A Biography of Henry Clay, the Senator from Kentucky Containing Also, a Complete Report of All His Speeches; Selections From His Private Correspondence; Eulogies in the Senate and House; and a Poem, by George D. Prentice, Esq. (part 6 of 8)

A Biography of Henry Clay, the Senator from Kentucky Containing Also, a Complete Report of All His Speeches; Selections From His Private Correspondence; Eulogies in the Senate and House; and a Poem, by George D. Prentice, Esq. (part 6 of 8)

If there be any who want civil war, who want to see the blood of any portion of our countrymen spilt, I am not one of them. I wish to see war of no kind; but, above all, I do not desire to see a civil war. When war begins, whether civil or foreign, no human sight is competent to foresee when, or how, or where it is to terminate. But when a civil war shall be lighted up in the bosom of our own happy land, and armies are marching, and commanders are winning their victories, and fleets are in motion on our coast, tell me, if you can, tell me, if any human being can tell, its duration. God alone knows where such a war would end. In what a state will our institutions be left? In what state our liberties? I want no war; above all, no war at home.

Sir, I repeat, that I think South Carolina has been rash, intemperate, and greatly in the wrong; but I do not want to disgrace her, nor any other member of this union. No: I do not desire to see the lustre of one single star dimmed of that glorious confederacy which constitutes our political sun; still less do I wish to see it blotted out, and its light obliterated for ever. Has not the state of South Carolina been one of the members of this union in ‘days that tried men’s souls?’ Have not her ancestors fought along side our ancestors? Have we not, conjointly, won together many a glorious battle? If we had to go into a civil war with such a state, how would it terminate? Whenever it should have terminated, what would be her condition? If she should ever return to the union, what would be the condition of her feelings and affections? what the state of the heart of her people? She has been with us before, when her ancestors mingled in the throng of battle, and as I hope our posterity will mingle with hers, for ages and centuries to come, in the united defence of liberty, and for the honor and glory of the union; I do not wish to see her degraded or defaced as a member of this confederacy.

In conclusion, allow me to entreat and implore each individual member of this body to bring into the consideration of this measure, which I have had the honor of proposing, the same love of country which, if I know myself, has actuated me, and the same desire of restoring harmony to the union, which has prompted this effort. If we can forget for a moment――but that would be asking too much of human nature――if we could suffer, for one moment, party feelings and party causes――and, as I stand here before my God, I declare I have looked beyond those considerations, and regarded only the vast interests of this united people――I should hope, that under such feelings, and with such dispositions, we may advantageously proceed to the consideration of this bill, and heal, before they are yet bleeding, the wounds of our distracted country.

IN SUPPORT OF THE COMPROMISE TARIFF ACT.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, FEBRUARY 25, 1833.

[THE compromise tariff bill introduced by Mr. Clay, and supported by him in the foregoing speech of the twelfth of February, although favorably received by a majority, encountered considerable opposition from various motives. Mr. Forsyth, of Georgia, and others, met the proposition with sarcastic remarks, while Mr. Webster, and other northern senators, objected to it as surrendering too much of the protective system. To these objections Mr. Clay replied as follows. The bill finally passed the house of representatives (to obviate doubts as to its being a revenue bill) on the twenty-sixth of February, by a vote of one hundred and twenty to eighty-four, and the senate on the first of March, by twenty-nine to sixteen.]

BEING anxious, Mr. President, that this bill should pass, and pass this day, I will abridge as much as I can, the observations I am called upon to make. I have long, with pleasure and pride, coöperated in the public service with the senator from Massachusetts; and I have found him faithful, enlightened, and patriotic. I have not a particle of doubt as to the pure and elevated motives which actuate him. Under these circumstances, it gives me deep and lasting regret, to find myself compelled to differ from him as to a measure involving vital interests, and perhaps the safety of the union. On the other hand, I derive great consolation from finding myself on this occasion, in the midst of friends with whom I have long acted, in peace and in war, and especially with the honorable senator from Maine, (Mr. Holmes,) with whom I had the happiness to unite in a memorable instance. It was in this very chamber, that senator presiding in the committee of the senate, and I in committee of twenty-four of the house of representatives, on a Sabbath day, that the terms were adjusted, by which the compromise of the Missouri question was effected. Then the dark clouds that hung over our beloved country were dispersed, and now the thunders from others not less threatening, and which have been longer accumulating, will, I hope, roll over us harmless and without injury.

The senator from Massachusetts objects to the bill under consideration, on various grounds. He argues, that it imposes unjustifiable restraints on the power of future legislation; that it abandons the protective policy, and that the details of the bill are practically defective. He does not object to the gradual, but very inconsiderable, reduction of duties which is made prior to 1842. To that he could not object, because it is a species of prospective provision, as he admits, in conformity with numerous precedents on our statute-book. He does not object so much to the state of the proposed law prior to 1842, during a period of nine years; but throwing himself forward to the termination of that period, he contends that congress will then find itself under inconvenient shackles, imposed by our indiscretion. In the first place, I would remark, that the bill contains no obligatory pledges; it could make none; none are attempted. The power over the subject is in the constitution; put there by those who formed it, and liable to be taken out only by an amendment of the instrument. The next congress, and every succeeding congress, will undoubtedly have the power to repeal the law whenever they may think proper. Whether they will exercise it or not, will depend upon a sound discretion, applied to the state of the whole country, and estimating fairly the consequences of the repeal, both upon the general harmony and the common interests. Then the bill is founded in a spirit of compromise. Now, in all compromises there must be mutual concessions. The friends of free trade insist, that duties should be laid in reference to revenue alone. The friends of American industry say, that another, if not paramount object in laying them, should be, to diminish the consumption of foreign and increase that of domestic products. On this point the parties divide, and between these two opposite opinions a reconciliation is to be effected, if it can be accomplished. The bill assumes as a basis adequate protection for nine years, and less beyond that term. The friends of protection say to their opponents, we are willing to take a lease of nine years, with the long chapter of accidents beyond that period, including the chance of war, the restoration of concord, and along with it, a conviction common to all, of the utility of protection; and in consideration of it, if, in 1842, none of these contingences shall have been realized, we are willing to submit as long as congress may think proper, to a maximum rate of twenty per centum, with the power of discrimination below it, cash duties, home valuations, and a liberal list of free articles, for the benefit of the manufacturing interest. To these conditions the opponents of protection are ready to accede. The measure is what it professes to be, a compromise; but it imposes and could impose no restriction upon the will or power of a future congress. Doubtless great respect will be paid, as it ought to be paid, to the serious condition of the country that has prompted the passage of this bill. Any future congress that might disturb this adjustment, would act under a high responsibility, but it would be entirely within its competency to repeal, if it thought proper, the whole bill. It is far from the object of those who support this bill, to abandon or surrender the policy of protecting American industry. Its protection or encouragement may be accomplished in various ways――first, by bounties, as far as they are within the constitutional power of congress to offer them; second, by prohibitions, totally excluding the foreign rival article; third, by high duties without regard to the aggregate amount of revenue which they produce; fourth, by discriminating duties so adjusted as to limit the revenue to the economical wants of government; and, fifth, by the admission of the raw material, and articles essential to manufactures, free of duty; to which may be added, cash duties, home valuations, and the regulation of auctions. A perfect system of protection would comprehend most if not all these modes of affording it. There might be at this time a prohibition of certain articles (ardent spirits and coarse cottons, for example,) to public advantage. If there were not inveterate prejudices and conflicting opinions prevailing, (and what statesman can totally disregard impediments?) such a compound system might be established.

Now, Mr. President, before the assertion is made, that the bill surrenders the protective policy, gentlemen should understand perfectly what it does not as well as what it does propose. It impairs no power of congress over the whole subject; it contains no promise or pledge whatever, express or implied, as to bounties, prohibitions, or auctions; it does not touch the power of congress in regard to them, and congress is perfectly free to exercise that power at any time; it expressly recognises discriminating duties within a prescribed limit; it provides for cash duties and home valuations; and it secures a free list, embracing numerous articles, some of high importance to the manufacturing arts. Of all the modes of protection which I have enumerated, it affects only the third; that is to say, the imposition of high duties, producing a revenue beyond the wants of government. The senator from Massachusetts contends that the policy of protection was settled in 1816, and that it has ever since been maintained. Sir, it was settled long before 1816. It is coeval with the present constitution, and it will continue, under some of its various aspects, during the existence of the government. No nation can exist, no nation perhaps ever existed, without protection in some form, and to some extent, being applied to its own industry. The direct and necessary consequence of abandoning the protection of its own industry, would be to subject it to the restrictions and prohibitions of foreign powers; and no nation, for any length of time, can endure an alien legislation in which it has no will. The discontents which prevail, and the safety of the republic, may require the modification of a specific mode of protection, but it must be preserved in some other more acceptable shape.

All that was settled in 1816, in 1824, and in 1828, was, that protection should be afforded by high duties, without regard to the amount of the revenue which they might yield. During that whole period, we had a public debt which absorbed all the surpluses beyond the ordinary wants of government. Between 1816 and 1824, the revenue was liable to the greatest fluctuations, vibrating between the extremes of about nineteen and thirty-six millions of dollars. If there were more revenue, more debt was paid; if less, a smaller amount was reimbursed. Such was sometimes the deficiency of the revenue, that it became necessary to the ordinary expenses of government, to trench upon the ten millions annually set apart as a sinking fund, to extinguish the public debt. If the public debt remained undischarged, or we had any other practical mode of appropriating the surplus revenue, the form of protection, by high duties, might be continued without public detriment, it is the payment of the public debt, then, and the arrest of internal improvements by the exercise of the veto, that unsettles that specific form of protection. Nobody supposes, or proposes, that we should continue to levy, by means of high duties, a large annual surplus, of which no practical use can be made, for the sake of the incidental protection which they afford. The secretary of the treasury estimates that surplus on the existing scale of duties, and with the other sources of revenue, at six millions annually. An annual accumulation at that rate, would, in a few years, bring into the treasury the whole currency of the country, to lie there inactive and dormant.

This view of the condition of the country has impressed every public man with the necessity of some modification of the principles of protection, so far as it depends upon high duties. The senator from Massachusetts feels it; and hence, in the resolutions which he submitted, he proposes to reduce the duties, so as to limit the amount of the revenue to the wants of the government. With him revenue is the principal, protection the subordinate object. If protection cannot be enjoyed after such a reduction of duties as he thinks ought to be made, it is not to be extended. He says, specific duties and the power of discrimination, are preserved by his resolutions. So they may be under the operation of the bill. The only difference between the two schemes is, that the bill, in the maximum which it provides, suggests a certain limit, while his resolutions lay down none. Below that maximum, the principle of discrimination and specific duties may be applied. The senator from Pennsylvania, (Mr. Dallas,) who, equally with the senator from Massachusetts, is opposed to this bill, would have agreed to the bill if it had fixed thirty instead of twenty per centum; and he would have dispensed with home valuation, and come down to the revenue standard in five or six years. Now, Mr. President, I prefer, and I think the manufacturing interest will prefer, nine years of adequate protection, home valuations, and twenty per centum, to the plan of the senator from Pennsylvania.

Mr. President, I want to be perfectly understood as to the motives which have prompted me to offer this measure. I repeat what I said on the introduction of it, that they are, first, to preserve the manufacturing interest, and, secondly, to quiet the country. I believe the American system to be in the greatest danger; and I believe it can be placed on a better and safer foundation at this session than at the next. I heard with surprise, my friend from Massachusetts say, that nothing had occurred within the last six months to increase its hazard. I entreat him to review that opinion. Is it correct? Is the issue of numerous elections, including that of the highest officer of the government, nothing? Is the explicit recommendation of that officer, in his message, at the opening of the session, sustained, as he is, by a recent triumphant election, nothing? Is his declaration in his proclamation, that the burdens of the south ought to be relieved, nothing? Is the introduction of a bill into the house of representatives, during this session, sanctioned by the head of the treasury and the administration, prostrating the greater part of the manufactures of the country, nothing? Are the increasing discontents, nothing? Is the tendency of recent events to unite the whole south, nothing? What have we not witnessed in this chamber? Friends of the administration, bursting all the ties which seemed indissolubly to unite them to its chief, and, with few exceptions south of the Potomac, opposing, and vehemently opposing, a favorite measure of that administration, which three short months ago they contributed to establish! Let us not deceive ourselves. Now is the time to adjust the question, in a manner satisfactory to both parties. Put it off until the next session, and the alternative may and probably then would be a speedy and ruinous reduction of the tariff, or a civil war with the entire south.

It is well known, that the majority of the dominant party is adverse to the tariff. There are many honorable exceptions, the senator from New Jersey, (Mr. Dickerson,) among them. But for the exertions of the other party, the tariff would have been long since sacrificed. Now let us look at the composition of the two branches of congress at the next session. In this body we lose three friends of the protective policy, without being sure of gaining one. Here, judging from present appearances, we shall at the next session be in the minority. In the house it is notorious, that there is a considerable accession to the number of the dominant party. How then, I ask, is the system to be sustained against numbers, against the whole weight of the administration, against the united south, and against the increased pending danger of civil war? There is, indeed, one contingency that might save it, but that is too uncertain to rely upon. A certain class of northern politicians, professing friendship to the tariff, have been charged with being secretly inimical to it, for political purposes. They may change their ground, and come out open and undisguised supporters of the system. They may even find in the measure which I have brought forward, a motive for their conversion. Sir, I shall rejoice in it, from whatever cause it may proceed. And, if they can give greater strength and durability to the system, and at the same time quiet the discontents of its opponents, I shall rejoice still more. They shall not find me disposed to abandon it, because it has drawn succor from an unexpected quarter. No, Mr. President, it is not destruction, but preservation of the system at which we aim. If dangers now assail it, we have not created them. I have sustained it upon the strongest and clearest convictions of its expediency. They are entirely unaltered. Had others, who avow attachment to it, supported it with equal zeal and straight-forwardness, it would be now free from embarrassment; but with them it has been a secondary interest. I utter no complaints; I make no reproaches. I wish only to defend myself now, as heretofore, against unjust assaults. I have been represented as the father of this system, and I am charged with an unnatural abandonment of my own offspring. I have never arrogated to myself any such intimate relation to it. I have, indeed, cherished it with parental fondness, and my affection is undiminished, but in what condition do I find this child? It is in the hands of the Philistines, who would strangle it. I fly to its rescue, to snatch it from their custody, and to place it on a bed of security and repose for nine years, where it may grow and strengthen, and become acceptable to the whole people. I behold a torch about being applied to a favorite edifice, and I would save it if possible before it is wrapt in flames, or at least preserve the precious furniture which it contains. I wish to see the tariff separated from the politics of the country, that business men may go to work in security, with some prospect of stability in our laws, and without every thing being staked on the issue of elections, as it were on the hazards of the die.

And the other leading object which has prompted the introduction of this measure, the tranquillizing of the country, is no less important. All wise human legislation must consult in some degree the passions and prejudices, and feelings, as well as the interests of the people. It would be vain and foolish to proceed at all times, and under all circumstances, upon the notion of absolute certainty in any system, or infallability in any dogma, and to push these out without regard to any consequences. With us, who entertain the opinion that congress is constitutionally invested with power to protect domestic industry, it is a question of mere expediency as to the form, the degree, and the time that the protection shall be afforded. In weighing all the considerations which should control and regulate the exercise of that power, we ought not to overlook what is due to those who honestly entertain opposite opinions to large masses of the community, and to deep long-cherished, and growing prejudices. Perceiving, ourselves, no constitutional impediment, we have less difficulty in accommodating ourselves to the sense of the people of the United States upon this interesting subject. I do believe that a majority of them is in favor of this policy; but I am induced to believe this almost against evidence. Two states in New England, which have been in favor of the system, have recently come out against it. Other states of the north and east have shown a remarkable indifference to its preservation. If, indeed, they have wished to preserve it, they have nevertheless placed the powers of government in hand, which ordinary information must have assured them were rather a hazardous depository. With us in the west, although we are not without some direct and considerable indirect interest in the system, we have supported it more upon national than sectional grounds.

Meantime the opposition of a large and respectable section of the union, stimulated by political success, has increased, and is increasing. Discontents are multiplying and assuming new and dangerous aspects. They have been cherished by the course and hopes inspired during this administration, which, at the very moment that it threatens and recommends the use of the power of the union, proclaims aloud the injustice of the system which it would enforce. These discontents are not limited to those who maintain the extravagant theory of nullification; they are not confined to one state; they are coextensive with the entire south, and extend even to northern states. It has been intimated by the senator from Massachusetts, that, if we legislate at this session on the tariff, we would seem to legislate under the influence of a panic. I believe, Mr. President, I am not more sensible to danger of any kind, than my fellow-men are generally. It perhaps requires as much moral courage to legislate under the imputation of a panic, as to refrain from it lest such an imputation should be made. But he who regards the present question as being limited to South Carolina alone, takes a view of it much too contracted. There is a sympathy of feeling and interest throughout the whole south. Other southern states may differ from that as to the remedy to be now used, but all agree, (great as in my humble judgment is their error,) in the substantial justice of the cause. Can there be a doubt that those who think in common will sooner or later act in concert? Events are on the wing, and hastening this coöperation. Since the commencement of this session, the most powerful southern member of the union has taken a measure which cannot fail to lead to important consequences. She has deputed one of her most distinguished citizens to request a suspension of measures of resistance. No attentive observer can doubt that the suspension will be made. Well, sir, suppose it takes place, and congress should fail at the next session to afford the redress which will be solicited, what course would every principle of honor, and every consideration of the interests of Virginia, as she understands them, exact from her? Would she not make common cause with South Carolina? and if she did, would not the entire south eventually become parties to the contest? The rest of the union might put down the south, and reduce it to submission; but, to say nothing of the uncertainty and hazards of all war, is that a desirable state of things? Ought it not to be avoided if it can be honorably prevented? I am not one of those who think that we must rely exclusively upon moral power, and never resort to physical force. I know too well the frailties and follies of man, in his collective as well as individual character, to reject in all possible cases, the employment of force; but I do think that when resorted to, especially among the members of a confederacy, it should manifestly appear to be the only remaining appeal.

But suppose the present congress terminates without any adjustment of the tariff, let us see in what condition its friends will find themselves at the next session. South Carolina will have postponed the execution of the law passed to carry into effect her ordinance, until the end of that session. All will be quiet in the south for the present. The president, in his opening message, will urge that justice, as he terms it, be done to the south; and that the burdens imposed upon it by the tariff, be removed. The whole weight of the administration, the united south, and majorities of the dominant party, in both branches of congress, will be found in active coöperation. Will the gentleman from Massachusetts tell me how we are to save the tariff against this united and irresistible force? They will accuse us of indifference to the preservation of the union, and of being willing to expose the country to the dangers of civil war. The fact of South Carolina’s postponing of her ordinance, at the instance of Virginia, and once more appealing to the justice of congress, will be pressed with great emphasis and effect. It does appear to me impossible that we can prevent a most injurious modification of the tariff, at the next session, and that this is the favorable moment for an equitable arrangement of it. I have been subjected to animadversion, for the admission of the fact, that, at the next session, our opponents will be stronger, and the friends of the American system weaker than they are in this congress. But, is it not so? And is it not the duty of every man, who aspires to be a statesman, to look at naked facts as they really are? Must he suppress them? Ought he, like children, to throw the counterpane over his eyes, and persuade himself that he is secure from danger? Are not our opponents as well informed as we are, about their own strength?

If we adjourn, without any permanent settlement of the tariff, in what painful suspense and terrible uncertainty shall we not leave the manufacturers and business men of the country? All eyes will be turned, with trembling and fear, to the next session. Operations will be circumscribed, and new enterprises checked or, if otherwise, ruin and bankruptcy may be the consequence. I believe, sir, this measure, which offers a reasonable guarantee for permanence and stability, will be hailed by practical men with pleasure. The political manufacturers may be against it, but it will command the approbation of a large majority of the business manufacturers of the country.

But the objections of the honorable senator from Massachusetts are principally directed to the period beyond 1842. During the intermediate time, there is every reason to hope and believe that the bill secures adequate protection. All my information assures me of this; and it is demonstrated by the fact, that, if the measure of protection, secured prior to the thirty-first of December, 1841, were permanent; or if the bill were even silent beyond that period, it would command the cordial and unanimous concurrence of the friends of the policy. What then divides, what alarms us? It is what may possibly be the state of things in the year one thousand eight hundred and forty-two, or subsequently! Now, sir, even if that should be as bad as the most vivid imagination, or the most eloquent tongue could depict it, if we have intermediate safety and security, it does not seem to me wise to rush upon certain and present evils, because of those which, admitting their possibility, are very remote and contingent. What! shall we not extinguish the flame which is bursting through the roof that covers us, because, at some future and distant day, we may be again threatened with conflagration?

I do not admit that this bill abandons or fails, by its provisions, to secure reasonable protection beyond 1842. I cannot know, I pretend not to know, what will then be the actual condition of this country, and of the manufacturing arts, and their relative condition to the rest of the world. I would as soon confide in the forecast of the honorable senator from Massachusetts, as in that of any other man in this senate, or in this country; but he, nor any one else, can tell what that condition will then be. The degree of protection which will be required for domestic industry beyond 1842, depends upon the reduction of wages, the accumulation of capital, the improvement in skill, the protection of machinery, and the cheapening of the price, at home, of essential articles, such as fuel, iron, and so forth. I do not think that the honorable senator can throw himself forward to 1842, and tell us what, in all these particulars, will be the state of this country, and its relative state to other countries. We know that, in all human probability, our numbers will be increased by an addition of one third, at least, to their present amount, and that may materially reduce wages. We have reason to believe that our capital will be augmented, our skill improved; and we know that great progress has been made, and is making, in machinery. There is a constant tendency to decrease in the price of iron and coal. The opening of new mines and new channels of communication, must continue to lower it. The successful introduction of the process of cooking, will have great effect. The price of these articles, one of the most opulent and intelligent manufacturing houses in this country assures me, is a principal cause of the present necessity of protection to the cotton interest; and that house is strongly inclined to think that twenty per centum, with the other advantages secured in this bill, may do beyond 1842. Then, sir, what effect may not convulsions and revolutions in Europe, if any should arise, produce? I am far from desiring them, that our country may profit by their occurrence. Her greatness and glory rest, I hope, upon a more solid and more generous basis. But we cannot shut our eyes to the fact, that our greatest manufacturing, as well as commercial competitor, is undergoing a momentous political experiment, the issue of which is far from being absolutely certain. Who can raise the veil of the succeeding nine years, and show what, at their termination, will be the degree of competition which Great Britain can exercise towards us in the manufacturing arts?

Suppose, in the progress of gradual descent towards the revenue standard for which this bill provides, it should some years hence become evident that further protection, beyond 1842, than that which it contemplates may be necessary, can it be doubted that, in some form or other, it will be applied? Our misfortune has been, and yet is, that the public mind has been constantly kept in a state of feverish excitement, in respect to this system of policy. Conventions, elections, congress, the public press, have been for years all acting upon the tariff, and the tariff acting upon them all. Prejudices have been excited, passions kindled, and mutual irritations carried to the highest pitch of exasperation, insomuch that good feelings have been almost extinguished, and the voice of reason and experience silenced, among the members of the confederacy. Let us separate the tariff from the agitating politics of the country, place it upon a stable and firm foundation, and allow our enterprising countrymen to demonstrate to the whole union, by their skilful and successful labors, the inappreciable value of the arts. If they can have what they have never yet enjoyed, some years of repose and tranquillity, they will make, silently, more converts to the policy, than would be made during a long period of anxious struggle and boisterous contention. Above all, I count upon the good effects resulting from a restoration of the harmony of this divided people, upon their good sense and their love of justice. Who can doubt, that when passions have subsided, and reason has resumed her empire, that there will be a disposition throughout the whole union, to render ample justice to all its parts? Who will believe that any section of this great confederacy would look with indifference to the prostration of the interests of another section, by distant and selfish foreign nations, regardless alike of the welfare of us all? No, sir; I have no fears beyond 1842. The people of the United States are brethren, made to love and respect each other. Momentary causes may seem to alienate them, but, like family differences, they will terminate in a closer and more affectionate union than ever. And how much more estimable will be a system of protection, based on common conviction and common consent, and planted in the bosoms of all, than one wrenched by power from reluctant and protesting weakness?

That such a system will be adopted, if it should be necessary for the period of time subsequent to 1842, I will not doubt. But, in the scheme which I originally proposed, I did not rely exclusively, great as my reliance is, upon the operation of fraternal feelings, the return of reason, and a sense of justice. The scheme contained an appeal to the interests of the south. According to it, unmanufactured cotton was to be a free article after 1842. Gentlemen from that quarter have again and again asserted that they were indifferent to the duty of three cents per pound on cotton, and that they feared no foreign competition. I have thought otherwise; but I was willing, by way of experiment, to take them at their word; not that I was opposed to the protection of cotton, but believing that a few cargoes of foreign cotton introduced into our northern ports, free of duty, would hasten our southern friends to come here and ask that protection for their great staple, which is wanted in other sections for their interests. That feature in the scheme was stricken out in the select committee, but not by the consent of my friend from Delaware, (Mr. Clayton,) or myself. Still, after 1842, the south may want protection for sugar, for tobacco, for Virginia coal, perhaps for cotton and other articles, whilst other quarters may need it for wool, woollens, iron, and cotton fabrics; and these mutual wants, if they should exist, will lead, I hope, to some amicable adjustment of a tariff for that distant period, satisfactory to all. The theory of protection supposes, too, that, after a certain time, the protected arts will have acquired such strength and perfection as will enable them subsequently, unaided, to stand up against foreign competition. If, as I have no doubt, this should prove to be correct, it will, on the arrival of 1842, encourage all parts of the union to consent to the continuance of longer protection to the few articles which may then require it.

The bill before us strongly recommends itself by its equity and impartiality. It favors no one interest, and no one state, by an unjust sacrifice of others. It deals equally by all. Its basis is the act of July last. That act was passed, after careful and thorough investigation, and long deliberation, continued through several months. Although it may not have been perfect in its adjustment of the proper measure of protection to each article which was supposed to merit it, it is not likely, that, even with the same length of time before us, we could make one more perfect. Assuming the justness of that act, the bill preserves the respective propositions for which the act provides, and subjects them all to the same equal but moderate reduction, spread over the long space of nine years. The senator from Massachusetts contends that a great part of the value of all protection, is given up by dispensing with specific duties and the principle of discrimination. But much the most valuable articles of our domestic manufactures, (cotton and woollens, for example,) have never enjoyed the advantage of specific duties. They have always been liable to ad valorem duties, with a very limited application of the minimum principle. The bill does not, however, even after 1842, surrender either mode of laying duties. Discriminations are expressly recognised below the maximum, and specific duties may also be imposed, provided they do not exceed it.

The honorable senator also contends that the bill is imperfect, and that the execution of it will be impracticable. He asks, how is the excess above twenty per centum to be ascertained on coarse and printed cottons, liable to minimums of thirty and thirty-five cents, and subject to a duty of twenty-five per centum, ad valorem; and how is it to be estimated in the case of specific duties? Sir, it is very probable that the bill is not perfect, but I do not believe that there is any thing impracticable in its execution. Much will, however, depend upon the head of the treasury department. In the instance of the cotton minimums, the statute having, by way of exception to the general ad valorem rule, declared, in certain cases, how the value shall be estimated, that statutory value ought to govern; and consequently, the twenty per centum should be exclusively deducted from the twenty-five per centum, being the rate of duties to which cottons generally are liable; and the biennial tenths should be subtracted from the excess of five per centum. With regard to specific duties, it will, perhaps, be competent to the secretary of the treasury, in the execution of the law, for the sake of certainly, to adopt some average value, founded upon importations of a previous year. But if the value of each cargo, and every part of it, is to be ascertained, it would be no more than what now is the operation in the case of woollens, silks, cottons above thirty and thirty-five cents, and a variety of other articles; and consequently there would be no more impracticability in the law.

To all defects, however, real or imaginary, which it may be supposed will arise in the execution of the principle of the bill, I oppose one conclusive, and, I hope, satisfactory answer. Congress will be in session one whole month before the commencement of the law; and if, in the meantime, omissions calling for further legislation shall be discovered, there will be more time then than we have now to supply them. Let us, on this occasion of compromise, pursue the example of our fathers, who, under the influence of the same spirit, in the adoption of the constitution of the United States, determined to ratify it, and go for amendments afterwards.

To the argument of the senator from Massachusetts, that this interest, and that, and the other, cannot be sustained under the protection, beyond 1842, I repeat the answer, that no one can now tell what may then be necessary. That period will provide for itself. But I was surprised to hear my friend singling out iron as an article that would be most injuriously affected by the operation of this bill. If I am not greatly mistaken in my recollection, he opposed and voted against the act of 1824, because of the high duty imposed on iron. But for that duty, (and perhaps the duty on hemp,) which he then considered threw an unreasonable burden upon the navigation of the country, he would have supported that act. Of all the articles to which protecting duties are applied, iron, and the manufactures of iron, enjoy the highest protection. During the term of nine years, the deductions from the duty are not such as seriously to impair those great interests, unless all my information deceives me; and beyond that period, the remedy has been already indicated. Let me suppose that the anticipations which I form, upon the restoration of concord and confidence, shall be all falsified; that neither the sense of fraternal affection, nor common justice, nor even common interests, will lead to an amicable adjustment of the tariff beyond 1842. Let me suppose that period has arrived, and that the provisions of the bill shall be interpreted as an obligatory pledge upon the congress of that day; and let me suppose, also, that a greater amount of protection than the bill provides, is absolutely necessary to some interests; what is to be done? Regarded as a pledge, it does not bind congress for ever to adhere to the specific rate of duty contained in the bill. The most, in that view, that it exacts, is, to make a fair experiment. If, after such experiment, it should be demonstrated, that, under such an arrangement of the tariff, the interests of large portions of the union would be sacrificed, and they exposed to ruin, congress will be competent to apply some remedy that will be effectual; and I hope and believe that, in such a contingency, some will be devised that may preserve the harmony and perpetuate the blessings of the union.

It has been alleged, that there will be an augmentation, instead of a diminution of revenue, under the operation of this bill. I feel quite confident of the reverse; but it is sufficient to say, that both contingencies are carefully provided for in the bill, without affecting the protected articles.

The gentleman from Massachusetts dislikes the measure, because it commands the concurrence of those who have been hitherto opposed, in regard to the tariff; and is approved by the gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. Calhoun,) as well as by myself. Why, sir, the gentleman has told us that he is not opposed to any compromise. Will he be pleased to say how any compromise can be effected, without a concurrence between those who had been previously divided, and taking some medium between the two extremes? The wider the division may have been, so much the better for the compromise, which ought to be judged of by its nature and by its terms, and not solely by those who happen to vote for it. It is an adjustment to which both the great interests in this country may accede without either being dishonored. The triumph of neither is complete. Each, for the sake of peace, harmony, and union, makes some concessions. The south has contended that every vestige of protection should be eradicated from the statute-book, and the revenue standard forthwith adopted. In assenting to this bill, it waives that pretension――yields to reasonable protection for nine years; and consents, in consideration of the maximum of twenty per centum, to be subsequently applied, to discriminations below it, cash duties, home valuations, and a long list of free articles. The north and west have contended for the practical application of the principle of protection, regulated by no other limit than the necessary wants of the country. If they accede to this adjustment, they agree, in consideration of the stability and certainty which nine years’ duration of a favorite system of policy affords, and of the other advantages which have been enumerated, to come down in 1842 to a limit not exceeding twenty per centum. Both parties, animated by a desire to avert the evils which might flow from carrying out into all their consequences the cherished system of either, have met upon common ground, made mutual and friendly concessions, and, I trust, and sincerely believe, that neither will have, hereafter, occasion to regret, as neither can justly reproach the other with what may be now done.

This, or some other measure of conciliation, is now more than ever necessary, since the passage, through the senate, of the enforcing bill. To that bill, if I had been present, on the final vote, I should have given my assent, although with great reluctance. I believe this government not only possessed of the constitutional power, but to be bound by every consideration, to maintain the authority of the laws. But I deeply regretted the necessity which seemed to me to require the passage of such a bill. And I was far from being without serious apprehensions as to the consequences to which it might lead. I felt no new-born zeal in favor of the present administration, of which I now think as I have always thought. I could not vote against the measure; I would not speak in its behalf. I thought it most proper in me to leave to the friends of the administration and to others, who might feel themselves particularly called upon, to defend and sustain a strong measure of the administration. With respect to the series of acts to which the executive has resorted, in relation to our southern disturbance, this is not a fit occasion to enter upon a full consideration of them; but I will briefly say, that, although the proclamation is a paper of uncommon ability and eloquence, doing great credit, as a composition, to him who prepared it, and to him who signed it, I think it contains some ultra doctrines, which no party in this country had ventured to assert. With these are mixed up many sound principles and just views of our political systems, if it is to be judged by its effects upon those to whom it was more immediately addressed, it must be admitted to have been ill-timed and unfortunate. Instead of allaying the excitement which prevailed, it increased the exasperation in the infected district, and afforded new and unnecessary causes of discontent and dissatisfaction in the south generally. The message, subsequently transmitted to congress, communicating the proceedings of South Carolina, and calling for countervailing enactments, was characterized with more prudence and moderation. And, if this unhappy contest is to continue, I sincerely hope, that the future conduct of the administration may be governed by wise and cautious counsels, and a parental forbearance. But when the highest degree of animosity exists; when both parties, however unequal, have arrayed themselves for the conflict; who can tell when, by the indiscretion of subordinates, or other unforeseen causes, the bloody struggle may commence? In the midst of magazines, who knows when the fatal spark may produce a terrible explosion? And the battle once begun, where is its limit? What latitude will circumscribe its rage? Who is to command our armies? When, and where, and how, is the war to cease? In what condition will the peace leave the American system, the American union, and, what is more than all, American liberty? I cannot profess to have a confidence, which I have not, in this administration, but if I had all confidence in it, I should still wish to pause, and, if possible, by any honorable adjustment, to prevent awful consequences, the extent of which no human wisdom can foresee.

It appears to me, then, Mr. President, that we ought not to content ourselves with passing the enforcing bill only. Both that and the bill of peace seem to me to be required for the good of our country. The first will satisfy all who love order and law, and disapprove the inadmissible doctrine of nullification. The last will soothe those who love peace and concord, harmony and union. One demonstrates the power and the disposition to vindicate the authority and supremacy of the laws of the union; the other offers that, which, if it be accepted in the fraternal spirit in which it is tendered, will supersede the necessity of the employment of all force.

There are some who say, let the tariff go down; let our manufactures be prostrated, if such be the pleasure, at another session, of those to whose hands the government of this country is confided; let bankruptcy and ruin be spread over the land; and let resistance to the laws, at all hazards, be subdued. Sir, they take counsel from their passions. They anticipate a terrible reaction from the downfall of the tariff, which would ultimately reëstablish it upon a firmer basis than ever. But it is these very agitations, these mutual irritations between brethren of the same family, it is the individual distress and general ruin that would necessarily follow the overthrow of the tariff, that ought, if possible, to be prevented. Besides, are we certain of this reaction? Have we not been disappointed in it as to other measures heretofore? But suppose, after a long and embittered struggle, it should come, in what relative condition would it find the parts of this confederacy? In what state our ruined manufactures? When they should be laid low, who, amidst the fragments of the general wreck, scattered over the face of the land, would have courage to engage in fresh enterprises, under a new pledge of the violated faith of the government? If we adjourn, without passing this bill, having intrusted the executive with vast powers to maintain the laws, should he be able by the next session to put down all opposition to them, will he not, as a necessary consequence of success, have more power than ever to put down the tariff also? Has he not said that the south is oppressed, and its burdens ought to be relieved? And will he not feel himself bound, after he shall have triumphed, if triumph he may in a civil war, to appease the discontents of the south by a modification of the tariff, in conformity with its wishes and demands? No, sir; no, sir; let us save the country from the most dreadful of all calamities, and let us save its industry, too, from threatened destruction. Statesmen should regulate their conduct and adapt their measures to the exigences of the times in which they live. They cannot, indeed, transcend the limits of the constitutional rule; but with respect to those systems of policy which fall within its scope, they should arrange them according to the interests, the wants, and the prejudices of the people. Two great dangers threaten the public safety. The true patriot will not stop to inquire how they have been brought about, but will fly to the deliverance of his country. The difference between the friends and the foes of the compromise, under consideration, is, that they would, in the enforcing act, send forth alone a flaming sword. We would send out that also, but along with it the olive branch, as a messenger of peace. They cry out, the law! the law! the law! Power! power! power! We, too, reverence the law, and bow to the supremacy of its obligation; but we are in favor of the law executed in mildness, and of power tempered with mercy. They, as we think, would hazard a civil commotion, beginning in South Carolina and extending, God only knows where. While we would vindicate the federal government, we are for peace, if possible, union, and liberty. We want no war, above all, no civil war, no family strife. We want to see no sacked cities, no desolated fields, no smoking ruins, no streams of American blood shed by American arms!

