuse subjection to him, and set up a new king of their own, when he resolveth to play the tyrant, and rule them after his own absolute power; then it is a duty, when he actually plays the tyrant, and by his absolute power overturns laws and religion, and claims by law such a prerogative; but the former is true: Ergo----See Jus populi vindic. chap. 3. page 52.

4. This same Jeroboam, when he turned tyrant and idolater, was revolted from and deserted by the priests and the levites, and after them out of all the tribes of Israel, by all such as set their heart to seek the Lord God of Israel; because that king, degenerating into tyranny and idolatry, had put them from the exercise of their office and religion (as our Charles did,) and ordained him priests for the devils, and for the calves: so they returned to Rehoboam, being induced by his administration of the government, which for a time was better than he promised, for three years he walked in the ways of David and Solomon, 2 Chron. xi. 13,--17. Hence I argue, if idolatrous tyrants may be deserted, then they may be disowned abroad, it is the same duty at home, though may be not the same policy or prudence.

5. Another example of the like nature we have in the reign of Baasha, who succeeded to Nadab, Jeroboam's son, whom he slew, and reigned in his stead, (the same way that the duke came to the throne) for he could not keep his subjects within his kingdom, but behoved to build Ramah, that he might not suffer any to go out or come in to Asa, king of Judah, a good prince, 1 Kings xv. 17. yet that could not hinder them, but many strangers out of Ephraim, and Manasseh, and Simeon, fell to him in abundance, when they saw that the Lord his God was with him, 2 Chron. xv. 9. Hence, if people may choose another king, when they see the Lord is with him, then they may disown their country king, when they see the devil is with him.

9. When Jeroboam, the son of Ahab, reigned over Israel, we have an express example of Elisha's disowning him, 2 Kings iii. 14, 15. And Elisha said unto the king of Israel, what have I to do with thee?----As the Lord of hosts liveth, before whom I stand, surely were it not that I regard the presence of Jehoshaphat the king of Judah, I would not look towards thee, nor see thee. Here he declares so much contempt of him, and so little regard, that he disdains him a look.

And if he would not regard him, nor give him honour, then he did not own him as king; for all kings are to be honoured, that are owned to be kings really. It may be alledged by some, that Elisha was an extraordinary man, and this was an extraordinary action, and therefore not imitable. I shall grant it so far extraordinary, that it is not usual to carry so to persons of that figure, and that indeed there are few Elishas now, not only for his prophetic spirit which now is ceased, but even in respect of his gracious spirit of zeal, which in a great measure is now extinguished: he was indeed an extraordinary man, and this action did demonstrate much of the spirit of Elias to have been abiding with him. But that this was was inimitable, these reasons induce me to deny, (1.) Prophets were subjects to kings, as well as others, as Nathan was to David (1 Kings i 32, 33.) every soul must be subject to the higher powers that are of God. (2.) All the actions of prophets were not extraordinary, nor did they every thing by extraordinary inspiration; that was peculiar to Christ, that he could prophesy, and do extraordinary acts when he pleased, because he received the spirit not by measure, and it rested upon him. (3.) This particular action and carriage was before he called for the minstrel, and before the hand of the Lord came upon him, ver. 15. Ergo, this was not by inspiration. (4.) The ground of this was moral and ordinary, for hereby he only shewed himself to be a person fit to abide in the Lord's tabernacle, and an upright walker, in whose eyes a vile person is contemned, Psal. xv. 4. And a just man, to whom the unjust is an abomination, Prov. xxix. 29. What further can be alledged against this instance, I see not. And I need draw no argument by consequence, it is so plain.

7. This same Jehoram, after many signal demonstrations of the power of God exerted in the ministry of his servant Elisha, which sometimes did extort his acknowledgement, and made him call the prophet his father, 2 Kings vi. 21. yet, when in the strait siege of Samaria, he was plagued with famine for his idolatry, insomuch that the pitiful mothers were made to eat their own tender children; became so insolent a tyrant, that being incensed into a madness of outragious malice against the prophet Elisha, that he sware, God do so to him, and more also, if the head of Elisha, the son of Shaphat, should stand on him that day, accordingly he sent a messenger to execute it. But the prophet, from a principle of nature, and reason, and law, as well as grace, and by the spirit of a man as well as of a prophet, stood upon his defence and encouraged those that were with him to keep out the house against him, saying, see ye how this son of a murderer (a proper stile for such a monster of a king) hath sent to take away mine head--2 Kings vi. 32. This is a strong argument for self defence; but I improve it thus; if tyrants may be opposed as sons of murderers, and murderers themselves, and no otherwise to be accounted than under such a vile character, then can they not be owned as kings; but here is an example for the first: Ergo.--

8. This man's brother in law, of the same name, Jehoram the son of Jehoshaphat, who had the daughter of Ahab to wife, and therefore walked in the way of the house of Ahab, gives us another instance. He turned apostate and tyrant, and Abimelech-like (or if you will, York-like) slew his brethren, and divers also of the princes of Israel; moreover he made high places in the mountains of Judah and caused the inhabitants of Jerusalem to commit fornication, and compelled Judah thereto: for which cause of his intolerable insolency in wickedness, Libnah one of the cities of priests in Judah, revolted from him, 2 Kings viii. 22. because he had forsaken the Lord God of his fathers, 2 Chron. xxi. 10. which was the motive and impulsive cause of their disowning him, and is not to be detorted to that restricted cavil of royalists, understanding it only as the meritorious or procuring cause of his punishment, and loss sustained thereby; for it is not said of the Edomites, who revolted at the same time, as it is mentioned in another paragraph; neither of the Philistines and Arabians, and Ethiopians, whose spirit the Lord stirred up against him; these were also a punishment to him: nor would it sound very suitably to be said, that they opposed him, because he had forsaken the Lord God of his fathers: for that would insinuate some influence that his apostasy had on them, as certainly it could not but have on the Lord's priests that dwelt in Libnah, who understood by the law of God, what was their duty to do with enticers, or drawers or drivers to idolatry: and when they were not in capacity to execute the judgment of the Lord, this was the least they could, to revolt. Here then is an example of a peoples revolt from a prince, and disowning allegiance to him, because of apostasy and tyranny.

9. In this kingdom of Judah, after long experience of a succession of hereditary tyranny in many wicked kings, the people, after they had long smarted for their lazy loyalty, in their stupid abandoning, forgetting and foregoing this privilege of disowning tyrants, and keeping them in order, began at length to bestir themselves in their endeavours to recover their lost liberties, and repress tyrants insolencies on several occasions; wherein, though sometimes were extravagancies, when circumstances did mar the justice of the action, and some did go beyond their sphere in tumultuary precipitations; yet, upon the matter, it was justice, and in conformity to a moral command. One impregnable witness of this we have, in the pious plot of Jehoiada the priest, who being but a subject, as all priests were (as the deposition of Abiathar by king Solomon, 1 Kings ii. 27. proveth) entered into an association with the inferior rulers, to choose and make a new king: and notwithstanding that the idolatress and the tyrant Athaliah, who had the possession of the government, cried treason, treason at the fact, they had her forth without the ranges, and slew her, 2 Kings xi. 14, 16. This was according to the law, Deut. xiii. and approven by all interpreters, even Mr. Pool in his Synopsis Critic. though otherwise superlatively loyal, yet approves of this, and says, she was an incurable idolatress, and therefore deserved to be deposed by the nobles of the kingdom, and quotes Grotius in loc. saying (she reigned by mere force; for the Hebrews were to have brethren for their kings, but not sisters, Deut. xvii. 15.) Hence if tyrants may be forcibly repressed, then may they peaceably be disowned; but this example confirms that: therefore----

10. The sacred history proceeds in the relation, how this same Joash the son of Ahaziah, after he degenerated into murdering tyranny, was slain by Jozachar and Jehozabad, 2 Kings xii. 20, 21. but that was by his own servants in private assassination: therefore they are called murderers by Amaziah his son, 2 Kings xiv. 5, 6. but upon the matter it was the justice of God, which he deserved (if it had been duly execute) for the blood of the son of Jehoiada the priest, 2 Chron. xxiv. 25. So Amon the son of Manesseh, for his walking in the way of his father in idolatry and tyranny, and forsaking the Lord God of his fathers, was slain in his own house by his servants, who conspired against him; but though this was justice also upon the matter and consonant to the command for punishing idolaters and murderers, yet because defective in the manner, and done by them that took too much upon them in a perfidious way of private assassination and conspiracy, therefore the people of the land punished them for it, 2 Kings xxi. 23, 24. But the repressing and punishing of Amaziah is a more unexceptionable instance.

The people made a conspiracy against him in Jerusalem, and he fled to Lachish; but they sent after him to Lachish, and slew him there, 2 Kings xiv. 19. after the time that he turned away from following the Lord, 2 Chron. xxv. 27. which was according to the command, Deut. xiii. which hath no exception of kings in it. This action was not questioned either by the people or his successor, as the forementioned conspiracies were. His son Uzziah succeeding, who did right, and consulted the Lord (2. Chron. xxvi. 4, 5.) did not resent nor revenge his father's death; which certainly he would have done, by advice of Zechariah, who had understanding in the visions of God, if it had been a transgression. The famous and faithful Mr. Knox doth clear this passage beyond contradiction in his conference with Lethington. Hence I take an argument a fortiori, if people may conspire and concur in executing judgment upon their king turning idolater and tyrant, then much more may they revolt from him; but this example clears the antecedent: therefore.

11. The fame power and privilege of people's punishing their princes, was exemplified in the successor of him last mentioned, to wit, in Uzziah the son of Amaziah, called Azariah, 2 Kings xv. when he degenerated into the ambition of arrogating a supremacy in causes ecclesiastic and sacred, as well as civil, his heart was lifted up to his destruction, for he transgressed against the Lord his God, and went into the temple of the Lord to burn incense. In which usurpation he was resisted by Azariah the priest, and with him fourscore priests of the Lord, that were valiant men, who withstood him, and told him, it did not appertain to him to take upon him so much, and bade him go out of the sanctuary, or else it should not be for his honour. Which indeed he stomached at as an affront, to be controuled and resisted; but in thinking to resent it, he was plagued of the Lord with leprosy; which the priests looking upon, they thrust him out from thence: and thereafter sequestred him from all supremacy, both that which he had before in things civil, and that which he was affecting in matters sacred; for he was made to dwell in a several house, being a leper, (the law including, and here execute upon, the king as well as the beggar) and to resign the government into his son Jotham's hands, 2 Chron. xxvi. 16,--21. where it appears, he was not only excommunicated by a ceremonial punishment, but also deposed judicially. Whether he voluntarily demitted or not, it is to no purpose to contend; 'tis evident, that by the law of God, the actual exercise of his power was removed, whether with his will or against it, it is all one; and that he was punished both by God and by men is undeniable. Yea, in this, his punishment was very gentle, and far short of the severity of the law: for by the law he should have been put to death, for intermeddling with these holy things, interdicted to all but to the priests, under pain of death, Numb. iii. 10. Numb. xviii. 7. The stranger that cometh nigh shall be put to death. All were strangers that were not priests. Whence I argue, if a prince, for his usurpation beyond his line in things sacred, may by the priests be excommunicated, and by the people deposed; then may a prince, not only usurping a supremacy (as Charles did) but an absolute power of overturning all things, sacred and civil (as James doth) and oppressing his subjects in all their liberties, be disowned, a fortiori, for that is less than deposing or dethroning; but this example clears the antecedent; therefore----. See Knox's discourse to Lethington. Lex Rex, quest. 44. sect. 15, p. 461. Jus popul. chap. 3. p. 56.

12. What if I should adduce the example of a king's rebellion against, and revolt from a superior king, to whom he and his fathers both acknowledged themselves subject? Surely our royalists and loyalists would not condemn this; and yet in justifying it, they should condemn their beloved principle of uncontrouled subjection to uncontroulable sovereigns possessing the government. Ahaz became servant to the Assyrian monarch, 2 Kings xvi. 7. yet Hezekiah his son, when the Lord was with him, and he prospered--rebelled against the king of Assyria, and he served him not, 2 Kings xviii. 7. Hezekiah was indeed a king; but he was not Sennacherib's king; he acknowledges himself his vassal, and that he offended in disowning him, ver. 14. which certainly was his sin against the Lord, to make such an acknowledgment: for if his father's transaction with the Assyrian was sin, then it was duty to break the yoke; if the Lord was with him in that rebellion, then it was sin to acknowledge it to be his offence: and to make good this acknowledgment, it was certainly his sin to commit sacrilege, in robbing the house of God, to satisfy that tyrant. By way supplement, I shall add that instance of repressing a mad and furious tyrant, which all will acknowledge to be lawful. Nebuchadnezzar was both stricken of God with madness, and for that was depelled from the kingdom, according to the heavenly oracle, The kingdom is departed from thee, and they shall drive thee from men, Dan. iv. 31, 33. Calvin says upon the place, he was ejected, as usually is done to tyrants, by the combination of the nobles and people, Pool's synopsis critic. in locum. Thus he was unkinged for a time, both by the just judgment of God, and by the intermediation of the just judgment of men; and could not be owned to be king at that time, when his nails were as birds claws, and he could not tell his own fingers: they could not own him to be the governor then of so many kingdoms, when he could not govern himself. Hence, though this is an instance of heathens, yet, because they acted upon a rational ground, it may be argued, If kings, because natural madness, when they cannot govern themselves, may not be owned; then also, because of moral madness, when they will not govern but to the destruction of kingdoms, may not be owned, but the former is true: therefore also the latter. The same reason against the government of asses, will also militate against the government of tygers, the first is more eligible than the last.

Fifthly, This may be confirmed from several promises in scripture.

1. There are many gracious and precious promises of reformation of the magistracy, and restitution of good rulers, as a great blessing from God to mankind, and to the church, Isa. i. 26. 'I will restore thy judges as at the first, and thy counsellors as at the beginning, afterward thou shalt be called the city of righteousness.' If judges must first be restored before the city can be a city of righteousness, then they must be restored before we can own the government thereof: for that government, under which it cannot be a city of righteousness, cannot be owned, since it is no government, but a rebellion and combination of thieves, see ver. 33. I do not here restrict the promise, as it is a prophecy, to its exact fulfilment, as if no government were to be owned but what answers this promise, of the restitution of the primitive order of magistrates; but I plead, that when the princes are rebellious, and companions of thieves, the government is not to be owned, till judges be so far restored, as to reduce righteousness in some measure, which cannot be under tyranny.

And in the general I may plead, that none is to be owned as a magistrate, but who some way is found in a promise; for there is no ordinance of God, no duty, no blessing, no good thing, either to be done or enjoyed, but what is in a promise; but tyranny, or owning of tyrants, or subjection to usurpers, is not, nor cannot be in a promise. We have many other promises about magistrates, as, that the Lord will be for a spirit of judgment to him that sitteth in judgment, Isa. xxviii. 6. A tyrant cannot be capable of this happiness, nor we under tyranny, nor any while they own them. Kings shall be the church's nursing fathers, and their queens her nursing mothers, Isa. xlix. 23. Kings are not always so, but all kings to be owned are such as can be so, at least they are never to be owned when they turn destroyers of what they should nourish; but tyrants can never be nourishers. It is promised to the Lord's people, if they will hearken diligently unto the Lord, and keep the sabbath, then shall there enter into their gates kings and princes, Jer. xxiii. 3, 4. But it is never promised, neither doth it come to pass in providence, that these duties procured tyrants.

There are many other promises to the same purpose: from whence may be concluded, the Lord will not always leave his people to howl under uneluctable tyranny, but will accomplish their deliverance in his own time and way, though we are not to look to miracles. Whence I argue, 1. Since all the ordinances of God, and rulers in a special manner, are appointed and promised as blessings, these cannot be owned for his ordinance, which are not blessings, but curses. 2. That which would vacate and evacuate all the promises of magistracy, cannot be a doctrine of God; but this that obliges to own tyrants and usurpers, as long as they are up, would vacate and evacuate all the promises of magistracy: for except the Lord work miracles, (which are not in the promise) and do all without means, they cannot be accomplished. For if any means be used, they must be such as will infer disowning of tyrants; for magistrates cannot be restored, except tyrants be removed; and whatever way they be removed without miracles, by others or their own subjects, they must still be disowned, and that before they be removed: for if they be to be owned before their removal, if they exist, cannot make them to be disowned: dispossession cannot take away their right, if they have it before.