I have been accused of ambition in presenting this measure. Ambition! inordinate ambition! If I had thought of myself only, I should have never brought it forward. I know well the perils to which I expose myself; the risk of alienating faithful and valued friends, with but little prospect of making new ones, if any new ones could compensate for the loss of those whom we have long tried and loved; and the honest misconceptions both of friends and foes. Ambition! If I had listened to its soft and seducing whispers; if I had yielded myself to the dictates of a cold, calculating, and prudential policy, I would have stood still and unmoved. I might even have silently gazed on the raging storm, enjoyed its loudest thunders, and left those who are charged with the care of the vessel of state, to conduct it as they could. I have been heretofore often unjustly accused of ambition. Low, grovelling souls, who are utterly incapable of elevating themselves to the higher and nobler duties of pure patriotism――beings, who, for ever keeping their own selfish aims in view, decide all public measures by their presumed influence on their aggrandizement――judge me by the venal rule which they prescribe to themselves. I have given to the winds those false accusations, as I consign that which now impeaches my motives. I have no desire for office, not even the highest. The most exalted is but a prison, in which the incarcerated incumbent daily receives his cold, heartless visitants, marks his weary hours, and is cut off from the practical enjoyment of all the blessings of genuine freedom. I am no candidate for any office in the gift of the people of these states, united or separated; I never wish, never expect to be. Pass this bill, tranquillize the country, restore confidence and affection in the union, and I am willing to go home to Ashland, and renounce public service for ever. I should there find, in its groves, under its shades, on its lawns, amidst my flocks and herds, in the bosom of my family, sincerity and truth, attachment, and fidelity, and gratitude, which I have not always found in the walks of public life. Yes, I have ambition; but it is the ambition of being the humble instrument, in the hands of Providence, to reconcile a divided people; once more to revive concord and harmony in a distracted land――the pleasing ambition of contemplating the glorious spectacle of a free, united, prosperous, and fraternal people!

IN SUPPORT OF THE COMPROMISE ACT.

IN THE SENATE, MARCH 1, 1833.

[THE bill for modifying the duties on imports, as passed by the house of representatives, (in effect, Mr. Clay’s bill,) being under consideration, and on its passage, a brief discussion took place, between Messrs. Calhoun, Mangum, Frelinghuysen, Sprague, and others, in favor of the bill, and Messrs. Webster, Dallas, Robbins, and others, in opposition.]

MR. CLAY then said a few words in reference to this bill and the enforcing bill, both of which he considered that it was necessary to send forth, as well to show that the laws must be executed, as that there is a disposition to make concessions. He stated, that on the subject of the government’s being a compact, he principally agreed with the senator from South Carolina, but with some difference as to the character of the right conferred by that compact. He did not adopt the opinion, that there had been any advance made in usurpation of powers by the general government. He then went into a view of the history of this system, to show, that twelve or thirteen years ago, there was no opposition raised against the power of congress to protect domestic industry. The opposition on constitutional grounds had subsequently grown up. He then stated, that in his opinion no state could so practically construe the constitution as to nullify the laws of the United States, without plunging the country into all the miseries of anarchy. He said that he adhered to the doctrines of that ablest, wisest, and purest of American statesmen, James Madison, who still lives, and resides in Virginia――the doctrines which were advanced by him in 1799. The answer of that distinguished man to the resolutions of the other states, and his address to the people, effected a sudden revolution of public opinion. The people rallied around him; the alien and sedition laws were repealed; and the usurpations of the general government were arrested. He viewed the government as federative in its origin, in its character, and in its operation, and under the clause of the constitution which gives to congress power to pass all laws to carry into effect the granted powers, they could pass all necessary laws. He hoped that the effect of this bill would conciliate all classes and all sections of the union.

He did not arrogate any merit for the passage of this bill. He had cherished this system as a favorite child, and he still clung to it, and should still cling to it. Why had he been reproached? He had come to the child and found it in the hands of the Philistines, who were desirous to destroy it. He wished to save and cherish it, and to find for it better and safer nurses. He did not wish to employ the sword, but to effect his object by concession and conciliation. He wished to see the system placed on a securer basis, to plant it in the bosoms and affections of the people. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, who had learned his views of the system from the senator from South Carolina, had spoken of him as the pilot who was directing the vessel. If it was so, he would ask if she had been secured by a faithful crew? If all had been faithful, he believed there would have been no danger in assailing the system. He assailed no one; he merely defended himself against the reproaches of others.

Another motive with him was to preserve the union. He feared he saw hands uplifted to destroy the system; he saw the union endangered; and in spite of all peril which might assail himself, he had determined to stand forward and attempt the rescue.

He felt himself pained exceedingly in being obliged to separate on the question, from valued friends, especially from his friend from Massachusetts, whom he had always respected, and whom he still respected. He then replied to the argument founded on the idea that the protective principle had been abandoned by this bill. He admitted that protection had been better secured by former bills, but there was no surrender by this. He considered revenue as the first object and protection as the second. As to the reduction of the revenue, he was of opinion that there was an error in the calculations of gentlemen. He thought that in the article of silks alone, there would be a considerable reduction. The protection to the mechanic arts was only reduced by the whole operation of the bill to twenty-six per centum, and he did not know that there would be any just ground for complaint, as some of the mechanic arts now enjoy only twenty-five per centum.

The argument of the senator from New York, (Mr. Wright,) was against the bill, but he was happy to find his vote was to be for it. If his argument brought other minds to the same conclusion to which it had brought his, the bill would not be in any danger. He would say, save the country; save the union; and save the American system.

ON THE PRESIDENT’S MESSAGE, RETURNING THE PUBLIC LAND BILL.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, DECEMBER 5, 1833.

[THE bill to distribute the proceeds of the public lands, introduced by Mr. Clay, passed both houses of congress on the first of March, 1832, one day before the adjournment, and the term of the twenty-second congress expired on Sunday, the third of March, 1832. The majorities were so large in favor of the bill, that it was believed if the president had immediately returned the bill with his objections, on the second of March, it would have been passed by the constitutional majority of two thirds of the members present in each house, and thus have become a law, notwithstanding the objections of president Jackson. But the president adopted the unprecedented course of retaining the bill until the next session of congress. In December, 1833, the twenty-third congress assembled, and the president sent a message to the senate, returning the land bill which had been passed by the previous congress, with his objections to the same, and stating that for want of time he had not pursued the usual course. The message of the president, assigning his reasons for the return of the bill, having been read, Mr. Clay rose and made the following remarks.]

THIS measure had been first introduced into congress at the session before the last, under circumstances which must be within the recollection of every member of the senate. Its object was, to dispose of the proceeds of the public lands for a limited time. The subject had been greatly discussed not only in congress, but throughout the country. The principles and provisions of the bill were well and generally understood. The subject had attracted the attention of the chief magistrate himself, and this bill was made the subject of commentary in his message at the commencement of the last session of congress. It must, therefore, be considered as a subject perfectly well understood by the president, for it was not to be supposed that he would have commented upon it, and recommended it to the attention of congress, if it had not been understood. During the last session, this bill, which had previously been before the house, was introduced in this body, and was passed, and sent to the other house, whence it was returned with a slight amendment, taking away the discretion which had been vested in the state legislatures as to the disposal of the proceeds. This bill, which had been before congress the session before the last, which had passed at the last session, having been before the country for a whole year, when it passed the two houses, was placed before the executive, with a number of other measures, just before the close of the last congress. As the subject had been before the president for consideration so long previously to the passage of the bill, and he had reflected upon it, it was not to have been expected that he would take advantage of the shortness of the session to retain the bill until this time. Yet such had been the fact, and a proceeding had taken place which was unprecedented and alarming, and which, unless the people of this country were lost to all sense of what was due to the legislative branch of the government, to themselves, and to those principles of liberty which had been transmitted to them from the revolution, they would not tolerate. It was at least due to the legislature, that the president should have sent a few lines, courteously informing them, that when his own mind was made up he would communicate the result. But, without deigning to make known his intention, or to impart the reasons which influenced him, he despotically kept silence, and retained the bill. He begged leave to congratulate the senate on the return of the bill. The question which now presented itself was, whether the bill was dead, in consequence of the non-action of the president, or whether it had become an existing law. He was not now about to discuss that question; but he had felt himself called on to make a few observations on the extraordinary course, and to say that it was due to congress, to the people, and to the executive himself, to have informed the last congress in reference to this subject, concerning which he must have made up his mind. He would now move to lay this bill on the table, and would afterwards give notice of a day when he should ask leave to bring in a bill in order to submit it again to the action of the senate.

Mr. Kane wished to know if it was the intention of the senator from Kentucky that the bill should lie permanently on the table, or only to be called up at an early day.

Mr. Clay replied that the only alternative was to consider the bill as defunct, or as an existing law. If the gentleman from Illinois could point out any other course, he had read some clause in the constitution which he (Mr. Clay) had never been so fortunate as to find.

Mr. Benton said he would wish to make a remark; and, if he was precluded by the pressing of this question, he would find some other opportunity of making it.

The question was then taken on the motion to lay the bill upon the table, and decided in the affirmative――ays nineteen.

Mr. Benton then moved to take up the message for consideration.

After further discussion, Mr. Clay said, he did not rise to reply to any one who had felt himself called upon to rise in the senate to vindicate the president. If there were any such member, he did not wish to disturb him in his office of vindicator of the president, or to affect the complacency with which he might regard his vindication. But he (Mr. Clay) stood here to sustain his own course, to vindicate the constitution, and to vindicate the rights of congress under it. And he must repeat, that the withholding of the land bill, at the last session, under the circumstances of the case, was a violation of the constitution, and disrespectful to the senate. What were the circumstances?

At two different sessions of congress, the land subject was before it. At that which preceded the last, a bill had been introduced to distribute among the states the proceeds of the public lands. The whole subject, by the bill and by reports of committees, was laid before congress and spread before the country. A copy of the bill, when it was first introduced, according to the constant practice of congress, was sent to the president. He was thus, as well as the country generally, put in entire possession of the matter. It attracted great public attention. It engaged that of the president. And, accordingly, at the commencement of the last session, in his annual message, he adverted to it, in a manner which evidently showed that the writer of the message fully understood it, and all the views which had been developed about it.

[Here Mr. Clay read the message of the last session, so far as it related to the public lands, to show that the president had himself invited the attention of congress to it, as one of urgent and pressing importance; that the discretion of congress to make any disposition of the public lands, which they might deem best for the harmony, union, and interest of the United States, was uncontrolled; that the question ought speedily to be settled; and that the president had considered, but objected to the bill of the previous session, proposing, as a substitute, a plan of his own, which, while the message on the table argued that the public lands belonged to all the states, proposed to give the unsold lands to some of them.]

Thus was congress, at the commencement of the last session, officially invited to act, and to act speedily, respecting the public lands; and thus did the president manifest his knowledge of the provisions of the bill of the previous session. Well, sir, congress again took up the question. The identical bill of the previous session was again introduced, and again, prior to its passage, placed before the president, along with the other printed documents, according to standing usage. And it was passed by both houses, substantially in the shape in which at the previous session it was passed by the senate, except that the restriction as to the power of the states to apply the sum to be distributed among the several states, after the deduction of the twelve and a half per centum first set apart for the new states, was stricken out.

In this form, the bill was laid before the president on the second day of March last. It was no stranger, but an old acquaintance. He had seen it repeatedly before; and he must have been well informed as to its progress in congress. He had commented on the very project contained in the bill, when he had brought forward his own in his message, at the opening of the session. Without deigning to communicate to congress what disposition he had made, or meant to make of it, he permitted the body to rise, in utter ignorance of his intentions.

It may be true, that there was a great press of business on the president on the second of March, and that he may have acted upon some ninety or one hundred bills. But this is what occurs with every president on the day before the termination of the short session of congress. With most of those bills the president must have been less acquainted than he was with the land bill. Of some of them he probably had never heard at all. Not one of them possessed the importance of the land bill. How did it happen that the president could find time to decide on so many new bills, and yet had not time to examine and dispose of one which had long been before him and the public; one embracing a subject which he thought the union, harmony, and interests of the states required should be speedily adjusted; one which he himself had pronounced his judgment upon at the commencement of the session? By withholding the bill, the president took upon himself a responsibility beyond the exercise of the veto. He deprived congress altogether of its constitutional right to act upon the bill, and to pass it, his negative notwithstanding.

The president is, by the constitution, secured time to consider bills which shall have passed both branches of congress. But so is congress equally secured the right to act upon bills which they have passed, and which the president may have thought proper to reject. If he exercises his veto, and returns the bill, two thirds may pass it. But if he withholds the bill, it cannot become a law, even although the two houses should be unanimously in its favor.

Mr. Clay denied that the constitution gave to the president ten days to consider bills, except at the long session. At that session, the period of its termination is uncertain, and dependent upon the will of congress. To guard against a sudden adjournment, by which the president might be deprived of due time to deliberate on an important bill, the constitution provides for ten days at that session. But, at the short session, it is not an adjournment but a dissolution of congress, on the third of March, and the day of that dissolution is fixed in the constitution itself, and known to all.

Mr. Clay contended, therefore, that the act of withholding the bill was arbitrary and unconstitutional, by which congress, and the senate especially, in which the bill originated, were deprived of their constitutional right of passing on the bill, after the president had exercised his powers. Respect to congress required of the president, if he really had not time to form a judgment on the bill, or, having formed it, had not time to lay his reasons before the body, a communication to that effect. But, without condescending to transmit one word upon the subject to congress, he suffered the session to terminate, and the members to go home destitute of all information, until this day, of his intentions.

Mr. Benton then withdrew his motion to take up the bill.

ON THE REMOVAL OF THE PUBLIC DEPOSITS FROM THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES.

IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE, DECEMBER 26, 1833.

[THE house of representatives, on the second of March, 1833, adopted, by a vote of one hundred and ten to forty-six, the following resolution: ‘that the government deposits may, in the opinion of the house, be safely continued in the bank of the United States.’ Notwithstanding this resolution, the president of the United States, (general Jackson,) in September following, read a paper to his cabinet, declaring his intention to cause the deposits to be removed from the bank. He then removed the secretary of the treasury, Mr. Duane, from office, in consequence of his refusal to comply with the president’s orders in this respect, and appointed Mr. Taney secretary in his place; who removed the deposits from the United States bank, on the first of October, 1833, and placed them in sundry state banks. At the ensuing session of congress, the secretary of the treasury, Mr. Taney, having made his report on that transaction, the subject came up for consideration in the senate, when Mr. Clay submitted the following resolutions, which he accompanied with the subjoined speech.]

RESOLVED, that by dismissing the late secretary of the treasury, because he would not, contrary to his sense of his own duty, remove the money of the United States in deposit with the bank of the United States and its branches, in conformity with the president’s opinion; and by appointing his successor to effect such removal, which has been done, the president has assumed the exercise of a power over the treasury of the United States not granted to him by the constitution and laws, and dangerous to the liberties of the people.

Resolved, that the reasons assigned by the secretary of the treasury for the removal of the money of the United States, deposited in the bank of the United States and its branches, communicated to congress on the third of December, 1833, are unsatisfactory and insufficient.

WE are in the midst of a revolution, hitherto bloodless, but rapidly tending towards a total change of the pure republican character of the government, and to the concentration of all power in the hands of one man. The powers of congress are paralysed, except when exerted in conformity with his will, by frequent and an extraordinary exercise of the executive veto, not anticipated by the founders of our constitution, and not practiced by any of the predecessors of the present chief magistrate. And, to cramp them still more, a new expedient is springing into use, of withholding altogether bills which have received the sanction of both houses of congress, thereby cutting off all opportunity of passing them, even if, after their return, the members should be unanimous in their favor. The constitutional participation of the senate in the appointing power is virtually abolished by the constant use of the power of removal from office, without any known cause, and by the appointment of the same individual to the same office, after his rejection by the senate. How often have we, senators, felt that the check of the senate, instead of being, as the constitution intended, a salutary control, was an idle ceremony? How often, when acting on the case of the nominated successor, have we felt the injustice of the removal? How often have we said to each other, well, what can we do? the office cannot remain vacant, without prejudice to the public interest, and, if we reject the proposed substitute, we cannot restore the displaced; and, perhaps, some more unworthy man may be nominated.

The judiciary has not been exempt from the prevailing rage for innovation. Decisions of the tribunals, deliberately pronounced, have been contemptuously disregarded. And the sanctity of numerous treaties openly violated. Our Indian relations, coeval with the existence of the government, and recognised and established by numerous laws and treaties, have been subverted, the rights of the helpless and unfortunate aborigines trampled in the dust, and they brought under subjection to unknown laws, in which they have no voice, promulgated in an unknown language. The most extensive and most valuable public domain that ever fell to the lot of one nation, is threatened with a total sacrifice. The general currency of the country――the life-blood of all its business――is in the most imminent danger of universal disorder and confusion. The power of internal improvement lies crushed beneath the veto. The system of protection of American industry was snatched from impending destruction, at the last session; but we are now coolly told by the secretary of the treasury, without a blush, ‘that it is understood to be conceded on all hands, that the tariff for protection merely is to be finally abandoned.’ By the third of March, 1837, if the progress of innovation continues, there will be scarcely a vestige remaining of the government and its policy, as they existed prior to the third of March, 1829. In a term of eight years, a little more than equal to that which was required to establish our liberties, the government will have been transformed into an elective monarchy――the worst of all forms of government.

Such is a melancholy but faithful picture of the present condition of our public affairs. It is not sketched or exhibited to excite, here or elsewhere, irritated feeling. I have no such purpose. I would, on the contrary, implore the senate and the people to discard all passion and prejudice, and to look calmly, but resolutely, upon the actual state of the constitution and the country. Although I bring into the senate the same unabated spirit, and the same firm determination which have ever guided me in the support of civil liberty, and the defence of our constitution, I contemplate the prospect before us with feelings of deep humiliation and profound mortification.

It is not among the least unfortunate symptoms of the times, that a large portion of the good and enlightened men of the union, of all parties, are yielding to sentiments of despondency. There is, unhappily, a feeling of distrust and insecurity pervading the community. Many of our best citizens entertain serious apprehensions, that our union and our institutions are destined to a speedy overthrow. Sir, I trust that the hopes and confidence of the country will revive. There is much occasion for manly independence and patriotic vigor, but none for despair. Thank God, we are yet free; and, if we put on the chains which are forging for us, it will be because we deserve to wear them. We should never despair of the republic. If our ancestors had been capable of surrendering themselves to such ignoble sentiments, our independence and our liberties would never have been achieved. The winter of 1776–7 was one of the gloomiest periods of the revolution; but on this day, fifty-seven years ago, the father of his country achieved a glorious victory, which diffused joy and gladness and animation throughout the states. Let us cherish the hope that, since he has gone from among us, Providence, in the dispensation of his mercies, has near at hand in reserve for us, though yet unseen by us, some sure and happy deliverance from all impending dangers.

When we assembled here last year, we were full of dreadful forebodings. On the one hand we were menaced with a civil war, which, lighting up in a single state, might spread its flames throughout one of the largest sections of the union. On the other, a cherished system of policy, essential to the successful prosecution of the industry of our countrymen, was exposed to imminent danger of immediate destruction. Means were happily applied by congress to avert both calamities; the country was reconciled, and our union once more became a band of friends and brothers. And I shall be greatly disappointed, if we do not find those who were denounced as being unfriendly to the continuance of our confederacy, among the foremost to fly to its preservation, and to resist all executive encroachment.

Mr. President, when congress adjourned, at the termination of the last session, there was one remnant of its powers, that over the purse, left untouched. The two most important powers of civil government are, those of the sword and the purse. The first, with some restriction, is confided by the constitution to the executive, and the last to the legislative department. If they are separate, and exercised by different responsible departments, civil liberty is safe; but if they are united in the hands of the same individual, it is gone. That clear-sighted and sagacious revolutionary orator and patriot, Patrick Henry, justly said, in the Virginia convention, in reply to one of his opponents:

‘Let him candidly tell me where and when did freedom exist, when the sword and purse were given up from the people? Unless a miracle in human affairs interposed, no nation ever retained its liberty after the loss of the sword and the purse? Can you prove by any argumentative deduction, that it is possible to be safe without one of them? If you give them up you are gone.’

Up to the period of the termination of the last session of congress, the exclusive constitutional power of congress over the treasury of the United States had never been contested. Among its earliest acts was one to establish the treasury department, which provided for the appointment of a treasurer, who was required to give bond and security in a very large amount, ‘to receive and keep the moneys of the United States and to disburse the same, upon warrants drawn by the secretary of the treasury, countersigned by the comptroller, recorded by the register, and not otherwise.’ Prior to the establishment of the present bank of the United States, no treasury or place had been provided and designated by law for the safe-keeping of the public moneys, but the treasurer was left to his own discretion and responsibility. When the existing bank was established, it was provided that the public moneys should be deposited with it, and consequently that bank became the treasury of the United States. For whatever place is designated by law for the keeping of the public money of the United States, under the care of the treasurer of the United States, is for the time being the treasury. Its safety was drawn in question by the chief magistrates, and an agent was appointed, a little more than a year ago, to investigate its ability. He reported to the executive, that it was perfectly safe. His apprehensions of its solidity were communicated by the president to congress, and a committee was appointed to examine the subject. They, also, reported in favor of its security. And, finally, among the last acts of the house of representatives, prior to the close of the last session, was the adoption of a resolution, manifesting its entire confidence in the ability and solidity of the bank.

After all these testimonies to the perfect safety of the public moneys, in the place appointed by congress, who could have supposed that the place would have been changed? Who could have imagined, that within sixty days of the meeting of congress, and, as it were, in utter contempt of its authority, the change should have been ordered? Who would have dreamed, that the treasurer should have thrown away the single key to the treasury, over which congress held ample control, and accepted in lieu of it some dozens of keys, over which neither congress nor he has any adequate control? Yet, sir, all this has been done; and it is now our solemn duty to inquire, first, by whose authority it has been ordered? and, secondly, whether the order has been given in conformity with the constitution and laws of the United States?

I agree, sir, and I am happy whenever I can agree with the president, as to the immense importance of these questions. He says, in a paper which I hold in my hand, that he looks upon the pending question as involving higher considerations than the ‘mere transfer of a sum of money from one bank to another. Its decision may affect the character of our government for ages to come.’ And, with him, I view it as of transcendent importance, both in its consequences and the great principles which the question involves. In the view which I have taken of this subject, I hold the bank as nothing, as perfectly insignificant, faithful as it has been in the performance of all its duties, efficient as it has proved in regulating the currency, than which there is none in all christendom so sound, and deep as is the interest of the country in the establishment and continuance of a sound currency, and the avoidance of all those evils which result from a defective or unsettled currency. All these I regard as questions of no importance, in comparison with the principles involved in this executive innovation. It involves the distribution of power by the executive, and the taking away a power from congress which it was never before doubted to possess――the power over the public purse. Entertaining these views, I shall not, to-day, at least, examine the reasons assigned by the president, or by the secretary of the treasury; for if the president had no power to perform the act, no reasons, however cogent or strong, which he can assign as urging him to the accomplishment of his purpose, no reasons, can sanctify an unconstitutional and illegal act.

The first question, sir, which I intimated it to be my purpose to examine, was, by whose direction was this change of the deposits made?

Now, sir, is there any man who hears me, who requires proof on this point? Is there an intelligent man in the whole country who does not know who it was that decided on the removal of the deposits? Is it not of universal notoriety? Does any man doubt that it was the act of the president? That it was done by his authority and at his command? The president, on this subject, has himself furnished evidence which is perfectly conclusive, in the paper which he has read to his cabinet; for, although he has denied to the senate an official copy of that paper, it is universally admitted that he has given it to the world, as containing the reasons which influenced him to this act. As a part of the people, if not in our senatorial character, we have a right to avail ourselves of that paper, and of all which it contains. Is it not perfectly conclusive as to the authority by which the deposits have been removed? I admit that it is an unprecedented and most extraordinary power. The constitution of the United States admits of a call, from the chief magistrate, on the heads of departments, for their opinions in writing.

It appears, indeed, that this power which the constitution confers on the president, had been exercised, and that the cabinet were divided, two and two; and one, who was ready to go on either side, being a little indifferent how this great constitutional power was settled by the president. The president was not satisfied with calling on his cabinet for their opinions, in the customary and constitutional form; but he prepares a paper of his own, and instead of receiving reasons from them, reads to them, and thus indoctrinates them according to his own views. This, sir, is the first time in the history of our country, when a paper has been thus read, and thus published. The proceeding is entirely without precedent. Those who now exercise power, consider all precedents wrong. They hold precedents in contempt; and, casting them aside, have commenced a new era in administration. But while they thus hold all precedents in contempt, disregarding all, no matter how long established, no matter to what departments of the government they may have given sanction, they are always disposed to shield themselves behind a precedent, whenever they can find one to subserve their purpose.

But the question is, who gave the order for the removal of the deposits? By whose act were they removed from the bank of the United States, where they were required by the law to be placed, and placed in banks which the law never designated? I tell the gentlemen who are opposed to me, that I am not to be answered by the exhibition of an order signed by R. Taney, or any one else. I want to know, not the clerk who makes the writing, but the individual who dictates――not the hangman who executes the culprit, but the tribunal which orders the execution. I want the original authority, that I may know by whose order, on whose authority, the public deposits were removed, and I again ask, is there a member of this senate, is there an intelligent man in the whole country, who doubts on this point? Hear what the president himself says, in his manifesto, read to his cabinet:

‘The president deems it HIS duty, to communicate in this manner to his cabinet the final conclusions OF HIS OWN MIND, and the reasons on which they are founded,’ and so forth.

At the conclusion of this paper what does he say?

‘The president again repeats, that he begs his cabinet to consider the proposed measure as HIS OWN, in the support of which he shall require no one of them to make a sacrifice of opinion or principle. ITS RESPONSIBILITY HAS BEEN ASSUMED, after the most mature reflection, as necessary to preserve the morals of the people, the freedom of the press, and the purity of the elective franchise, without which all will unite in saying, that the blood and treasure expended by our forefathers in the establishment of our happy system of government will have been vain and fruitless. Under these convictions, he feels that a measure so important to the American people cannot be commenced too soon; and HE therefore names the first day of October next as a period proper for the change of the deposits, or sooner, provided the necessary arrangements with the state banks can be made.’

Sir, is there a senator here who will tell me that this removal was not made by the president? I know, indeed, that there are in this document many of those most mild, most gracious, most condescending expressions, with which power too well knows how to clothe its mandates. The president coaxes, he soothes the secretary, in the most bland and conciliating language:

‘In the remarks he has made on this all-important question, he trusts the secretary of the treasury will see only the frank and respectful declarations of the opinions which the president has formed on a measure of great national interest, deeply affecting the character and usefulness of his administration; and not a spirit of dictation, which the president would be as careful to avoid, as ready to resist. Happy will he be, if the facts now disclosed produce uniformity of opinion and unity of action among the members of the administration.’

Sir, how kind! how gentle! How very gracious must this have sounded in the gratified ear of the secretary of the treasury! Sir, it reminds me of an historical anecdote, related of one of the most remarkable characters which our species has ever produced. While Oliver Cromwell was contending for the mastery of Great Britain, or Ireland, (I do not now remember which,) he besieged a certain catholic town. The place made a stout resistance; but at length the town being likely to be taken, the poor catholics proposed terms of capitulation, stipulating therein for the toleration of their religion. The paper containing the terms was brought to Oliver, who, putting on his spectacles to read it, cried out, ‘oh, granted, granted, certainly;’ he added, however, ‘but if one of them shall dare to be found attending mass, he shall be hanged;’ (under what section is not mentioned; whether under a second, or any other section, of any particular law, we are not told.)

Thus, sir, the secretary was told by the president, that he had not the slightest wish to dictate――oh, no; nothing is further from the president’s intention; but, sir, what was he told in the sequel? ‘If you do not comply with my wishes――if you do not effect the removal of these deposits within the period I assign you――you must quit your office.’ And what, sir, was the effect? This document bears date on the eighteenth of September. In the official paper, published at the seat of government, and through which it is understood that the government makes known its wishes and purposes to the people of the United States, we were told, under date of the twentieth of September, 1833, two days only after this cabinet paper was read, as follows:

‘We are authorized to state’――[authorized; this is the word which gave credit to this annunciation――] ‘We are authorized to state, that the deposits of the public money will be changed from the bank of the United States to the state banks, as soon as necessary arrangements can be made for that purpose; and that it is believed they can be completed in Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, and Boston, in time to make the change by the first of October, and perhaps sooner, if circumstances should render an earlier action necessary on the part of the government.’

Yes, sir, on the eighteenth of September this measure was decided on; and on the twentieth, it is announced to the people, that the deposits would be removed by the first of October, or sooner, if practicable! Mr. Duane was continued in office till the twenty-third, on which day he was dismissed; and between the twenty-third and the twenty-sixth, on which latter day the mere clerical act of signing the order for removal was performed, Mr. Taney, by whom it was done, was appointed secretary of the treasury, having conformed to the will of the president, against his own duty, which Mr. Duane would not do. Yes, sir, on the twentieth went forth this proclamation, by authority, of the removal of the deposits, although Mr. Duane remained in office till the twenty-third. On this point we have conclusive proof in a letter of the president to that gentleman, dated on the twenty-third, which letter, after all the gracious, friendly, and conciliating language of the cabinet paper, concludes in these terms:

‘I feel constrained to notify you, that your further services as secretary of the treasury are no longer required.’

Such, Mr. President, is the testimony on the one side to prove the truth of the proposition, that the removal of the deposits from the bank of the United States, was a measure determined on by the president himself――determined on while the latter secretary of the treasury was still in office, and against the will of the secretary; although Mr. Taney may have put his signature to the order on the twenty-sixth――a mere ministerial act, done in conformity with the previous decision of the president, that the removal should take place on or before the first of October.

I now call the attention of the senate to testimony of the other party; I mean Mr. Duane. After giving a history of the circumstances which accompanied his appointment to office, and what passed antecedently to his removal, he proceeds to say:

‘Thus was I thrust into office: thus was I thrust from office; not because I had neglected any duty; not because I had differed with him about the bank of the United States; but because I refused, without further inquiry by congress, to remove the deposits.’

Can testimony be more complete to establish the proposition I have advanced? And is it possible, after the testimony of the president on one side, and of his secretary on the other, that the former had decided that the deposits should be removed, and had removed the secretary because he would not do it, that any man can doubt that the removal was the president’s own act?――that it was done in accordance with his command?

And now, sir, having seen that the removal was made by the command and authority of the president, I shall proceed to inquire whether it was done in conformity with the constitution and laws of the United States.

I do not purpose at this time to go into the reasons alleged by the president or his secretary, except so far as those reasons contain an attempt to show that he possessed the requisite authority. Because if the president of the United States had no power to do this thing――if the constitution and laws, instead of authorizing it, required him to keep his hands off the treasury――it is useless to inquire into any reasons he may give for exercising a power which he did not possess. Sir, what power has the president of the United States over the treasury? Is it in the charter establishing the bank? The clause of the charter relating to the public deposits declares,

‘That the deposits of the money of the United States, in places in which the said bank and branches thereof may be established, shall be made in said bank or branches thereof, unless the secretary of the treasury shall at any time otherwise order and direct; in which case the secretary of the treasury shall immediately lay before congress, if in session, and if not, immediately after the commencement of the next session, the reasons of such order or direction.’

This is in strict consonance with the act creating the treasury department in 1789. The secretary of the treasury is by that act constituted the agent of congress; he is required to report to congress annually the state of the finances, and his plans respecting them; and if congress in either of its branches shall require it, he is to report at any time on any particular branch of the fiscal concerns of the country. He is the agent of congress to watch over the safety of the national deposits; and if, from any peculiar circumstances, the removal of them shall be required, he is to report the fact――to whom? to the president? No, sir; he must report to congress, together with his reasons therefor. By the charter of the bank, the president of the United States is clothed with two powers respecting it, and two only. By one of its clauses he is authorized to nominate, and by and with the consent of the senate, to appoint the government directors, and to remove them, by the other clause he is empowered to issue a scire facias when he shall apprehend that the charter of the institution has been violated. These, I say, are the only powers given him by the charter; all others are denied to him, and are given to others. The bank is not bound to report the state of its affairs to him, but to the secretary of the treasury; and it is thus to report whenever he shall call upon it for information; but when it becomes necessary to go further, a committee of congress is authorized to examine the books of the bank, and to look into the whole state of its affairs, and to report, not to the president, but to congress, who appointed them. The president, as I have said, is restricted to the two powers of appointing directors, and issuing a scire facias.

And has the president any power over the treasury by the constitution? None, sir――none. The constitution requires that no money shall be drawn from the treasury except by appropriation, thus placing it entirely under the control of congress. But the president himself says; ‘upon him has been devolved, by the constitution and the suffrages of the American people, the duty of superintending the operation of the executive departments of the government, and seeing that the laws are faithfully executed.’ Sir, the president, in another part of this same paper, refers to the same suffrages of the American people, as the source of some other and new powers over and above those in the constitution, or at least as expressive of their approbation of the exercise of them. Sir, I differ from the president on this point; and though it does not belong exactly in this place in the argument, I will add a remark or two on this idea. His reëlection resulted from his presumed merits generally, and the confidence and attachment of the people; and from the unworthiness of his competitor; nor was it intended thereby to express their approbation of all the opinions he was known to hold. Sir, it cannot be believed that the great state of Pennsylvania, for instance, which has so justly been denominated the key-stone of our federal arch, in voting again and again for the present chief magistrate, meant by that act to reverse her own opinions on the subject of domestic industry. Sir, the truth is, that the reëlection of the president proves as little an approbation by the people of all the opinions he may hold, even if he had ever unequivocally expressed what those opinions were, (a thing which he never, so far as my knowledge extends, has yet done,) as it would prove that if the president had a carbuncle or the king’s evil, they meant, by reëlecting him, to approve of his carbuncle.

But the president says, that the duty ‘has been devolved upon him,’ to remove the deposits, ‘by the constitution and the suffrages of the American people.’ Sir, does he mean to say that these suffrages created of themselves a new source of power? That he derived an authority from them which he did not hold as from any other source? If he means that their suffrages made him the president of the United States, and that, as president, he may exercise every power pertaining to that office under the constitution and the laws, there are none who controvert it; but then there could be no need to add the suffrages to the constitution. But his language is, ‘the suffrages of the American people and the constitution.’ Sir, I deny it. There is not a syllable in the constitution which imposes any such duty upon him. There is nothing of any such thing; no color to the idea. It is true, that by law, all the departments, with the exception of the treasury, are placed under the general care of the president. He says this is done by the constitution. The laws, however, have appointed but three executive departments; and it is true, that the secretaries are often required by law to act in certain cases according to the directions of the president. So far it is admitted that they have been, by the law, (not by the constitution,) placed under the direction of the president. Yet, even as to the state department, there are duties devolving upon the secretary over which the president has no control; and for the non-performance of which that officer is responsible, not to the president, but to the legislative tribunals or to the courts of justice. This is no new opinion. The supreme court, in the case of Marbury and Madison, expressed it in the following terms:

‘By the constitution of the United States, the president is invested with certain important political powers, in the exercise of which, he is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his political character, and to his own conscience. To aid him in the performance of these duties, he is authorized to appoint certain officers, who act by his authority, and in conformity to his orders.

* * * * *

‘In such cases, their acts are his acts: and whatever opinion may be entertained of the manner in which executive discretion may be used, still there exists, and can exist, no power to control that discretion. The subjects are political. They respect the nation, not individual rights, and being intrusted to the executive, the decision of the executive is conclusive. The application of this remark will be perceived by adverting to the act of congress for establishing the department of foreign affairs. This officer, as his duties were prescribed by that act, is to conform precisely to the will of the president. He is the mere organ by whom that will is communicated. The acts of such an officer, as an officer, can never be examined by the courts.

‘But when the legislature proceeds to impose on that officer other duties; when he is directed peremptorily to perform certain acts, (that is, when he is not placed under the direction of the president,) when the rights of individuals are dependent on the performance of those acts, he is so far the officer of the law; is amenable to the laws for his conduct; and cannot at his discretion sport away the vested rights of others.

‘The conclusion from this reasoning is that where the heads of departments are the political or confidential agents of the executive, merely to execute the will of the president, or rather to act in cases in which the executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing can be more perfectly clear than that their acts are only politically examinable. But where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, it seems equally clear that the individual who considers himself injured, has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy.’