2. There are many promises of breaking the yoke of tyrants, Isa. x. 27. "His burden shall be taken away from off thy shoulder, and his yoke from off thy neck." And in that promise of the church's deliverance and enlargement, wherein they are prophetically urged and stirred up to some activity in co-operating with the providence, Isa. lii. 1, 2. "They are called to awake, and put on strength and their beautiful garments--and to shake themselves from the dust--and to rise and to loose themselves from the bands of their neck," that were captives. Here is not only a promise of deliverance or a ground of encouragement what the church may expect, but a promise of, and direction for their being active in delivering themselves, as men, from the encroachments that were made on their human liberties, that they should loose themselves from these bands. Whose bands? from their bands that ruled over them, and made them to howl, and the Lord's name to be blasphemed, (ver. 5) Here is a promise of breaking the bands of rulers, by them who howled under their subjection. And it also includes a precept, that people should not stay any longer under these yokes, than they can shake them off, or slip from under them. Hence we see we are not to ly stupidly sleeping, or sinking in the ditch, expecting the accomplishment of the promise of deliverance; but are to endeavour actively, in dependence upon the Lord's assistance, to deliver ourselves. Hence we may argue, 1. A promise by way of command, that a people under bands of oppressing rulers shall rouse themselves up to loose themselves from them, implies and infers a promise and a duty of disowning those rulers (for otherwise they cannot be loosed from their subjection.) But here is a promise by way of command, that a people under bands of oppressing rulers shall rouse themselves up to loose themselves from them: Ergo----2. If the removal of tyranny and usurpation be promised as a blessing, then those can never be owned to be the ordinance of God; for the removal of that can never be a blessing; but in these promises we see the removal of those is promised as a blessing: therefore they can never be owned.

Sixthly, To the same purpose we may cite some threatnings, that will confirm the same truth.

1. There are many threatnings against tyrants themselves. There are two mentioned, Jer. xxii. that seem partly to quadrate, and near of a piece with our misrulers; both because of the demerit of the threatning, and the likeness of the judgment threatned. The ground of it was "building their house by unrighteousness, and their chambers by wrong," ver. 13. And severally threatned: "Jehoiakim with the burial of an ass unlamented," ver. 18, 19. Coniah with a life without prosperity, and a death without issue to succeed, ver. 30. The first of these is verified in the elder of our royal brothers, the last is like to be of both. But that which I take notice of is, first, the demerit, building their house by unrighteousness, on which Whitehall is built with a witness: and particularly it is noted of Jehoiakim, as his crimson sin (to which his son Jehoiachin or Coniah served himself heir) that he burnt Jeremiah's roll, or causes of wrath; so did our dominators burn the causes of wrath (a book written by the commission of the general assembly) and the covenants. Then I note these words, ver. 15. "Shalt thou reign because thou closest thyself in cedar, &c." It is certainly not fit for us to say, He shall reign, of whom the Lord says, He shall not reign; but when we own the authority of those whom the Lord threatens they shall not reign, we say, they shall reign; for we say, they have a right to reign, and own ourselves obliged to do all that is required in our capacity to perpetuate their reign. There is a terrible threatning against Zedekiah, Ezek xx. 25,--27. "Thou profane," or as some translate it, "thou worthy to be killed," (Pool. synops. crit. in locum.) "wicked prince of Israel--Thus saith the Lord God, remove the diadem, take off the crown, this shall not be the same, exalt him that is low, and abase him that is high; I will overturn, overturn, overturn it, and it shall be no more until he come whose right it is, and I will give it him." Than which nothing can be more applicable to our princes, who are profane, and the patterns and patrons of it, whose diadem the Lord will remove; and if he threaten it, wo to them that contribute to hold it on. We see here a profane and wicked prince threatned to be overturned must not be owned, because he hath no right; but our excommunicate tyrant is a profane and wicked prince, threatned to be overturned: Ergo--There is another dreadful threatning against tyrants, Amos iv. 1, 2. "Hear this word ye kine of Bashan, which oppress the poor, which crush the needy--The Lord God hath sworn by his holiness, that lo the days shall come upon you, that he will take you away with hooks, and your posterity with fishhooks." Shall we own these, against whom the Lord hath engaged his holiness by oath so solemnly, that he will fish them with hooks? we may fear if there be such a tie as allegiance between them and us, that that same hook which fishes them may also catch us; as it is said of Pharaoh and his subjects, when he is hooked, then his fish stick unto his scales, and he and they are left in the wilderness, Ezek. xxix. 4, 5. that is, as Grotius expounds it, whoever are of his community shall be consorts in his calamity, Pool. Critic. in locum. If we then own them, we must be of their community, and so partake of their judgments.

2. There are many threatnings against illimited loyalty, and those who had more of that than religion: for this Ephraim was broken in judgment, because he walked willingly after the commandment, Hos. v. 11. And because the statutes of Omri were kept, and the works of the house of Ahab, therefore the Lord threatens to make them a desolation, Mic. vi. ult. And among other threatnings against the men of such universal loyalty, that is notable, Hos. x. 3. "Now ye shall say, we have no king, because we feared not the Lord, what then should a king do to us?" It is the just punishment of wicked loyalty, that prefers the fear and favour of kings to the fear and favour of God, that at length they are brought to that pass, that either they have no kings at all to look to, or else they have such of whom it may be said, they are no kings in effect; for they cannot act the part of kings to them that trust in them. Hence, 1. If to have really no kings be a punishment. 2. If those that have the name of kings, that can do no good, be no kings; then tyrants that can do no good, but a great deal of hurt, must be reckoned no kings also; but here it is threatned, people that had kings, that had the name, but could do no good, should reckon they had no kings: therefore much more may tyrants be reckoned to be no kings, who can do no good, but a great deal of hurt.

Seventhly, This truth is confirmed from scripture-prayers; whereof there are many against tyrants, none for them. Hence we argue, If we are not to pray for tyrants, then we are not to own them; for we are to pray for all that are in authority, 1 Tim. ii. 2. But we are not to pray for tyrants; Ergo, we are not to own them. The minor now must be proved. And this leads me to another subordinate question, which hath also been a head of suffering to some serious seekers of God in our land of late.

The profane emissaries of this and the late tyrant, sent out with bloody commissions to hunt after the Lord's hidden ones, in order to murder all whom they might meet with, that made conscience of adhering to every part of the present testimony; among other trapping questions to discover their prey, they used to put this to them as a discriminating Shibboleth, and tessera of owning the present tyranny, will you say, God save the king? and for refusing this, many have been cruelly murdered in the fields; and many before their bloody judicatories, have for this been arraigned and condemned, and executed to the death. Wherefore to this somewhat must be said, 1. By way of concession. 2. By way of vindication, of scrupling it, and suffering upon it.

First, In the general, it will be necessary to premit by way of concession, 1. It is duty to pray, supplicate and interceed for all men, 1 Tim. ii. 1. not collectively considered nor distributively for every one universally without exception, but indefinitely and indiscriminately, for the kinds of every individual, for all sorts and sexes, of whatsoever nation or religion, Jew or Gentile, Christian or infidel, not excluding any for these distinctions: and not only so, but for every individual of the kinds, also conditionally, if they be among those all whom the Lord will have to be saved, verse 4. If they be among those all for whom the mediator gave himself a ransom to be testified in due time, verse 5, 9. If they have not sinned the sin unto death, for which we are not bidden pray, 1 John v. 19. Which, because we know not particularly who are guilty of it, charity will oblige us to take into our prayers many that may never be the better of them; yet it is necessary that we pray in faith, for what, or whomsoever we pray, at least, if I may so call it, we must have a negative faith, a belief that they have not sinned that sin unto death; which we cannot have at all, there being some whose demonstrations of desperate displays of affronted wickedness, and hatred of holiness may give ground to doubt of it, as Christians had of Julian the apostate. 2. We are obliged to love our enemies, to bless them that curse us, to do good to them that hate us, to pray for them that despitefully use and persecute us, Mat. v. 44. Accordingly our master, who commanded this, did give us a pattern to imitate, when he prayed, Father forgive them for they know not what they do, Luke xxiii. 34. And his faithful martyr Stephen, prayed for his murderers, Lord lay not this sin to their charge, Acts vii. the last verse. We are to pity them, and not to seek vengeance against them, for any injuries they can do to us. Yet, as this doth not interfere with a holy and zealous appeal to God for righting, and resenting, and requiting, the wrongs done to us, that he may vindicate us and our cause, and make them repent of their injuries done to us, to the glory of God, and conviction of onlookers, and confusion of themselves, which may well consist with mercy to their souls; so all we can pray for them in their opposition to us, is in order to their repentance, but never for their prosperity in that course.

And we may well imitate, even against our enemies, that prayer of Zechariah's, "The Lord look upon it, and require it," 2 Chron. xxiv. 22. But we are never to pray for Christ's stated enemies, as to the bulk of them; and under that formality as his enemies: for we must not "love them that hate the Lord," 2 Chron. xix. 2. but hate them, and hate them with a perfect hatred, Psal. cxxxix. 21, 22. We are to pray for the elect among them, but only to the end they may escape the vengeance, which we are obliged to pray for against them. 3. We are not to execrate our enemies, or use imprecations against any, out of blind zeal, or the passionate or revengeful motions of our own hearts: our Lord rebuked his disciples for such preposterous zeal, Luke ix. 55. "Ye know not what manner of spirit ye are of;" but against the stated and declared enemies of Christ, as such and while such, we may well take a pattern from the imprecatory prayers of saints recorded in scripture; such as do not peremptorily determine about the eternal state of particular persons: which determinations, except we be extraordinarily acted by the same spirit, whose dictates these are, are not to be imitated by us. We find several sorts of imprecations in the Psalms and other scriptures: some are imitable, some not; some are prophetical, having the force of a prophecy, as David's Psal. xxxv. 4. "Let them be confounded--that seek after my soul.--Let destruction come upon him," Psal. lv. 15. "Let them go down quick to hell." And Jeremiah, chap. xvii. 18. "Let them be confounded that persecute me,--destroy them with double destruction." Without this prophetical spirit, determining the application of these threatnings to particular persons, we may not imitate this peremptoriness. Some are typical of Christ's mediatory devoting his enemies to destruction; who as he interceeds for his friends, so, by virtue of the same merits (by them trampled upon) he pleads for vengeance against his enemies; which mediatory vengeance is the most dreadful of all vengeances, (Heb. x. 29.) So also, Psal. xl. He whose ears were opened, and who said, "lo I come,"--verse 6, 7. (that is Christ) does imprecate shame, and confusion, and desolation, ver. 14, 15. As also Psal. cix. the Psalmist personates Christ, complaining of, and imprecating against his enemies; particularly Judas the traitor, verse 8. It must be dreadful to be under the dint of the Mediator's imprecations; and also dreadful to clash with him in his intercessions, that is, to apprecate for them against whom he intercedes. But some imprecations against the enemies of God are imitable; such as proceed from pure zeal for God, and the spirit of prayer, as that, Psal. cix. last verse, "Put them in fear, O Lord, that the nations, may know themselves to be but men." Psal. lxxxiii. 16.----"fill their faces with shame that they may seek thy name." This is to be imitated in general against all the enemies of God, Psal. cxxix. 5. "Let them all be confounded that hate Zion;" without condescending on particular persons, except obviously and notoriously desperate and presumptively Christ's implacable enemies. 4. Touching magistrates it is a great duty to pray, that God would give us magistrates, as he hath promised for the comfort of his church, Isa. i. 26. Isa. xlix. 2. Jer. xxx. 21. Promises should be motives and foments of prayer. We ought to pray against anarchy as a plague, and with all earnestness beg of God, that the mercy of magistracy may again be known in Britain, of which it hath been long deprived. 5. And when we have them, it is a necessary duty to pray for them; "For kings and for all that are in authority, that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life in all godliness and honesty," 1 Tim. ii. 2. Where it is specified, what sort we should pray for, and to what end. As we are not to pray for all men absolutely; for some, as they are declared to be out of the precincts of Christ's mediation, so they must be out of our prayers: so there may be some in actual rule, that may be excepted out of the verge of the Christian prayers, as was said of Julian the apostate. But he that is a magistrate indeed, and in authority, the subjects are to pray and to give thanks for him, not as a man merely, but as a magistrate. Yea, though they be heathen magistrates, Ezra vi. 10. We may pray for all in authority, two ways; as men, and as kings. As men, we may pray for their salvation, or conversion, or taking them out of the way, if they be enemies to Christ's kingdom, according as they are stated; and upon condition, if it be possible, and if they belong to the election of grace. Though for such as are opposites to the coming of Christ's kingdom, as it is a contradiction to the second petition of the Lord's prayer, (thy kingdom come.) So, in the experience of the most eminent wrestlers, they have found less faith, and less encouragement, in praying for them, than for any other sort of men. It is rare that ever any could find their hands in praying for the conversion of the rulers. And though we pray that the Lord would convince them; yea, and confound them, in mercy to their souls; yet this must never be wanting in our prayers for tyrants, as men, that God would bring them down, and cause justice overtake them, that God may be glorified, and the nation eased of such a burden. But if we pray for them as kings, then they must be such by God's approbation, and not mere possessory occupants, to whom we owe no such respect nor duty. For whatever the Hobbists, and the time serving Casuists of our day, and even many good men (though wofully lax in this point) homologating both doctrinally and practically their heathenish notions, say to the contrary; I hope it be in some measure made out, that tyrants are no more the ordinance of God, nor to be owned as his ministers and vicegerents, than the devil the prince of this world for the Lord's anointed, or Baal's priests for true ministers. If we pray for them as kings, we must pray for their peace, prosperity, and preservation, that their government may be blessed with success, their designs not frustrated, nor their desires disappointed. This we cannot pray for tyrants. 6. Albeit, we may pray for the peace of the nation, and for the government thereof, so far as it may conduce to our own and the church's tranquillity, that we may live a peaceable and godly life under it; yet this cannot be extended to the peace of tyrants, for whom the best prayer that we can bestow is, that the Lord would bridle and restrain them, that they may not mar the church's peace. That command, Jer. xxix. 7. "Seek the peace of the city, whithersoever I have caused you to be carried captives, and pray unto the Lord for it, for in the peace thereof shall you have peace," is apparent to have been but of a temporary nature, upon occasion of their captivity there, until the 70 years should be expired, having it also declared by God, that their own peace was bound up in that of Babylon's: for after that time they are taught the contrary carriage towards that city, to depart, and pray against it, and exult and rejoice in its ruin: "O daughter of Babylon, happy shall he be that rewardeth thee as thou hast served us, that dasheth thy little ones against the stones," Psal. cxxxvii. 8, 9. "The voice of them that flee out of the land of Babylon, to declare in Zion the vengeance of the Lord, the vengeance of his temple," Jer. l. 28. And Jer. li. 35. "The violence done to me, and to my flesh, be upon Babylon, shall the inhabitant of Zion say, and my blood be upon Chaldea, shall Jerusalem say." Certainly this is not the season to seek the peace of mystical Babylon, but to pray for the destruction thereof, and all its supporters: which we cannot do, if we pray for them that improve, employ, and apply all their power to support it, lest we pray contradictions; as many do, who pray against Babel's brats, and yet pray for the king; but the comfort is this, that nonsensical prayers will do little good, little hurt, but to themselves that pray them.