Though the president is mistaken in his assertion, that the constitution devolves upon the president the superintendence of the departments, there is one clause of that instrument which he has very correctly quoted, and which makes it his duty to ‘see that the laws are faithfully executed,’ as it is mine now to examine what authority he obtains by this clause in the case before us. Under it, the most enormous pretensions have been set up for the president.

It has been contended, that if a law shall pass which the president does not conceive to be in conformity with the constitution, he is not bound to execute it; and if a treaty shall have been made, which, in his opinion, has been unconstitutional in its stipulations, he is not bound to enforce them. And it necessarily follows, that, if the courts of justice shall give a decision, which he shall in like manner deem repugnant to the constitution, he is not expected or bound to execute that law. Sir, let us look a little into this principle, and trace it out into some of its consequences.

One of the most important acts performed at the departments is, to settle those very large accounts which individuals have with the government; accounts amounting to millions of dollars; to settle them, an auditor and a comptroller have been appointed by law, whose official acts may affect, to the extent of hundreds of thousands of dollars, the property of individual contractors. If the pretensions of the president are well founded, his power goes further than he has exerted it. He may go into the office of the auditor, or the office of the comptroller, and may say to him, sir, Mr. A. B. has an account under settlement in this office, one item of which, objected to by you, I consider to be in accordance with the constitution; pass that account and send it to the auditor; and he may then go to the auditor and hold similar language. If the clause of the constitution is to be expounded, as is contended for, it amounts to a complete absorption of all the powers of government in the person of the executive. Sir, when a doctrine like this shall be admitted as orthodox, when it shall be acquiesced in by the people of this country, our government will have become a simple machine enough. The will of the president will be the whole of it. There will be but one bed, and that will be the bed of Procrustes; but one will, the will of the president. All the departments, and all subordinate functionaries of government, great or small, must submit to that will; and if they do not, then the president will have failed to ‘see that the laws are faithfully executed.’

Sir, such an extravagant and enormous pretension as this must be set alongside of its exploded compeer, the pretension that congress has the power of passing any and all laws which it may suppose conducive to ‘the general welfare.’

Let me, in a few words, present to the senate what are my own views as to the structure of this government. I hold that no powers can legitimately be exercised under it but such as are expressly delegated, and those which are necessary to carry these into effect. Sir, the executive power, as existing in this government, is not to be traced to the notions of Montesquieu, or of any other writer of that class, in the abstract nature of the executive power. Neither is the legislative nor the judicial power to be decided by any such reformer. These several powers with us, whatever they may be elsewhere, are just what the constitution has made them, and nothing more. And as to the general clauses in which reference is made to either, they are to be controlled and interpreted by those where these several powers are specially delegated, otherwise the executive will become a great vortex that must end in swallowing up all the rest. Nor will the judicial power be any longer restrained by the restraining clauses in the constitution, which relate to its exercise. What then, it will be asked, does this clause, that the president shall see that the laws are faithfully executed, mean? Sir, it means nothing more nor less than this, that if resistance is made to the laws, he shall take care that resistance shall cease. Congress, by the first article of the eighth section of the constitution, is required to provide for calling out the militia to execute the laws, in case of resistance. Sir, it might as well be contended under that clause, that congress have the power of determining what are, and what are not, the laws of the land. Congress has the power of calling out the military; well, sir, what is the president, by the constitution? He is commander of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia when called out into actual service. When, then, we are here told that he is clothed with the whole physical power of the nation, and when we are afterwards told, that he must take care that the laws are faithfully executed, is it possible that any man can be so lost to the love of liberty, as not to admit that this goes no further than to remove any resistance which may be made to the execution of the laws? We have established a system in which power has been carefully divided among different departments of the government. And we have been told a thousand times, that this division is indispensable as a safeguard to civil liberty. We have designated the departments, and have established in each, officers to examine the power belonging to each. The president, it is true, presides over the whole; his eye surveys the whole extent of the system in all its movements. But has he power to enter into the courts, for example, and tell them what is to be done? Or may he come here, and tell us the same? Or when we have made a law, can he withhold the power necessary to its practical effect? He moves, it is true, in a high, a glorious sphere. It is his to watch over the whole with a paternal eye; and, when any one wheel of the vast machine is for a time interrupted by the occurrence of invasion or rebellion, it is his care to propel its movements, and to furnish it with the requisite means of performing its appropriate duty in its own place.

That this is the true interpretation of the constitutional clause to which I have alluded, is inferred from the total silence of all contemporaneous expositions of that instrument on the subject. I have myself, (and when it was not in my power personally, have caused others to aid me,) made researches into the numbers of the Federalist, the debates in the Virginia convention, and in the conventions of other states, as well as all other sources of information to which I could obtain access, and I have not, in a solitary instance, found the slightest color for the claims set up in these most extraordinary times for the president, that he has authority to afford or withhold at pleasure the means of enforcing the laws, and to superintend and control an officer charged with a specific duty, made by the law exclusively his. But, sir, I have found some authorities which strongly militate against any such claim. If the doctrine be indeed true, then it is most evident that there is no longer any other control over our affairs, than that exerted by the president. If it be true, that when a duty is by law specifically assigned to a particular officer, the president may go into his office and control him in the manner of performing it, then is it most manifest that all barriers for the safety of the treasury are gone. Sir, it is that union of the purse and the sword, in the hand of one man, which constitutes the best definition of tyranny which our language can give.

The charter of the bank of the United States requires that the public deposits be made in its vaults. It also gives the secretary of the treasury power to remove them――and why? The secretary is at the head of the finances of the government. Weekly reports are made by the bank to him. He is to report to congress annually; and to either house whenever he should be called upon. He is the sentinel of congress――the agent of congress――the representative of congress. Congress has prescribed and has defined his duties. He is required to report to them, not to the president. He is put there by us, as our representative; he is required to remove the deposits when they shall be in danger, and we not in session; but when he does this, he is required to report to congress the fact, with his reasons for it. Now, sir, if, when an officer of government is thus specifically assigned his duty, if he is to report his official acts on his responsibility to congress; if, in a case where no power whatever is given to the president, the president may go and say to that officer, ‘go and do as I bid you, or you shall be removed from office;’ let me ask, whether the danger apprehended by that eloquent man has not already been realized?

But, sir, let me suppose that I am mistaken in my construction of the constitution; and let me suppose that the president has, as is contended, power to see every particular law carried into effect; what, then, was it his duty to do in the present case under the clause thus interpreted? The law authorized the secretary of the treasury to remove the deposits on his responsibility to congress. Now, if the president has power to see this, like other laws, faithfully executed, then, surely, the law exacted of him that he should see that the secretary was allowed to exercise his free, unbiased, uncontrolled judgment in removing or not removing them. That was the execution of the law. Congress had not said that the secretary of war, or the secretary of state, might remove the public deposits from the treasury.

The president has no right to go to the secretary of war and ask him what the secretary of the treasury ought to do. He might as well have consulted the secretary of the treasury about a contemplated movement of the army, as to ask the secretary of war about the disposition of the public moneys. It was not to the president, and all his secretaries combined, that the power was given to alter the disposition of the deposits in the bank. It was to the secretary alone, exclusive of the president, and all the other officers of government. And according to gentlemen’s own showing, by their construction of the clause, the secretary ought to have been left to his own unbiased determination, uncontrolled by the president or any body else.

I would thank the secretary of the senate to get me the sedition law. It is not very certain how soon we may be called to act upon it.

Now, sir, let us trace some of the other sources of the exercise of this power, or motives for it, or by whatever other name they are to be called. He says to Mr. Duane:

‘The president repeats, that he begs the cabinet to consider the proposed measure as his own, in the support of which he shall require no one of them to make a sacrifice of opinion or principle. Its responsibility has been assumed, after the most mature deliberation and reflection, as necessary to preserve the morals of the people, the freedom of the press, and the purity of the elective franchise.’

The morals of the people! What part of the constitution has given to the president any power over ‘the morals of the people?’ None. It does not give such power even over religion, the presiding and genial influence over every true system of morals. No, sir, it gives him no such power.

And what is the next step? To-day he claims a power as necessary to the morals of the people; to-morrow he will claim another, as still more indispensable to our religion. And the president might in this case as well have said that he went into the office of the secretary of the treasury, and controlled his free exercise of his authority as secretary, because it was necessary to preserve ‘the religion of the people!’ I ask for the authority. Will any one of those gentlemen here, who consider themselves as the vindicators of the executive, point me to any clause of the constitution which gives to the present president of the United States any power to preserve ‘the morals of the people?’

But ‘the freedom of the press,’ it seems, was another motive. Sir, I am not surprised that the present secretary of the treasury should feel a desire to revive this power over the press. He, I think, was a member of that party which passed the sedition law, under precisely the same pretext. I recollect it was said, that this bank, this monster of tyranny, was taking into its pay a countless number of papers, and by this means was destroying the fair fame of the president and his secretary, and all that sort of thing. Sir, it is sometimes useful to refer back to those old things――to the notions and the motives which induced men in former times to do certain acts which may not be altogether unlike some others in our own time.

The famous sedition act was passed, sir, in 1789; and it contained, among others, the following provision:

‘Section 2. That if any person shall write, print, utter, or publish, or shall cause or procure to be written, printed, uttered, or published, or shall, knowingly and willingly, assist or aid in writing, printing, uttering, or publishing, any false, scandalous, and malicious writing or writings, against the government of the United States, or either house of the congress of the United States, or the president of the United States, with intent to defame the said government, or either house of the said congress, or the said president, or to bring them, or either of them, into contempt or disrepute; or to excite against them, or either of them, the hatred of the good people of the United States, or to stir up sedition within the United States: or to excite any unlawful combinations therein, for opposing or resisting any law of the United States, or any act of the president of the United States, done in pursuance of any such law, or of the powers in him vested by the constitution of the United States; or to resist, oppose, or defeat, any such law or act; or to aid, encourage, or abet, any hostile designs of any foreign nation, against the United States, their people, or government, then such person, being thereof convicted before any court of the United States having jurisdiction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars, and by imprisonment not exceeding two years.’

We have now, sir, in the reasons for the removal of the government deposits, the same motives avowed and acted upon. The abuse of the government, bringing it into disrepute, using contemptuous language to persons high in authority, constituted the motives for passing the sedition law; and what have we now but a repetition of the same complaints of abuses, disrespect, and so forth. As it is now, so it was then; for, says the next section of the same sedition act:

‘That if any person shall be prosecuted under this act for the writing or publishing of any libel aforesaid, it shall be lawful for the defendant, upon the trial of the cause, to give in evidence in his defence, the truth of the matter contained in the publication charged as a libel. And the jury who shall try the cause, shall have a right to determine the law and the fact, under the direction of the court, as in other cases.’

It is only for the sake of the truth, said they who favored the passage of that law――for the sake of justice; as it is now said that it was necessary to remove the deposits, in order to preserve the purity of the press. That’s all, sir. But there is one part of this assumption of power by the president much more tyrannical than that act. Under that law, the offending party was to have a trial by jury; the benefit of witnesses and of counsel; and the right to have the truth of his alleged libels examined. But what is the case now under consideration? Why, sir, the president takes the whole matter in his own hands; he is at once the judge, the jury, and the executioner of the sentence, and utterly deprives the accused party of the opportunity of showing that the imputed libel is no libel at all, but founded in the clearest truth.

But ‘the purity of the elective franchise,’ also, the president has very much at heart. And here, again, I ask what part of the constitution gives him any power over that ‘franchise?’ Look, sir, at the nature of the exercise of this power! If it was really necessary that steps should be taken to preserve the purity of the press or the freedom of elections, what ought the president to have done? Taken the matter into his own hands? No, sir; it was his duty to recommend to congress the passage of laws for the purpose, under suitable sanctions; laws which the courts of the United States could execute. We could not have been worse off under such laws, (however exceptionable they might be,) than we are now. We could then, sir, have reviewed the laws, and seen whether congress or the president had properly any power over this matter; or whether the article of the constitution which forbids that the press shall be touched, and declares that religion shall be sacred from all the powers of legislation, applied in the case or not. This the president has undertaken to do of himself, without the shadow of authority, either in the constitution or the laws.

Suppose, sir, that this contumacious institution, which committed the great sin, in 1829, of not appointing a new president to a certain one of its branches――suppose that the bank should go on and vindicate itself against the calumnies poured out upon it――that it should continue to stand upon its defence; how inefficient will have been the exercise of power by the president! How inadequate to the end he had in view, of preserving the press from being made use of to defend the bank! Why, sir, if we had had the power, and the president had come to us, we could have laid Mr. Nicholas Biddle by the heels, if he should have undertaken to publish another report of general Smith or Mr. Duffie, or another speech of the eloquent gentleman near me, (Mr. Webster,) or any other such libels, tending to bring the president or his administration into disrepute. But the president of the United States, who thought he had the bank in his power, who thought he could stop it, who was induced to believe, by that ‘influence behind the throne, greater than itself,’ that he could break down the bank at a word, has only shown his want of power over the press, by his attempt to exercise it in the manner he has done. The bank has avowed and openly declared its purpose to defend itself on all suitable occasions. And, what is still more provoking, instead of being a bankrupt, as was expected, with its doors closed, and its vaults inaccessible, it has now, it seems, got more money than it knows what to do with; and this greatest of misers and hoarders, cruelly refuses to let out a dollar of its ten millions of specie, to relieve the sufferings of the banks to which the government deposits have been transferred.

Sir, the president of the United States had nothing to do with the morals of the community. No, sir; for the preservation of our morals we are responsible to God, and I trust that that responsibility will ever remain to Him and His mercy alone. Neither had the president any thing to do with the freedom of the press. The power over it is denied, even to congress, by the people. It was said, by one of those few able men and bright luminaries, whom Providence has yet spared to us, in answer to complaints by a foreign minister, against the freedom with which the American press treated certain French functionaries, that the press was one of those concerns which admitted of no regulation by the government; that its abuses must be tolerated, lest its freedom should be abridged. Such, sir, is the freedom of the press, as recognised by our constitution, and so it has been respected ever since the repeal of the obnoxious act which I have already quoted, until the detestable principles of that law have been reasserted by the president, in his assumption of a power, in nowise belonging to his office, of preserving the purity of the press.

Such, sir, are the powers on which the president relies to justify his seizure of the treasury of the United States. I have examined them one by one; and they all fail, utterly fail, to bear out the act. We are irresistibly brought to the conclusion, that the removal of the public money from the bank of the United States has been effected by the displacement from the head of the treasury department of one who would not remove them, and putting in his stead another person, who would; and, secondly, that the president has no color of authority in the constitution or the laws for the act which he has undertaken to perform.

Let us now, for a few moments, examine the consequences which may ensue from the exercise of this enormous power. If the president has authority, in a case in which the law has assigned a specific duty exclusively to a designated officer, to control the exercise of his discretion by that officer, he has a right to interfere in every other case, and remove every one from office who hesitates to do his bidding, against his judgment of his own duty. This, surely, is a logical deduction not to be resisted. Well, then, how stands the matter? Recapitulating the provisions of the law prescribing how money should be drawn from the treasury and the deduction above stated, what is to prevent the president from going to the comptroller, and, if he will not countersign a warrant which he has found an accommodating secretary to sign, turning him out for another; then going to the register, and doing the same; and then to the treasurer, and commanding him to pay over the money expressed in the warrant, or subject himself to expulsion.

Where is the security against such conduct on the part of the president? Where the boundary to this tremendous authority, which he has undertaken to exercise? Sir, every barrier around the treasury is broken down. From the moment that the president said, ‘I make this measure my own, I take upon myself the responsibility,’ from that moment the public treasury might as well have been at the hermitage as at this place. Sir, the measure adopted by the president is without precedent――in our day at best. There is, indeed, a precedent on record, but you must go down to the christian era for it. It will be recollected, by those who are conversant with ancient history, that after Pompey was compelled to retire to Brundusium, Cæsar, who had been anxious to give him battle, returned to Rome, ‘having reduced Italy, (says the historian,) in sixty days, (the exact period, sir, between the removal of the deposits, and the meeting of congress, without the usual allowance of three days’ grace,) without bloodshed.’ The historian goes on; ‘finding the city in a more settled condition than he expected, and many senators there, he addressed them in a mild and gracious manner, (as the president addressed his late secretary of the treasury,) and desired them to send deputies to Pompey with an offer of honorable terms of peace. As Metellus, the tribune, opposed his taking money out of the public treasury, and cited some laws against it, (such, sir, I suppose, as I have endeavored to cite on this occasion,) Cæsar said, ‘arms and laws do not flourish together. If you are not pleased with what I am about, you have only to withdraw. (Leave the office, Mr. Duane!) War, indeed, will not tolerate much liberty of speech. When I say this, I am renouncing my own right; for you, and all those whom I have found exciting a spirit of faction against me, are at my disposal.’ Having said this, he approached the doors of the treasury, and as the keys were not produced, he sent for workmen to break them open. Metellus again opposed him, and gained credit with some for his firmness; but Cæsar, with an elevated voice, threatened to put him to death, if he gave any further trouble. ‘And you know very well, young man,’ said he, ‘that this is harder for me to say than to do.’ Metellus, terrified by the measure, retired, and Cæsar was afterward easily and readily supplied with every thing necessary for the war.

And where now, sir, is the public treasury? Who can tell? It is certainly without a local habitation, if it be not without a name. And where is the money of the people of the United States? Floating about in treasury drafts or checks to the amount of millions, placed in the hands of tottering banks, to enable them to pay their own debts, instead of being appropriated to the service of the people. These checks are scattered to the winds by the treasurer of the United States, who is required by law to let out money from the treasury, on warrants signed by the secretary of the treasury, countersigned, registered, and so forth, and not otherwise.

[Mr. Clay here referred to a correspondence, which he quoted, between the treasurer and the officers of the bank, complaining of these checks drawn without proper notice, and so forth, in which the treasurer says they were only issued to be used in certain contingencies, and so forth.]

Thus, sir, the people’s money is put into a bank here, and the bank there, in regard to the solvency of which we know nothing, and it is placed there to be used in the event of certain contingencies――contingencies of which neither the treasurer nor the secretary have yet deigned to furnish us any account.

Where was the oath of office of the treasurer, when he ventured thus to sport with the people’s money? Where was the constitution, which forbids money to be drawn from the treasury without appropriation by law? Where was the treasurer’s bond, when he thus cast about the people’s money? Sir, his bond is forfeited. I do not pretend to any great knowledge of the law, but give me an intelligent and unpacked jury, and I undertake to prove to him that he has forfeited the penalty of his bond.

Mr. President, the people of the United States are indebted to the president for the boldness of this movement; and as one among the humblest of them, I profess my obligations to him. He has told the senate, in his message refusing an official copy of his cabinet paper, that it has been published for the information of the people. As a part of the people, the senate, if not in their official character, have a right to its use. In that extraordinary paper, he has proclaimed, that the measure is his own; and that he has taken upon himself the responsibility of it. In plain English, he has proclaimed an open, palpable, and daring usurpation!

For more than fifteen years, Mr. President, I have been struggling to avoid the present state of things. I thought I perceived in some proceedings, during the conduct of the Seminole war, a spirit of defiance to the constitution and to all law. With what sincerity and truth, with what earnestness and devotion to civil liberty, I have struggled, the searcher of all human hearts best knows. With what fortune, the bleeding constitution of my country now fatally attests.

I have, nevertheless, persevered; and under every discouragement, during the short time that I expect to remain in the public councils, I will persevere. And if a bountiful Providence would allow an unworthy sinner to approach the throne of grace, I would beseech Him, as the greatest favor He could grant to me here below, to spare me until I live to behold the people rising in their majesty, with a peaceful and constitutional exercise of their power, to expel the Goths from Rome; to rescue the public treasury from pillage, to preserve the constitution of the United States; to uphold the union against the danger of the concentration and consolidation of all power in the hands of the executive; and to sustain the liberties of the people of this country against the imminent perils to which they now stand exposed.

[Here Mr. Clay, who was understood to have gone through the first part of his speech only, gave way, and Mr. Ewing of Ohio moved that the further consideration of the subject be postponed until Monday next; which was ordered accordingly. And then the senate adjourned to that day. December 30, Mr. Clay resumed his speech.]

Before I proceed to a consideration of the report of the secretary of the treasury, and the second resolution, I wish to anticipate and answer an objection, which may be made to the adoption of the first. It may be urged, that the senate, being, in a certain contingency, a court of impeachment, ought not to prejudge a question which it may be called upon to decide judicially. But by the constitution the senate has three characters, legislative, executive, and judicial. Its ordinary, and by far its most important character, is that of its being a component part of the legislative department. Only three or four cases, since the establishment of the government, (that is, during a period of nearly half a century,) have occurred, in which it was necessary that the senate should act as a judicial tribunal, the least important of all its characters. Now it would be most strange if, when its constitutional powers were assailed, it could not assert and vindicate them, because, by possibility, it might be required to act as a court of justice. The first resolution asserts only, that the president has assumed the exercise of a power over the public treasury not granted by the constitution and laws. It is silent as to motive; and without the quo animo――the deliberate purpose of usurpation――the president would not be liable to impeachment. But if a concurrence of all the elements be necessary to make out a charge of wilful violation of the constitution, does any one believe that the president will now be impeached? And shall we silently sit by and see ourselves stripped of one of the most essential of our legislative powers, and the exercise of it assumed by the president, to which it is not delegated, without effort to maintain it, because, against all human probability, he may be hereafter impeached?

The report of the secretary of the treasury, in the first paragraph, commences with a misstatement of the fact. He says, ‘I have directed’ that the deposits of the money of the United States shall not be made in the bank of the United States. If this assertion is regarded in any other than a mere formal sense, it is not true. The secretary may have been the instrument, the clerk, the automaton, in whose name the order was issued; but the measure was that of the president, by whose authority or command the order was given; and of this we have the highest and most authentic evidence. The president has told the world that the measure was his own, and that he took it upon his own responsibility. And he has exonerated his cabinet from all responsibility about it. The secretary ought to have frankly disclosed all the circumstances of the case, and told the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. If he had done so, he would have informed congress, that the removal had been decided by the president on the eighteenth of September last; that it had been announced to the public on the twentieth; and that Mr. Duane remained in office until the twenty-third. He would have informed congress, that this important measure was decided before he entered into his new office, and was the cause of his appointment. Yes, sir, the present secretary stood by, a witness to the struggle in the mind of his predecessor, between his attachment to the president and his duty to the country; saw him dismissed from office, because he would not violate his conscientious obligations, and came into his place, to do what he could not, honorably, and would not perform. A son of one of the fathers of democracy, by an administration professing to be democratic, was expelled from office, and his place supplied by a gentleman, who, throughout his whole career, has been uniformly opposed to democracy!――a gentleman who, at another epoch of the republic, when it was threatened with civil war, and a dissolution of the union, voted, (although a resident of a slave state,) in the legislature of Maryland, against the admission of Missouri into the union without a restriction incompatible with her rights as a member of the confederacy![21] Mr. Duane was dismissed because the solemn convictions of his duty would not allow him to conform to the president’s will; because his logic did not bring his mind to the same conclusions with those of the logic of a venerable old gentleman, inhabiting a white house not distant from the capitol; because his watch, (here Mr. Clay held up his own,) did not keep time with that of the president. He was dismissed under that detestable system of proscription for opinion’s sake, which has finally dared to intrude itself into the halls of congress――a system under which three unoffending clerks, the husbands of wives, the fathers of families, dependent on them for support, without the slightest imputation of delinquency, have been recently unceremoniously discharged, and driven out to beggary, by a man, himself the substitute of a meritorious officer, who has not been in this city a period equal to one monthly revolution of the moon! I tell our secretary, (said Mr. Clay, raising his voice,) that, if he touch a single hair of the head of any one of the clerks of the senate, (I am sure he is not disposed to do it,) on account of his opinions, political or religious, if no other member of the senate does it, I will instantly submit a resolution for his own dismission.

The secretary ought to have communicated all these things; he ought to have stated that the cabinet was divided two and two, and one of the members equally divided with himself on the question, willing to be put into either scale. He ought to have given a full account of this, the most important act of executive authority since the origin of the government; he should have stated with what unsullied honor his predecessor retired from office, and on what degrading conditions he accepted his vacant place. When a momentous proceeding like this, varying the constitutional distribution of the powers of the legislative and executive departments, was resolved on, the ministers against whose advice it was determined, should have resigned their stations. No ministers of any monarch in Europe, under similar circumstances, would have retained the seals of office. And if, as nobody doubts, there is a cabal behind the curtain, without character and without responsibility, feeding the passions, stimulating the prejudices, and moulding the actions of the incumbent of the presidential office, it was an additional reason for their resignations. There is not a maitre d’hotel in christendom, who, if the scullions were put into command in the parlor and dining-room, would not scorn to hold his place, and fling it up in disgust with indignant pride!

I shall examine the report before us, first, as to the power of the secretary over the deposits; secondly, his reasons for the exercise of it; and, thirdly, the manner of its exercise.

First. The secretary asserts that the power of removal is exclusively reserved to him; that it is absolute and unconditional, so far as the interests of the bank are concerned; that it is not restricted to any particular contingencies; that the reservation of the power to the secretary of the treasury exclusively, is a part of the compact; that he may exercise it, if the public convenience or interest would in any degree be promoted; that this exclusive power, thus reserved, is so absolute, that the secretary is not restrained by the considerations that the public deposits in the bank are perfectly safe; that the bank promptly meets all demands upon it; and that it faithfully performs all its duties; and that the power of congress, on the contrary, is so totally excluded, that it could not, without a breach of the compact, order the deposits to be changed, even if congress were satisfied that they were not safe, or should be convinced that the interests of the people of the United States imperiously demanded the removal.

Such is the statement which this unassuming secretary makes of his own authority. He expands his own power to the most extravagant dimensions; and he undertakes to circumscribe that of congress in the narrowest and most restricted limits! Who would have expected that, after having so confidently maintained for himself such absolute, exclusive, unqualified, and uncontrollable power, he would have let in any body else to share with him its exercise? Yet he says, ‘as the secretary of the treasury presides over one of the executive departments of the government, and his power over this subject forms a part of the executive duties of his office, the manner in which it is exercised must be subject to the supervision of the officer,’ (meaning the president, whose official name his modesty would not allow him to pronounce,) ‘to whom the constitution has confided the whole executive power, and has required to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.’ If the clause in the compact exclusively vests the power of removal in the secretary of the treasury, what has the president to do with it? What part of the charter conveys to him any power? If, as the secretary contends, the clause of removal, being part of the compact, restricts its exercise to the secretary, to the entire exclusion of congress, how does it embrace the president? especially since both the president and secretary conceive, that ‘the power over the place of deposit for the public money would seem properly to belong to the legislative department of the government?’ If the secretary be correct in asserting that the power of removal is confined to the secretary of the treasury, then Mr. Duane, while in office, possessed it; and his dismission, because he would not exercise a power which belonged to him exclusively, was itself a violation of the charter.

But by what authority does the secretary assert that the treasury department is one of the executive departments of the government? He has none in the act which creates the department; he has none in the constitution. The treasury department is placed by law on a different footing from all the other departments, which are, in the acts creating them, denominated executive, and placed under the direction of the president. The treasury department, on the contrary, is organized on totally different principles. Except the appointment of the officers, with the coöperation of the senate, and the power which is exercised of removing them, the president has neither by the constitution nor the law creating the department, any thing to do with it. The secretary’s reports and responsibility are directly to congress. The whole scheme of the department is one of checks, each officer acting as a control upon his associates. The secretary is required by the law to report, not to the president, but directly to congress. Either house may require any report from him, or command his personal attendance before it. It is not, therefore, true, that the treasury is one of the executive departments, subject to the supervision of the president. And the inference drawn from that erroneous assumption entirely fails. The secretary appears to have no precise ideas either of the constitution or duties of the department over which he presides. He says:

‘The treasury department being intrusted with the administration of the finances of the country, it was always the duty of the secretary, in the absence of any legislate provision on the subject, to take care that the public money was deposited in safe-keeping, in the hands of faithful agents,’ and so forth.

The premises of the secretary are only partially correct, and the conclusion is directly repugnant to law. It never was the duty of the secretary to take care that the public money was deposited in safe-keeping, in the hands of faithful agents, and so forth. That duty is expressly, by the act organizing the department, assigned to the treasurer of the United States, who is placed under oath, and under bond, with a large penalty, not to issue a dollar out of the public treasury, but in virtue of warrants granted in pursuance of acts of appropriation, ‘and not otherwise.’ When the secretary treats of the power of the president, he puts on corsets and prostrates himself before the executive, in the most graceful, courteous, and lady-like form; but when he treats of that of congress, and of the treasurer, he swells and expands himself, and flirts about, with all the airs of high authority.

But I cannot assent to the secretary’s interpretation of his power of removal, contained in the charter. Congress has not given up its control over the treasury, or the public deposits, to either the secretary or the executive. Congress could not have done so without a treacherous renunciation of its constitutional powers, and a faithless abandonment of its duties. And now let us see what is the true state of the matter. Congress has reserved to itself, exclusively, the right to judge of the reasons for removal of the deposits, by requiring the report of them to be made to it; and, consequently, the power to ratify or invalidate the act. The secretary of the treasury is the fiscal sentinel of congress, to whom the bank makes weekly reports, and who is presumed constantly to be well acquainted with its actual condition. He may, consequently, discover the urgent necessity of prompt action, to save the public treasure, before it is known to congress, and when it is not in session. But he is immediately to report――to whom? To the executive? No, to congress. For what purpose? That congress may sanction or disprove the act.

The power of removal is a reservation for the benefit of the people, not of the bank. It may be waived. Congress, being a legislative party to the compact, did not thereby deprive itself of ordinary powers of legislation. It cannot, without a breach of the national faith, repeal privileges or stipulations intended for the benefit of the bank. But it may repeal, modify, or waive the exercise altogether, of those parts of the charter which were intended exclusively for the public. Could not congress repeal altogether the clause of removal? Such a repeal would not injure, but add to, the security of the bank. Could not congress modify the clause, by revoking the agency of the secretary of the treasury, and substituting that of the treasurer, or any other officer of government? Could not congress, at any time during the twenty years’ duration of the charter, abolish altogether the office of secretary of the treasury, and assign all his present duties to some newly constituted department? The right and the security of the bank do not consist in the form of the agency, nor in the name of the agent, but in this: that, whatever may be its form or his denomination, the removal shall only be made upon urgent and satisfactory reasons. The power of supplemental legislation was exercised by congress both under the new and old bank. Three years after the establishment of the existing bank, an act passed, better to regulate the election of directors, and to punish any one who should attempt, by bribes, or presents in any form, to influence the operation of the institution.

The denial of the secretary, to congress, of the power to remove the deposits, under any circumstances, is most extraordinary. Why, sir, suppose a corrupt collusion between the secretary and the bank, to divide the spoils of the treasury? Suppose a total nonfulfilment of all the stipulations on the part of the bank? Is congress to remain bound and tied, whilst the bank should be free from all the obligations of the charter? The obligation of one party, to observe faithfully his stipulations, in a contract, rests upon the corresponding obligation of the other party to observe his stipulations. If one party is released, both are free. If one party fails to comply with his contract, that releases the other. This is the fundamental principle of all contracts, applicable to treaties, charters, and private agreements. If it were a mere private agreement, and one party who had bound himself to deposit, from time to time, his money with the other, to be redrawn at his pleasure, saw that it was wasting and squandered away, he would have a clear right to discontinue the deposits. It is true, that a party has no right to excuse himself from the fulfilment of his contract, by imputing a breach to the other which has never been made. And it is fortunate for the peace and justice of society, that neither party to any contract, whether public or private, can decide conclusively the question of fulfilment by the other, but must always act under subjection to the ultimate decision, in case of controversy, of an impartial arbiter, provided in the judicial tribunals of civilized communities.

As to the absolute, unconditional, and exclusive power which the secretary claims to be vested in himself, it is in direct hostility with the principles of our government, and adverse to the genius of all free institutions. The secretary was made, by the charter, the mere representative or agent of congress. Its temporary substitute, acting in subordination to it, and bound, whenever he did act, to report to his principal his reasons, that they might be judged of and sanctioned, or overruled. Is it not absurd to say, that the agent can possess more power than the principal? The power of revocation is incident to all agency, unless, in express terms, by the instrument creating it, a different provision is made. The powers, whether of the principal or the agent, in relation to any contract, must be expounded by the principles which govern all contracts. It is true, that the language of the clause of removal, in the charter, is general, but it is not, therefore, to be torn from the context. It is a part only of an entire compact, and is so to be interpreted, in connection with every part and with the whole. Upon surveying the entire compact, we perceive that the bank has come under various duties to the public; has undertaken to perform important financial operations of the government; and has paid a bonus into the public treasury of a million and a half of dollars. We perceive, that, in consideration of the assumption of these heavy engagements, and the payment of that large sum of money on the part of the bank, the public has stipulated that the public deposits shall remain with the bank, during the continuation of the charter, and that its notes shall be received by the government, in payment of all debts, dues, and taxes. Except the corporate character conferred, there is none but those two stipulations of any great importance to the bank. Each of the two parties to the compact must stand bound to the performance of his engagements, whilst the other is honestly and faithfully fulfilling his. It is not to be conceived, in the formation of the compact, that either party could have anticipated that, whilst he was fairly and honestly executing every obligation which he had contracted, the other party might arbitrarily or capriciously exonerate himself from the discharge of his obligations. Suppose, when citizens of the United States were invited by the government to subscribe to the stock of this bank, that they had been told, that, although the bank performs all its covenants with perfect fidelity, the secretary of the treasury may, arbitrarily or capriciously, upon his speculative notions of any degree of public interest or convenience to be advanced, withdraw the public deposits; would they have ever subscribed? Would they have been guilty of the folly of binding themselves to the performance of burdensome duties, whilst the government was left at liberty to violate at pleasure that stipulation of the compact which by far was the most essential to them?

On this part of the subject, I conclude, that congress has not parted from, but retains, its legitimate power over the deposits; that it might modify or repeal altogether the clause of removal in the charter; that a breach of material stipulations on the part of the bank would authorize congress to change the place of the deposits; that a corrupt collusion to defraud the public, between the bank and a secretary of the treasury, would be a clear justification to congress to direct a transfer of the public deposits; that the secretary of the treasury is the mere agent of congress, in respect to the deposits, acting in subordination to his principal; that it results from the nature of all agency that it may be revoked, unless otherwise expressly provided; and, finally, that the principal, and much less the agent, of one party cannot justly or lawfully violate the compact, or any of its essential provisions, whilst the other party is in the progressive and faithful performance of all his engagements.

If I am right in this view of the subject, there is an end of the argument. There was perfect equality and reciprocity between the two parties to the compact. Neither could exonerate himself from the performance of his obligations, while the other was honestly proceeding fairly to fulfil all his engagements. But the secretary of the treasury concedes that the public deposits were perfectly safe in the hands of the bank; that the bank promptly met every demand upon it; and that it faithfully performed all its duties. By these concessions, he surrenders the whole argument, admits the complete obligation of the public to perform its part of the compact, and demonstrates that no reasons, however plausible or strong, can justify an open breach of a solemn national compact.

Secondly. But he has brought forward various reasons to palliate or justify his violation of the national faith; and it is now my purpose to proceed, in the second place, to examine and consider them. Before I proceed to do this, I hope to be allowed again to call the attention of the senate to the nature of the office of secretary of the treasury. It is altogether financial and administrative. His duties relate to the finances, their condition and improvement, and to them exclusively. The act creating the treasury department, and defining the duties of the secretary, demonstrates this. He has no legislative powers; and congress has delegated and could delegate none to him. His powers, wherever given, and in whatever language expressed, must be interpreted by his defined duties. Neither is the treasury department an executive department. It was expressly created not to be an executive department. It is administrative, but not executive. His relations are positive and direct to congress, by the act of his creation, and not to the president. Whenever he is put under the direction of the president, (as he is by various subsequent acts, especially those relating to the public loans,) it is done by express provision of law, and for specified purposes.

With this key to the nature of the office, and the duties of the officer, I will now briefly examine the various reasons which he assigns for the removal of the public deposits. The first is, the near approach of the expiration of the charter. But the charter had yet to run about two and a half of the twenty years to which it was limited. During the whole term the public deposits were to continue to be made with the bank. It was clearly foreseen, at the commencement of the term, as now, that it would expire, and yet congress neither then nor since has ever thought proper to provide for the withdrawal of the deposits prior to the expiration of the charter. Whence does the secretary derive an authority to do what congress had never done? Whence his power to abridge in effect the period of the charter, and to limit it to seventeen and a half years, instead of twenty? Was the urgency for the removal of the deposits so great, that he could not wait sixty days, until the assembling of congress? He admits that they were perfectly safe in the bank; that it promptly met every demand upon it; and that it faithfully performed all its duties. Why not, then, wait the arrival of congress? The last time the house of representatives had spoken, among the very last acts of the last session, that house had declared its full confidence in the safety of the deposits. Why not wait until it could review the subject, with all the new light which the secretary could throw upon it, and it again proclaims its opinion? He comes into office on the twenty-third of September, 1833, and in three days, with intuitive celerity, he comprehends the whole of the operations of the complex department of the treasury, perceives that the government, from its origin, had been in uniform error, and denounces the opinions of all his predecessors! And, hastening to rectify universal wrong, in defiance and in contempt of the resolution of the house, he signs an order for the removal of the deposits! It was of no consequence to him, whether places of safety, in substitution of the bank of the United States, could be obtained or not; without making the essential precautionary arrangements, he commands the removal almost instantly to be made.

Why, sir, if the secretary were right in contending that he alone could order the removal, even he admits that congress has power to provide for the security of the public money, in the new places to which it might be transferred. If he did not deign to consult the representatives of the people as to the propriety of the first step, did not a decent respect to their authority and judgment exact from him a delay, for the brief term of sixty days, that they might consider what was fitting to be done? The truth is, that the secretary, by law, has nothing to do with the care and safe-keeping of the public money. As has been already shown, that duty is specifically assigned by law to the treasurer of the United States. And, in assuming upon himself the authority to provide other depositories than the bank of the United States, he alike trampled upon the duties of the treasurer, and what was due to congress. Can any one doubt the motive of this precipitancy? Does anybody doubt, that it was to preclude the action of congress, or to bring it under the influence of the executive veto? Let the two houses, or either of them, perform their duty to the country, and we shall hereafter see whether, in that respect, at least, Mr. Secretary will not fail to consummate his purpose.

Second. The next reason assigned for this offensive proceeding, is the reëlection of the present chief magistrate. The secretary says:

‘I have always regarded the result of the last election of president of the United States, as the declaration of a majority of the people, that the charter ought not to be renewed.’ * * * ‘Its voluntary application to congress for the renewal of its charter four years before it expired, and upon the eve of the election of president, was understood on all sides as bringing forward that question for incidental decision at the then approaching election. It was accordingly argued on both sides before the tribunal of the people, and their verdict pronounced against the bank,’ and so forth.

What has the secretary to do with elections? Do they belong to the financial concerns of his department? Why this constant reference to the result of the last presidential election? Ought not the president to be content with the triumphant issue of it? Did he want still more vetoes? The winners ought to forbear making any complaints, and be satisfied, whatever the losers may be. After an election is fairly terminated, I have always thought that the best way was to forget all the incidents of the preceding canvass, and especially the manner in which votes had been cast. If one has been successful, that ought to be sufficient for him; if defeated, regrets are unavailing. Our fellow-citizens have a right freely to exercise their elective franchise as they please, and no one, certainly no candidate, has any right to complain about it.

But the argument of the secretary is, that the question of the bank was fully submitted to the people, by the consent of all parties, fully discussed before them, and their verdict pronounced against the institution, in the reëlection of the president. His statement of the case requires that we should examine carefully the various messages of the president, to ascertain whether the bank question was fairly and frankly, (to use a favorite expression of the president,) submitted by him to the people of the United States. In his message of 1829, the president says:

‘The charter of the bank of the United States expires in 1836, and its stockholders will most probably apply for a renewal of their privileges. In order to avoid the evils resulting from precipitancy in a measure involving such important principles, and such deep pecuniary interests, I feel that I cannot, in justice to the parties interested, too soon present it to the deliberate consideration of the legislature and the people.’

The charter had then upwards of six years to run. Upon this solemn invitation of the chief magistrate, two years afterwards, the bank came forward with an application for renewal. Then it was discovered that the application was premature. And the bank was denounced for accepting the very invitation which had been formally given. The president proceeds:

‘Both the constitutionality and the expediency of the bank are well questioned by a large portion of our fellow-citizens.’

This message was a noncommittal. The president does not announce clearly his own opinion, but states that of a large portion of our fellow-citizens. Now we all know that a large and highly respectable number of the people of the United States have always entertained an opinion adverse to the bank on both grounds. The president continues:

‘If such an institution is deemed essential to the fiscal operations of the government, I submit to the wisdom of the legislature whether a national one, founded upon the credit of the government, and its resources, might not be devised.’

Here, again, the president, so far from expressing an explicit opinion against all national banks, makes a hypothetical admission of the utility of a bank, and distinctly intimates the practicability of devising one on the basis of the credit and resources of the government.

In his message of 1830, speaking of the bank, the president says:

‘Nothing has occurred to lessen, in any degree, the dangers which many of our citizens apprehend from that institution, as at present organized. In the spirit of improvement and compromise, which distinguishes our country and its institutions, it becomes us to inquire whether it be not possible to secure the advantages afforded by the present bank through the agency of a bank of the United States, so modified in its principles and structure, as to obviate constitutional and other objections.’

Here, again, the president recites the apprehensions of ‘many of our citizens,’ rather than avows his own opinion. He admits, indeed, ‘the advantages afforded by the present bank,’ but suggests an inquiry whether it be possible, (of course doubting,) to secure them by a bank differently constructed. And towards the conclusion of that part of the message, his language fully justifies the implication, that it was not to the bank itself, but to ‘its present form,’ that he objected.

The message of 1831, when treating of the bank, was very brief. The president says:

‘Entertaining the opinions heretofore expressed in relation to the bank of the United States, as at present organized,’ (noncommittal once more: and what that means, Mr. President, nobody better knows than you and I,) ‘I felt it my duty, in my former messages, frankly to disclose them.’

Frank disclosures! Now, sir, I recollect perfectly well the impressions made on my mind, and on those of other senators with whom I conversed, immediately after the message was read. We thought and said to each other, the president has left a door open to pass out. It is not the bank; it is not any bank of the United States to which he is opposed, but it is to the particular organization of the existing bank. And we all concluded that, if amendments could be made to the charter satisfactory to the president, he would approve a bill for its renewal.

We come now to the famous message of July, 1832, negativing the bill to recharter the bank. Here, it may be expected, we shall certainly find clear opinions, unequivocally expressed. The president cannot elude the question. He must now be perfectly frank. We shall presently see. He says:

‘A bank of the United States is, in many respects, convenient to the government, and useful to the people. Entertaining this opinion, and deeply impressed with the belief that some of the powers and privileges possessed by the existing bank, are unauthorized by the constitution.’ and so forth. * * * ‘I felt it my duty, at an early period of my administration, to call the attention of congress to the practicability of organizing an institution, combining all its advantages, and obviating these objections. I sincerely regret, that in the act before me I can perceive none of those modifications,’ and so forth. * * * ‘That a bank of the United States, competent to all the duties which may be required by the government, might be so organized as not to infringe on our own delegated powers, or the reserved rights of the states, I do not entertain a doubt. Had the executive been called on to furnish the project of such an institution, the duty would have been cheerfully performed.’

The message is principally employed in discussing the objections which the president entertained to the particular provisions of the charter, and not to the bank itself; such as the right of foreigners to hold stock in it; its exemption from state taxation; its capacity to hold real estate, and so forth, and so forth. Does the president, even in this message, array himself in opposition to any bank of the United States? Does he even oppose himself to the existing bank under every organization of which it is susceptible? On the contrary, does he not declare that he does not entertain a doubt that a bank may be constitutionally organized? Does he not even rebuke congress for not calling on him to furnish a project of a bank, which he would have cheerfully supplied? Is it not fairly deducible, from the message, that the charter of the present bank might have been so amended as to have secured the president’s approbation to the institution? So far was the message from being decisive against all banks of the United States, or against the existing bank, under any modification, that the president expressly declares that the question was adjourned. He says:

‘A general discussion will now take place, eliciting new light, and settling important principles; and a new congress, elected in the midst of such discussion, and furnishing an equal representation of the people, according to the last census, will bear to the capitol the verdict of public opinion, and I doubt not bring this important question to a satisfactory result.’

This review of the various messages of the president, conclusively evinces that they were far from expressing, frankly and decisively, any opinions of the chief magistrate, except that he was opposed to the amendments of the charter contained in the bill submitted to him for its renewal, and that he required further amendments. It demonstrates that he entertained no doubt that it was practicable and desirable to establish a bank of the United States; it justified the hope that he might be ultimately reconciled to the continuation of the present bank, with suitable modifications; and it expressly proclaimed that the whole subject was adjourned to the new congress, to be assembled under the last census. If the parts of the messages which I have cited, or other expressions, in the same document, be doubtful, or susceptible of a different interpretation, the review is sufficient for my purpose; which is, to refute the argument, so confidently advanced, that the president’s opinion, in opposition to the present or any other bank of the United States, was frankly and fairly stated to the people, prior to the late election, was fully understood, and finally decided by them.

Accordingly, in the canvass which ensued, it was boldly asserted by the partisans of the president, that he was not opposed to a bank of the United States, nor to the existing bank with proper amendments. They maintained, at least, wherever those friendly to a national bank were in the majority, that the reëlection would be followed by a recharter of the bank, with proper amendments. They dwelt, it is true, with great earnestness, upon his objections to the pernicious influence of foreigners in holding stock in it; but they nevertheless contended that these objections would be cured, if he was reëlected, and the bank sustained. I appeal to the whole senate, to my colleagues, to the people of Kentucky, and especially to the citizens of the city of Louisville, for the correctness of this statement.

After all this, was it anticipated by the people of the United States, that, in the reëlection of the president, they were deciding against an institution of such vital importance? Could they have imagined, that, after an express adjournment of the whole matter to a new congress, by the president himself, he would have prejudged the action of this new congress, and pronounced that a question, expressly by himself referred to its authority, was previously settled by the people? He claimed no such result in his message, immediately after the reëlection; although in it he denounced the bank as an unsafe depository of the public money, and invited congress to investigate its condition. The president, then, and the secretary of the treasury, are without all color of justification for their assertions, that the question of bank or no bank was fully and fairly submitted to the people, and a decision pronounced against it by them.

Sir, I am surprised and alarmed at the new source of executive power, which is found in the result of a presidential election. I had supposed that the constitution and the laws were the sole source of executive authority; that the constitution could only be amended in the mode which it has itself prescribed; that the issue of a presidential election, was merely to place the chief magistrate in the post assigned to him; and that he had neither more nor less power, in consequence of the election, than the constitution defines and delegates. But it seems that if, prior to an election, certain opinions, no matter how ambiguously put forth by a candidate, are known to the people, these loose opinions, in virtue of the election, incorporate themselves with the constitution, and afterwards are to be regarded and expounded as parts of the instrument.

Third. The public money ought not, the secretary thinks, to remain in the bank until the last moment of the existence of the charter. But that was not the question which he had to decide on the twenty-sixth of September last. The real question then was, could he not wait sixty days for the meeting of congress? There were many last moments, nearly two years and a half, between the twenty-sixth of September and the day of the expiration of the charter. But why not let the public money remain in the bank until the last day of the charter? It is a part of the charter, that it shall so remain; and congress having so ordered it, the secretary ought to have acquiesced in the will of congress, unless the exigency had arisen on which alone it was supposed his power over the deposits would be exercised. The secretary is greatly mistaken, in believing that the bank will be less secure in the last hours of its existence than previously. It will then be collecting its resources, with a view to the immediate payment of its notes, and the ultimate division among the stockholders of their capital; and at no period of its existence will it be so strong and able to pay all demands upon it. As to the depreciation in the value of its notes in the interior, at that time, why, sir, is the secretary possessed of the least knowledge of the course of the trade of the interior, and especially of the western states? If he had any, he could not have made such a suggestion. When the bank itself is not drawing, its notes form the best medium of remittance from the interior to the Atlantic capitals. They are sought after by merchants and traders with avidity, are never below par, and in the absence of bank drafts may command a premium. This will continue to be the case as long as the charter endures, and especially during the last moments of its existence, when its ability will be unquestionable, Philadelphia being the place of the redemption; whilst the notes themselves will be received in all the large cities in payment of duties.

Fourth. The secretary asserts, that ‘it is well understood that the superior credit heretofore enjoyed by the notes of the bank of the United States, was not founded on any particular confidence in its management or solidity. It was occasioned altogether by the agreement on behalf of the public, in the act of incorporation, to receive them in all payments to the United States.’ I have rarely seen any state paper characterized by so little gravity, dignity, and circumspection, as the report displays. The secretary is perfectly reckless in his assertions of matters of fact, and culpably loose in his reasoning. Can he believe the assertion which he has made? Can he believe, for example, that if the notes of the bank of the Metropolis were made receivable in all payments to the government, they would ever acquire, at home and abroad, the credit and confidence which are attached to those of the bank of the United States? If he had stated that the faculty mentioned, was one of the elements of the great credit of those notes, the statement would have been true; but who can agree with him, that it is the sole cause? The credit of the bank of the United States results from the large amount of its capital; from the great ability and integrity with which it has been administered; from the participation of the government in its affairs; from its advantageous location; from its being the place of deposit of the public moneys, and its notes being receivable in all payments to the government; and from its being emphatically the bank of the United States. This latter circumstance arranges it with the bank of England, France, Amsterdam, Genoa, and so forth.

Fifth. The expansion and contraction of the accommodations of the bank to its individual customers, are held up by the secretary, in bold relief, as evidences of misconduct, which justified his withdrawal of the deposits. He represents the bank as endeavoring to operate on the public, by alternate bribery and oppression, with the same object in both cases, of influencing the election, or the administration of the president. Why this perpetual reference of all the operations of the institution to the executive? Why does the executive think of nothing but itself? It is I! It is I! It is I, that is meant! appears to be the constant exclamation. Christianity and charity enjoin us never to ascribe a bad motive if we can suppose a good one. The bank is a moneyed corporation, whose profits result from its business; if that be extensive, it makes better; if limited, less profit. Its interest is to make the greatest amount of dividends which it can safely. And all its actions may be more certainly ascribed to that than any other principle. The administration must have a poor opinion of the virtue and intelligence of the people of the United States, if it supposes that their judgments are to be warped, and their opinions controlled by any scale of graduated bank accommodations. The bank must have a still poorer conception of its duty to the stockholder, if it were to regulate its issues by the uncertain and speculative standard of political effect, rather than a positive arithmetical rule for the computation of interest.

As to the alleged extension of the business of the bank, it has been again and again satisfactorily accounted for by the payment of the public debt, and the withdrawal from Europe of considerable sums, which threw into its vaults a large amount of funds, which, to be productive, must be employed; and, as the commercial wants proceeding from extraordinary activity of business, created great demands about the same period for bank accommodations, the institution naturally enlarged its transactions. It would have been treacherous to the best interests of its constituents if it had not done so. The recent contraction of its business is the result of an obvious cause. Notwithstanding the confidence in it, manifested by one of the last acts of the last house of representatives, congress had scarcely left the district before measures were put in operation to circumvent its authority. Denunciations and threats were put forth against it. Rumors, stamped with but too much authority, were circulated, of the intention of the executive to disregard the admonition of the house of representatives. An agent was sent out――and then such an agent――to sound the local institutions as to the terms on which they would receive the deposits. Was the bank, who could not be ignorant of all this, to sit carelessly by, without taking any precautionary measures? The prudent mariner, when he sees the coming storm, furls his sails, and prepares for all its rage. The bank knew that the executive was in open hostility to it, and that it had nothing to expect from its forbearance. It had numerous points to defend, the strength or weakness of all of which was well known from its weekly returns to the secretary, and it could not possibly know at which the first mortal stroke would be aimed. If, on the twentieth of September last, instead of the manifesto of the president against the bank, he had officially announced, that he did not mean to make war upon the bank, and intended to allow the public deposits to remain until the pleasure of congress was expressed, public confidence would have been assured and unshaken, the business of the country continued in quiet and prosperity, and the numerous bankruptcies in our commercial cities averted. The wisdom of human actions is better known in their results than at their inception. That of the bank is manifest from all that has happened, and especially from its actual condition of perfect security.

Sixth. The secretary complains of misconduct of the bank in delegating to the committee of exchange the transaction of important business, and in that committee’s being appointed by the president and not the board, by which the government directors have been excluded. The directors who compose the board meet only periodically. Deriving no compensation from their places, which the charter, indeed, prohibits them from receiving, it cannot be expected that they should be constantly in session. They must, necessarily, therefore, devolve a great part of the business of the bank in its details, upon the officers and servants of the corporation. It is sufficient, if the board controls, governs, and directs the whole machine. The most important operation of a bank, is that of paying out its cash, and that the cashier or teller and not the board performs. As to committees of exchange, the board not being always in session, it is evident that the convenience of the public requires that there should be some authority at the bank daily, to pass daily upon bills, either in the sale or purchase, as the wants of the community require. Every bank, I believe, that does business to any extent, has a committee of exchange, similar to that of the bank of the United States. In regard to the mode of appointment by the president of the board, it is in conformity with the invariable usage of the house of representatives, with the practice of the senate for several years, and, until altered at the commencement of this session, with the usage, in a great variety, if not all of the state legislatures, and with that which prevails in our popular assemblies. The president, speaker, chairman, moderator, almost uniformly appoints committees. That none of the government directors have been on the committee of exchange, has proceeded, it is to be presumed, from their not being entitled, from their skill and experience, and standing in society, to be put there. The government directors stand upon the same equal footing with those appointed by the stockholders. When appointed, they are thrown into the mass, and must take their fair chances with their colleagues. If the president of the United States will nominate men of high character and credit, of known experience and knowledge in business, they will, no doubt, be placed in corresponding stations. If he appoints different men, he cannot expect it. Banks are exactly the places where currency and value are well understood, and duly estimated. A piece of coin, having even the stamp of the government, will not pass, unless the metal is pure.

Seventh. The French bill forms another topic of great complaint with the secretary. The state of the case is, that the government sold to the bank a bill on that of France for nine hundred thousand dollars, which the bank sold in London, whence it was sent by the purchaser to Paris to receive the amount. When the bank purchased the bill, it paid the amount to the government, or, which is the same thing, passed it to the credit of the treasury, to be used on demand. The bill was protested in Paris, and the agents of the bank, to avoid its being liable to damages, took up the bill on account of the bank. The bill being dishonored, the bank comes back on the drawer, and demands the customary damages due according to the course of all such transactions. The complaint of the secretary is, that the bank took up the bill to save its own credit, and that it did not do it on account of the government; in other words, that the bank did not advance at Paris nine hundred thousand dollars to the government on account of a bill which it had already paid, every dollar, at Philadelphia. Why, sir, has the secretary read the charter? If he has, he must have known that the bank could not have advanced the nine hundred thousand dollars for the government at Paris, without subjecting itself to a penalty of three times the amount, (two million and seven hundred thousand dollars.) The thirteenth section of the charter is express and positive:

‘That if the said corporation shall advance or lend any sum of money for the use or on account of the government of the United States, to an amount exceeding five hundred thousand dollars, all persons concerned in making such unlawful advances or loan, shall forfeit treble the amount, one fifth to the informer,’ and so forth.

Eighth. The last reason which I shall notice of the secretary is, that this ambitious corporation aspires to possess political power. Those in the actual possession of power, especially when they have grossly abused it, are perpetually dreading its loss. The miser does not cling to his treasure with a more death-like grasp. Their suspicions are always active and on the alert. In every form they behold a rival, and every breeze comes charged with alarm and dread. A thousand spectres glide before their affrighted imaginations, and they see, in every attempt to enlighten those who have placed them in office, a sinister design to snatch from them their authority. On what other principles can we account for the extravagant charges brought forward by the secretary against the bank? More groundless and reckless assertions than those which he has allowed himself to embody in his report, never were presented to a deceived, insulted, and outraged people. Suffer me, sir, to group some of them. He asserts, ‘that there is sufficient evidence to prove that the bank has used its means to obtain political power;’ that, in the presidential election, ‘the bank took an open and direct interest, demonstrating that it was using its money for the purpose of obtaining a hold upon the people of this country;’ that it ‘entered the political arena;’ that it circulated publications containing ‘attacks on the officers of government;’ that ‘it is now openly in the field as a political partisan;’ that there are ‘positive proofs’ of the efforts of the bank to obtain power. And, finally, he concludes, as a demonstrated proposition:

‘Fourthly, that there is sufficient evidence to show that the bank has been and still is seeking to obtain political power, and has used its money for the purpose of influencing the election of the public servants.’

After all this, who can doubt that this ambitious corporation is a candidate for the next presidency? Or, if it can moderate its lofty pretensions, that it means at least to go for the office of secretary of the treasury, upon the next removal? But, sir, where are the proofs of these political designs? Can any thing be more reckless than these confident assertions of the secretary? Let us have the proofs; I call for the proofs. The bank has been the constant object for years of vituperation and calumny. It has been assailed in every form of bitterness and malignity. Its operations have been misrepresented; attempts have been made to destroy its credit, and the public confidence in its integrity and solidity; and the character of its officers has been assailed. Under these circumstances, it has dared to defend itself. It has circulated public documents, speeches of members of congress, reports made by chairmen of committees, friends of the administration, and other papers. And, as it was necessary to make the defence commensurate with the duration and the extensive theatre of the attack, it has been compelled to incur a heavy expense to save itself from threatened destruction. It has openly avowed, and yet avows, its right and purpose to defend itself. All this was known to the last congress. Not a solitary material fact has been since disclosed. And when before, in a country where the press is free, was it deemed criminal for any body to defend itself? Who invested the secretary of the treasury with power to interpose himself between the people, and light and intelligence? Who gave him the right to dictate what information should be communicated to the people and by whom? Whence does he derive his jurisdiction? Who made him censor of the public press? From what new sedition law does he deduce his authority? Is the superintendence of the American press a part of the financial duty of a secretary of the treasury? Why did he not lay the whole case before congress, and invite the revival of the old sedition law? Why anticipate the arrival of their session? Why usurp the authority of the only department of government competent to apply a remedy, if there be any power to abridge the freedom of the press? If the secretary wishes to purify the press, he has a most Herculean duty before him. And when he sallies out on his quixotic expedition, he had better begin with the Augean stable, the press nearest to him, his organ, as most needing purification.

I have done with the secretary’s reasons. They have been weighed and found wanting. There was not only no financial motive for his acting――the sole motive which he could officially entertain――but every financial consideration forbade him to act. I proceed now, in the third and last place, to examine the manner in which he has exercised his power over the deposits.

Thirdly. The whole people of the United States derive an interest from the public deposits in the bank of the United States, as a stockholder, in that institution. The bank is enabled, through its branches, to throw capital into those parts of the union where it is most needed. Thus it distributes and equalizes the advantages accruing from the collection of a large public revenue, and the consequent public deposits. Thus it neutralizes the injustice which would otherwise flow from the people of the west and the interior’s paying their full proportion of the public burdens, without deriving any corresponding benefit from the circulation and deposits of the public revenue. The use of the capital of the bank has been signally beneficial to the west. We there want capital, domestic, foreign――any capital that we can honestly get. We want it to stimulate enterprise, to give activity to business, and to develope the vast resources which the bounty of Nature has concentrated in that region. But, by the secretary’s financial arrangements, the twenty-five or thirty millions of the public revenue collected from all the people of the United States, (including those of the west,) will be retained in a few Atlantic ports. Each port will engross the public moneys there collected. And, as that of New York collects about one half of the public revenue, all the people of the United States will be laid under contribution, not for the sake of the people of the city of New York, but of two or three banks in that city, in which the people of the United States, collectively, have not a particle of interest; banks, the stock in which is or may be held by foreigners.

Three months have elapsed, and the secretary has not yet found places of deposit for the public moneys, as substitutes for the bank of the United States. He tells us, in his report of yesterday, that the bank at Charleston, to which he applied for their reception, declined the custody, and that he has yet found no other bank willing to assume it. But he states that the public interest does not in consequence suffer. No! What is done with the public moneys constantly receiving in the important port of Charleston, the largest port, (New Orleans excepted,) from the Potomac to the Gulf of Mexico? What with the revenue bonds? It appears that he has not yet received the charters from all the banks selected as places of deposit. Can any thing be more improvident than that the secretary should undertake to contract with banks, without knowing their power and capacity to contract by their charters? That he should venture to deposit the people’s money in banks, without a full knowledge of every thing respecting their actual condition? But he has found some banks willing to receive the public deposits, and he has entered into contracts with them. And the very first step he has taken has been in direct violation of an express and positive statute of the United States. By the act of the first of May, 1820, section sixth, it is enacted:

‘That no contract shall hereafter be made by the secretary of state, or of the treasury, or of the department of war, or of the navy, except under a law authorizing the same, or under an appropriation adequate to its fulfilment; and excepting, also, contracts for the subsistence and clothing of the army or navy, and contracts by the quarter-master’s department, which may be made by the secretaries of those departments.’

Now, sir, what law authorized these contracts with the local banks, made by the secretary of the treasury? The argument, if I understand the argument intended to be employed on the other side, is this; that, by the bank charter, the secretary, is authorized to remove the public deposits, and that includes the power in question? But the act establishing the treasury department confides, expressly, the safe-keeping of the public moneys of the United States to the treasurer of the United States, and not to the secretary; and the treasurer, not the secretary, gives a bond for the fidelity with which he shall keep them. The moment, therefore, that they are withdrawn from the bank of the United States, they are placed, by law, under the charge and responsibility of the treasurer and his bond, and not of the secretary, who has given no bond. But let us trace this argument a little further. The power to remove the deposits, says the secretary, from a given place, implies the power to designate the place to which they shall be removed. And this implied power to designate the place to which they shall be removed, implies the power to the secretary of the treasury to contract with the new banks of deposit. And, on this third link, in the chain of implications, a fourth is constructed, to dispense with the express duties of the treasurer of the United States, defined in a positive statute; and yet a fifth, to repeal a positive statute of congress, passed four years after the passage of the law containing the present source of this most extraordinary chain of implications. The exceptions in the act of 1820, prove the inflexibility of the rule which it prescribes. Annual appropriations are made for the clothing and subsistence of the army and navy. These appropriations might have been supposed to be included in a power to contract for those articles, notwithstanding the prohibitory clause in that act. But congress thought otherwise, and therefore expressly provided for the exceptions. It must be admitted that our clerk, (as the late governor Robinson, of Louisiana, one of the purest republicans I have ever known, used to call a secretary of the treasury,) tramples with very little ceremony upon the duties of the treasurer, and the acts of the congress of the United States, when they come in his way.

These contracts, therefore, between the secretary of the treasury and the local banks are mere nullities, and absolutely void, enforceable in no court of justice whatever, for two causes; first, because they are made in violation of the act of the first of May, 1820; and, secondly, because the treasurer, and not the secretary of the treasury, alone had, if any federal officer possessed the power to contract with the local banks. And here, again, we perceive the necessity there was for avoiding the precipitancy with which the executive acted, and for awaiting the meeting of congress. Congress could have deliberately reviewed the previous legislation, decided upon the expediency of a transfer of the public deposits, and, if deemed proper, could have passed the new laws adapted to the new condition of the treasury. It could have decided whether the local banks should pay any bonus, or pay any interest, or diffuse the public deposits throughout the United States, so as to secure among all their parts, equality of benefits as well as of burdens, and provided for ample guarantees for the safety of the public moneys in their new depositories.

But let us now inquire, whether the secretary of the treasury has exercised his usurped authority, in the formation of these contracts, with prudence and discretion. Having substituted himself to congress and to the treasurer of the United States, he ought at least to show that, in the stipulations of the contracts themselves, he has guarded the public moneys and provided for the public interests. I will examine the contract with the Girard bank of Philadelphia, which is presented as a specimen of the contracts with the Atlantic banks. The first stipulation limits the duty of the local banks to receive in deposit, on account of the United States, only the notes of banks convertible into coin, ‘in its immediate vicinity,’ or which it is, ‘for the time being, in the habit of receiving.’ Under this stipulation, the Girard bank, for example, will not be bound to receive the notes of the Louisville bank, although that also be one of the deposit banks, nor the notes of any other bank, not in its immediate vicinity. As to the provision that it will receive the notes of banks which, for the time being, it is in the habit of receiving, it is absurd to put such a stipulation in a contract, because by the power retained to change the habit, for the time being, it is an absolute nullity. Now, sir, how does this compare with the charter and bank of the United States? The bank receives every where, and credits the government with the notes, whether issued by the branches or the principal bank. The amount of all these notes is every where available to the government. But the government may be overflowing in distant bank notes when they are not wanted, and a bankrupt, at the places of expenditure, under this singular arrangement.

With respect to the transfer of moneys from place to place, the local banks require in this contract, that it shall not take place but upon reasonable notice. And what reasonable is, has been left totally undefined, and of course open to future contest. When hereafter a transfer is ordered, and the bank is unable to make it, there is nothing to do but to allege the unreasonableness of the notice. The local bank agrees to render to the government all the services now performed by the bank of the United States, subject, however, to the restriction that they are required ‘in the vicinity’ of the local bank. But the bank of the United States is under no such restrictions; its services are coextensive with the United States and their territories.

The local banks agree to submit their books and accounts to the secretary of the treasury, or to any agent to be appointed by him, but to be paid by the local banks pro rata, as far as such examination is admissible without a violation of their respective charters; and how far that may be, the secretary cannot tell, because he has not yet seen all the charters. He is, however, to appoint the agents of examination, and to fix the salaries which the local banks are to pay. And where does the secretary find the authority to create officers and fix their salaries, without the authority of congress?

But the most improvident, unprecedented, and extraordinary provision in the contract, is that which relates to the security. When, and not until the deposits in the local bank shall exceed one half of the capital stock annually paid in, collateral security, satisfactory to the secretary of the treasury, is to be given for the safety of the deposits. Why, sir, a freshman, a schoolboy, would not have thus dealt with his father’s guardian’s money. Instead of the security preceding, it is to follow the deposit of the people’s money! That is, the local bank gets an amount of their money, equal to one half its capital, and then it condescends to give security! Does not the secretary know, that when he goes for the security, the money may be gone, and that he may be entirely unable to get the one or the other! We have a law, if I mistake not, which forbids the advance of any public money, even to a disbursing agent of the government, without previous security. Yet, in violation of the spirit of that law, or, at least, of all common sense and common prudence, the secretary disperses upwards of twenty-five millions of public revenue among a countless number of unknown banks, and stipulates that, when the amount of the deposit exceeds one half of their respective capitals, security is to be given!

The best stipulation in the whole contract, is the last, which reserves to the secretary of the treasury the power of discharging these local banks from the service of the United States whenever he pleases; and the sooner he exercises it, and restores the public deposits to the place of acknowledged safety, from which they have been rashly taken, the better for all parties concerned.

Let us look into the condition of one of these local banks, the nearest to us, and that with respect to which we have the best information. The banks of this district (and among them that of the Metropolis) are required to make annual reports of their condition on the first day of January. The latest official return from the Metropolis bank is of the first of January, 1832. Why it did not make one on the first of last January, along with the other banks, I know not. In point of fact, I am informed, it made none. Here is its account of January, 1832, and I think you will agree that it is a Flemish one. On the debit side stand capital paid in, five hundred thousand dollars. Due to the banks, twenty thousand nine hundred and eleven dollars and ten cents; individuals on deposit, seventy-four thousand nine hundred and seventy-seven dollars and forty-two cents; dividend and expenses, seventeen thousand five hundred and ninety-one dollars and seventy-seven cents; and surplus, eight thousand one hundred and thirty-one dollars and two cents; making an aggregate of six hundred and eighty-four thousand four hundred and ninety-six dollars and thirty-one cents. On the credit side, there are bills and notes discounted, and stock (what sort?) bearing interest, six hundred and twenty-six thousand and eleven dollars and ninety cents; real estate, eighteen thousand four hundred and four dollars and eighty-six cents; notes of other banks on hand, and checks on the same, twenty-three thousand two hundred and thirteen dollars and eighty cents; specie――now, Mr. President, how much do you imagine? Recollect, that this is the bank selected at the seat of government, where there is necessarily concentrated a vast amount of public money, employed in the expenditure of government. Recollect that, by another executive edict, all public officers, charged with the disbursement of the public money here, are required to make their deposits with this Metropolis; and how much specie do you suppose it had at the date of its last official return? ten thousand nine hundred and seventy-four dollars and seventy-six cents; due from other banks, five thousand eight hundred and ninety dollars and ninety-nine cents; making in the aggregate on the credit side, six hundred and eighty-four thousand four hundred and ninety-six dollars and thirty-one cents. Upon looking into the items, and casting them up, you will find that this Metropolis bank, on the first day of January, 1832, was liable to an immediate call for one hundred and seventy-six thousand three hundred and thirty-five dollars and twenty-nine cents, and that the amount which it had on hand, ready to meet that call, was forty thousand and seventy-nine dollars and fifty-five cents. And this is one of the banks selected at the seat of the general government, for the deposit of the public moneys of the United States. A bank with a capital of thirty millions of dollars, and upwards of ten millions of specie on hand has been put aside, and a bank with a capital of half a million, and a little more than ten thousand dollars in specie on hand, has been substituted in its place! How that half million has been raised, whether in part or in the whole, by the neutralizing operation of giving stock notes in exchange for certificates of stock, does not appear.

The design of the whole scheme of this treasury arrangement seems to have been, to have united in one common league a number of local banks, dispersed throughout the union, and subject to one central will, with a right of scrutiny instituted by the agents of that will. It is a bad imitation of the New York project of a safety-fund. This confederation of banks will probably be combined in sympathy as well as interest, and will be always ready to fly to the succor of the source of their nourishment. As to their supplying a common currency, in place of that of the bank of the United States, the plan is totally destitute of the essential requisite. They are not required to credit each other’s paper, unless it be issued in the ‘immediate vicinity.’

We have seen what is in this contract. Now let us see what is not there. It contains no stipulation for the preservation of the public morals; none for the freedom of elections; none for the purity of the press. All these great interests, after all that has been said against the bank of the United States, are left to shift and take care of themselves as they can. We have already seen the president of a bank in a neighboring city, rushing impetuously to the defence of the secretary of the treasury against an editorial article in a newspaper, although the ‘venom of the shaft was quite equal to the vigor of the bow.’ Was he rebuked by the secretary of the treasury? Was the bank discharged from the public service? Or, are morals, the press, and elections, in no danger of contamination, when a host of banks become literary champions on the side of power and the officers of government? Is the patriotism of the secretary only alarmed when the infallibility of high authority is questioned? Will the states silently acquiesce, and see the federal authority insinuating itself into banks of their creation, and subject to their exclusive control?

We have, Mr. President, a most wonderful financier at the head of our treasury department. He sits quietly by in the cabinet, and witnesses the contest between his colleague and the president; sees the conflict in the mind of that colleague between his personal attachment to the president on the one hand, and his solemn duty to the public on the other; beholds the triumph of conscientious obligation; contemplates the noble spectacle of an honest man, preferring to surrender an exalted office with all its honors and emoluments, rather than betray the interests of the people; witnesses the contemptuous and insulting expulsion of that colleague from office; and then coolly enters the vacated place, without the slightest sympathy or the smallest emotion. He was installed on the twenty-third of September, and by the twenty-sixth, the brief period of three days, he discovers that the government of the United States had been wrong from its origin; that every one of his predecessors from Hamilton down, including Gallatin, (who, whatever I said of him on a former occasion, and that I do not mean to retract, possessed more practical knowledge of currency, banks, and finance, than any man I have ever met in the public councils,) Dallas, and Crawford, had been mistaken about both the expediency and constitutionality of the bank; that every chief magistrate, prior to him whose patronage he enjoyed, had been wrong; that the supreme court of the United States, and the people of the United States, during the thirty-seven years that they had acquiesced in or recognised the utter utility of a bank, were all wrong. And, opposing his single opinion to their united judgments, he dismisses the bank, scatters the public money, and undertakes to regulate and purify the public morals, the public press, and popular elections!

If we examine the operations of this modern Turgot, in their financial bearing, merely, we shall find still less for approbation.

First. He withdraws the public moneys, where, by his own deliberate admission, they were perfectly safe, with a bank of thirty-five millions of capital, and ten millions of specie, and places them at great hazard with banks of comparatively small capital, and but little specie, of which the Metropolis bank is an example.

Second. He withdraws them from a bank created by, and over which the federal government had ample control, and puts them in other banks, created by different governments, and over which it has no control.

Third. He withdraws them from a bank in which the American people, as a stockholder, were drawing their fair proportion of interest accruing on loans, of which those deposits formed the basis, and puts them where the people of the United States draw no interest.