Secondly, To vindicate the scruplers and refusers of such compelled and extorted devotions in praying for tyrants, I shall offer these considerations,

1. The imposed form of it (which as it is found in the original from whence it is taken, is only paraphrastically expounded, God save the king; and catechrestically applied to tyrants, being in the native sense of the words of this signification. Let the king live; which is a very improper wish for men of death, of whom God says they shall die, and the law says, they should die for their murders and capital crimes) must be taken either as an adulatory compliment; or a congratulatory honour; or a precatory benediction. The first as it is extorted most illegally, so it can be tendered neither civilly, nor sincerely, nor christianly; but all ingenious men would think it a base imposition, to be forced not only to subject themselves to their tyrannical oppressors, but to flatter them as if they were not such. Whatever they may force the mouth to speak dissemblingly, they can never compel the heart to think such wishes are due to them; and so they can never be cordial, nor confident with candor: and to interpose the holy and dreadful name of God, in a dissembling compliment, to flatter base men, is a horrid mocking of God, and a heinous taking his name in vain, contrary to the third command. If it be a congratulation (as always it is used in scripture, and in cases formerly; being never imposed on men, by way of compulsion, before this set of tyrants started up, that know they can get no deference of honest men, but by extortion) it is the more abominable; not only for the hypocrisy that is in it, but the blasphemy, in giving thanks for the promoter of the devil's interest, and the destroyer of Christ's, and the liberties of mankind. What have we to congratulate him for, but for overturning our laws and liberties, and oppressing us in most grievous tyranny? Besides, to give the vilest of men, when exalted, any congratulatory honour, is contrary to the fifth command, as is shewed above. "And it were a forsaking of the law, thus to praise the wicked, since they that keep the law, will contend with them," Prov. xxviii. 4. If it be a benediction, we cannot bestow it upon one whom our father curses, our mother curses, and all our brethren. It is no less preposterous to bless whom the Lord declaredly curses, than to curse whom he blesses. "The curse of the Lord is in the house of the wicked," Prov. iii. 33. we cannot then bless that house. Nor can we bless them that our mother curses, and cries for vengeance against, as she did against Nebuchadnezzar, Jer. li. 34, 35. Nor them against whom the blood of our dead brethren hath a moral cry, "How long, O Lord, holy and true, dost thou not judge and avenge our blood," Rev. vi. 10. And the vexed spirits of our brethren, yet howling under the same yoke, are putting up before the throne of grace, the same continued cry, with incessant importunity; "How long, how long shall the wicked triumph? How long shall they break in pieces thy people? O God, to whom vengeance belongeth," Psal. xciv. 1-4. Yea God hath said it, and we must not contradict it in our practice, against all tyrants that wrest judgment, and say unto the wicked, "Thou art righteous, him shall the people curse, nations shall abhor him," Prov. xxiv. 24. And this must stand registred, as the everlasting clause of all Zion's haters, to which all her lovers must say, Amen, that they shall be as the grass upon the house tops, and never have the benefit of the church's benediction, Psal. cxxix. 8. "Neither do they which go by say, The blessing of the Lord be upon you; we bless you in the name of the Lord." This one word may be a sufficient supersede as from blessing any of the enemies of God; or of the church, while acting in a declared opposition to God for the destruction of his people and interest.

2. Either this----Save the king, as they mouth it, and demand the repetition of it, is a prayer, or it is not. If not, it must be a dreadful profanation of the name of God, to be commanded to speak to him, and yet not to pray. If it be a prayer, we would expect another way of dealing with us, if they really desired the benefit of our prayers, than a threatning us with death, if we did it not. And if they did desire it, as Darius did, "that we might offer sacrifices of sweet savour unto the God of heaven, and pray for the life of the king and of his sons," Ezra vi. 10. we could not refuse to pray for him, so far as might consist with that prayer of the same Darius, in that same decree, ver. 12. "That God may destroy all kings and people, that shall put to their hand to alter and destroy the house of God." We can pray no prayer inconsistent with this; and to pray that God would save this king, and yet destroy all kings that put to their hand against his house, were to pray contradictions. But they know they deserve no prayers, and must force them, if they get them. And all the world knows, that compelled prayers are no devotion; and if they be no devotion, they must be sin; imposed prayers are not the prayers that God will hear and accept: and if we have not the faith of acceptance in them, they must be sin; for whatever is not of faith is sin, Rom. xiv. last ver. All prayers which God will hear, must proceed from the heart voluntarily and fervently, in spirit and in truth, with the whole heart; but imposed and compelled prayers cannot be such, especially when they are not only by them imposed, but prescribed as to the form of them: which sets and forms prescribed by men, and such men as usurp a supremacy over the church, cannot be subjected to, according to the word of God, and principles of our reformation.

3. That infallible proposition of the apostle, whatsoever is not of faith is sin, must be urged yet a little further: and that with a reference, both to the person required to be prayed for, and to the matter of the duty more generally. First, if we cannot pray for this man, neither as a Christian, nor as a king, then we cannot satisfy this imposed demand; for it will not satisfy for him as a heathen: but we cannot in faith pray for him, either as a Christian, or as a king. Not as a Christian, for besides that he is an excommunicate apostate (by a sentence, which we believe stands yet ratified in heaven, pronounced by a faithful servant of Christ) and a papist, which, as such, can no more be prayed for, than the pope as pope; for whom, and all the limbs of antichrist, the only prayer that protestants can pray, is, that the Lord would consume him with the spirit of his mouth, and destroy with the brightness of his coming, 2 Thess. ii. 8. (we cannot reconcile the prayers of some, that pray against the pope and his supporters, and upholders of his tottering kingdom, and yet for this his antichristian vassal) his rage and resolution in prosecuting a war against Christ and his followers, is such, that if we may make comparisons, our faith will have little more ground to pray for James, than Christians of old could find for Julian the apostate. Nor as a king, for that we cannot do, because he is none with God's approbation, and may not do, for a very heathen could teach us to pray, that God would destroy all kings that put to their hand to alter and destroy the house of God, Ezra vi. 12. And besides, in the second place, with respect to the matter of the duty in general; that cannot be, in faith, which wants a warrant in the word, either by precept, promise, or practice; but to pray for wicked tyrants and enemies of God, wants a warrant in the word, either by precept, promise, or practice: there is no precept for it, either general or particular, neither express, nor any to which this is reducible: and who dare add without a precept in the worship of God, either for matter, manner, or end, what he hath not commanded? For such presumption Nadab and Abihu were destroyed, Levit. x. 1, 2. because they did that which the Lord had not commanded. What command can there be for praying for that, which is against the preceptive will of God? But it is against the preceptive will of God that there should be tyrants: therefore to pray that these may be preserved in the world, cannot fall under a command of God. There is no promise for it, which is the foment and foundation of prayer: we can pray for nothing that we have not a promise for, either general or particular; but we have none, nor can have any, for the preservation of a plague to us, as tyrants are.

There is no practice for it in scripture, to pray for kings that put to their hand to destroy the house of God. Samuel did indeed mourn for Saul, but the Lord reproved him for it, how long wilt thou mourn for Saul, seeing I have rejected him from being king over Israel? 1 Sam. xvi. i. belike this reproof was for his praying for Saul's preservation as king, for otherwise we may mourn for wicked wretches, for their sin and misery both. But hence, if the Lord reprove his servant, for mourning for a king whom he disowned, then we may not pray for such a king whom the Lord disowns, as he disowns all tyrants, for they are set up and not by him; but the antecedent is true in that example of Samuel; therefore also the consequent, that we may not pray for them as kings, whom the Lord disowns.