Fourth. From a bank which has paid a bonus of a million and a half, which the people of the United States may be now liable to refund, and puts them in banks which have paid to the American people no bonus.

Fifth. Depreciates the value of stock in a bank, where the general government holds seven millions, and advances that of banks in whose stock it does not hold a dollar; and whose aggregate capital does not probably much exceed that very seven millions. And, finally,

Sixth. He dismisses a bank whose paper circulates in the greatest credit throughout the union and in foreign countries, and engages in the public service banks whose paper has but a limited and local circulation in their ‘immediate vicinities.’

These are immediate and inevitable results. How much that large and long-standing item of unavailable funds, annually reported to congress, will be swelled and extended, remains to be developed by time.

And now, Mr. President, what, under all these circumstances, is it our duty to do? Is there a senator, who can hesitate to affirm, in the language of the resolution, that the president has assumed a dangerous power over the treasury of the United States, not granted to him by the constitution and the laws; and that the reasons assigned for the act, by the secretary of the treasury, are insufficient and unsatisfactory?

The eyes and the hopes of the American people are anxiously turned to congress. They feel that they have been deceived and insulted; their confidence abused; their interests betrayed; and their liberties in danger. They see a rapid and alarming concentration of all power in one man’s hands. They see that, by the exercise of the positive authority of the executive, and his negative power exerted over congress, the will of one man alone prevails, and governs the republic. The question is no longer what laws will congress pass, but what will the executive not veto? The president, and not congress, is addressed for legislative action. We have seen a corporation, charged with the execution of a great national work, dismiss an experienced, faithful, and zealous president, afterwards testify to his ability by a voluntary resolution, and reward his extraordinary services by a large gratuity, and appoint in his place an executive favorite, totally inexperienced and incompetent, to propitiate the president. We behold the usual incidents of approaching tyranny. The land is filled with spies and informers; and detraction and denunciation are the orders of the day. People, especially official incumbents in this place, no longer dare speak in the fearless tones of manly freedom, but in the cautious whispers of trembling slaves. The premonitory symptoms of despotism are upon us; and if congress do not apply an instantaneous and effective remedy, the fatal collapse will soon come on, and we shall die――ignobly die! base, mean, and abject slaves――the scorn and contempt of mankind――unpitied, unwept, unmourned!

ON THE PUBLIC DISTRESS CAUSED BY THE REMOVAL OF THE DEPOSITS.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, MARCH 7, 1834.

[THE removal of the deposits from the bank of the United States, by order of president Jackson, in October, 1833, caused great pecuniary embarrassments and distress in the commercial cities and towns of the United States, from the pernicious effect of the measure on the banks and currency. Numerous memorials were presented to congress, by the people, praying for relief. On the presentation of a memorial from Philadelphia, Mr. Clay made the brief remarks which follow, consisting principally of an eloquent appeal to the vice-president, Mr. Van Buren, to use his influence with general Jackson, to restore peace and prosperity to the country.]

I HAVE been requested by the committee from Philadelphia, charged with presenting the memorial to congress, to say a few words on the subject; and although, after the ample and very satisfactory exposition which it has received from the senator from Massachusetts, further observations are entirely unnecessary, I cannot deny myself the gratification of complying with a request, proceeding from a source so highly worthy of respectful consideration.

And what is the remedy to be provided for this most unhappy state of the country? I have conversed freely with the members of the Philadelphia committee. They are real, practical, working men; intelligent, well acquainted with the general condition, and with the sufferings of their particular community. No one, who has not a heart of steel, can listen to them, without feeling the deepest sympathy for the privations and sufferings unnecessarily brought upon the laboring classes. Both the committee and the memorial declare that their reliance is, exclusively, on the legislative branch of the government. Mr. President, it is with subdued feelings of the profoundest humility and mortification, that I am compelled to say, that, constituted as congress now is, no relief will be afforded by it, unless its members shall be enlightened and instructed by the people themselves. A large portion of the body, whatever may be their private judgment upon the course of the president, believe it to be their duty, at all events safest for themselves, to sustain him, without regard to the consequences of his measures upon the public interests. And nothing but clear, decided, and unequivocal demonstrations of the popular disapprobation of what has been done, will divert them from their present purpose.

But there is another quarter which possesses sufficient power and influence to relieve the public distresses. In twenty-four hours the executive branch could adopt a measure which would afford an efficacious and substantial remedy, and reëstablish confidence. And those who, in this chamber, support the administration, could not render a better service than to repair to the executive mansion, and, placing before the chief magistrate the naked and undisguised truth, prevail upon him to retrace his steps and abandon his fatal experiment. No one, sir, can perform that duty with more propriety than yourself. You can, if you will, induce him to change his course. To you, then, sir, in no unfriendly spirit, but with feelings softened and subdued by the deep distress which pervades every class of our countrymen, I make the appeal. By your official and personal relations with the president, you maintain with him an intercourse which I neither enjoy nor covet. Go to him and tell him, without exaggeration, but in the language of truth and sincerity, the actual condition of his bleeding country. Tell him it is nearly ruined and undone, by the measures which he has been induced to put in operation. Tell him that his experiment is operating on the nation like the philosopher’s experiment upon a convulsed animal, in an exhausted receiver, and that it must expire in agony, if he does not pause, give it free and sound circulation, and suffer the energies of the people to be revived and restored. Tell him that, in a single city, more than sixty bankruptcies, involving a loss of upwards of fifteen millions of dollars, have occurred. Tell him of the alarming decline in the value of all property, of the depreciation of all the products of industry, of the stagnation in every branch of business, and of the close of numerous manufacturing establishments, which, a few short months ago, were in active and flourishing operation. Depict to him, if you can find language to portray, the heart-rending wretchedness of thousands of the working classes cast out of employment. Tell him of the tears of helpless widows, no longer able to earn their bread; and of unclad and unfed orphans, who have been driven, by his policy, out of the busy pursuits in which but yesterday they were gaining an honest livelihood. Say to him, that if firmness be honorable, when guided by truth and justice, it is intimately allied to another quality, of the most pernicious tendency, in the prosecution of an erroneous system. Tell him how much more true glory is to be won by retracing false steps, than by blindly rushing on until his country is overwhelmed in bankruptcy and ruin. Tell him of the ardent attachment, the unbounded devotion, the enthusiastic gratitude towards him, so often signally manifested by the American people, and that they deserve at his hands better treatment. Tell him to guard himself against the possibility of an odious comparison, with that worst of the Roman emperors, who, contemplating with indifference the conflagration of the mistress of the world, regaled himself during the terrific scene, in the throng of his dancing courtiers. If you desire to secure for yourself the reputation of a public benefactor, describe to him truly the universal distress already produced, and the certain ruin which must ensue from perseverance in his measures. Tell him that he has been abused, deceived, betrayed, by the wicked counsels of unprincipled men around him. Inform him that all efforts in congress, to alleviate or terminate the public distress, are paralysed, and likely to prove totally unavailing, from his influence upon a large portion of the members, who are unwilling to withdraw their support, or to take a course repugnant to his wishes and feelings. Tell him that, in his bosom alone, under actual circumstances, does the power abide to relieve the country; and that, unless he opens it to conviction, and corrects the errors of his administration, no human imagination can conceive, and no human tongue can express, the awful consequences which may follow. Entreat him to pause, and to reflect that there is a point beyond which human endurance cannot go; and let him not drive this brave, generous, and patriotic people, to madness and despair.

Mr. President, unaffectedly indisposed, and unwilling as I am to trespass upon the senate, I could not decline complying with a request addressed to me, by a respectable portion of my fellow-citizens, part of the bone and sinew of the American public. Like the senator from Massachusetts, who has been intrusted with the presentation of their petition to the senate, I found them plain, judicious, sensible men, clearly understanding their own interests, and, with the rest of the community, writhing under the operation of the measures of the executive. If I have deviated from the beaten track of debate in the senate, my apology must be found in the anxious solicitude which I feel for the condition of the country. And, sir, if I shall have been successful in touching your heart, and exciting in you a glow of patriotism, I shall be most happy. You can prevail upon the president to abandon his ruinous course; and, if you will exert the influence which you possess, you will command the thanks and the plaudits of a grateful people.

ON THE STATE OF THE COUNTRY FROM THE EFFECTS OF THE REMOVAL OF THE DEPOSITS.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, MARCH 14, 1834.

[THE following is one of the most happy and eloquent of Mr. Clay’s efforts in the senate, delivered impromptu. The pecuniary distress of the business community of the United States, brought upon them by the war of general Jackson upon the currency, particularly the removal of the deposits, induced the merchants and mechanics to pour into the halls of congress their memorials for relief. Mr. Clay, on presenting some of these petitions, denounces in indignant terms the tyrannical and obstinate course of the president and his partisans, and alludes to the election in the city of New York, favorable to the whigs, as evidence of a great change in public opinion.]

I AM charged with the pleasing duty of presenting to the senate the proceedings of a public meeting of the people, and two memorials, subscribed by large numbers of my fellow-citizens, in respect to the exciting state of public affairs.

The first I would offer are the resolutions of the young men of Troy, assembled upon a call of upwards of seven hundred of their number. I have recently visited that interesting city. It is one of the most beautiful of a succession of fine cities and villages, that decorate the borders of one of the noblest rivers of our country. In spite of the shade cast upon it by its ancient and venerable sister and neighbor, it has sprung up with astonishing rapidity. When I saw it last fall, I never beheld a more respectable, active, enterprising, and intelligent business community. Every branch of employment was flourishing. Every heart beat high in satisfaction with present enjoyment, and hopes from the prospect of future success. How sadly has the scene changed! How terribly have all their anticipations of continued and increasing prosperity been dashed and disappointed by the folly and wickedness of misguided rulers!

The young men advert to this change, in their resolutions, and to its true cause. They denounce all experiments upon their happiness. They call for the safer counsels which prevailed under the auspices of Washington and Madison, both of whom gave their approbation to charters of a bank of the United States.

But what gives to these resolutions peculiar interest, in my estimation, is, that they exhibit a tone of feeling which rises far above any loss of property, however great, any distress from the stagnation of business, however intense. They manifest a deep and patriotic sensibility to executive usurpations, and to the consequent danger to civil liberty. They solemnly protest against the union of the purse and the sword in the hands of one man. They would not have consented to such a union in the person of the father of his country, much less will they in that of any living man. They feel that, when liberty is safe, the loss of fortune and property is comparatively nothing; but that when liberty is sacrificed, existence has lost all its charms.

The next document which I have to offer is a memorial, signed by nearly nine hundred mechanics of the city of Troy. Several of them are personally known to me. And judging from what I know, see, and hear, I believe there is not any where a more skilful, industrious, and respectable body of mechanics, than in Troy. They bear testimony to the prevalence of distress, trace it to the illegal acts of the executive branch of the government in the removal of the public deposits; ask their restoration, and the recharter of the bank of the United States. And the committee, in their letter addressed to me, say, ‘we are, what we profess to be, working men, dependent upon our labor for our daily bread, confine our attention to our several vocations, and trust in God and the continental congress for such protection as will enable us to operate successfully.’

The first-mentioned depository of their confidence will not deceive them. But I lament to say that the experience during this session, does not authorize us to anticipate that coöperation in another quarter, which is indispensable to the restoration of the constitution and laws, and the recovery of the public purse.

The last memorial I would present, has been transmitted to me by the secretaries to a meeting stated to be the largest ever held in the county of Schenectady, in New York. It is signed by about eight hundred persons. In a few instances, owing to the subscriptions having been obtained by different individuals, the same name occurs twice. The memorialists bring their testimony to the existence of distress, and the disorders of the currency, and invoke the application of the only known, tried, and certain remedy, the establishment of a national bank.

And now, Mr. President, I will avail myself of the occasion to say a few words on the subject matter of these proceedings and memorials, and on the state of the country as we found it at the commencement of the session, and its present state.

When we met, we found the executive in the full possession of the public treasury. All its barriers had been broken down, and in place of the control of the law was substituted the uncontrolled will of the chief magistrate. I say uncontrolled; for it is idle to pretend, that the executive has not unrestrained access to the public treasury, when every officer connected with it is bound to obey his paramount will. It is not the form of keeping the account; it is not the place alone where the public money is kept; but it is the power, the authority, the responsibility of independent officers, checking and checked by each other, that constitute the public security for the safety of the public treasure. This no longer exists, is gone, is annihilated.

The secretary sent us in a report containing the reasons (if they can be dignified with that appellation) for the executive seizure of the public purse. Resolutions were promptly offered in this body, denouncing the procedure as unconstitutional and dangerous to liberty, and declaring the total insufficiency of the reasons. Nearly three months were consumed in the discussion of them. In the early part of this protracted debate, the supporters of distress, pronounced it a panic got up for dramatic effect, and affirmed that the country was enjoying great prosperity. Instances occurred of members asserting that the places of their own residence were in the full enjoyment of enviable and unexampled prosperity, who, in the progress of the debate, were compelled reluctantly to own their mistake, and to admit the existence of deep and intense distress. Memorial after memorial poured in, committee after committee repaired to the capitol to represent the sufferings of the people, until incredulity itself stood rebuked and abashed. Then it was the bank that had inflicted the calamity upon the country; that bank which was to be brought under the feet of the president, should proceed forthwith to wind up its affairs.

And, during the debate, it was again and again pronounced by the partisans of the executive, that the sole question involved in the resolutions was, bank or no bank. It was in vain that we protested, solemnly protested, that that was not the question; and that the true question was of immensely higher import; that it comprehended the inviolability of the constitution, the supremacy of the laws, and the union of the purse and the sword in the hands of one man. In vain did members repeatedly rise in their places, and proclaim their intention to vote for the restoration of the deposits, and their settled determination to vote against the recharter of the bank, and against the charter of any bank. Gentlemen persisted in asserting the identity of the bank question, and that contained in the resolutions; and thousands of the people of the country are, to this moment, deluded by the erroneous belief in that identity.

Mr. President, the arts of power and its minions are the same in all countries and in all ages. It marks a victim; denounces it; and excites the public odium and the public hatred, to conceal its own abuses and encroachments. It avails itself of the prejudice and the passions of the people, silently and secretly to forge chains to enslave the people.

Well, sir, during the continuance of the debate, we have been told, over and over again, that, let the question of the deposits be settled, let congress pass upon the report of the secretary, and the activity of business and the prosperity of the country will again speedily revive. The senate has passed upon the resolutions, and has done its duty to the country, to the constitution, and to its conscience.

And the report of the secretary has been also passed upon in the other house; but how passed upon? The official relations which exist between the two houses, and the expediency of preserving good feelings and harmony between them, forbid my saying all that I feel on this momentous subject. But I must say, that the house, by the constitution, is deemed the especial guardian of the rights and interests of the people; and, above all, the guardian of the people’s money in the public treasury. The house has given the question of the sufficiency of the secretary’s reasons the go-by, evaded it, shunned it, or rather merged it in the previous question. The house of representatives have not ventured to approve the secretary’s reasons. It cannot approve them; but, avoiding the true and original question, has gone off upon a subordinate and collateral point. It has indirectly sanctioned the executive usurpation. It has virtually abandoned its constitutional care and control over the public treasury. It has surrendered the keys, or rather permits the executive to retain their custody; and thus acquiesces in that conjunction of the sword and the purse of the nation, which all experience has evinced, and all patriots have believed, to be fatal to the continuance of public liberty.

Such has been the extraordinary disposition of this great question. Has the promised relief come? In one short week, after the house pronounced its singular decision, three banks in this District of Columbia have stopped payment and exploded. In one of them the government has, we understand, sustained a loss of thirty thousand dollars. And in another, almost within a stone’s throw of the capitol, that navy pension fund, created for our infirm and disabled, but gallant tars, which ought to be held sacred, has experienced an abstraction of twenty thousand dollars! Such is the realization of the prediction of relief made by the supporters of the executive.

And what is the actual state of the public treasury? The president, not satisfied with the seizure of it, more than two months before the commencement of the session, appointed a second secretary of the treasury since the adjournment of the last congress. We are now in the fifth month of the session; and in defiance of the sense of the country, and in contempt of the participation of the senate in the appointing power, the president has not yet deigned to submit the nomination of his secretary to the consideration of the senate. Sir, I have not looked into the record, but, from the habitual practice of every previous president, from the deference and respect which they all maintained towards a coördinate branch of the government, I venture to say, that a parallel case is not to be found.

Mr. President, it is a question of the highest importance, what is to be the issue, what the remedy, of the existing evils. We should deal with the people, openly, frankly, sincerely. The senate stands ready to do whatever is incumbent upon it; but unless the majority in the house will relent, unless it will take heed of and profit by recent events, there is no hope for the nation from the joint action of the two houses of congress at this session. Still, I would say to my countrymen, do not despair. You are a young, brave, intelligent, and as yet a free people. A complete remedy for all that you suffer, and all that you dread, is in your own hands. And the events, to which I have just alluded, demonstrate that those of us have not been deceived who have always relied upon the virtue, the capacity, and the intelligence of the people.

I congratulate you, Mr. President, and I hope you will receive the congratulation with the same heartfelt cordiality with which I tender it, upon the issue of the late election in the city of New York. I hope it will excite a patriotic glow in your bosom. I congratulate the senate, the country, the city of New York, the friends of liberty every where. It was a great victory. It must be so regarded in every aspect. From a majority of more than six thousand, which the dominant party boasted a few months ago, if it retain any, it is a meagre and spurious majority of less than two hundred. And the whigs contended with such odds against them――a triple alliance of state placemen, corporation placemen, and federal placemen, amounting to about thirty-five hundred, and deriving, in the form of salaries, compensations, and allowances, ordinary and extra, from the public chests, the enormous sum, annually, of nearly one million of dollars; marshalled, drilled, disciplined, commanded. The struggle was tremendous; but what can withstand the irresistible power of the votaries of truth, liberty, and their country? It was an immortal triumph――a triumph of the constitution and the laws over usurpation here, and over clubs and bludgeons and violence there.

Go on, noble city! Go on, patriotic whigs! follow up your glorious commencement; persevere, and pause not until you have regenerated and disenthralled your splendid city, and placed it at the head of American cities devoted to civil liberty, as it now stands preëminently the first as the commercial emporium of our common country. Merchants, mechanics, traders, laborers, never cease to recollect, that without freedom, you can have no sure commerce or business; and that without law you have no security for personal liberty, property, or even existence! Countrymen of Tone, of Emmet, of Macneven, and of Sampson, if any of you have been deceived, and seduced into the support of a cause dangerous to American liberty, hasten to review and correct your course! Do not forget, that you abandoned the green fields of your native island to escape what you believed the tyranny of a British king. Do not, I adjure you, lend yourselves, in this land of your asylum, this last retreat of the freedom of man, to the establishment here, for you, and for us all, of that despotism which you had proudly hoped had been left behind you, in Europe, for ever! There is much, I would fain believe, in the constitutional forms of government. But at last it is its parental and beneficent operation that must fix its character. A government may in form be free, in practice tyrannical; as it may in form be despotic, and in practice liberal and free.

It was a brilliant and signal triumph of the whigs. And they have assumed for themselves, and bestowed on their opponents, a demonstration which, according to all the analogy of history, is strictly correct. It deserves to be extended throughout the whole country. What was the origin, among our British ancestors, of those appellations? The tories were the supporters of executive power, of royal prerogative, of the maxim that the king could do no wrong, of the detestable doctrines of passive obedience and non-resistance. The whigs were the champions of liberty, the friends of the people, and the defenders of the power of their representatives in the house of commons.

During our revolutionary war, the tories took sides with executive power and prerogative, and with the king, against liberty and independence. And the whigs, true to their principles, contended against royal executive power, and for freedom and independence.

And what is the present but the same contest in another form? The partisans of the present executive sustain his power in the most boundless extent. They claim for him all executive authority. They make his sole will the governing power. Every officer concerned in the administration, from the highest to the lowest, is to conform to his mandates. Even the public treasury, hitherto regarded as sacred, and beyond his reach, is placed by them under his entire direction and control. The whigs of the present day are opposing executive encroachment, and a most alarming extension of executive power and prerogative. They are ferreting out the abuses and corruptions of an administration, under a chief magistrate who is endeavoring to concentrate in his own person the whole powers of government. They are contending for the rights of the people, for civil liberty, for free institutions, for the supremacy of the constitution and the laws. The contest is an arduous one; but, although the struggle may be yet awhile prolonged, by the blessing of God, and the spirit of our ancestors, the issue cannot be doubtful.

The senate stands in the breach, ready to defend the constitution, and to relieve the distresses of the people. But, without the concurrence of another branch of congress, which ought to be the first to yield it, the senate alone can send forth no act of legislation. Unaided, it can do no positive good; but it has vast preventive power. It may avert and arrest evil, if it cannot rebuke usurpation. Senators, let us remain steadily by the constitution and the country, in this most portentous crisis; let us oppose, to all encroachments and to all corruption, a manly, resolute, and uncompromising resistance; let us adopt two rules, from which we will never deviate, in deliberating upon all nominations. In the first place, to preserve untarnished and unsuspected the purity of congress, let us negative the nominations of every member for any office, high or low, foreign or domestic, until the authority of the constitution and laws is fully restored. I know not that there is any member of either house capable of being influenced by the prospect of advancement or promotion; I would be the last to make such an insinuation; but suspicion is abroad, and it is best, in these times of trouble and revolution, to defend the integrity of the body against all possible imputations. For one, whatever others may do, I here deliberately avow my settled determination, whilst I retain a seat in this chamber, to act in conformity to that rule. In pursuing it, we but act in consonance with a principle proclaimed by the present chief magistrate himself, when out of power! But, alas! how little has he respected it in power! How little has he, in office, conformed to any of the principles which he announced when out of office!

And, in the next place, let us approve of the original nomination of no notorious brawling partisan and electioneerer; but, especially, of the reappointment of no officer presented to us, who shall have prostituted the influence of his office to partisan and electioneering purposes. Every incumbent has a clear right to exercise the elective franchise. I would be the last to controvert or deny it. But he has no right to employ the influence of his office, to exercise an agency which he holds in trust for the people, to promote his own selfish or party purposes. Here, also, we have the authority of the present chief magistrate for this rule; and the authority of Mr. Jefferson. The senator from Tennessee, (Mr. Grundy,) merits lasting praise for his open and manly condemnation of these practices of official incumbents. He was right, when he declared his suspicion and distrust of the purity of the motives of any officer whom he saw busily interfering in the elections of the people.

Senators! we have a highly responsible and arduous position; but the people are with us, and the path of duty lies clearly marked before us. Let us be firm, persevering, and unmoved. Let us perform our duty in a manner worthy of our ancestors; worthy of American senators; worthy of the dignity of the sovereign states that we represent; above all, worthy of the name of American freemen! Let us ‘pledge our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honor,’ to rescue our beloved country from all impending dangers. And, amidst the general gloom and darkness which prevail, let us continue to present one unextinguished light, steadily burning, in the cause of the people, of the constitution, and of civil liberty.

ON THE STATE OF THE COUNTRY.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, MAY 21, 1834.

[THE agitation of the public mind on the subject of the removal of the deposits from the bank of the United States, continued during the session of congress in 1834, and memorials were constantly presented to that body, asking for relief to the people from the pecuniary pressure occasioned by the arbitrary measures of president Jackson. On presenting one of these memorials Mr. Clay made the following brief remarks.]

(From the National Intelligencer of May 22.)

MR. CLAY took occasion, yesterday, in presenting to the senate some memorials, and especially one from Doylestown, in Bucks county, Pennsylvania, to animadvert seriously for the most part, but in part playfully, to the present state of the country. Among the opinions expressed by the memorialists is one which Mr. Clay said he most decidedly entertained in common with them, that, after the vote by one branch of congress, that the removal of the deposits by the secretary of the treasury was unjustifiable and unconstitutional, it was the duty of the secretary of the treasury instantly to have restored the deposits to the place from which they had been illegally taken; and such, he said, would have been the course of any secretary of the treasury who entertained a proper sense of the fallibility of his own judgment, and of the respect which was due to the deliberate opinion of the senate, or of the house of representatives, on such a question as this, when it came in conflict with his own. Mr. Clay added, that if there was, in either house of congress, a single individual whose private judgment approved of the removal of the deposits as an original act, independently of party considerations or posterior circumstances, he had yet to meet with that man.

As to the question yesterday addressed by the senator from Massachusetts, to those who hold the power, whether they meant to adjourn without taking any measure to relieve the country from its present suffering, Mr. Clay said, he verily believed that they do not know what to do; they are afraid to stay, and afraid to return; they are between two fires――afraid of Jackson if they remain, and of their constituents if they go home. If, however, they mean to do nothing to recover possession of the public treasure; if they mean to do nothing to relieve the distress which pervades the country, Mr. Clay said he was himself ready to concur with them in fixing the earliest practicable day for adjournment, after passing the bills necessary to carry on the government.

What would be the consequence of such contempt, by these in power, of the successive evidences of public opinion, presented from day to day, and from week to week, it was easy to foresee. Already, he said, the whole ‘party’ was crumbling away; sinking, like the banks of the Mississippi undermined by the torrent, whole acres at a time. Why, (said Mr. Clay,) I am told that the whole regency of New York, taking the alarm, has fled from Albany, and taken refuge in this city. Whether they would or would not be redemanded by governor Marcy, under the laws in such cases made and provided, he could not say; but if they remained, he hoped they would be allowed the benefit of all the rights of hospitality due to such distinguished strangers. For himself, he condoled with the gentlemen, in this the trying time of their misfortunes, and trusted that they would be able to bear them with manly fortitude and christian resignation.

If any one who heard this part of Mr. Clay’s speech was able to look grave upon it, thank heaven, it was not we.

In the course of Wednesday’s debate, Mr. Clay having denounced, as contrary to the spirit of the constitution, the omission of the president of the United States to nominate to the senate, for confirmation or rejection, the present secretary of the treasury and other officers, though the senate has been now nearly six months in session; Mr. Webster rose, for the purpose of showing the views of this subject entertained by the great first president of the United States, and practiced upon by every administration in this government, up to the beginning of the present. For this purpose, Mr. Webster quoted from the record the following:

Message from the president of the United States to the senate of the United States.

United States, February 9, 1790.

GENTLEMEN OF THE SENATE,

Among the persons appointed, during the last session, to offices under the national government, there were some who declined serving. Their names and offices are specified in the first column of the foregoing list. I supplied these vacancies, agreeably to the constitution, by temporary appointments, which you will find mentioned in the second column of the list. These appointments will expire with your present session, and indeed OUGHT NOT TO ENDURE LONGER THAN UNTIL OTHERS CAN BE REGULARLY MADE. For that purpose, I now nominate to you the persons named in the third column of the list, as being in my opinion qualified to fill the offices opposite to their names in the first.

G. WASHINGTON.

ON OUR RELATIONS WITH FRANCE.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, JANUARY 14, 1835.

[IN his annual message to congress, in December, 1834, president Jackson recommended that a law should be passed, authorizing reprisals upon French property, in case provision should not be made for the payment of the claims of the United States, for aggressions upon our commerce, by France, between the years 1800 and 1817. A treaty had been concluded between the two governments, at Paris, in 1831, by which the French had agreed to pay the United States twenty-five millions of francs, for spoliations on the commerce of the latter, but the French chambers had refused to vote the necessary appropriation to execute the treaty. The president, therefore, proposed extreme measures to congress, which, if they had been approved of, by that body, would, in all human probability, have involved the two nations in war. Mr. Clay, as chairman of the committee on foreign relations, it will be seen by the following, disapproved of such a course. The controversy was finally settled through the intervention of William the fourth, king of England.

Mr. Clay, from the committee on foreign relations, reported the following resolution:

Resolved, that it is inexpedient, at this time, to pass any law vesting in the president authority for making reprisals upon French property, in the contingency of provision not being made for paying to the United States the indemnity stipulated by the treaty of 1831, during the present session of the French chambers.

The question being on agreeing to this resolution, Mr. CLAY said:]

IT is not my purpose, at the present stage of consideration of this resolution, and I hope it will not be necessary at any stage, to say much with the view of enforcing the arguments in its favor, which are contained in the report of the committee. In the present posture of our relations with France, the course which has appeared to me and to the committee most expedient being to await the issue of those deliberations in the French chambers which may even at this moment be going on, it would not be proper to enter at large, at the present time, into all the particulars touched upon in the report. On all questions connected with the foreign affairs of the country, differences of opinion will arise, which will finally terminate in whatever way the opinion of the people of this country may so tend as to influence their representatives. But, whenever the course of things shall be such that a rupture shall unfortunately take place between this country and any foreign country, (whether France or any other,) I take this opportunity of saying, that, from that moment, whatever of energy or ability, whatever of influence I may possess in my country, shall be devoted to the carrying on of that war with the utmost vigor which the arms and resources of the United States can give to it. I will not anticipate, however, such a state of things; nay, I feel very confident that such a rupture will not occur between the United States and France.

With respect to the justice of our claim upon France for payment of the indemnity stipulated by the treaty, the report of the committee is in entire concurrence with the executive. The opinion of the committee is, that the claims stipulated to be paid are founded in justice; that we must pursue them; that we must finally obtain satisfaction for them, and to do so, must, if necessary, employ such means as the law of nations justifies and the constitution has placed within our power. On these points there is no diversity of sentiment between the committee and the president; there could be no diversity between either the committee or the president and any American citizen.

In all that the president has said of the obligation of the French government to make the stipulated provision for the claims, the committee entirely concur. If the president, in his message, after making his statement of the case, had stopped there, and abstained from the recommendation of any specific measure, there could not have been possibly any diversity of opinion on the subject between him and any portion of the country. But, when he declares the confidence which he entertains in the French government; when he expresses his conviction that the executive branch of that government is honest and sincere in its professions, and recites the promise by it of a renewed effort to obtain the passage of a bill of appropriation by the French chambers, it did appear to the committee inconsistent with these professions of confidence, that they should be accompanied by the recommendation of a measure which could only be authorized by the conviction that no confidence, or, at least, not entire confidence, could be placed in the declaration and professions of the French government. Confidence and distrust are unnatural allies. If we profess confidence any where, especially if that confidence be but for a limited period, it should be unaccompanied with any indication whatever of distrust; a confidence full, free, frank. But to say, as the president, through our minister, has said, that he will await the issue of the deliberations of the chambers, confiding in the sincerity of the king, and this, too, after hearing of the rejection of the first bill of appropriation by the chambers, and now, at the very moment when the chambers are about deliberating on the subject, to throw out in a message to congress what the president himself considered might possibly be viewed as a menace, appeared to the committee, with all due deference to the executive, and to the high and patriotic purposes which may be supposed to have induced the recommendation, to be inconsistent to such a degree as not to be seconded by the action of congress. It also appeared to the committee, after the distinct recommendation by the president on this subject, that there should be some expression of the sense of congress in regard to it. Such an expression is proposed by the resolution now under consideration.

In speculating upon probabilities in regard to the course of the French government, in reference to the treaty, four contingencies might be supposed to arise――first, that the French government may have made the appropriation to carry the treaty into effect before the reception of the president’s message; second, the chambers may make the appropriation after the reception of the president’s message, and notwithstanding the recommendation on this subject contained in it; third, the chambers may, in consequence of that recommendation, hearing of it before they shall have acted finally on the subject, refuse to make any appropriation until what they may consider a menace shall have been explained or withdrawn; or, fourth, they may, either on that ground, or on the ground of dissatisfaction with the provisions of the treaty, refuse to pass the bill of appropriation. Now, in any of these contingencies, after what has passed, an expression of the sense of congress on the subject appears to me indispensable, either to the passage of the bill, or the subsequent payment of the money, if passed.

Suppose the bill to have passed before the reception of the message, and the money to be in the French treasury, it would throw upon the king a high responsibility to pay the money, unless the recommendation of the message should be explained or done away, or at any rate unless a new motive to the execution of the treaty should be furnished in the fact that the two houses of congress, having considered the subject, had deemed it inexpedient to act until the French chambers should have had an opportunity to be heard from. In the second contingency, that of the passage of a bill of appropriation after receiving the message, a vote of congress, as proposed, would be soothing to the pride of France, and calculated to continue that good understanding which it must be the sincere desire of every citizen of the United States to cultivate with that country. If the chambers shall have passed the bill, they will see that though the president of the United States, in the prosecution of a just claim, and in the spirit of sustaining the rights of the United States, had been induced to recommend the measure of reprisals, yet that a confidence was entertained in both branches of congress that there would be a compliance, on the part of the French government, with the pledges it had given, and so forth. In that contingency, the expression of such a sentiment by congress could not but have a happy effect. In the other contingency supposed, also, it is indispensable that some such measure should be adopted. Suppose the bill of appropriation to be rejected, or its passage to be suspended, until the chambers ascertain whether the recommendation by the president is to be carried out by the passage of a law by congress, a resolution like this will furnish the evidence desired of the disposition of congress.

If, indeed, upon the reception of the president’s message the chambers shall have refused to make the appropriation, they will have put themselves in the wrong by not attending to the distribution of the powers of this government, and informing themselves whether those branches which alone can give effect to the president’s recommendation, would respond to it. But, if they take the other course suggested, that of suspending action on the bill until they ascertain whether the legislative department of the government coincides with the executive in the contingent measure recommended, they will then find that the president’s recommendation――the expression of the opinion of one high in authority, indeed, having a strong hold on the affections and confidence of the people, wielding the executive power of the nation, but still an inchoate act, having no effect whatever without the legislative action――had not been responded to by congress, and so forth. Thus under all contingencies happening on the other side of the water, and adapted to any one of those contingencies, the passage of this resolution can do no mischief in any event, but is eminently calculated to prevent mischief, and to secure the very object which the president doubtless proposed to accomplish by his recommendation.

I will not now consume any more time of the house by further remarks, but will resume my seat with the intimation of my willingness to modify the resolution in any manner, not changing its result, which may be calculated to secure, what on such an occasion would be so highly desirable, the unanimous vote of the senate in its favor. I believe it, however, all-essential that there should be a declaration that congress do not think it expedient, in the present state of the relations between the United States and France, to pass any law whatever concerning them.

[After brief remarks by several other members, the resolution was slightly modified passed by a unanimous vote.]

ON OUR RELATIONS WITH THE CHEROKEE INDIANS.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, FEBRUARY 4, 1835.

[THE situation of the Indian tribes within the boundaries of the state of Georgia was long a subject of controversy between that state and the United States; it having been contended that the general government were bound, by former contracts with the state, to extinguish the Indian title to the lands occupied by them, and to provide for their removal therefrom, which lands were then to belong to the state. In May, 1830, a bill, providing for the removal of the Cherokees from the limits of Georgia to territories of the United States west of the Mississippi river, was passed by congress; but such was the reluctance of these Indians to remove, that, during a period of five years thereafter, only about one fourth of their number had emigrated. The sufferings of those who remained, from the wrongs perpetrated upon them by the whites, excited a deep sympathy in their behalf among the people of the United States. The Cherokees frequently sent memorials to congress, asking for relief; in presenting one of which, Mr. Clay made the following remarks, in which will be found much valuable information on an interesting subject. His opinions and sentiments will accord with those of every philanthropist.]

MR. CLAY held in his hands, and begged leave to present to the senate, certain resolutions and a memorial, to the senate and house of representatives of the United States, of a council met at Running Waters, consisting of a portion of the Cherokee Indians. The Cherokees have a country――if indeed it can be any longer called their country――which is comprised within the limits of Georgia, Alabama, Tennessee, and North Carolina. They have a population which is variously estimated, but which, according to the best information which I possess, amounts to about fifteen thousand souls. Of this population a portion, believed to be much the greater part, amounting, as is estimated, to between nine and ten thousand souls, reside within the limits of the state of Georgia. The senate was well aware that for several years past it had been the policy of the general government to transfer the Indians to the west of the Mississippi river, and that a portion of the Cherokees have already availed themselves of this policy of the government, and emigrated beyond the Mississippi. Of those who remain, a portion――a respectable but also an inconsiderable portion――are desirous to emigrate to the west, and a much larger portion desire to remain on their lands, and lay their bones where rest those of their ancestors. The papers which I now present emanate from the minor portion of the Cherokees; from those who are in favor of emigration. They present a case which appeals strongly to the sympathies of congress. They say that it is impossible for them to continue to live under laws which they do not understand, passed by authority in which they have no share, promulgated in language of which nothing is known to the greater portion of them, and establishing rules for their government entirely unadapted to their nature, education, and habits. They say that destruction is hanging over them if they remain; that, their right of self-government being destroyed, though they are sensible of all the privations, hardships, and sufferings of banishment from their native homes, they prefer exile, with liberty, to residence in their homes, with slavery. They implore, therefore, the intervention of the general government, to provide for their removal west of the Mississippi, and to establish guarantees, never hereafter to be violated, of the possession of the lands to be acquired by them west of the Mississippi, and of the perpetual right of self-government. This was the object of the resolutions and petition which he was about to offer to the senate.