4. Moreover, to confirm this yet further; that prayer is not of faith, and so sin, which is contrary to the precepts of God, and his promises, and the practices of the saints; but praying for wicked kings, their preservation, is contrary to these precepts, promises, and practices, &c. Ergo----. It is contrary to some divine precepts, both affirmative and negative. There is an affirmative precept, prescribing what prayer should be used under the domination of tyrants, that they should weep and say, Spare thy people, O Lord, give not thine heritage to reproach, that the heathen should rule over them, wherefore should they say among the people, where is their God? Joel ii. 17. If it be a reproach to be under heathen rulers, and if we should pray that they may not rule, but that our God may shew himself where he is, and who he is, in delivering his people from their domination; then it is contrary to this, to pray for the preservation of tyrants, that do rule over them to their destruction and reproach; for it is contradictory to pray, that they may not rule, and that they may be preserved in ruling. There is a negative precept, prohibiting the salutation of heretics and enemies of the gospel, which will condemn this salutation of heretical kings: for, in the original, God save the king, is no more than a solemn salutation, or apprecatory wish that he may prosper. 2 Epist. John ver. 10, 11. "If there come any----, and bring not this doctrine,----neither bid him God speed, for he that biddeth him God speed, is partaker of his evil deeds." God speed, in the Greek, is the same with God save, in the Hebrew. If then we must not say, God save a heretic; neither must we say, God save an heretical king, or a popish tyrant, a sworn enemy to the gospel of Christ, and the coming of his kingdom. This is also inconsistent with that rule and directory of our prayers, commonly called the Lord's prayer, not only because it cannot be reduced to any of its petitions, (which are comprehensive of all that we are warranted to pray for,) but because it is contradictory to the second, which is, thy kingdom come. The coming of Christ's kingdom in our land cannot consist with the preservation of the tyrant's reign, which is Satan's rule, for antichrist's and satan's kingdom, and Christ's, cannot be promoted both at once. It may be also demonstrated, that it is inconsistent with all the petitions of that perfect form of prayer. With the first, hallowed be thy name; for when they who rule over his people make them to howl, then his name continually is blasphemed, Isa. lii. 5. Yea much profaned in the frequent repeating that imposition. With the second, thy kingdom come; for when he takes unto him his great power and reins, then is the time he will destroy them that destroy the earth, Rev. xi. 17, 18. It is against the third, thy will be done--for it is against his preceptive will that there should be a throne of iniquity, it shall not have fellowship with him; as it would have, if according to his will. And therefore Habbakkuk pleads from the Lord's holiness and righteousness against tyrants, Habbak. i. 13, 14. It is against the fourth, give us this day our daily bread, to pray for them that rob us of it, whom the Lord hath set over us for a plague, to domineer over our bodies, and all the means of life, Neh. ix. 37. The saints there make a complaint of kings, and pray to remove them, not to save them: the church also prays against base rulers on this account, because under them they get their bread with the peril of their lives, Lam. v. 8, 9. It is against the fifth, forgive us our debts or sins; for if we pray for taking away the guilt of sin, we must also pray for removing the punishment; whereof this is one, to be under tyrants: and if it be sin which brings on judgment, then it is sin to pray for the keeping of it on, and continuing thereof; and though we should forgive their sin against us, yet we ought to complain against their sins against God, and the church, in defiling it, and shedding the blood of the saints, Psal. lxxix. 1-7. It is against the sixth, Lead us not into temptation, and deliver us from evil: for their government is a continued tract of temptation, they being a snare on Mizpah, and a net spread upon Tabor, Hos. v. 1. And if we pray to be delivered from all evil, then we must pray to be delivered from tyranny, which is a great evil. It is against the conclusion also, For thine is the kingdom,----and glory: tyrants being stated in opposition to the glory of God. Again, in the next place, it is against many promises of giving good rulers, and of breaking the yoke of tyrants, (as I cited several above;) neither of which can consist with the preservation of tyrants, if such a prayer should be answered according to the idol of the heart of the supplicants: for if God should save this man as long as we may pray for him as a king, then all the promises of a change and revolution are precluded. Lastly, It is contrary to the constant tenor of the saints prayers against the enemies of God. Deborah prayed upon the destruction of a tyrant, so let all thine enemies perish, O Lord, Judg. v. ult. Jotham prayed against the bastard king, Let fire come out from Abimelech and devour the men of Shechem, and--let fire come out from the men of Shechem and devour Abimelech, Judg. ix. 20. David prays against Saul, whom he calls Cush the Benjamite in the title of Psal. vii. alluding to Kish his father, or because he was no better than an Ethiopian, a Cushite, Amos ix. 7. and could no more change his manners than an Ethiopian can change his skin, Jer. xiii. 23. See Pool's synops. critic. in locum. Where it is proven, that this was Saul; against him he prays, that the Lord would awake to judgment, Psal. vii. 6. and that he would break the arm of the wicked and the evil man, Psal. x. 15. that he would not slay them, (to wit, suddenly, or in a common way) lest the people forget, but scatter, and bring them down, and consume them in wrath, that they may not be, that it may be known God ruleth in Jacob to the ends of the earth, Psal. lix. 11, 13. This is a psalm against dogs, ver. 9. what dogs?--Saul and his men watching David. See the title. As also it is against Saul that he prays, that the Lord would not grant his desires, nor further his devices, and as for the head of them that compassed him about, (which was Saul.) Let the mischief of their own lips cover them, Psal. cxl. 8, 9. There is also a prayer, that the saints may execute vengeance, and the judgment written upon tyrants, and bind them with chains, Psal. cxlix. 6, 8, 9. The church is brought in praying for vengeance against the Babylonian tyrant, Nebuchadnezzar the king of Babylon hath devoured me,--the violence done to me and my flesh be upon Babylon shall the inhabitants of Zion say, Jer. li. 34, 35. Paul imprecates any man that does not love the Lord Jesus, let him be Anathema Maranatha, 1 Cor. xvi. 22. and sure no tyrant, persecutor, subverter of Christ's kingdom, can be a lover of Christ. The martyrs, under the fifth seal slain for the word of God, and the testimony which they held, are brought in crying against the tyrants that murdered them, How long! O Lord, holy and true, dost thou not judge and avenge our blood, Revel. vi. 9, 10. Which though it be to be understood of a moral cry of blood, as Abel's blood cried against Cain: yet ought to be a pattern of our prayers against such bloody enemies, imbruing their hands in the blood of our brethren, for which we ought to pray that the Lord would haste to make inquisition. Durham observes from this place, that God's people, in a holy way, may pray for vengeance upon persecutors.

5. Let us consider the person and matter, for whom and for what this prayer is extorted. Either it is for the personal salvation of James the papist, or the royal preservation of James the tyrant. It will not satisfy to pray, that if it be possible, and if it were the Lord's will, he might be taken to heaven, that so we might be quit of him. Neither were it lawful to pray, that, except we prayed first, that he might repent of this his wickedness, if perhaps it might be forgiven him, as Peter directed Simon Magus to pray for himself, Acts viii. 22. for it is unlawful to pray for the salvation of a papist, except upon supposition of his repentance and relinquishing popery. We must pray nothing but according to the will of God; and it is not the will of God, that they that have and keep, and will not part with the mark of the beast, should be saved, for he is adjudged of God to drink of the wine of his wrath, Revel. xiv. 9, 10. So we cannot pray for him as a Christian, which he is not; nor as a papist, except that he may get repentance. Nor can we pray for him as a king, which he is not; nor as a tyrant, except that he may repent of and relinquish his tyranny and usurpation: for tyrants as such cannot be saved, no more than papists as such; for Tophet is ordained of old, yea for the king it is prepared,----Isa. xxx. 33. We cannot then pray for his salvation, except we pray for his repentance, and relinquishing all his sins, and so we must pray for him relinquishing his kingship, and that he may cease to be king; for that is his sin, that he hath made himself king without God, and against the laws of the land.

And now, while he continues such, we must complain in prayer, not for his misgovernment only, but for that he governs, and desire to be delivered from him. See Gee's magistrates original, pag. 258. But now considering what a man, and what a king he hath been, guilty of murder, adultery, idolatry, under sentence of the law both of God and man; we can pray no otherwise for him, than for a murderer, adulterer, or an idolater. We cannot pray for him as cloathed with authority, or that the Lord may bless his government, for that is his sin and our misery, that he is a governor: and his throne is a throne of iniquity, which we dare not pray may have fellowship with God. Can we pray that God would bless him on a throne of iniquity? Could we pray, that the Lord would bless a drunkard in his drunkenness, abusing his enjoyments? Or a thief in his stealing, though he used his purchase never so soberly? What if prevailing robbers by land, or pirates by sea, preying upon all passengers, should require this as the sign of subjection to them, and only condition whereupon such, as they apprehend and overcame, should be suffered to live, that they should pray for preservation and prosperity to them? Would not this be wickedness thus to pray for thieves and robbers? And are not tyrants the greatest of thieves, that rob and destroy twenty for one of private robberies? And do they not require this as such a sign on such a condition?

6. Lastly, Then the plea will be reduced to this, that it is exacted as a badge of loyalty, and sign, Tessera, Shibboleth of owning the authority. Which I have at this length endeavoured to prove, cannot be conscientiously owned by us, in these circumstances. And even by this argument: that authority which we cannot pray for we cannot own; but we cannot pray for this tyrannical authority: therefore.--The minor I trust is in some measure made manifest, by what is said above. And so I conclude this head, with that form of prayer, that I use for the king. O Lord God, to whom vengeance belongeth, shew thy self; lift up thyself, thou judge of the earth, render a reward to the proud. Lord, how long shall the wicked? how long shall the wicked triumph? Shall the throne of iniquity have fellowship with thee, that frameth mischief by a law? The mighty and terrible God destroy all kings and people, that put to their hand to alter and destroy the house of God. Overturn, overturn, overturn this throne of tyranny, and let it be no more, until he come whose right it is.

HEAD III.

The refusing to swear and subscribe the many unlawful imposed oaths, for which many have suffered great cruelties; chiefly that of Abjuration which was the cause of several their suffering to death, vindicated.

Another great head of grievous sufferings, in this fatal period, hath been, this stated war between Christ and his enemies in Scotland, he hath not wanted witnesses, who in their wrestlings for the word of God and the testimony which they held, thought it their duty to refuse all illegally imposed and wickedly required transactions with his declared enemies, and tampering any manner of way with them, in taking or subscribing any of their conscience couzening impositions of deceitful and destructive bonds and oaths, obtruded by men who have cast off all sense of a Deity, or regard to humanity, upon the consciences of poor people, to debauch them and cast them down from the only excellency or integrity that was left them: whereby (though they have missed of their design as to some, who through grace have escaped the snares of these fowlers, and in resisting have overcome through the blood of the Lamb) they have prevailed to inveigle the generality, even of the professors of this generation, into such a degree of defection and wretched compliance with all their snares, that as it prognosticates universal desolation ineluctable, (if it be not prevented as universal as the compliance hath been,) so it proclaims the infamy of the compliers perjury as indelible as their perfidy with whom they have complied. The consideration of which woful apostasy, in its various steps by which it hath been propagated and promoted, ought to deter and demur all the fearers of God, that would not partake of its threatned punishment, from venturing any more to come near the brink, or border of such precipices, and paths of the destroyer, when so many have stumbled, and fallen, and been hooked, and taken; yea not so much as to look near them, lest they be left to follow their look, but to stand aloof from every appearance of transacting with these man catchers, yea conscience-catchers, who are so cunning to ensnare and destroy; as their predecessors, to whose sins and judgments also they serve themselves heirs, are described by the Holy Ghost, Jer. v. 26-29. They lay wait as he that setteth snares, they set a trap, they catch men,----their houses are full of deceit, therefore they are become great and waxen rich.----Shall I not visit for these things saith the Lord? Many and manifold have been the snares, traps and gins, laid in the way of the professors of this generation and nation, by these mischief hatchers, these keen and cunning persecutors, the party now regnant or rather raging, in madness and malice against Christ and all that are loyal and zealous for his interest against their encroachings thereon, whereby they have caught and cozened many out of their consciences, and have broken the neck of some, the peace of others, and the hearts of not a few. Yea no nation can be instanced, wherein so many oaths and bonds have been imposed on peoples consciences, so nauseating for naughtiness and number, as well as noxious in their nature, in an age, as have been in Scotland within these 27 years past; on design to waste all remainder of conscience, or sense of religion among people, that so having worn out the awful impression of it, they may introduce what they would, upon a people involved in the same apostasy with themselves and either to incorporate all with themselves in the same combination against the Lord, or to extirpate all dissenters, who should discover any tenderness of conscience, in not going along with them in the same excess of riot. And to the end they might have the greater concurrence and countenance, with the help of hell's policy, they contrived them in such terms as might engage many to take them, and load the recusants with odious obloquies, either as silly scruplers, or seditious schismaticks, or rebels. For this hath been all along their grand project, to level their designs against religion, not directly and formally under that notion, but obliquely to the destruction of the lovers and professors of it under the nickname of fanatical enemies to government. Of these ensnaring engines levelled to these ends, some have been more patent and open, others more latent and hidden; both have made a pray of people, the last chiefly. For a snare the more latent and hidden it be and the more varnished over with the vermillion of pretended honesty and innocence, it is the more dangerous; and will be so accounted by all the circumspect and cautious, as in its design more destructive, and in its effects, when discovered, more dolorous, than that which is more open and manifest. A hook, the braver that it is busked, and the better that it is baited, the surer and more successful it is to catch the simple fish; if it want its busking, they will not so readily bite at it.

In vain is a net spread in the sight of any bird; yet though this is a truth, such silly birds have the bulk of us been, such silly doves without a heart, and so senselessly stupefied, as to suffer ourselves to be blindfolded and hood-winked into snares, of such a manifest baseness, as none could be readily supposed might fall into, who did not brutishly abandon all common sense of reason, besides religion; as a test, and oaths of arbitrary allegiance, bonds of conformity, and irregular regulation, &c. Some again, and these, alas! too many, have been ensnared with snares of a more smooth, and subtile complexion, and poisoned with gilded arrows, coloured over with the specious pretexts of the enemies relenting condescendency and tenderness, stooping now to universal and general terms, obviously thought capable of a very good construction, and daubed over with the untempered mortar of the frequency of the most universally unscrupled supscription of very good and conscientious men and the rarity of recusants lying under the reproach of some few, wild, fantastical fools. These well busked hooks have caught many; of which sort have been many banded indemnities, and easily swallowed oaths thereunto appended. Though the present indeed is contrived without gins of this sort, and now all these snares of oaths and bands are as illegally taken away as they were before imposed; upon the same design, to catch silly fish by other methods; not with hooks, as before, but with a large spread net, to hale the whole school to antichrist's shore; and to put to proof and practice the vastness of that leviathan prerogative of absolute power, to dispense with all oaths; especially because, in all of them, even the most monstrous, people might think there was some tye obliging them to maintain the protestant religion, therefore to obliterate that, and bury it in oblivion, all now are taken away; but the guilt of them still remains upon the land, and the grievous cry of suffering for refusing them still continues; and therefore the iniquity of them must be looked unto and lamented, and that with an eye to the account and reckoning must be rendered for them, to a greater judgment than that of creatures. But among all these destructive and diabolical devices, there have been none more charming and cheating, than that cunningly contrived oath of abjuration, as it is called, enjoined to be taken by all within the kingdom, by a proclamation about it, representing a late declaration emmitted by that party, whose sufferings I am vindicating (as a manifesto of their enemies) under the most odious character, that the malice of men helped with hell's hatred could devise; and requiring all to abjure it in the most peremptory manner, and under the severest penalty that ever was heard. This oath, I say, was contrived with such cunning, and followed with such keenness, that it hath involved more under its obligation, and engaged more to subscribe it, than any other that went before it: because it hath been painted over with such pretexts, as never any before was capable of. The pressing of it hath been so impartial, upon travelling to the country, &c. And their acceptance of the pass annexed to it thought so necessary, as without it no business could be gone about. Its subscription so universally unscrupled, even by the generality of great professors and ministers too; the thing abjured represented so odious, as no honest man could refuse to renounce; and the matter renounced, under its best aspect and construction, esteemed only a paper declaration of a party very despicable, wherein the principles, profession, or confession of the church seems no way concerned; and if any way concerned, yet the concern appearing so finall, as few or none durst state their sufferings upon that head. Yet I believe, if either such as have taken it, or others that may have the tentation of the like hereafter, will impartially ponder it; so much iniquity may be discovered in it, as may oblige the one to mourn in the sense of its fulness, and the other to beware of its danger. And so much rather would I offer this to consideration, that I know one who was wofully wheedled into it, that found the bitter effects of this poisoned pill in his wounded conscience, after reflections on the deed, in such a measure that he despaired of ever recovering peace. And this man had as much, and more to say, to justify his deed, than any that ever took it; having it with all the advantages that ever it could be tendered with: for, being urged thereunto before the justiciary, he expresly refused to disown that declaration, and the principles whereupon it was founded, and told them that it was misrepresented in the proclamation: and when they yielded to an abstract disowning of it in so far as the proclamation represents it, or, if so be, it might be so represented, he gave in a sense in writ, wherein he would take it; shewing that, upon supposition, the declaration did assert such things as was represented, he would disown it: and after the sense was accepted as satisfactory, he refused to swear after the ordinary manner, following the clerks, blind manuduction, but behoved to have it written down: and when it was written, with express specification of that apologetical declaration, he refused to swear it, till it was altered and corrected, and the word pretended put in the stead of it: which done, before he subscribed it, he protested it might be constructed in no other sense, than the genuine meaning of the words he delivered in, and that it might not be reckoned a compliance for fear of his life: yet, notwithstanding of all this, he lost the jewel of inward peace, and knew the terror of the Lord for many days. Therefore I shall chiefly insist on discovering the iniquities of this last oath, called the abjuration oath, both because it is the smoothest, and more generally taken than any other, and approven by many that condemn the rest, and refusing it hath been punished by death, and most illegally pressed upon all, under the penalty thereof, as none of the rest was; and because as all other oaths successively imposed, were so contrived that the last did always imply and involve the substance of the former, so it will appear that the iniquity of none of the preceeding oaths was altogether wanting in this. But to the end, both the complication of the iniquities of this oath may be evinced, and the continued strain of all the oaths (which have also been heads of suffering, though not to this degree) may be discovered; I shall touch somewhat of all the sorts of them, and shew that their iniquity cleaves to this last oath: and then come to canvass this oath itself, after I have premitted some general concessions.