But I have thought that this occasion was one which called upon me to express the opinions and sentiments which I hold in relation to this entire subject, as respects not only the emigrating Indians, but those also who are desirous to remain at home; in short, to express, in concise terms, my views of the relations between the Indian tribes and the people of the United States, the rights of both parties, and the duties of this government in regard to them.

The rights of the Indians were to be ascertained in the first place, by the solemn stipulations of numerous treaties made with them by the United States. It was not his purpose to call the attention of the senate to all the treaties which had been made with Indian tribes bearing on this particular topic; but he felt constrained to ask the attention of the senate to some portions of those treaties which have been made with the Cherokees, and to the memorable treaty of Greenville, which had terminated the war that previously thereto for many years raged between the United States and the north-western Indian tribes. He found, upon consulting the collection of Indian treaties in his hand, that within the last half century, fourteen different treaties had been concluded with the Cherokees, the first of which bore date in the year 1775, and some one or more of which had been concluded under every administration of the general government, from the beginning of it to the present time, except the present administration, and that which immediately preceded it. The treaty of Hopewell, the first in the series, was concluded in 1775, in the third article of which ‘the said Indians, for themselves and their respective tribes and towns, do acknowledge all the Cherokees to be under the protection of the United States of America, and of no other sovereign whatsoever.’ The fifth article of the same treaty provides, that ‘if any citizen of the United States, or other person, not being an Indian, shall attempt to settle on any of the lands westward or southward of the said boundary, which are hereby allotted to the Indians for their hunting-grounds, or, having already settled, and will not remove from the same within six months after the ratification of this treaty, such person shall forfeit the protection of the United States, and the Indians may punish him or not, as they please; provided, nevertheless, that this article shall not extend to the people settled between the fork of French Broad and Holston rivers,’ and so forth.

The next treaty in the series, which was concluded after the establishment of the government of the United States, under the auspices of the father of his country, was in the year 1791, on the bank of the Holston, and contains the following provision. ‘Article 7. The United States solemnly guaranty to the Cherokee nation all their lands not hereby ceded.’ This, Mr. Clay said, was not an ordinary assurance of protection, and so forth, but a solemn guarantee of the rights of the Cherokees to the land in question. The next treaty to which he would call the attention of the senate was concluded in 1794, also under the auspices of general Washington, and declares as follows. ‘The undersigned, Henry Knox, secretary for the department of war, being authorized thereto by the president of the United States, in behalf of the said United States, and the undersigned chiefs and warriors, in their own names, and in behalf of the whole Cherokee nation, are desirous of reëstablishing peace and friendship between the said parties in a permanent manner, do hereby declare, that the said treaty of Holston is, to all intents and purposes, in full force, and binding upon the said parties, as well in respect to the boundaries therein mentioned as in all other respects whatever.’ This treaty, it is seen, renews the solemn guarantee contained in the preceding treaty, and declares it to be binding and obligatory upon the parties in all respects whatever. Again, in another treaty, concluded in 1798, under the second chief magistrate of the United States, we find the following stipulations. ‘Article 2. The treaties subsisting between the present contracting parties are acknowledged to be of full and operating force; together with the construction and usage under their respective articles, and so to continue.’ ‘Article 3. The limits and boundaries of the Cherokee nation, as stipulated and marked by the existing treaties between the parties, shall be and remain the same, where not altered by the present treaty.’

There were other provisions, in other treaties, to which, if he did not intend to take up as little time as possible of the senate, he might advantageously call their attention. He would, however, pass on to one of the last treaties with the Cherokees, which was concluded in the year 1817. That treaty recognised the difference existing between the two portions of the Cherokees, one of which was desirous to remain at home and prosecute the good work of civilization, in which they had made some progress, and the other portion was desirous to go beyond the Mississippi. In that treaty, the fifth article, after several other stipulations, concludes as follows. ‘And it is further stipulated, that the treaties heretofore between the Cherokee nation and the United States are to continue in full force with both parts of the nation, and both parts thereof entitled to all the privileges and immunities which the old nation enjoyed under the aforesaid treaties; the United States reserving the right of establishing factories, a military post, and roads, within the boundaries above defined.’ And to this treaty, thus emphatically renewing the recognition of the rights of the Indians, is signed the name, as one of the commissioners of the United States who negotiated it, of the present chief magistrate of the United States.

These were the stipulations in treaties with the Cherokee nation, to which, Mr. Clay said, he thought proper to call the attention of the senate. He would now turn to the treaty of Greenville, concluded about forty years ago, recognising some general principles applicable to this subject. Mr. Clay then quoted the fifth article of that treaty, as follows. ‘To prevent any misunderstanding about the Indian lands relinquished by the United States in the fourth article, it is now explicitly declared, that the meaning of that relinquishment is this: the Indian tribes who have a right to those lands are quietly to enjoy them, hunting, planting, and dwelling thereon so long as they please, without any molestation from the United States; but when those tribes, or any of them, shall be disposed to sell their lands, or any part of them, they are to be sold only to the United States; and until such sale, the United States will protect all the said Indian tribes in the quiet enjoyment of their lands against all citizens of the United States, and against all other white persons who intrude upon the same. And the said Indian tribes again acknowledge themselves to be under the protection of the said United States, and no other power whatever.’

Such, sir, are the rights of the Indian tribes. And what are those rights? They are, that the Indians shall live under their own customs and laws; that they shall live upon their own lands, hunting, planting, and dwelling thereon so long as they please, without interruption or molestation of any sort from the white people of the United States, acknowledging themselves under the protection of the United States, and of no other power whatever; that when they no longer wish to keep the lands, they shall sell them only to the United States, whose government thus secures to itself the preemptive right of purchase in them. These rights, so secured by successive treaties and guarantees, have also been recognised on several occasions, by the highest judicial tribunals. Mr. Clay here quoted, from an opinion of the supreme court, a passage, declaring that the Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable and heretofore unquestioned right to their land, until it shall be extinguished by voluntary cession to this government.

But it is not at home alone that the rights of the Indians within the limits of the United States have been recognised. Not only has the executive, the congress of the United States, and the supreme court, recognised these rights, but in one of the most important epochs of this government, and on one of the most solemn occasions in our intercourse with foreign powers, these rights of the Indian tribes have been acknowledged. You, sir, (addressing the president of the senate,) will understand me at once to refer to the negotiation between the government of Great Britain and that of the United States, which had for its object the termination of the late war between the two countries. Sir, it must be within your recollection, and that of every member of the senate, that the hinge upon which that negotiation turned, the ground upon which it was for a long time apprehended that the conference between the commissioners would terminate in a rupture of the negotiation between the two countries, was, the claim brought forward, on that memorable occasion, by Great Britain, in behalf of the Indians within the limits of the United States. It will be recollected that she advanced, as a principle from which she would not recede, as a sine qua non, again and again, during the progress of the negotiation, that the Indians, as her allies, should be included in the treaty of peace which the negotiators were about forming; that they should have a permanent boundary assigned them, and that neither Great Britain nor the United States should be at liberty to purchase their lands.

Such were the pretensions urged on that occasion, which the commissioners of the United States had felt it to be their imperative duty to resist. To establish as the boundary the line of the treaty of Greenville, as proposed, which would have excluded from the benefit of American laws and privileges a population of not less than a hundred thousand of the inhabitants of Ohio, American citizens, entitled to the protection of the government, was a proposition which the American negotiators could not for a moment entertain; they would not even refer it to their government, though assured that it would there meet with the same unanimous rejection that it did from them. But it became a matter of some importance that a satisfactory assurance should be given to Great Britain, that the war, which we were about to bring to a conclusion with her, should close also with her allies; and what was that assurance? Mr. Clay said he would not trouble the senate with tracing the whole account of that negotiation, but he begged leave to call their attention to one of the passages of it. You will find on examining the history of the negotiation, that the demand brought forward by the British government through their minister, on this occasion, was the subject of several argumentative papers. Towards the close of this correspondence, reviewing the course pursued towards the aborigines by the several European powers which had planted colonies in America, comparing it with that of the United States, and contrasting the lenity, kindness, and forbearance of the United States, with the rigor and severity of other powers, the American negotiators expressed themselves as follows.

‘From the rigor of this system, however, as practiced by Great Britain, and all the other European powers in America, the humane and liberal policy of the United States has voluntarily relaxed. A celebrated writer on the law of nations, to whose authority British jurists have taken particular satisfaction in appealing, after stating, in the most explicit manner, the legitimacy of colonial settlements in America, to the exclusion of all rights of uncivilized Indian tribes, has taken occasion to praise the first settlers of New England, and of the founder of Pennsylvania, in having purchased of the Indians the lands they resolved to cultivate, notwithstanding their being furnished with a charter from their sovereign. It is this example which the United States, since they became by their independence the sovereigns of the territory, have adopted and organized into a political system. Under that system the Indians residing in the United States are so far independent, that they live under their own customs, and not under the laws of the United States; that their rights upon the lands where they inhabit or hunt are secured to them by boundaries defined in amicable treaties between the United States and themselves; and that whenever those boundaries are varied, it is also by amicable and voluntary treaties, by which they receive from the United States ample compensation for every right they have to the lands ceded by them,’ and so forth.

The correspondence was further continued; and, finally, the commissioners on the part of Great Britain proposed an article to which the American commissioners assented, the basis of which is, a declaration of what is the state of the law between the Indian tribes and the people of the United States. They then proposed a further article, which declared that the United States should endeavor to restore peace to the Indians who had acted on the side of Great Britain, together with all the rights, possessions, privileges, and immunities which they possessed prior to the year 1811, that is, antecedently to the war between England and the United States; in consideration that Great Britain would terminate the war, so far as respected the Indians who had been allies of the United States, and restore to them all the rights, privileges, possessions, and immunities which these also had enjoyed previously to the same period. Mr. President, I here state my solemn belief, that if the American commissioners had not declared the laws between the Indians and the people of this country, and the rights of the Indians, to be such as they are stated to be in the extracts I have read to the senate; if they had then stated that any one state of this union who happened to have Indians residing within its limits, possessed the right of extending over them the laws of such state, and of taking their lands, when and how it pleased, that the effect would have been a prolongation of the war. I again declare my most solemn belief that Great Britain, who assented with great reluctance to this mutual stipulation with respect to the Indians, never would have done it at all, but under a conviction of the correspondence of those principles of Indian international law, (if I may use such a phrase,) with those which the United States government had respected ever since the period of our independence.

Sir, if I am right in this, let me ask whether in adopting the new code which now prevails, and by which the rights of the Indians have been trampled on, and the most solemn obligations of treaties have been disregarded, we are not chargeable with having induced that power to conclude a peace with us by suggestions utterly unfounded and erroneous?

Most of the treaties between the Cherokee nation of Indians and the United States have been submitted to the senate for ratification, and the senate have acted upon them in conformity with their constitutional power. Besides the action of the senate, as a legislative body, in the enactment of laws in conformity with their stipulations, regulating the intercourse of our citizens with that nation, it has acted in its separate character, and confirmed the treaties themselves by the constitutional majority of two thirds of its members. Thus have those treaties been sanctioned by the government of the United States, and by every branch of that government; by the senate, the executive, and the supreme court; both at home and abroad. But not only have the rights of the Cherokees received all these recognitions; they have been, by implication, recognised by the state of Georgia itself, in the act of 1802, in which she stipulated that the government of the United States, and not the state of Georgia, should extinguish the Indian title to land within her limits; and the general government has been, from time to time, urged by Georgia to comply with its engagement from that period until the adoption of the late new policy upon this subject.

Having thus, Mr. President, stated, as I hope with clearness, the RIGHTS of the Indian tribes, as recognised by the most solemn acts that can be entered into by any government, let me, in the next place, inquire into the nature of the INJURIES which have been inflicted upon them; in other words, into the present condition of these Cherokees, to whom protection had been assured as well by solemn treaties as by the laws and guarantees of the United States government.

And here let me be permitted to say, that I go into this subject with feelings which no language at my command will enable me adequately to express. I assure the senate, and in an especial manner do I assure the honorable senators from Georgia, that my wish and purpose is any other than to excite the slightest possible irritation on the part of any human being. Far from it. I am actuated only by feelings of grief, feelings of sorrow, and of profound regret, irresistibly called forth by a contemplation of the miserable condition to which these unfortunate people have been reduced by acts of legislation proceeding from one of the states of this confederacy. I again assure the honorable senators from Georgia, that, if it has become my painful duty to comment upon some of these acts, I do it not with any desire to place them, or the state they represent, in an invidious position; but because Georgia was, I believe, the first in the career, the object of which seems to be the utter annihilation of every Indian right, and because she has certainly, in the promotion of it, far outstripped every other state in the union.

I have not before me the various acts of the state in reference to the Indians within her bounds; and it is possible I may be under some mistake in reference to them; and if I am, no one will correct the error more readily, or with greater pleasure.

If, however, I had all those laws in my hands, I should not now attempt to read them. Instead of this, it will be sufficient for me to state the effects which have been produced by them upon the condition of the Cherokee Indians residing in that state. And here follows a list of what has been done by her legislature. Her first act was to abolish the government of these Cherokees. No human community can exist without a government of some kind; and the Cherokees, imitating our example, and having learned from us something of the principles of a free constitution, established for themselves a government somewhat resembling our own. It is quite immaterial to us what its form was. They always had had some government among them; and we guarantied to them the right of living under their own laws and customs, unmolested by any one; insomuch that our own citizens were outlawed should they presume to interfere with them. What particular regulations they adopted, in the management of their humble and limited concerns, is a matter with which we have no concern. However; the very first act of the Georgia legislature was, to abolish all government of every sort among these people, and to extend the laws and government of the state of Georgia over them. The next step was to divide their territory into counties; the next, to survey the Cherokee lands; and the last, to distribute this land among the citizens of Georgia by lottery, giving to every head of a family one ticket, and the prize in land that should be drawn against it. To be sure there were many reservations for the heads of Indian families; and of how much did gentlemen suppose? of one hundred and sixty acres only, and this to include their improvements. But even to this limited possession the poor Indian was to have no fee simple title; he was to hold as a mere occupant, at the will of the state of Georgia, for just as long or as short a time as she might think proper. The laws at the same time gave him no one political right, whatever. He could not become a member of the state legislature, nor could he hold any office under state authority, nor could he vote as an elector. He possessed not one single right of a freeman; no; not even the poor privilege of testifying to his wrongs in the character of a witness in the courts of Georgia, or in any matter of controversy, whatsoever.

These, Mr. President, are the acts of the legislature of the state of Georgia, in relation to the Indians. They were not all passed at one session; they were enacted, time after time, as the state advanced further and further in her steps to the acquisition of the Indian country, and the destruction and annihilation of all Indian rights; until, by a recent act of the same body, the courts of the state itself are occluded against the Indian sufferer, and he is actually denied an appeal even to foreign tribunals, in the erection and in the laws of which he had no voice, there to complain of his wrongs. If he enters the hall of Georgia’s justice, it is upon a surrender at the threshold of all his rights. The history of this last law, to which I have alluded, is this; when the previous law of the state dividing the Indian lands by lottery was passed, some Indians made an appeal to one of the judges of the state, and applied for an injunction against the proceeding; and such was the undeniable justice of their plea, that the judge found himself unable to refuse it, and he granted the injunction sought. It was that injunction which led to the passage of this act; to some of the provisions of which I now invite the attention of the senate. And first to the title of the act; ‘a bill to amend an act entitled an act more effectually to provide for the government and protection of the Cherokee Indians residing within the limits of Georgia, and to prescribe the bounds of their occupant claims; and also to authorize grants to issue for lots drawn in the late land and gold lotteries’――ah, sir, it was the pursuit of gold which led the Spanish invader to desolate the fair fields of Mexico and Peru――‘and to provide for the appointment of an agent to carry certain parts thereof into execution; and to fix the salary of such agent, and to punish those persons who may deter Indians from enrolling for emigration, passed the twentieth of December, 1833.’ Well, sir, this bill goes on to provide, ‘that it shall be the duty of the agent or agents appointed by his excellency the governor, under the authority of this or the act of which it is amendatory, to report to him the number, district, and section of all lots of land subject to be granted by the provisions of said act, which he may be required to do by the drawer, or his agent, or the person claiming the same; and it shall be the duty of his excellency the governor, upon the application of the drawer of any of the aforesaid lots, his or her special agents, or the person to whom the drawer may have bonâ fide conveyed the same, his agent or assigns, to issue a grant therefor; and it shall be the duty of the said agent or agents, upon the production of the grant so issued as aforesaid by the grantor, his or her agent, or the person, or his or her agent to whom said land so granted as aforesaid may have been bonâ fide conveyed, to deliver possession of said granted lot to the said grantee, or person entitled to the possession of the same under the provisions of this act, or the act of which this is amendatory, and his excellency the governor is hereby authorized, upon satisfactory evidence that the said agent is impeded or resisted in delivering such possession, by a force which he cannot overcome, to order out a sufficient force to carry the power of said agent or agents fully into effect, and to pay the expenses of the same out of the contingent fund; provided nothing in this act shall be so construed as to require the interference of the said agent between two or more individuals claiming possession, by virtue of titles derived from a grant from the state to any lot.’

Thus, after the state of Georgia had distributed the lands of the Indians by lottery, and the drawers of prizes were authorized to receive grants of the land drawn, and with these grants in their hand were authorized to demand of the agent of the state, appointed for the purpose, to be put in possession of the soil thus obtained; and if any resistance to their entry should be made, and who was to make it but a poor Indian? the governor is empowered to turn out the military force of the state, and enable the agent to take possession by force, without trial, without judgment, and without investigation.

But, should there be two claimants of the prize, should two of the ticket-holders dispute their claim to the same lot, then no military force was to be used. It was only when the resistance was by an Indian――it was only when Indian rights should come into collision with the alleged rights of the state of Georgia――that the strong hand of military power was instantly to interpose.

The next section of the act is in these words: ‘and be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, that if any person dispossessed of a lot of land under this act, or the act of which it is amendatory, shall go before a justice of the peace or of the inferior court, and make affidavit that he or she was not liable to be dispossessed under or by any of the provisions of this or the aforesaid act, and file said affidavit in the clerk’s office of the superior court of the county in which said land shall lie, such person upon giving bond and security in the clerk’s office for the costs to accrue on the trial, shall be permitted within ten days from such dispossessing to enter an appeal to said superior court and at said court, the judge shall cause an issue to be made up between the appellant and the person to whom possession of said land was delivered by either of said agents, which said issue shall be in the following form.’

[Mr. Cuthbert, of Georgia, here interposed; and having obtained Mr. Clay’s consent to explain, stated that he had unfortunately not been in the senate when the honorable senator commenced his speech; but had learned that it was in support of a memorial from certain Cherokee Indians in the state of Georgia, who desired to emigrate. He must be permitted to say, that the current of the honorable senator’s remarks did not suit remarkably well the subject of such a memorial. A memorial of a different kind had been presented, and which the committee on Indian affairs had before it, to which the senator’s remarks would better apply. The present discussion was wholly unexpected, and it seemed to him not in consistency with the object of the memorial he had presented.]

Mr. Clay replied, that he was truly sorry the honorable gentleman had been absent when he commenced speaking. He had delayed presenting the memorial, because he observed that neither of the senators from Georgia was in his seat, until the hour when they might be expected to be present, and when one of them, (Mr. King,) had actually taken his seat. If the honorable senator had been present he would have heard Mr. Clay say that he thought the presentation of the memorial a fit occasion to express his sentiments, not only touching the rights of these individual petitioners, but on the rights of all the Indian tribes, and their relations to this government. And if he would have but a little patience he would find that it was Mr. Clay’s intention to present propositions which went to embrace both resolutions.

Mr. Clay now resumed the course of his speech. And here, Mr. President, let me pause, and invite the attention of the senate to the provision in the act of Georgia which I was reading, (the substance of which Mr. Clay here repeated,) that is, that he may have the privilege of an appeal to a tribunal of justice by forms and by a bond with the nature and force of which he is unacquainted; and that then he may have――what beside? I invoke the attention of the senate to this part of the law. What, I ask, does it secure to the Indian? His rights? the rights recognised by treaties? the rights guarantied to him by the most solemn acts which human governments can perform? No. It allows him to come into the courts of the state, and there to enjoy the benefit of the summary proceeding called in the act ‘an appeal,’ but which can never be continued beyond a second term; and when he comes there, what then? He shall be permitted to come into court and enter an appeal, which shall be in the following form.

“A. B., who was dispossessed of a lot of land by an agent of the state of Georgia, comes into court, and, admitting the right of the state of Georgia to pass the law under which agent acted, avers that he was not liable to be dispossessed of said land, by or under any one of the provisions of the act of the general assembly of Georgia, passed the twentieth of December, 1833, ‘more effectually to provide for the protection of the Cherokee Indians residing within the limits of Georgia, and to prescribe the bounds of their occupant claims, and also to authorize grants to issue for lots drawn in the land and gold lotteries in certain cases, and to provide for the appointment of an agent to carry certain parts thereof into execution, and fix the salary of such agent, and to punish those persons who may deter Indians from enrolling for emigration,’ or the act amendatory thereof, passed at the session of the legislature of 1834: ‘in which issue the person to whom possession of said land was delivered shall join; and which issue shall constitute the entire pleadings between the parties; nor shall the court allow any matter other than is contained in said issue to be placed upon the record or files of said court; and said cause shall be tried at the first term of the court, unless good cause shall be shown for a continuance, and the same party shall not be permitted to continue said cause more than once, except for unavoidable providential cause; nor shall said court at the instance of either party pass any order or grant any injunction to stay said cause, nor permit to be engrafted on said cause any other proceedings, whatever.’”

At the same time, we find, by another enactment, the judges of the courts of Georgia are restrained from granting injunctions, so that the only form in which the Indian can come before them, is in the form of an appeal; and in this, the very first step is an absolute renunciation of the rights he holds by treaty, and the unqualified admission of the rights of his antagonist, as conferred by the laws of Georgia; and the court is expressly prohibited from putting any thing else upon the record. Why? do we not all know the reason? If the poor Indian was allowed to put in a plea stating his rights, and the court should then decide against him, the cause would go upon an appeal to the supreme court; the decision could be reëxamined, could be annulled, and the authority of treaties vindicated. But, to prevent this, to make it impossible, he is compelled, on entering the court, to renounce his Indian rights, and the court is forbidden to put any thing on record which can bring up a decision upon them.

Mr. President, I have already stated that, in the observations I have made, I am actuated by no other feelings than such as ought to be in the breast of every honest man, the feelings of common justice. I would say nothing, I would whisper nothing, I would insinuate nothing, I would think nothing, which can, in the remotest degree, cause irritation in the mind of any one, of any senator here, of any state in this union; I have too much respect for every member of the confederacy. I feel nothing but grief for the wretched condition of these most unfortunate people, and every emotion of my bosom dissuades me from the use of epithets that might raise emotions which should draw the attention of the senate from the justice of their claims. I forbear to apply to this law any epithet of any kind. Sir, no epithet is needed. The features of the law itself; its warrant for the interposition of military power, when no trial and no judgment has been allowed; its denial of any appeal, unless the unhappy Indian shall first renounce his own rights, and admit the rights of his opponent; features such as these are enough to show what the true character of the act is, and supersede the necessity of all epithets, were I even capable of applying any.

The senate will thus perceive that the whole power of the state of Georgia, military as well as civil, has been made to bear upon these Indians, without their having any voice in forming, judging upon, or executing the laws under which he is placed, and without even the poor privilege of establishing the injury he may have suffered, by Indian evidence; nay, worse still, not even by the evidence of a white man! Because the renunciation of his rights precludes all evidence, white or black, civilized or savage. There then he lies, with his property, his rights, and every privilege which makes human existence desirable, at the mere mercy of the state of Georgia; a state, in whose government or laws he has no voice. Sir, it is impossible for the most active imagination to conceive a condition of human society more perfectly wretched. Shall I be told that the condition of the African slave is worse? No, sir; no, sir. It is not worse. The interest of the master makes it at once his duty and his inclination, to provide for the comfort and the health of his slave; for without these, he would be unprofitable. Both pride and interest render the master prompt in vindicating the rights of his slave, and protecting him from the oppression of others; and the laws secure to him the amplest means to do so. But who, what human being, stands in the relation of master or any other relation, which makes him interested in the preservation and protection of the poor Indian thus degraded and miserable? Thrust out from human society, without the sympathies of any, and placed without the pale of common justice, who is there to protect him, or to defend his rights?

Such, Mr. President, is the present condition of these Cherokee memorialists, whose case it is my duty to submit to the consideration of the senate. There remains but one more inquiry before I conclude. Is there any REMEDY within the scope of the powers of the federal government, as given by the constitution? If we are without power, if we have no constitutional authority, then we are also without responsibility. Our regrets may be excited, our sympathies may be moved, our humanity may be shocked, our hearts may be grieved, but if our hands are tied, we can only unite with all the good, the christian, the benevolent portion of the human family, in deploring what we cannot prevent.

But, sir, we are not thus powerless. I stated to the senate when I began, that there are two classes of the Cherokees; one of these classes desires to emigrate, and it was their petition I presented this morning; and with respect to these, our powers are ample to afford them the most liberal and effectual relief. They wish to go beyond the Mississippi, and to be guarantied in the possession of the country which may be there assigned to them. As the congress of the United States have full powers over the territories, we may give them all the guarantee which congress can express, for the undisturbed possession of their lands. With respect to their case, there can be no question as to our powers.

And, then, as to those who desire to remain on this side the river, I ask, again, are we powerless? Can we afford them no redress? Must we sit still, and see the injury they suffer, and extend no hand to relieve them? It were strange, indeed, were such the case. Why have we guarantied to them the enjoyment of their own laws? Why have we pledged to them protection? Why have we assigned them limits of territory? Why have we declared that they shall enjoy their homes in peace, without molestation from any? If the United States government has contracted these serious obligations, it ought, before the Indians were reduced by our assurances to rely upon our engagement, to have explained to them its want of authority to make the contract. Before we pretend to Great Britain, to Europe, to the civilized world, that such were the rights we would secure to the Indians, we ought to have examined the extent and the grounds of our own rights to do so. But is such, indeed, our situation? No, sir. Georgia has shut her courts against these Indians. What is the remedy? To open ours. Have we not the right? What says the constitution? ‘The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity, arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority.’

But here was a case of conflict between the rights of the proprietors and the local laws; and here was the very case which the constitution contemplated, when it declared that the power of the federal judiciary should extend to all cases under the authority of the United States. Therefore, it was fully within the competence of congress, under the provisions of the constitution, to provide the manner in which the Cherokees might have their rights decided, because a grant of the means was included in the grant of jurisdiction. It was competent, then, for congress to decide, whether the Cherokee had a right to come into a court of justice and to make an appeal to the highest authority, to sustain the solemn treaties under which their rights had been guarantied, and in the sacred character of which they had reposed their confidence. And if congress possessed the power to extend relief to the Indians, were they not bound, by the most sacred of human considerations, the obligations of treaties, the protection assured them, by every christian tie, every benevolent feeling, every humane impulse of the human heart, to extend it? If they were to fail to do this, and there was, as reason and revelation declared there was, a tribunal of eternal justice, to which all human power was amenable, how could they, if they refused to perform their duties to this injured and oppressed, though civilized race, expect to escape the visitations of that divine vengeance which none would be permitted to avoid, who had committed wrong, or done injustice to others?

At this moment, when the United States were urging on the government of France the fulfilment of the obligations of the treaty concluded with that country, to the execution of which, it was contended that France had plighted her sacred faith, what strength, what an irresistible force would be given to our plea, if we could say to France, that, in all instances, we had completely fulfilled all our engagements, and that we had adhered faithfully to every obligation which we had contracted, no matter whether it was entered into with a powerful or a weak people; if we could say to her, that we had complied with all our engagements to others, that we now came before her, always acting right as we had done, to induce her also to fulfil her obligations to us. How should we stand in the eyes of France, and of the civilized world, if we, in spite of the most solemn treaties, which had existed for half a century, and had been recognised in every form, and by every branch of the government; how would they be justified, if they, suffered these treaties to be trampled under foot, and the rights which they were given to secure, trodden into the dust? How would Great Britain, after the solemn understanding entered into with her at Ghent, feel, after such a breach of faith? And how could he, as a commissioner on the negotiation of that treaty, hold up his head before Great Britain, after having been thus made an instrument of fraud and deception, as he assuredly would have been, if the rights of the Indians are to be thus violated, and the treaties by which they were secured, violated? How could he hold up his head, after such a violation of rights, and say that he was proud of his country, of which they all must wish to be proud?

For himself, he rejoiced that he had been spared, and allowed a suitable opportunity to present his views and opinions, on this great national subject, so interesting to the national character of the country for justice and equity. He rejoiced that the voice which, without charge of presumption or arrogance, he might say, was ever raised in defence of the oppressed of the human species, had been heard in defence of this most oppressed of all. To him, in that awful hour of death, to which all must come, and which, with respect to himself, could not be very far distant, it would be a source of the highest consolation, that an opportunity had been found by him, on the floor of the senate, in the discharge of his official duty, to pronounce his views on a course of policy marked by such wrongs as were calculated to arrest the attention of every one, and that he had raised his humble voice, and pronounced his solemn protest, against such wrongs.

He would no longer detain the senate, but would submit the following propositions.

Resolved, that the committee on the judiciary be directed to inquire into the expediency of making further provision, by law, to enable Indian nations or tribes, to whose use and occupancy lands are secured by treaties concluded between them and the United States, to defend and maintain their rights to such lands, in the courts of the United States, in conformity with the constitution of the United States.

Resolved, that the committee on Indian affairs be directed to inquire into the expediency of making further provisions, by law, for setting apart a district of country west of the Mississippi river, for such of the Cherokee nation as may be disposed to emigrate and to occupy the same, and for securing, in perpetuity, the peaceful and undisturbed enjoyment thereof, to the emigrants and their descendants.

Mr. Clay moved that the memorial and resolutions adopted by the council of the Running Waters, be referred to the committee on Indian affairs, and printed.

As to his resolutions, he knew, that in the regular order of business, they could not be taken up until to-morrow, but, if it met with the approbation of the senate, he would be as well disposed to act on them to-day as to-morrow.

In reply to Mr. Cuthbert, of Georgia, and Mr. White, of Tennessee, Mr. Clay said he could assure the honorable senator from Georgia, that nothing was further from his purpose, than to make any display on this occasion. That he always left to others, and by the judgment of the senate he was willing to abide, whether the honorable senator himself had not been guilty of that which he imputed to others. For, after addressing the senate, himself, some time, he had said that he did not intend arguing the question, that Georgia would not appear before the senate or any other tribunal. Now, Georgia might be content to do that, but could congress, could honorable senators, reconcile it with their duty, with their responsibility, to coldly contemplate the violation of numerous treaties, to witness the destruction of a people under the protection of the United States, and to let that injustice which had been inflicted on these unfortunate Cherokees, be perpetuated without the slightest notice on their part?

The gentleman from Tennessee, (Mr. White,) had remarked, that they were all unconstitutional treaties; that they had no binding force as treaties; that general Washington was mistaken; that every succeeding administration was mistaken; that general Jackson himself was mistaken, in 1817, in regard to these treaties. Now, if they gave the argument of the honorable senator from Tennessee its full force, what was the consequence? What did he, (Mr. Clay,) offer? He said, merely to open the question to the court. If they had no validity, if the question which was sent to the judiciary did not rest upon treaties, they could vindicate no rights under them. Why had Georgia, if she believed there were no treaties, made provisions in her late act to which he had referred? Why shut out the rights of the Indians under the treaty? Why, if she was convinced of the unconstitutionality of the treaties, did she not allow them to be submitted to the federal judiciary, which was bound to declare that they were not obligatory and binding, if unconstitutional? Why has she studiously precluded the possibility of a review, in the supreme court, of the decisions of the local tribunals? But the gentleman had told the senate, that the treaty of ’91 was the first that guarantied to the Cherokees their lands, and that president Washington doubted whether it was necessary to submit it to the senate. It might be true, at the commencement of the government, when every thing was new and unfixed, that there were doubts; but general Washington decided that it was a treaty, and laid it, with his doubts, before the senate, who decided them, and the treaty was ratified by and with the consent of the senate. And from that day those doubts have remained dispelled. He was indebted to the honorable senator for the historical fact which he, (Mr. Clay,) had not before pressed, that this very guaranty which secured to the Indians the undisturbed possession of their lands in the treaty of ’91, was inserted by the express direction of the father of his country. And the senate was called upon now, not merely to violate the solemn obligations which the whole nation had contracted, but to violate the provision which had been inserted at the instance of the venerated father of his country!

The honorable senator had told this body, that the treaty of ’91 was the first in which there was any guarantee. If the gentleman meant to say it was the first in which there was any express guarantee, he, (Mr. Clay,) would admit it. But, in the treaty of ’85, if it was not expressed, was it not implied? What was that clause, marking the boundaries of their territory? That, in the same treaty, which places the Indians under the protection of the United States, and excludes them from the authority of any other sovereign? And that, which outlaws citizens of the United States who intrude in their territory? What was the meaning of those clauses, if they did not, by implication at least, guaranty their rights, their property, and the peace of their country? But, the gentleman says, that in inserting the guaranty of ’91, there was a mistake; it was supposed that it was without the limits of North Carolina, and other states; a mistake which ran through all the treaties from that time down to 1817, which renewed and enforced the preëxisting treaties. So that general Jackson himself had been acting under a mistake when he signed the treaty of 1817. Is it possible, that, if a mistake were committed as early as 1791, it would not have been corrected in some of the various treaties negotiated as late as 1817?

The senator had said also, that the states had a right to extend their laws over all the territories and people within their limits, as defined by the treaty of ’83. Why, that was the very question under consideration, the identical question to be submitted to the judiciary. He, (Mr. Clay,) contended that the states had no right to extend their laws over that portion of the territory assigned to the Indians, or over the Indians dwelling upon it. And that is the exact question which his resolution proposes to be submitted to the determination of the judiciary, and which the late act of Georgia carefully shuns.

But the senator from Tennessee had asked, ‘what will the poor Indian, with his six hundred and forty acres of land, do, contending for his rights in a court of justice?’ Why, he, (Mr. Clay,) would admit that his condition would be miserable enough; but it was all they could do for him, and they were bound to do all they could, under the constitutional power they possessed, to maintain his rights. But, he would ask, what was to prevent these Indians, in their corporate, or collective character, from bringing their grievances before the courts? Nothing. And, that they were competent to this, we had only to look at the state papers which had emanated from them, and which did them immortal credit, to be convinced. The senator from Tennessee asked, ‘what the states would do? Would they array the federal power against the power of the state governments, and thus produce that condition of things which must result in the Indians’ being stricken from the face of the earth?’ Did not the honorable senator remember the period when a state of this union was actually arrayed and marshalled to defend its interpretation of the constitution? He was hearty in the support of the force bill; he did not stop to look at the possible consequences of a civil war. He, (Mr. Clay,) gave it his reluctant and most painful support. He would gladly have turned the bitter cup from his lips, but he felt it to be his duty to sustain the authority of the general government; and, after giving to the subject the most solemn and serious consideration, he felt himself constrained to sustain that measure. And he went along with the senator from Tennessee upon the principle, now denied by him, that the federal authority must maintain its dignity. He went upon the ground, now abandoned by the senator from Tennessee, that no state ought to array itself against the constitutional powers of this government.

How was the fact up to the period of 1829? The gentleman from Tennessee tells us the true policy of this government is to send these poor creatures beyond the Mississippi, and that there is no impediment in the obligations of subsisting treaties. Never, until the new light burst upon us, that hundreds of Indian treaties, made during a period of half a century, under almost every administration of the government, concluded and ratified with all the solemn forms of the constitution, and containing the most explicit guarantees and obligations of protection to the Indians, and of security to their possessions, were mere nullities, was it supposed competent to effect a compulsory removal of the Indians beyond the Mississippi. It is true, that the policy of removing them has been long entertained; was contemplated by Mr. Jefferson; but it was a free, voluntary, and unconstrained emigration. No one, until of late, ever dreamed of a forcible removal, against their consent, accomplished either by the direct application of military power, or by cruel and intolerable local legislation. He wished that they would voluntarily remove. He believed that absorption or extinction was the only alternative of their remaining in the bosom of the whites. But they were a part of the human race, as capable as we are of pleasure and pain, and invested with as indisputable a right as we have, to judge of and pursue their own happiness.