First, In a few words some general concessory propositions may be premitted,

1. That oaths both assertory and promissory are lawful, will not be denied but by Quakers, &c. It is clear, swearing is a moral duty, and so material, that oftentimes it is used for the whole worship of God, Deut. vi. 13. "Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God, and shalt serve him, and swear by his name," Deut. x. 20.----"To him shalt thou cleave and swear by his name." The reason is, because by whomsoever we swear, him we profess to be our God, and invocate him as witness of our heart's uprightness, and honest meaning in the thing sworn, according as it is understood by both parties, and as avenger if we prove false. Hence, every oath, which doth not bind us faster to serve and cleave to him, is but a breach of the third command. Again, it is not only commanded as a duty, but qualified how it should be performed, Jer. iv. 1, 2. Where it is required of a people returning to the Lord, to swear in truth, in judgment, and in righteousness. Hence, every oath which is not so qualified, and does not consist with a penitent frame, is sin. It is likewise promised in the covenant, that believers shall speak the language of Canaan, and swear to the Lord, Isa. xix. 18. every oath then that is not in the language of Canaan, is unsuitable to believers, that is to say, consentaneous to the word of God, and confession of our faith. Again, he that sweareth in the earth shall swear by the God of truth, Isa. lxv. 16. and therefore that oath which is not according to truth, is dishonourable to the God of truth. If all the oaths imposed upon Scotland these many years, were examined by these touch-stones, they would be found all naught. So giving bands for security, which for obligation are equivalent to promissory oaths, are also lawful materially; but with the same qualifications, otherwise they are sinful.

2. This duty when suitably discharged, truly, judiciously, righteously, in the fear of God, according to his will, is in many cases very necessary. Not only in vows, in which God is the party, in matters morally necessary, to keep the righteous judgments of God, Psal. cxix. 106. Nor only in national covenants for reformation, and promoting the interest of Christ, whereof we find many instances in scripture, in Moses, Joshua, Asa, Hezekiah, Josiah, Ezrah, Nehemiah, their making and renewing such covenants by oath, coming under the dreadful curse of it if they should break it. And this may make our hearts meditate terror, for the universal unparalelled breach of solemn covenants with God, that exposes the nation to the curse of it; but also in human transactions, whereunto God is invocated as a witness, as in national transactions, at choosing and inaugurating their magistrates, for security of religion and liberties, as we have many examples in scripture. Seldom indeed do such bonds hold tyrants, but it is this generation's indelible brand and bane, that without this they have come under the yoke of ineluctable slavery, and have entailed it upon posterity. As likewise in contracts and mutual compacts of friendship, or stricter association, when edification, or other satisfaction, or security calls for it, as Jacob sware to Laban, David to Jonathan, &c. In which the matter must be clear, and mutually understood, and honestly meant, without equivocation and mental reservation, and all ambiguity, as also possible, and likely to continue so: for otherwise, it were but a mocking of God and man, to swear a thing we either cannot, or will not perform, according to the meaning of him in whose favours the oath is given. But withal we ought to be sparing in such things except where the matter of the oath or bond is weighty and necessary, and not multiply them needlesly upon formality or custom; for if there were suitable confidence in one another, there would not be need for so many of these securities. And specially in relative stipulations betwixt man and wife, &c. Where an indissolvable relation is entered into. And, in a particular manner, even in things civil, when we are called thereunto by a lawful magistrate, for deciding of controversies, or our own vindication, or to confirm our obligation to some duty, an oath for confirmation is an end of all strife, Heb. vi. 16. But always in this the matter must be lawful, according to the will of God, and true, and certainly known, and also necessary, weighty, useful, worthy of such confirmation, for the glory of God, and the good of our neighbour, that his holy name be not taken in vain; for otherwise if the matter be false, God is made witness of a lie; if uncertain, conscience condemns us that we know not, nor care not, what we call God witness to; if unlawful, then God is called to approve what he hath condemned, and so to contradict himself, which is horrid blasphemy. With all which cases, and hell devised impositions on consciences in these days, obtruded to debauch and ensnare them, not one of them, levelling all at one design, how smoothly soever conceived, can be taken without a wound and wramp to the conscience.

3. Of all these cases, only two are applicable to our imposed transactions with our wicked rulers, viz. in the matter of friendly contracts, or in the matter of judicial appearances before them, and swearing and banding before, and to them. In both which, there must be a sort of confederation, with them. In contracts with them it will not be doubted; and in judicial submitting to their authoritative impositions of such securities, it is evident, there must be also a confederation with them, not only in acknowledging their authority, but in coming under mutual exacted stipulations; wherein, by taking these oaths and bands, we give them security of orderly subjection, as members of the community whereof they are judges, and get their security of acquittance, and that we shall not be molested nor prosecuted among the recusants. Now concerning this confederation, I shall concede in two cases, it may be owned, and consequentially oaths and bonds may be given to men of their stamp, 1. A confederation which is more discretive, or discriminative may be allowed to them; that is, such bargains wherein they and we are kept still divided as two parties, and not under one incorporation, as in contracts of co-habitation, living under them as tenants, buying and selling, and the like. But we cannot enter into a confederation unitive with them, which may make us one body or party. 2. A confederation which is necessary and unavoidable; when either an unavoidable strife or contention doth arise between them and us, whereupon we are compelled to answer in law, and can no otherwise be decided but by our oath of confirmation, which is an end of all strife; or when we are falsely accused of some odious and heinous crime, as of murder or adultery: it is then lawful and necessary to vindicate ourselves, by giving all these legal confirmations that we are free of these things; for otherwise to ly under the imputation of such enormities, were shamefully scandalous to religion. But we cannot allow any transactions of this sort, which are elective and voluntary, to make or pursue either peace or pleas with them, when our own interest or benefit draweth us thereunto; but ere we go to law, or give oaths and bonds to, and before the unjust and perfidious, and such also as we cannot own as magistrates, we would rather take wrong, and suffer ourselves to be defrauded as the apostle adviseth, 1 Cor. vi. 1, 7. It was not unlawful, as expositors shew from that place, for the Corinthians to answer in law for their own vindication, being pursued by a heathen; but it was utterly a fault to go voluntarily one with another. And if to pursue a brother was a fault, then much more to go to law with an apostate, with whom there should be less meddling. And if to go before the unjust magistrates, as these heathen judges were at Corinth, who yet were magistrates, was utterly a fault, then much more to go before such as have neither rightful nor righteous authority at all: which yet must be acknowledged, if we take oaths and bands before them: for none can exact these but acknowledged magistrates. Hence it is apparent, it would be an elective confederation with these wicked usurping judges, when brought before them to take their tendered oaths and bonds, not as parties pursued before them, but as transacting with them, with whom, as well as before whom, we must give these confirming securities: and so not only must we acknowledge them to be gods, among whom the Lord sitteth, whose holy name is interposed in such solemn transactions; but also we must swear and enter in bonds to them as they require. This indeed is necessary when called before them against our will, and accused of horrid crimes, as was always in the imposition of the oath of abjuration audaciously imputed to the refusers, that they asserted murdering principles, and owned it lawful to kill all that served the king; in such a case, to declare with the most solemn asseverations, for vindication of truth, that we disown not only all such assertions, but all such thoughts as that it is lawful to kill all that serve the king, or any that serve him because they serve him, or because they have injured us any manner of way, and to declare our abhorrence of all murder and assassinations. But to swear such things to them, when we are altogether innocent, would be a granting that we were legally suspected, by offering a legal purgation. And so all the subjects of Scotland should take upon them to purge themselves from a suspicion of murder, which were odious. And to abjure a declaration, as asserting such things, when it asserts no such thing, is a swearing to a lie.

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