It is said, that annihilation is the destiny of the Indian race. Perhaps it is, judging from the past. But shall we therefore hasten it? Death is the irreversible decree pronounced against the human race. Shall we accelerate its approach, because it is inevitable? No, sir. Let us treat with the utmost kindness, and the most perfect justice, the aborigines whom Providence has committed to our guardianship. Let us confer upon them, if we can, the inestimable blessings of christianity and civilization, and then, if they must sink beneath the progressive wave of civilized population, we are free from all reproach, and stand acquitted in the sight of God and man.

The senator from Tennessee has left the senate under the impression, no doubt unintentionally, that three other states had advanced as far as Georgia in the exercise of a jurisdiction over the Indians and their property. But if he, (Mr. Clay,) were rightly informed, this was far from correct. North Carolina had exercised no such jurisdiction. She had not touched a hair upon the head of any Indian. Tennessee had extended her laws to the Indian country, for the sole purpose of protecting the Indians, and punishing the white intruders. Her upright judges and tribunals concurred, unanimously, if he were rightly informed, in supporting the Indian rights. No state, he believed, but Georgia, had seized upon the Indian lands, and distributed them among the whites. From the commencement of our independence down to this time, there was not another instance of such seizure, and appropriation, by any other member of the confederacy.

Mr. Clay assured the senator from Georgia, that he had not sought for the position in which he was placed. It was sought of him. He was applied to by the unfortunate Cherokees, to present their case to the senate. And he should have been false and faithless to his own heart, and unworthy of human nature, if he had declined to be their organ, however inadequate he feared he had proved himself to be.

On the whole, then, said Mr. Clay, the resolutions proposed an inquiry into the suitableness of making further provision for the Cherokees who choose to emigrate beyond the Mississippi. And in regard to those of them who will not go, but who prefer to cling to the graves of their forefathers, and to the spot which gave them birth, in spite of any destiny impending over them, the resolution proposes, that, since Georgia has shut her courts against them, we should inquire whether we should not open those of the federal government to them, and ascertain whether, according to the constitution, treaties, and laws, we are capable of fulfilling the obligations which we have solemnly contracted.

The memorial of the Cherokees was then referred to the committee on Indian affairs, and Mr. Clay’s resolutions laid on the table for one day.

ON THE CUMBERLAND ROAD BILL.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, FEBRUARY 11, 1835.

[THE Cumberland road is a national work, constructed under the authority of congress, commencing at Cumberland on the Potomac river in the state of Maryland, and extending west to the Ohio river at Wheeling; from whence it is to be continued, under the name of the national road, through Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Missouri, to Jefferson, the capital of the latter state. At the time when the compact with the state of Ohio was made by the United States, this road had become absolutely necessary for the purpose of securing an intercourse between the west and the east side of the Alleghany mountains. The first step to effect this, was taken in 1802, when Mr. Jefferson was president. Its completion to the Ohio river, was in a great measure owing to the exertions of Mr. Clay in the cause of internal improvement, at various periods during his congressional career. After the road had been made to Columbus, in the state of Ohio, the Ohio section had been given to and accepted by that state. At the session of congress in 1834, an appropriation of three hundred thousand dollars had been made for repairing the road, and on the present occasion a further sum of three hundred and forty thousand dollars was proposed for the purpose of putting the work in good condition, previously to its being surrendered to the states through which it passes. The bill to effect this object passed the senate by a vote of thirty-two to nine, after considerable discussion; Mr. Clay giving his views as follows.]

MR. CLAY remarked, that he would not have said a word then, but for the introduction in this discussion of collateral matters, not immediately connected with it. He meant to vote for the appropriation contained in the bill, and he should do so with pleasure, because, under all the circumstances of the case, he felt himself called upon by a sense of imperative necessity to yield his assent to the appropriation. The road would be abandoned, and all the expenditures which had heretofore been made upon it would have been entirely thrown away, unless they now succeeded in obtaining an appropriation to put the road in a state of repair. Now, he did not concur with the gentleman, (Mr. Ewing,) that Ohio could, as a matter of strict right, demand of the government to keep this road in repair. And why so? Because, by the terms of the compact, under the operation of which the road was made, there was a restricted and defined fund, set apart in order to accomplish that object. And that fund measured the obligation of the government. It had been, however, long since exhausted. There was no obligation, then, on the part of the government, to keep the road in repair. But he was free to admit, that considerations of policy would prompt it to adopt that course, in order that an opportunity should be presented to the states to take it into their own hands.

The honorable senator from Pennsylvania felicitated himself on having, at a very early epoch, discovered the unconstitutionality of the general government’s erecting toll-gates upon this road, and he voted against the first measure to carry that object into execution. He (Mr. Clay) must say, that, for himself, he thought the general government had a right to adopt that course which it deemed necessary for the preservation of a road which was made under its own authority. And as a legitimate consequence from the power of making a road, was derived the power of making an improvement on it. That was established; and, on that point he was sure the honorable gentleman did not differ from those who were in favor of establishing toll-gates at the period to which he had alluded. He would repeat, that, if the power to make a road were conceded, it followed, as a legitimate consequence from that power, that the general government had a right to preserve it. And, if the right to do so, there was no mode of preservation more fitting and suitable, than that which resulted from a moderate toll for keeping up the road, and thus continuing it for all time to come.

The opinion held by the honorable senator, at the period to which he had adverted, was not the general opinion. He would well remember that the power which he, (Mr. Clay,) contended, did exist, was sustained in the other branch of the legislature by large majorities. And, in that senate, if he was not mistaken, there were but nine dissentients from the existence of it. If his recollection deceived him not, he had the pleasure of concurring with the distinguished individual who now presided over the deliberations of that body. He thought that he, (the vice-president,) in common with the majority of the senate and house of representatives, coincided in the belief, that a road, constructed under the orders of the general government, ought to be preserved by the authority which brought it into being. Now, that was his, (Mr. Clay’s,) opinion still. He was not one of those who, on this or any other great national subject, had changed his opinion in consequence of being wrought upon by various conflicting circumstances.

With regard to the general power of making internal improvements, as far as it existed in the opinions he had frequently expressed in both houses, his opinion was unaltered. But with respect to the expediency of exercising that power, at any period, it must depend upon the circumstances of the times. And, in his opinion, the power was to be found in the constitution. This belief he had always entertained, and it remained unshaken. He could not coincide in the opinion expressed by the honorable senator from Pennsylvania and the honorable senator from Massachusetts, in regard to the disposition that was to be made of this road.

What, he would ask, had been stated on all hands? That the Cumberland road was a great national object, in which all the people of the United States were interested and concerned; that we are interested in our corporate capacity, on account of the stake we possessed in the public domain, and that we were consequently benefited by that road; that the people of the west were interested in it, as a common thoroughfare to all places from one side of the country to the other. Now, what was the principle of the arrangement that had been entered into? It was this common object, this national object, this object in which the people of this country were interested; its care, its preservation, was to be confided to different states, having no special motive or interest in its preservation; and, therefore, not responsible for the consequences that might result. The people of Kentucky and Indiana, and of the states west of those states, as well as the people living on the eastern side of the mountains, were all interested in the use and occupation of this road, which, instead of being retained and kept under the control of that common government in which all had a share, their interest in it was to be confided to the local jurisdictions through which the road passed; and thus the states, generally, were to depend upon the manner in which they should perform their duties; upon those having no sympathy with them, having no regard for their interest, but left to do as they chose in regard to the preservation of this road.

He would say that the principle was fundamentally wrong. He protested against it; had done from the first, and did so again now. It was a great national object, and they might as well give the care of the mint to Pennsylvania, the protection of the breakwater, or of the public vessels in New York, Baltimore, and Philadelphia, to the respective legislatures of the states in which that property was situated, as give the care of a great national road, in which the whole people of the United States were concerned, to the care of a few states which were acknowledged to have no particular interest in it――states having so little interest in that great work, that they would not repair it when offered to their hands.

But, he said, he would vote for this appropriation; he was compelled to vote for it by the force of circumstances over which he had no control. He had seen, in reference to internal improvements, and other measures of a national character, not individuals, merely, but whole masses, entire communities, prostrating their own settled opinions, to which they had conformed for half a century, wheel to the right or the left, march this way or that, according as they saw high authority for it. And he saw that there was no way of preserving this great object, which afforded such vast facilities to the western states, no other mode of preserving it, but by a reluctant acquiescence in a course of policy, which all, at least, had not contributed to produce, but which was formed to operate on the country, and from which there lay no appeal.

Mr. Clay, in conclusion, again reiterated that he should vote for the appropriation in this bill, although very reluctantly, and with the protest, that the road in question, being the common property of the whole nation, and under the guardianship of the general government, ought not to be treacherously parted from by it, and put into the hands of the local governments, who felt no interest in the matter.

ON THE APPOINTING AND REMOVING POWER.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, FEBRUARY 18, 1835.

[IN the course of a discussion on a bill relating to the power of appointing to and removal from office, as exercised by the president, Mr. Clay made the following speech, in which he denies the constitutionality of the unlimited power of removal from office, by the president, at his own will and pleasure, without the consent of the senate. Mr. Clay’s views of the nature and consequences of this arbitrary power claimed and exercised by president Jackson, will be found interesting, as well as his allusions to the pecuniary troubles and distress, which he then predicted would follow from the acts of Jackson’s administration――predictions painfully verified in the subsequent succession of disasters which have befallen the country.]

MR. CLAY thought it extremely fortunate that this subject of executive patronage came up, at this session, unincumbered by any collateral question. At the last session we had the removal of the deposits, the treasury report sustaining it, and the protest of the president against the resolution of the senate. The bank mingled itself in all our discussions, and the partisans of executive power availed themselves of the prejudices which had been artfully excited against that institution, to deceive and blind the people as to the enormity of executive pretensions. The bank has been doomed to destruction, and no one now thinks the recharter of it is practicable, or ought to be attempted. I fear, said Mr. Clay, that the people will have just and severe cause to regret its destruction. The administration of it was uncommonly able; and one is at a loss which most to admire, the imperturbable temper or the wisdom of its enlightened president. No country can possibly possess a better general currency than it supplied. The injurious consequences of the sacrifice of this valuable institution will soon be felt. There being no longer any sentinel at the head of our banking establishments to warn them, by its information and operations, of approaching danger, the local institutions, already multiplied to an alarming extent, and almost daily multiplying, in seasons of prosperity, will make free and unrestrained emissions. All the channels of circulation will become gorged. Property will rise extravagantly high, and, constantly looking up, the temptation to purchase will be irresistible. Inordinate speculation will ensue, debts will be freely contracted; and, when the season of adversity comes, as come it must, the banks, acting without concert and without guide, obeying the law of self-preservation, will all at the same time call in their issues; the vast number will exaggerate the alarm, and general distress, wide-spread ruin, and an explosion of the whole banking system, or the establishment of a new bank of the United States, will be the ultimate effects.

We can now deliberately contemplate the vast expansion of executive power, under the present administration, free from embarrassment. And is there any real lover of civil liberty, who can behold it without great and just alarm? Take the doctrines of the protest, and the secretary’s report together, and, instead of having a balanced government with three coördinate departments, we have but one power in the state. According to those papers, all the officers concerned in the administration of the laws are bound to obey the president. His will controls every branch of the administration. No matter that the law may have assigned to other officers of the government specifically defined duties; no matter that the theory of the constitution and the law supposes them bound to the discharge of those duties according to their own judgment, and under their own responsibility, and liable to impeachment for malfeasance; the will of the president, even in opposition to their own deliberate sense of their obligations, is to prevail, and expulsion from office is the penalty of disobedience! It has not, indeed, in terms, been claimed, but it is a legitimate consequence from the doctrines asserted, that all decisions of the judicial tribunals, not conformable with the president’s opinion, must be inoperative, since the officers charged with their execution are no more exempt from the pretended obligation to obey his orders than any other officers of the administration.

The basis of this overshadowing superstructure of executive power is, the power of dismission, which it is one of the objects of the bill under consideration somewhat to regulate, but which it is contended by the supporters of executive authority is uncontrollable. The practical exercise of this power, during this administration, has reduced the salutary coöperation of the senate, as approved by the constitution, in all appointments, to an idle form. Of what avail is it, that the senate shall have passed upon a nomination, if the president, at any time thereafter, even the next day, whether the senate be in session or in vacation, without any known cause, may dismiss the incumbent? Let us examine the nature of this power. It is exercised in the recesses of the executive mansion, perhaps upon secret information. The accused officer is not present nor heard, nor confronted with the witnesses against him, and the president is judge, juror, and executioner. No reasons are assigned for the dismission, and the public is left to conjecture the cause. Is not a power so exercised essentially a despotic power? It is adverse to the genius of all free governments, the foundation of which is responsibility. Responsibility is the vital principle of civil liberty, as irresponsibility is the vital principle of despotism. Free government can no more exist without this principle than animal life can be sustained without the presence of the atmosphere. But is not the president absolutely irresponsible in the exercise of this power? How can he be reached? By impeachment? It is a mockery.

It has been truly said, that the office was not made for the incumbent. Nor was it created for the incumbent of another office. In both, and in all cases, public offices are created for the public; and the people have a right to know why and wherefore one of their servants dismisses another. The abuses which have flowed, and are likely to flow from this power, if unchecked, are indescribable. How often have all of us witnessed the expulsion of the most faithful officers, of the highest character, and of the most undoubted probity, for no other imaginable reason, than difference in political sentiments? It begins in politics, and may end in religion. If a president should be inclined to fanaticism, and the power should not be regulated, what is to prevent the dismission of every officer who does not belong to his sect, or persuasion? He may, perhaps truly, say, if he does not dismiss him, that he has not his confidence. It was the cant language of Cromwell and his associates, when obnoxious individuals were in or proposed for office, that they could not confide in them. The tendency of this power is to revive the dark ages of feudalism, and to render every officer a feudatory. The bravest man in office, whose employment and bread depend upon the will of the president, will quail under the influence of the power of dismission. If opposed in sentiments to the administration, he will begin by silence, and finally will be goaded into partisanship.

The senator from New York, (Mr. Wright,) in analyzing the list of one hundred thousand, who are reported by the committee of patronage to draw money from the public treasury, contends that a large portion of them consists of the army, the navy, and revolutionary pensioners; and, paying a just compliment to their gallantry and patriotism, asks, if they will allow themselves to be instrumental in the destruction of the liberties of their country? It is very remarkable, that hitherto the power of dismission has not been applied to the army and navy, to which, from the nature of the service, it would seem to be more necessary than to those in civil places. But accumulation and concentration are the nature of all power, and especially of executive power. And it cannot be doubted, that, if the power of dismission, as now exercised, in regard to civil officers, is sanctioned and sustained by the people, it will, in the end, be extended to the army and navy. When so extended, it will produce its usual effect of subserviency, or if the present army and navy should be too stern and upright to be moulded according to the pleasure of the executive, we are to recollect, that the individuals who compose them are not to live always, and may be succeeded by those who will be more pliant and yielding. But I would ask the senator what has been the effect of this tremendous power of dismission upon the classes of officers to which it has been applied? Upon the post-office, the land-office, and the custom-house? They constitute so many corps d’armee, ready to further on all occasions the executive views and wishes. They take the lead in primary assemblies, whenever it is deemed expedient to applaud or sound the praises of the administration, or to carry out its purposes in relation to the succession. We are assured, that a large majority of the recent convention at Columbus, in Ohio, to nominate the president’s successor, were office-holders. And do you imagine that they would nominate any other than the president’s known favorite?

The power of removal, as now exercised, is nowhere in the constitution expressly recognised. The only mode of displacing a public officer, for which it does provide, is by impeachment. But it has been argued, on this occasion, that it is a sovereign power, an inherent power, and an executive power; and, therefore, that it belongs to the president. Neither the premises nor the conclusion can be sustained. If they could be, the people of the United States have all along totally misconceived the nature of their government, and the character of the office of their supreme magistrate. Sovereign power is supreme power; and in no instance whatever is there any supreme power vested in the president. Whatever sovereign power is, if there be any, conveyed by the constitution of the United States, is vested in congress, or in the president and senate. The power to declare war, to lay taxes, to coin money, is vested in congress; and the treaty-making power in the president and senate. The postmaster-general has the power to dismiss his deputies. Is that a sovereign power, or has he any?

Inherent power! That is a new principle to enlarge the powers of the general government. Hitherto it has been supposed, that there are no powers possessed by the government of the United States, or any branch of it, but such as are granted by the constitution; and, in order to ascertain what has been granted, that it was necessary to show the grant, or to establish that the power claimed was necessary and proper to execute some granted power. In other words, that there are no powers but those which are expressed or incidental. But it seems that a great mistake has existed. The partisans of the executive have discovered a third and more fruitful source of power. Inherent power! Whence is it derived? The constitution created the office of president, and made it just what it is. It had no powers prior to its existence. It can have none but those which are conferred upon it by the instrument which created it, or laws passed in pursuance of that instrument. Do gentlemen mean, by inherent power, such power as is exercised by the monarchs or chief magistrates of other countries? If that be their meaning, they should avow it.

It has been argued, that the power of removal from office is an executive power; that all executive power is vested in the president; and that he is to see that the laws are faithfully executed, which, it is contended, he cannot do, unless, at his pleasure, he may dismiss any subordinate officer.

The mere act of dismission or removal may be of an executive nature, but the judgment or sentence which precedes it is a function of a judicial, and not executive nature. Impeachments, which, as has been already observed, are the only mode of removal from office expressly provided for in the constitution, are to be tried by the senate, acting as a judicial tribunal. In England, and in all the states, they are tried by judicial tribunals. In several of the states, removal from office sometimes is effected by the legislative authority, as in the case of judges on the concurrence of two thirds of the members. The administration of the laws of the several states proceeds regularly, without the exercise on the part of the governors of any power similar to that which is claimed for the president. In Kentucky, and in other states, the governor has no power to remove sheriffs, collectors of the revenue, clerks of courts, or any one officer employed in administration; and yet the governor, like the president, is constitutionally enjoined to see that the laws are faithfully executed.

The clause relied upon to prove that all executive power is vested in the president, is the first section of the second article. On examining the constitution, we find that, according to its arrangement, it treats first of the legislative power, then of the executive, and lastly of the judicial power. In each instance, it provides how those powers shall be respectively vested. The legislative power is confided to a congress, and the constitution then directs how the members of the body shall be chosen, and, after having constituted the body, enumerates and carefully specifies its powers. And the same course is observed both with the executive and the judiciary. In neither case does the preliminary clause convey any power; but the powers of the several departments are to be sought for in the subsequent provisions. The legislative powers granted by the constitution are to be vested, how? In a congress. What powers? Those which are enumerated. The executive power is to be vested, how? In a council, or in several? No, in a president of the United States of America. What executive power? That which is possessed by any chief magistrate, in any country, or that which speculative writers attribute to the executive head? No such thing. That power, and that only, which the constitution subsequently assigns to the chief magistrate.

The president is enjoined by the constitution to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. Under this injunction, the power of dismission is claimed for him; and it is contended, that if those charged with the execution of the laws attempt to execute them in a sense different from that entertained by the president, he may prevent it, or withhold his coöperation. It would follow that, if the judiciary give to the law an interpretation variant from that of the president, he would not be bound to afford means which might become necessary to execute their decision. If these pretensions are well founded, it is manifest that the president, by means of the veto, in arresting the passage of laws which he disapproves, and the power of expounding those which are passed, according to his own sense of them, will become possessed of all the practical authority of the whole government. If the judiciary decide a law contrary to the president’s opinion of its meaning, he may command the marshal not to execute the decision, and urge his constitutional obligation to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. It will be recollected, perhaps, by the senate, that, during the discussions on the deposit question, I predicted that the day would arrive when a president, disposed to enlarge his powers, would appeal to his official oath as a source of power. In that oath he undertakes that he will, ‘to the best of his ability, preserve, protect, and defend the constitution of the United States.’ The fulfilment of the prediction quickly followed; and during the same session, in the protest of the president, we find him referring to this oath as a source of power and duty. Now, if the president, in virtue of his oath, may interpose and prevent any thing from being done, contrary to the constitution, as he understands it; and may, in virtue of the injunction to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, prevent the enforcement of any law contrary to the sense in which he understands it, I would ask, what powers remain to any other branch of the government? Are they not all substantially absorbed in the WILL of one man?

The president’s oath obliges him to do no more than every member of congress is also bound by official oath to do; that is, to support the constitution of the United States, in their respective spheres of action. In the discharge of the duties specifically assigned to him by the constitution and laws, he is for ever to keep in view the constitution; and this every member of congress is equally bound to do, in the passage of laws. To step out of his sphere; to trench upon other departments of the government, under the notion that they are about to violate the constitution, would be to set a most pernicious and dangerous example of violation of the constitution. Suppose congress, by two thirds of each branch, pass a law contrary to the veto of the president, and to his opinion of the constitution, is he afterwards at liberty to prevent its execution? The injunction, to which I have adverted, common both to the federal and most of the state constitutions, imposes only upon the chief magistrate the duty of executing those laws with the execution of which he is specially charged; of supplying, when necessary, the means with which he is intrusted to enable others to execute those laws, the enforcement of which is confided to them; and to communicate to congress infractions of the laws, that the guilty may be brought to punishment, or the defects of legislation remedied. The most important branch of the government to the rights of the people, as it regards the mere execution of the laws, is the judiciary; and yet they hold their offices by a tenure beyond the reach of the president. Far from impairing the efficacy of any powers with which he is invested, this permanent character in the judicial office is supposed to give stability and independence to the administration of justice.

The power of removal from office not being one of those powers which are expressly granted and enumerated in the constitution, and having I hope successfully shown that it is not essentially of an executive nature, the question arises, to what department of the government does it belong, in regard to all offices created by law, or whose tenure is not defined in the constitution? There is much force in the argument which attaches the power of dismission to the president and senate conjointly, as the appointing power. But I think we must look for it to a broader and higher source; the legislative department. The duty of appointment may be performed under a law which enacts the mode of dismission. This is the case in the post-office department, the postmaster-general being invested with both the power of appointment and of dismission. But they are not necessarily allied, and the law might separate them; and assign to one functionary the right to appoint, and to a different one the right to dismiss. Examples of such a separation may be found in the state governments.

It is the legislative authority which creates the office, defines its duties, and may prescribe its duration. I speak, of course, of offices not created by the constitution, but the law. The office, coming into existence by the will of congress, the same will may provide how, and in what manner, the office and the officer shall both cease to exist. It may direct the conditions on which he shall hold the office, and when and how he shall be dismissed. Suppose the constitution had omitted to prescribe the tenure of the judicial office, could not congress do it? But the constitution has not fixed the tenure of any subordinate offices, and therefore congress may supply the omission. It would be unreasonable to contend that, although congress, in pursuit of the public good, brings the office and the officer into being, and assigns their purposes, yet the president has a control over the officer which congress cannot reach or regulate; and this control, in virtue of some vague and undefined implied executive power, which the friends of executive supremacy are totally unable to attach to any specific clause in the constitution!

It has been contended, with great ability, that, under the clause of the constitution which declares, that congress shall have power ‘to make all laws, which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all others vested by this constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof,’ congress is the sole depository of implied powers, and that no other department or officer of the government possesses any. If this argument be correct, there is an end of the controversy. But if the power of dismission be incident to the legislative authority, congress has the clear right to regulate it. And if it belong to any other department of the government, under the cited clause, congress has the power to legislate upon the subject, and may regulate it, although it could not divest the department altogether of the right.

Hitherto I have considered the question upon the ground of the constitution, unaffected by precedent. We have in vain called upon our opponents to meet us upon that ground; and to point out the clause of the constitution which by express grant, or necessary implication, subjects the will of the whole official corps to the pleasure of the president, to be dismissed whenever he thinks proper, without any cause, and without any reasons publicly assigned or avowed for the dismission, and which excludes congress from all authority to legislate against the tremendous consequences of such a vast power. No such clause has been shown; nor can it be, for the best of all reasons, because it does not exist. Instead of bringing forward any such satisfactory evidence, gentlemen entrench themselves behind the precedent which was established in 1789, when the first congress recognised the power of dismission in the president; that is, they rely upon the opinion of the first congress, as to what the constitution meant, as conclusive of what it is.

The precedent of 1789 was established in the house of representatives against the opinion of a large and able minority, and in the senate by the casting vote of the vice-president, Mr. John Adams. It is impossible to read the debate which it occasioned, without being impressed with the conviction that the just confidence reposed in the father of his country, then at the head of the government, had great, if not decisive influence in establishing it. It has never, prior to the commencement of the present administration, been submitted to the process of review. It has not been reconsidered, because, under the mild administrations of the predecessors of the president, it was not abused, but generally applied to cases to which the power was justly applicable.

[Mr. Clay here proceeded to recite from a memorandum, the number of officers removed under the different presidents, from Washington down; but the reporter not having access to the memorandum, is unable to note the precise number under each, and can only state generally that it was inconsiderable, under all the administrations prior to the present, but under that of general Jackson the number of removals amounted to more than two thousand; of which some five or six hundred were postmasters.]

Precedents deliberately established by wise men are entitled to great weight. They are the evidence of truth, but only evidence. If the same rule of interpretation has been settled, by concurrent decisions, at different and distant periods, and by opposite dominant parties, it ought to be deemed binding, and not disturbed. But a solitary precedent, established, as this was, by an equal vote of one branch, and a powerful minority in the other, under the influence of a confidence never misplaced in an illustrious individual, and which has never been reëxamined, cannot be conclusive.

The first inquiry which suggests itself upon such a precedent as this is, brought forward by the friends of the administration, is, what right have they to the benefit of any precedent? The course of this administration has been marked by an utter and contemptuous disregard of all that had been previously done. Disdaining to move on in the beaten road carefully constructed by preceding administrations, and trampling upon every thing, it has seemed resolved to trace out for itself a new line of march. Then, let us inquire how this administration and its partisans dispose of precedents drawn from the same source, the first congress under the present constitution. If a precedent of that congress be sufficient authority to sustain an executive power, other precedents established by it, in support of legislative powers, must possess a like force. But do they admit this principle of equality? No such thing. They reject the precedents of the congress of 1789, sustaining the power of congress, and cling to that only which expands the executive authority. They go for prerogative, and they go against the rights of the people.

It was in the first congress that assembled in 1789, that the bank of the United States was established, the power to adopt a protective tariff was maintained, and the right was recognised to authorize internal improvements. And these several powers do not rest on the basis of a single precedent. They have been again and again affirmed, and reaffirmed by various congresses, at different and distant periods, under the administration of every dominant party; and, in regard to the bank, it has been sanctioned by every branch of the government, and by the people. Yet the same gentlemen, who console themselves with the precedent of 1789, in behalf of the executive prerogative, reject as unconstitutional all these legislative powers.

No one can carefully examine the debate in the house of representatives in 1789, without being struck with the superiority of the argument on the side of the minority, and the unsatisfactory nature of that of the majority. How various are the sources whence the power is derived! Scarcely any two of the majority agree in their deduction of it. Never have I seen, from the pen or tongue of Mr. Madison, one of the majority, any thing so little persuasive or convincing. He assumes that all executive power is vested in the president. He does not qualify it; he does not limit it to that executive power which the constitution grants. He does not discriminate between executive power assigned by the constitution, and executive power enacted by law. He asks, if the senate had not been associated with the president in the appointing power, whether the president, in virtue of his executive power, would not have had the right to make all appointments? I think not; clearly not. It would have been a most sweeping and far-fetched implication. In the silence of the constitution, it would have devolved upon congress to provide by law for the mode of appointing to office; and that in virtue of the clause, to which I have already adverted, giving to congress power to pass all laws necessary and proper to carry on the government. He says, ‘the danger, then, merely consists in this; the president can displace from office a man whose merits require that he should be continued in it. What will be the motives which the president can feel for such abuse of his power?’ What motives! The pure heart of a Washington could have had none; the virtuous head of Madison could conceive none; but let him ask general Jackson, and he will tell him of motives enough. He will tell him, that he wishes his administration to be a unit; that he desires only one will to prevail in the executive branch of government; that he cannot confide in men who opposed his election; that he wants places to reward those who supported it; that the spoils belong to the victor; and that he is anxious to create a great power in the state, animated by one spirit, governed by one will, and ever ready to second and sustain his administration in all its acts and measures; and to give its undivided force to the appointment of the successor whom he may prefer. And what, Mr. President, do you suppose are the securities against the abuse of this power, on which Mr. Madison relied? ‘In the first place,’ he says, ‘he will be impeachable by this house before the senate, for such an act of mal-administration,’ and so forth. Impeachment! It is not a scarecrow. Impeach the president for dismissing a receiver or register of the land office, or a collector of the customs! But who is to impeach him? The house of representatives. Now suppose a majority of that house should consist of members who approve the principle that the spoils belong to the victors; and suppose a great number of them are themselves desirous to obtain some of these spoils, and can only be gratified by displacing men from office whose merits require that they should be continued, what chance do you think there would be to prevail upon such a house to impeach the president? And if it were possible that he should, under such circumstances, be impeached, what prospect do you believe would exist of his conviction by two thirds of the senate, comprising also members not particularly averse to lucrative offices, and where the spoils doctrine, long practiced in New York, was first boldly advanced in congress?

The next security was, that the president, after displacing the meritorious officer, could not appoint another person without the concurrence of the senate. If Mr. Madison had shown how, by any action of the senate, the meritorious officer could be replaced, there would have been some security. But the president has dismissed him; his office is vacant; the public service requires it to be filled, and the president nominates a successor. In considering this nomination, the president’s partisans have contended that the senate is not at liberty to inquire how the vacancy was produced, but is limited to the single consideration of the fitness of the person nominated. But suppose the senate were to reject him, that would only leave the office still vacant, and would not reinstate the removed officer. The president would have no difficulty in nominating another, and another, until the patience of the senate, being completely exhausted, they would finally confirm the appointment. What I have supposed is not theory but actually matter of fact. How often within a few years past have the senate disapproved of removals from office, which they have been subsequently called upon to concur in filling? How often wearied in rejecting, have they approved of persons for office whom they never would have appointed? How often have members approved of bad appointments, fearing worse if they were rejected? If the powers of the senate were exercised by one man, he might oppose, in the matter of appointments, a more successful resistance to executive abuses. He might take the ground that, in cases of improper removal, he would persevere in the rejection of every person nominated, until the meritorious officer was reinstated. But the senate now consists of forty-eight members, nearly equally divided, one portion of which is ready to approve of all nominations; and of the other, some members conceive that they ought not to incur the responsibility of hazarding the continued vacancy of a necessary office, because the president may have abused his powers. There is then no security, not the slightest practical security, against abuses of the power of removal in the concurrence of the senate in appointment to office.

During the debate in 1789, Mr. Smith, of South Carolina, called for the clause of the constitution granting the power. He said, ‘we are declaring a power in the president which may hereafter be greatly abused; for we are not always to expect a chief magistrate in whom such entire confidence can be placed, as the present. Perhaps gentlemen are so much dazzled with the splendor of the virtues of the present president, as not to be able to see into futurity. * * * * * We ought to contemplate this power in the hands of an ambitious man, who might apply it to dangerous purposes. If we give this power to the president, he may from caprice remove the most worthy men from office; his will and pleasure will be the slight tenure by which the office is to be held, and of consequence you render the officer the mere state dependent, the abject slave of a person who may be disposed to abuse the confidence his fellow-citizens have placed in him.’ Mr. Huntington said, ‘if we have a vicious president who inclines to abuse this power, which God forbid, his responsibility will stand us in little stead.’

Mr. Gerry, afterwards the republican vice-president of the United States, contended, ‘that we are making these officers the mere creatures of the president; they dare not exercise the privilege of their creation, if the president shall order them to forbear; because he holds their thread of life. His power will be sovereign over them, and will soon swallow up the small security we have in the senate’s concurrence to the appointment; and we shall shortly need no other than the authority of the supreme executive officer, to nominate, appoint, continue, or remove.’ Was not that prophecy; and do we not feel and know that it is prophecy fulfilled?

There were other members who saw clearly into the future, and predicted, with admirable forecast, what would be the practical operation of this power. But there was one eminently gifted in this particular. It seems to have been specially reserved for a Jackson to foretell what a Jackson might do. Speaking of some future president, Mr. Jackson――(I believe of Georgia――that was his name. What a coincidence!) ‘If he wants to establish an arbitrary authority, and finds the secretary of finance, (Mr. Duane,) not inclined to second his endeavors, he has nothing more to do than to remove him, and get one appointed, (Mr. Taney,) of principles more congenial with his own. Then, says he, I have got the army; let me have but the money, and I will establish my throne upon the ruins of your visionary republic. Black, indeed, is the heart of that man who even suspects him, (WASHINGTON,) to be capable of abusing powers. But, alas! he cannot be with us for ever; he is but mortal,’ and so forth. ‘May not a man with a Pandora’s box in his breast come into power, and give us sensible cause to lament our present confidence and want of foresight?’

In the early stages, and during a considerable portion of the debate, the prevailing opinion seemed to be, not that the president was invested by the constitution with the power, but that it should be conferred upon him by act of congress. In the progress of it, the idea was suddenly started, that the president possessed the power from the constitution, and the first opinion was abandoned. It was finally resolved to shape the acts, on the passage of which the question arose, so as to recognise the existence of the power of removal in the president.

Such is the solitary precedent on which the contemners of all precedents rely for sustaining this tremendous power in one man! A precedent established against the weight of argument, by a house of representatives greatly divided, in a senate equally divided, under the influence of a reverential attachment to the father of his country, upon the condition that, if the power were applied as we know it has been in hundreds of instances recently applied, the president himself would be justly liable to impeachment and removal from office, and which, until this administration, has never, since its adoption, been thoroughly examined or considered――a power, the abuses of which, as developed under this administration, if they be not checked and corrected, must inevitably tend to subvert the constitution, and overthrow public liberty. A standing army has been, in all free countries, a just object of jealousy and suspicion. But is not a corps of one hundred thousand dependents upon government, actuated by one spirit, obeying one will, and aiming at one end, more dangerous and formidable than a standing army? The standing army is separated from the mass of society, stationed in barracks or military quarters, and operates by physical force. The official corps is distributed and ramified throughout the whole country, dwelling in every city, village, and hamlet, having daily intercourse with society, and operates on public opinion. A brave people, not yet degenerated, and devoted to liberty, may successfully defend themselves against a military force. But if the official corps is aided by the executive, by the post-office department, and by a large portion of the public press, its power is invincible. That the operation of the principle, which subjects to the will of one man the tenure of all offices, which he may vacate at pleasure, without assigning any cause, must be to render them subservient to his purposes, a knowledge of human nature, and the short experience which we have had, clearly demonstrate.

It may be asked, why has this precedent of 1789 not been reviewed? Does not the long acquiescence in it prove its propriety? It has not been reëxamined for several reasons. In the first place, all feel and own the necessity of some more summary and less expensive and less dilatory mode of dismissing delinquents from subordinate offices, than that of impeachment, which, strictly speaking, was perhaps the only one in the contemplation of the framers of the constitution; certainly it is the only one for which it expressly provides. Then, under all the predecessors of the president, the power was mildly and beneficially exercised, having been always, or with very few exceptions, applied to actual delinquents. Notwithstanding all that has been said about the number of removals which were made during Mr. Jefferson’s administration, they were, in fact, comparatively few. And yet he came into power as the head of a great party, which for years had been systematically excluded from the executive patronage; a plea which cannot be urged in excuse for the present chief magistrate. It was reserved for him to act on the bold and daring principle of dismissing from office, those who had opposed his election; of dismissing from office for mere difference of opinion!

But it will be argued, that if the summary process of dismission be expedient in some cases, why take it away altogether? The bill under consideration does not disturb the power. By the usage of the government, not I think by the constitution, the president practically possesses the power to dismiss those who are unworthy of holding these offices. By no practice or usage but that which he himself has created, has he the power to dismiss meritorious officers only because they differ from him in politics. The principal object of the bill, is, to require the president, in cases of dismission, to communicate the reasons which have induced him to dismiss the officer; in other words, to make an arbitrary and despotic power a responsible power. It is not to be supposed that, if the president is bound publicly to state his reasons, that he would act from passion or caprice, or without any reason. He would be ashamed to avow that he discharged the officer because he opposed his election. And yet this mild regulation of the power is opposed by the friends of the administration! They think it unreasonable that the president should state his reasons. If he has none, perhaps it is.

But, Mr. President, although the bill is, I think, right in principle, it does not seem to me to go far enough. It makes no provision for the insufficiency of the reasons of the president, by restoring or doing justice to the injured officer. It will be some but not sufficient restraint against abuses. I have, therefore, prepared an amendment which I beg leave to offer, but which I will not press against the decided wishes of those having the immediate care of the bill. By this ♦amendment,[22] as to all offices created by law, with certain exceptions, the power at present exercised is made a suspensory power. The president may, in the vacation of the senate, suspend the officer and appoint a temporary successor. At the next session of the senate, he is to communicate his reasons; and if they are deemed sufficient, the suspension is confirmed, and the senate will pass upon the new officer. If insufficient, the displaced officer is to be restored. This amendment is substantially the same proposition, as one which I submitted to the consideration of the senate at its last session. Under this suspensory power, the president will be able to discharge all defaulters or delinquents; and it cannot be doubted that the senate will concur in all such dismissions. On the other hand, it will insure the integrity and independence of the officer, since he will feel that if he honestly and faithfully discharges his official duties, he cannot be displaced arbitrarily, or from mere caprice, or because he has independently exercised the elective franchise.

It is contended, that the president cannot see that the laws are faithfully executed unless he possesses the power of removal. That injunction of the constitution, imports a mere general superintendence, except where he is specially charged with the execution of a law. It is not necessary that he should have the power of dismission. It will be a sufficient security against the abuses of subordinate officers, that the eye of the president is upon them, and that he can communicate their delinquency. The state executives do not possess this power of dismission. In several, if not all, the states, the governor cannot even dismiss the secretary of state; yet we have heard no complaints of the inefficiency of state executives, or of the administration of the laws of the states. The president has no power to dismiss the judiciary; and it might be asked, with equal plausibility, how he could see that the laws are executed if the judges will not conform to his opinion, and he cannot dismiss them?

But it is not necessary to argue the general question, in considering either the original bill or the amendment. The former does not touch the power of dismission, and the latter only makes it conditional instead of being absolute.

It may be said, that there are certain great officers, heads of departments and foreign ministers, between whom and the president entire confidence should exist. That is admitted. But, surely, if the president remove any of them, the people ought to know the cause. The amendment, however, does not reach those classes of officers. And supposing, as I do, that the legislative authority is competent to regulate the exercise of the power of dismission, there can be no just cause to apprehend, that it will fail to make such modifications and exceptions as may be called for by the public interest; especially as whatever bill may be passed must obtain the approbation of the chief magistrate. And if it should attempt to impose improper restrictions upon the executive authority, that would furnish a legitimate occasion for the exercise of the veto. In conclusion, I shall most heartily vote for the bill, with or without the amendment which I have proposed.

ON THE PUBLIC LANDS BILL.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, DECEMBER 29, 1835.

[NILES’S Weekly Register of January second, 1836, makes the following appropriate remarks. ‘We have the pleasure to present the able and beautiful speech of Mr. Clay, on again presenting his bill to dispose of the proceeds of the public lands. What an immense good would grow out of the passage of that bill! His history of this bill is very severe, though stated in the mildest terms possible.’ The bill offered by Mr. Clay at this session passed the senate, by a vote of twenty-five to twenty; but was laid on the table in the house, by one hundred and four to eighty-five.]

ALTHOUGH I find myself borne down by the severest affliction with which Providence has ever been pleased to visit me, I have thought that my private griefs ought not longer to prevent me from attempting, ill as I feel qualified, to discharge my public duties. And I now rise, in pursuance of the notice which has been given, to ask leave to introduce a bill to appropriate, for a limited time, the proceeds of the sales of the public lands of the United States, and for granting land to certain states.

I feel it incumbent on me to make a brief explanation of the highly important measure which I have now the honor to propose. The bill, which I desire to introduce, provides for the distribution of the proceeds of the public lands in the years 1833, 1834, 1835, 1836, and 1837, among the twenty-four states of the union, and conforms substantially to that which passed in 1833. It is therefore of a temporary character; but if it shall be found to have salutary operation it will be in the power of a future congress to give it an indefinite continuance; and, if otherwise, it will expire by its own terms. In the event of war unfortunately breaking out with any foreign power, the bill is to cease, and the fund which it distributes is to be applied to the prosecution of the war. The bill directs that ten per centum of the net proceeds of the public lands, sold within the limits of the seven new states, shall be first set apart for them, in addition to the five per centum reserved by their several compacts with the United States; and that the residue of the proceeds, whether from sales made in the states or territories shall be divided among the twenty-four states, in proportion to their respective federal population. In this respect the bill conforms to that which was introduced in 1832. For one I should have been willing to have allowed the new states twelve and a half instead of ten per centum, but as that was objected to by the president, in his veto message, and has been opposed in other quarters, I thought it best to restrict the allowance to the more moderate sum. The bill also contains large and liberal grants of land to several of the new states, to place them upon an equality with others to which the bounty of congress has been heretofore extended, and provides that, when other new states shall be admitted into the union, they shall receive their share of the common fund.

The net amount of the sales of the public lands in the year 1833 was the sum of three million nine hundred and sixty-seven thousand six hundred and eighty-two dollars and fifty-five cents; in the year 1834 was four million eight hundred and fifty-seven thousand and six hundred dollars and sixty-nine cents; and in the year 1835, according to actual receipts in the three first quarters and an estimate of the fourth, is twelve million two hundred and twenty-two thousand one hundred and twenty-one dollars and fifteen cents; making an aggregate for the three years of twenty-one million forty-seven thousand four hundred and four dollars and thirty-nine cents. This aggregate is what the bill proposes to distribute and pay to the twenty-four states on the first day of May, 1836, upon the principles which I have stated. The difference between the estimate made by the secretary of the treasury and that which I have offered of the product of the last quarter of this year, arises from my having taken, as the probable sum, one third of the total amount of the three first quarters, and he some other conjectural sum. Deducting from the twenty-one million forty-seven thousand four hundred and four dollars and thirty-nine cents the fifteen per centum to which the seven new states, according to the bill, will be first entitled, amounting to two million six hundred and twelve thousand three hundred and fifty dollars and eighteen cents, there will remain for distribution among the twenty-four states of the union the sum of eighteen million four hundred and thirty-five thousand and fifty-four dollars and twenty-one cents. Of this sum the proportion of Kentucky will be nine hundred and sixty thousand nine hundred and forty-seven dollars and forty-one cents, of Virginia the sum of one million five hundred and eighty-one thousand six hundred and sixty-nine dollars and thirty-nine cents, of North Carolina nine hundred and eighty-eight thousand six hundred and thirty-two dollars and forty-two cents, and of Pennsylvania two million eighty-three thousand two hundred and thirty-three dollars and thirty-two cents. The proportion of Indiana, including the fifteen per centum, will be eight hundred and fifty-five thousand five hundred and eighty-eight dollars and twenty-three cents, of Ohio one million six hundred and seventy-seven thousand one hundred and ten dollars and eighty-four cents, and of Mississippi nine hundred and fifty-eight thousand nine hundred and forty-five dollars and forty-two cents. And the proportions of all the twenty-four states are indicated in a table which I hold in my hand, prepared at my instance in the office of the secretary of the senate, and to which any senator may have access.[23] The grounds on which the extra allowance is made to the new states are, first, their complaint that all lands sold by the federal government are five years exempted from state taxation; secondly, that it is to be applied in such manner as will augment the value of the unsold public lands within them; and, lastly, their recent settlement.

It may be recollected that a bill passed both houses of congress, in the session which terminated on the third of March, 1833, for the distribution of the amount received from the public lands, upon the principles of that now offered. The president, in his message at the commencement of the previous session, had specially invited the attention of congress to the subject of the public lands; had adverted to their liberation from the pledge for the payment of the public debt; and had intimated his readiness to concur in any disposal of them which might appear to congress most conducive to the quiet, harmony, and general interest of the American people.

After such a message, the president’s disapprobation of the bill could not have been anticipated. It was presented to him on the second of March, 1833. It was not returned as the constitution requires, but was retained by him after the expiration of his official term, and until the next session of congress, which had no power to act upon it. It was understood and believed that, in anticipation of the passage of the bill, the president had prepared objections to it, which he had intended to return with his negative; but he did not. If the bill had been returned, there is reason to believe that it would have passed, notwithstanding those objections. In the house, it had been carried by a majority of more than two thirds. And, in the senate, although there was not the majority on its passage, it was supposed that, in consequence of the passage of the compromise bill, some of the senators who had voted against the land bill had changed their views, and would have voted for it upon its return, and others had left the senate.

There are those who believe that the bill was unconstitutionally retained by the president and is now the law of the land. But whether it be so or not, the general government holds the public domain in trust for the common benefit of all the states; and it is, therefore, competent to provide by law that the trustee shall make distribution of the proceeds of the three past years, as well as future years, among those entitled to the beneficial interest. The bill makes such a provision. And it is very remarkable, that the sum which it proposes to distribute is about the gross surplus, or balance, estimated in the treasury on the first of January, 1836. When the returns of the last quarter of the year come in, it will probably be found that the surplus is larger than the sum which the bill distributes. But if it should not be, there will remain the seven millions held in the bank of the United States, applicable, as far as it may be received, to the service of the ensuing year.

It would be premature now to enter into a consideration of the probable revenue of future years; but, at the proper time, I think it will not be difficult to show that, exclusive of what may be received from the public lands, it will be abundantly sufficient for all the economical purposes of government, in a time of peace. And the bill, as I have already stated, provides for seasons of war. I wish to guard against all misconception by repeating, what I have heretofore several times said, that this bill is not founded upon any notion of a power in congress to lay and collect taxes and distribute the amount among the several states. I think congress possesses no such power, and has no right to exercise it until such amendment as that proposed by the senator from South Carolina (Mr. Calhoun) shall be adopted. But the bill rests on the basis of a clear and comprehensive grant of power to congress over the territories and property of the United States in the constitution, and upon express stipulations in the deeds of session.

Mr. President, I have ever regarded, with feelings of the profoundest regret, the decision which the president of the United States felt himself induced to make on the bill of 1833. If it had been his pleasure to approve it, the heads of departments would not now be taxing their ingenuity to find out useless objects of expenditures, or objects which may be well postponed to a more distant day. If the bill had passed, about twenty millions of dollars would have been, during the three last years, in the hands of the several states, applicable by them to the beneficent purposes of internal improvement, education, or colonization. What immense benefits might not have been diffused throughout the land by the active employment of that large sum? What new channels of commerce and communication might not have been opened? What industry stimulated, what labor rewarded? How many youthful minds might have received the blessings of education and knowledge, and been rescued from ignorance, vice, and ruin? How many descendants of Africa might have been transported from a country where they never can enjoy political or social equality, to the native land of their fathers, where no impediment exists to their attainment of the highest degree of elevation, intellectual, social, and political? Where they might have been successful instruments, in the hands of God, to spread the religion of his son, and to lay the foundations of civil liberty!

And, sir, when we institute a comparison between what might have been effected, and what has been in fact done, with that large amount of national treasure, our sensations of regret, on account of the fate of the bill of 1833, are still keener. Instead of its being dedicated to the beneficent uses of the whole people, and our entire country, it has been an object of scrambling amongst local corporations, and locked up in the vaults, or loaned out by the directors of a few of them, who are not under the slightest responsibility to the government or people of the United States. Instead of liberal, enlightened, and national purposes, it has been partially applied to local, limited, and selfish uses. Applied to increase the semi-annual dividends of favorite stockholders in favorite banks! Twenty millions of the national treasure are scattered in parcels among petty corporations; and whilst they are growling over the fragments and greedy for more, the secretaries are brooding on schemes for squandering the whole.

But although we have lost three precious years, the secretary of the treasury tells us that the principal is yet safe, and much good may be still achieved with it. The general government, by an extraordinary exercise of executive power, no longer affords aid to any new works of internal improvement. Although it sprung from the union, and cannot survive the union, it no longer engages in any public improvement to perpetuate the existence of the union. It is but justice to it to acknowledge, that, with the coöperation of the public-spirited state of Maryland, it effected one national road having that tendency. But the spirit of improvement pervades the land, in every variety of form, active, vigorous, and enterprising, wanting pecuniary aid as well as intelligent direction. The states have undertaken what the general government is prevented from accomplishing. They are strengthening the union by various lines of communication thrown across and through the mountains. New York has completed one great chain. Pennsylvania another, bolder in conception and far more arduous in the execution. Virginia has a similar work in progress, worthy of all her enterprise and energy. A fourth further south, where the parts of the union are too loosely connected, has been projected, and it can certainly be executed with the supplies which this bill affords, and perhaps not without them.

This bill passed, and these and other similar undertakings completed, we may indulge the patriotic hope that our union will be bound by ties and interests that render it indissoluble. As the general government withholds all direct agency from these truly national works, and from all new objects of internal improvement, ought it not to yield to the states, what is their own, the amount received from the public lands? It would thus but execute faithfully a trust expressly created by the original deeds of cession, or resulting from the treaties of acquisition. With this ample resource, every desirable object of improvement, in every part of our extensive country, may, in due time, be accomplished. Placing this exhaustless fund in the hands of the several members of the confederacy, their common federal head may address them in the glowing language of the British bard, and

‘Bid harbors open, public ways extend, Bid temples worthier of the God ascend. Bid the broad arch the dangerous flood contain, The mole projecting break the roaring main. Back to his bounds their subject sea command, And roll obedient rivers through the land.’

The affair of the public lands was forced upon me. In the session of 1831 and 1832 a motion from a quarter politically unfriendly to me, was made to refer it to the committee of manufactures, of which I was a member. I strenuously opposed the reference. I remonstrated, I protested, I entreated, I implored. It was in vain that I insisted that the committee on the public lands was the regular standing committee to which the reference should be made. It was in vain that I contended that the public lands and domestic manufactures were subjects absolutely incongruous. The unnatural alliance was ordered by the vote of a majority of the senate. I felt that a personal embarrassment was intended me. I felt that the design was to place in my hands a many-edged instrument, which I could not touch without being wounded. Nevertheless I subdued all my repugnance, and I engaged assiduously in the task which had been so unkindly assigned me. This, or a similar bill, was the offspring of my deliberations. When reported, the report accompanying it was referred by the same majority of the senate to the very committee on the public lands to which I had unsuccessfully sought to have the subject originally assigned, for the avowed purpose of obtaining a counteracting report. But, in spite of all opposition, it passed the senate at that session. At the next, both houses of congress.

I confess, I feel anxious for the fate of this measure, less on account of any agency I have had in proposing it, as I hope and believe, than from a firm, sincere, and thorough conviction, that no one measure, ever presented to the councils of the nation, was fraught with so much unmixed good, and could exert such powerful and enduring influence in the preservation of the union itself, and upon some of its highest interests. If I can be instrumental, in any degree, in the adoption of it, I shall enjoy, in that retirement into which I hope shortly to enter, a heart-feeling satisfaction and a lasting consolation. I shall carry there no regrets, no complaints, no reproaches on my own account. When I look back upon my humble origin, left an orphan too young to have been conscious of a father’s smiles and caresses, with a widowed mother, surrounded by a numerous offspring, in the midst of pecuniary embarrassments, without a regular education, without fortune, without friends, without patrons, I have reason to be satisfied with my public career. I ought to be thankful for the high places and honors to which I have been called by the favor and partiality of my countrymen, and I am thankful and grateful. And I shall take with me the pleasing consciousness, that, in whatever station I have been placed, I have earnestly and honestly labored to justify their confidence by a faithful, fearless, and zealous discharge of my public duties. Pardon these personal allusions. I make the motion of which notice has been given.

[Leave was then granted, and the bill was introduced, read twice, referred to the committee on the public lands, and ordered to be printed.]

ON OUR RELATIONS WITH FRANCE.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, JANUARY 11, 1836.

[AT this session, the situation of affairs between the United States and France having become serious and alarming, Mr. Clay offered resolutions, calling upon the president for information, which, although generally known to the public, he had not then communicated to congress.]

IT must be obvious to every observer of passing events, that our affairs with France are becoming every day more and more serious in their character, and are rapidly tending to a crisis. Mutual irritations are daily occurring, from the animadversions of the public press, and among individuals, in and out of office, in both countries. And a state of feeling, greatly to be deprecated, if we are to preserve the relations of peace, must certainly be the consequence.

According to the theory of our constitution, our diplomatic concerns with foreign countries are intrusted to the president of the United States, until they reach a certain point involving the question of peace or war, and then congress is to determine on that momentous question. In other words, the president conducts our foreign intercourse; congress alone can change that intercourse from a peaceable to a belligerent one. This right, to decide the question of war, carries along with it the right to know whatever has passed between our own executive and the government of any foreign power. No matter what may be the nature of the correspondence, whether official or not, whether formal or informal, congress has the right to any and all information whatever, which may be in the possession of the other branch of the government. No senator here could have failed to have been acquainted with the fact, that the contents of a most important despatch or document has been discussed, and a most important overture canvassed in the different newspapers, in private and political circles, by individuals; every body, in fact, knows what has taken place, except the congress of the United States. The papers friendly to the administration――indeed, the whole circle of the American press――are in possession of the contents of a paper which this body has not been yet allowed to see; and I have one journal, a southern administration journal, before me, which states a new and important fact in reference to it. I have said that our situation with France grows every day more embarrassing; the aspect of our relations with her more and more dark and threatening. I could not, therefore, longer delay in making the following motion. I should have done so before, but for a prevalent rumor that the president would soon make a communication to congress, which would do away the necessity of the resolutions which I now submit, by laying before congress the information, which is the object of my motion. He has not, however, done so, and probably will not, without a call from the senate.

Mr. Clay then offered the following resolutions, which were adopted next day.

Resolved, that the president be requested to communicate to the senate (if it be not, in his opinion, incompatible with the public interest,) whether, since the termination of the last congress, any overture, formal or informal, official or unofficial, has been made by the French government to the executive of the United States, to accommodate the difficulties between the two governments, respecting the execution of the convention of the fourth day of July, 1831; and, particularly, whether a despatch from the duc de Broglie, the French minister of foreign affairs, to the chargé d’affaires at Washington, was read, and a copy of it furnished by him to the secretary of state, for the purpose of indicating a mode in which these difficulties might be removed.

Resolved, also, under the resolution above mentioned, in the event of any such overture having been made, that the president be requested to inform the senate what answer was given to it; and, if a copy of any such despatch was received, that he be further requested to communicate a copy of it to the senate.

ADMISSION OF ARKANSAS INTO THE UNION.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, APRIL 11, 1836.

[NOTWITHSTANDING the compromise of the slavery question, on the admission of Missouri into the union, many citizens of the northern states were opposed to the admission of Arkansas, agreeably to the terms of the compromise. Mr. Clay, however, adhered to his former opinions, as is shown in his remarks which follow.]

MR. CLAY rose to present several petitions which had come into his hands. They were signed by citizens of Philadelphia, many of whom were known to be of the first respectability, and the others were, no doubt, entitled to the highest consideration. The petitions were directed against the admission of Arkansas into the union, while there was a clause in her constitution prohibiting any future legislation for the abolition of slavery within her limits. He had felt considerable doubt as to the proper disposition which he should make of these petitions, while he wished to acquit himself of the duty intrusted to him. The bill for the admission of Arkansas had passed the senate, and gone to the other house. It was possible that it would be returned from that branch with an amendment, which would bring this subject into consideration. He wished the petitioners had selected some other organ. He did not concur in the prayer of the petitioners. He thought that Arkansas, and another state or territory south of forty degrees, had the entire right, according to the compromise made on the Missouri question, to frame its constitution, in reference to slavery, as it might think proper. He adhered to the opinions on this point which he held on a former memorable occasion, which would be in the recollection of senators. He would only ask that one of these memorials be read, and that the whole of them should then be laid on the table.

[Mr. King, of Alabama, expressed his regret that the senator from Kentucky had introduced these petitions, while a bill was pending in the other branch, in the progress of which it was probable that this question would be stirred. If the presentation of these petitions should bring up again the agitation which was produced by the discussion of the Missouri question, it would be difficult to predict the consequences which might ensue. When the Missouri question was under consideration, he acted with the senator from Kentucky, and agreed to give up certain rights of the new states for the purpose of conciliation. But he would now say, that never again would he give up any thing for the purpose of conciliating another quarter of the country. He repeated his astonishment and concern, that the senator from Kentucky should have brought forward the petitions.]

Mr. Clay said he felt unaffected surprise at the expression of regret contained in the language of the senator from Alabama, as to the presentation of these petitions. I feel no regret. The subject of these petitions I do not approve, and I stated my disapprobation. I should have been happy, had the petitioners chosen another organ, I stated, further, that my opinions were unchanged. But these petitions have been committed to my care. In presenting them, I only performed a duty――a duty, in reference to petitions, of a constitutional, almost a sacred character. I have presented the petitions, but I have asked for no other action on them than the mere laying of them on the table, although I might have done so, as the bill is yet before the other branch. It is highly competent to the legislative authority to pass another bill, to control this clause in the constitution of Arkansas. I have asked no such thing. If the question should be stirred in the other branch, as seems to be apprehended by the senator from Alabama, it is better that the petitions are presented here. Here they are. I have merely performed a duty in presenting them; yet I am chided, chided at least in tone, by the senator from Alabama, for having done so. Sure I am, sir, that in this tone of chiding, there is not another senator on this floor who will participate.

As to the principle of compromise, there were several epochs from which gentlemen might take their start. The adoption of the constitution was a compromise; the settlement of the Missouri question was the second epoch; the adjustment of the tariff was the third. The principle illustrated in all these great cases it was highly desirable should be carried out. These persons who now come before congress, think it hard that they should be excluded from any participation in the soil south of forty degrees, which was won by the aid of their treasure and their valor. Perhaps the hardship was equally severe on those whose habits have rendered them familiar with slavery, that they are virtually excluded from a residence in any of the states north of the line of forty. He concluded with saying, that he had defended the principle of compromise, in the Missouri question, with as much zeal, if not as much ability, as the senator from Alabama.

[The petitions were then laid on the table.]

ON THE FORTIFICATION BILL.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, JUNE 29, 1836.

[IN consequence of the threatening appearance of our affairs with France, which at one time rendered a war with that nation probable, congress, at the session of 1836, passed a bill making large appropriations for building and repairing fortifications on the Atlantic coast. Mr. Clay opposed the bill on account of the extravagant amount proposed to be appropriated, as is shown in the following brief remarks on the subject.]

MR. CLAY thought there was no inconsistency between the two propositions to amend the bill as proposed by the senator from South Carolina, with the view of reducing the amount proposed for fortifications, and to amend it as proposed by the senator from Delaware, to restrain the issue of money from the public treasury, except as it should be called for in a course of regular disbursement. Both might be well adopted, and he hoped would be.

He had, however, risen more particularly for the purpose of calling the attention of the senate to the enormous and alarming amount of appropriations which had been actually made, or were in progress, during this session. He had procured from the secretary of the senate a statement of such as had been made by bills which had passed one or both houses up to the twenty-seventh of last month, when it amounted to about twenty-five millions. Since then, other bills had passed, which swelled it up to thirty-two or three millions; and other bills were now in progress, and would probably pass, carrying it up to forty millions, or beyond that sum. Forty millions of dollars in one year, when we have no debt, and no foreign war! Will not the country be justly alarmed, profoundly astonished, when it hears of these enormous appropriations? Is it possible to proceed with the government on such a scale of expenditure?

Why, sir, it is a greater amount than is appropriated to similar objects by the British parliament, since its reform, in one year. The whole revenue of Great Britain is about forty-two millions sterling, of which sum twenty-eight millions is applied to the public debt, six to the payment of pensions, annuities, and so forth, and only about eight millions to the current annual expenses of the whole of their vast establishments, military and naval, and the civil government at home and abroad. Now, forty millions of dollars exceed eight millions sterling. Who would have supposed that an administration, which came in upon pledges and promises of retrenchment, reform, and economy, should, in the eighth year of its rule, have swelled the expenditure of the government to an amount exceeding that of Great Britain? And this surprise must be increased, when we reflect that the British parliament stands to the people of Great Britain in the double relation of the federal and state governments to the people of the United States.

When Mr. Adams left the administration, the current annual expenses of the government, exclusive of the public debt, amounted to about twelve millions. Only a few years ago, a secretary of the treasury under the present administration, (Mr. McLane,) estimated the ordinary expenses of the government at fifteen millions annually. Even during the present session, the able senator from New York, when the land bill was under discussion, placed them, for a series of succeeding years, at eighteen millions. And now we propose, in this year, to more than treble the amount of expenditure during the extravagant administration, as it was charged, of Mr. Adams!

Mr. Clay hoped the senate would pause. He called upon the friends of the administration, in no taunting or reproachful spirit, to redeem the pledges and promises with which they came into power. If the love of country, if a faithful discharge of duty to the people, if a just economy, would not animate them, and stay these extravagant appropriations, he hoped the devotion to party would. Could they expect to continue in power, (and he candidly confessed, that he was not particularly anxious that they should,) with such unexampled appropriations? How can they meet their constituents with these bills staring them in the face?

And for what purpose shall they be made? Does any man believe, will any senator rise in his place and say, that these immense appropriations can be prudently, safely, and wisely disbursed? He had, indeed, heard that it was not expected they would be. He had heard, what was too wicked, profligate, and monstrous for him to believe, that it was intended to withdraw the appropriations from the public treasury, place them to the credit of disbursing officers, in the custody of local banks, and thus elude the operation of the deposit bill, which has recently passed. That bill had been demanded by the people of this country. It had passed from a profound sense of duty, in consequence of that demand, by unprecedented majorities in both houses. And he would not allow himself for a moment to believe, that a sinister design existed any where, to elude the operation of that great and salutary measure. What, sir! is the money of the people of this country, to be held in the deposit banks, one of which, according to a statement going the rounds of the papers, has made fourteen and a half per centum dividend for six months?

The annual average appropriations for fortifications heretofore, have been about seven hundred and fifty or eight hundred thousand dollars; and by the bill now before us, and that for a similar object which we have sent to the house, if both pass, we shall have appropriated for fortifications for one year, four millions and a half. Is it possible in one year judiciously to expend this enormous sum? When we look at the price of labor, the demands upon it for an increase of the army, for volunteers, and for the general avocations of society, does any body believe, that this vast sum can be judiciously laid out? It has been said, that, having omitted to make any appropriation last year, we ought this year to appropriate double the ordinary sum. But, if you cannot safely expend it, why should that be done? He was willing to make large and liberal appropriations for the navy and for fortifications; we ought, however, to look to all our great interests, and regulate the appropriations in reference to a survey of the whole country; and he earnestly entreated the senate to fulfil the hopes and expectations which had been recently inspired in the people of this country, by checking and putting itself decidedly against this rash, wild, and ruinous extravagance. He would vote for the commitment, to reduce the appropriations one half; after which there would remain an amount equal to double the ordinary annual appropriations, without including the sum in the bill now before the house.

ON RECOGNISING THE INDEPENDENCE OF TEXAS.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, JULY 1, 1836.

[IN March, 1836, a convention of forty-four delegates assembled at the town of Washington, in Texas, and made a formal declaration of independence and separation from the republic of Mexico. A previous declaration had been made by a few individuals in Texas, in December, 1835. On the twenty-first of April, 1836, a decisive battle was fought on the banks of the San Jacinto river, between the Texans and Mexicans, in which the latter were defeated, and president Santa Ana taken prisoner. An armistice was concluded in May, 1836, between Santa Ana and the president of Texas, Mr. Burnet, by which the former was released and sent home, and the Mexican troops evacuated the territory of Texas; Santa Ana agreeing not to take up arms, nor to exercise his influence against Texas during the war of independence. Under these circumstances, a proposition was brought before congress to acknowledge the independence of Texas, when Mr. Clay expressed his sentiments as follows.

Mr. Preston made some remarks, in the course of which he stated, that he had with difficulty restrained himself from offering an amendment to recognise the independence of Texas immediately. He gave a brief narrative of the events of the revolution in Texas, and stated that he had this morning received authentic information, in the form of a letter from Mr. Austin, which confirms the statement that general Filasola had carried into effect the armistice agreed on between the Texian government and Santa Ana. This treaty Mr. Preston regarded as amounting to a recognition, on the part of Mexico, of the independence of Texas. The vice-president of Texas was about to proceed to Vera Cruz, to enforce from the mouths of the Texian guns the conclusion of a definitive treaty of peace between the two countries.

Mr. Preston continued, at some length, to expatiate on the situation and achievements and claims of Texas, and adverted to certain treaty stipulations with Mexico concerning the Indians west of the Sabine, which stipulations it would only be in the power of Texas now to carry into effect. He concluded with offering to amend the resolution, by adding an expression of the gratification which the senate felt on hearing of the course taken by the president of the United States to obtain information of the situation of Texas.

The report of the committee concluded with the following resolution.

Resolved, that the independence of Texas ought to be acknowledged by the United States, whenever satisfactory information shall be received that it has in successful operation a civil government, capable of performing the duties and fulfilling the obligations of an independent power.]

MR. CLAY said, that the report of the committee on foreign relations was so full, and the session was so near its termination, that he had not thought it necessary to add one word to what that document contained; and he should not now have risen but for the amendment proposed by the senator from South Carolina, (Mr. Preston,) and what had fallen from him.

With respect to that amendment, I have no objection to it, and wish it to be adopted. The committee on foreign relations had reported a resolution, ♦declaring that Texas ought to be recognised as an independent power, as soon as satisfactory information is acquired, that it has an established government in successful operation. The president states, in a message received in the senate subsequent to the report, that he has adopted measures to obtain that information. There is, therefore, an entire consistency between the resolution of the committee, the message of the president, and the proposed amendment, and he hoped it would be agreed to.

The senator from South Carolina, actuated by very natural and proper feelings, would be glad to propose a stronger measure, one of immediate recognition, but feels restrained by the dictates of his sober judgment. I, too, Mr. President, would be most happy, if the state of our information, and the course of events, were such as to warrant the adoption of that stronger measure. But I do not concur in the opinion which has been expressed, that the actual independence of Texas, by the overthrow or expulsion of the armies of Mexico, is the only consideration which should guide us in deciding the question of recognition. There is another, scarcely of less importance, and that is, whether there is in Texas a civil government in successful operation, competent to sustain the relations of an independent power. This is the very point on which we want information, and that respecting which the president is, we are given to understand, now endeavoring to obtain it. And, surely, considering how recently Texas has adopted a constitution of government, it is not unreasonable to wait a short time to see what its operation will be.

But there are other considerations which ought not to be overlooked by a wise and discreet government. We are told by the senator from South Carolina, that the vice-president of Texas is on his way to La Vera Cruz, to negotiate with the Mexican government a definitive treaty of peace between the two powers, and, consequently, an acknowledgment of the independence of Texas. This fact furnishes an additional motive on the part of the United States for forbearing, at present, to proceed to the formal acknowledgment of the independence of Texas. And how much more glorious will it not be for Texas herself, by her own valor, to force from her enemy the first acknowledgment of her independence?

We ought to discriminate between Santa Ana――the blood-thirsty vain-boasting, military tyrant, who has met in his overthrow and captivity a merited fate――and the eight millions of Mexicans, over whom he was exercising military sway. We should not allow the feelings of just indignation, which his conduct has excited, to transport us against the perhaps unoffending people whom he has controlled. We ought to recollect, that Mexico is our neighbor, having conterminous territory; that as long as we both remain independent powers, we shall stand in that relation to her, that we are carrying on, by sea and by land, a commerce highly beneficial to both parties; and that it is the interest of both to cultivate the most amicable and harmonious intercourse. If we proceed precipitately, and prematurely, how will our conduct be regarded by Mexico? May we not lay the foundations of a lasting and injurious misunderstanding? If, indeed, Mexico delays unreasonably the acknowledgment of the independence of Texas, and resolves on the prosecution of the war, I should be far from thinking that the United States ought to postpone, to any distant day, the recognition of Texas, after the desired information is obtained. The senator from South Carolina has supposed it to be necessary to recognise Texas, in order to insure the execution of existing treaties with Mexico. So far as they affect Texas, she is as much bound by them, as if they had been negotiated under her express authority. For I suppose it to be incontestable, that a nation remains bound by all the treaties it has formed, however often it may think proper to change the form of its government; and that all the parts of a common nation also continue so bound, notwithstanding and after they shall have formed themselves into separate and independent powers.

Then there are other considerations, which recommend us to act on full information, and with due deliberation. It is undeniable, that many citizens of the United States, impelled by a noble devotion to the cause of liberty, have rushed to the succor of Texas, and contributed to the achievement of her independence. This has been done without the sanction or authority of this government; but it nevertheless exposes us to unworthy imputations. It is known that European powers attribute to our union unbounded ambition, and a desire of aggrandizing ourselves at the expense of our neighbors. The extensive acquisition of territory by the treaties of Louisiana and Florida, peaceful and upon a fair consideration as it was, is appealed to as sustaining the unfounded charge against us. Now, if, after Texas has declared her independence not quite four months ago, we should hasten to acknowledge it, considering the aid afforded by citizens of the United States, should we not give countenance to those imputations? Does not a just regard to our own character, as a wise, cautious, and dignified power, a just regard to the opinion of the people of Mexico, and a just regard to that of the impartial world, require that we should avoid all appearance of haste and precipitation? And, when we have reason to suppose, that not a single hostile bayonet remains in Texas, and when the ceremony of recognition, performed now, or a few months hence, can be of no material consequence to her, is it not better for all parties that we should wait a little while longer.

The senator from South Carolina refers to the policy which has constantly guided our councils in regard to the acknowledgment of new powers, or new governments, and he has correctly stated it. But it would not be at all difficult, if it were proper to detain the senate, to show an essential difference between the present instance and the cases of France, of Spanish America, and of Greece, to which he has adverted. There is an obvious difference in the duration of the new governments, and the degree of information which we possess about them.

The senate, without the coöperation of the executive in some way, is incompetent to recognise Texas. The president tells us, in his message, that he has adopted measures to acquire necessary information to guide his judgment. We also want it. He cannot be justly accused of having delayed unreasonably to act. There is ground to believe, not only that Texas is independent, but that it has a government in practical operation. I sincerely hope it has; and that it has laid, on deep foundations, perfect securities for liberty, law, and order. In the mean time, every prudential consideration seems to me to require, that we should stop with the resolution and proposed amendment. Such appears to be the deliberate judgment of the senator himself. I sincerely, I most anxiously hope, that the desired information will be soon obtained by the executive; and that the feelings and wishes for the acknowledgment of the independence of Texas, which so generally prevail among our constituents, may be speedily gratified.

[After some further debate, the resolution was agreed to by a unanimous vote.]

ON THE EXPUNGING RESOLUTION.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, JANUARY 16, 1837.

[ON the twenty-eighth of March, 1834, the senate of the United States adopted, by a vote of twenty-six to twenty, the following resolution, which was offered by Mr. Clay, relative to the removal of the public deposits from the bank of the United States.

‘Resolved, that the president, in the late executive proceedings in relation to the public revenue, has assumed upon himself authority and power not conferred by the constitution and laws, but in derogation of both.’

This resolution Mr. Benton, of Missouri, in February, 1835, brought forward a motion to expunge from the journals of the senate; but that body, on the third of March, by a vote of thirty-nine to seven, refused to sustain the motion. Mr. Benton, however, continued to agitate the subject, and, at the session of 1836–7, the majority of the senate having been changed in favor of president Jackson, an expunging resolution was offered by Mr. Benton, and, after an exciting debate, carried. On this occasion Mr. Clay addressed the senate in the following speech, which may be numbered among his most powerful efforts in the cause of the constitution, and the rights of the legislative against executive power.]

CONSIDERING that I was the mover of the resolution of March, 1834, and the consequent relation in which I stood to the majority of the senate by whose vote it was adopted, I feel it to be my duty to say something on this expunging resolution, and I always have intended to do so when I should be persuaded that there existed a settled purpose of pressing it to a final decision. But it was so taken up and put down at the last session――taken up one day, when a speech was prepared for delivery, and put down when it was pronounced――that I really doubted, whether there existed any serious intention of ever putting it to the vote. At the very close of the last session, it will be recollected that the resolution came up, and in several quarters of the senate a disposition was manifested to come to a definitive decision. On that occasion, I offered to waive my right to address the senate, and silently to vote upon the resolution; but it was again laid upon the table, and laid there for ever, as the country supposed, and as I believed. It is, however, now revived; and sundry changes having taken place in the members of this body, it would seem that the present design is to bring the resolution to an absolute conclusion.

I have not risen to repeat at full length the argument by which the friends of the resolution of March, 1834, sustained it. That argument is before the world, was unanswered at the time, and is unanswerable. And I here, in my place, in the presence of my country and my God, after the fullest consideration and deliberation of which my mind is capable, reassert my solemn conviction of the truth of every proposition contained in that resolution. But whilst it is not my intention to commit such an infliction upon the senate as that would be, of retracing the whole ground of argument formerly occupied, I desire to lay before it at this time, a brief and true state of the case. Before the fatal step is taken, of giving to the expunging resolution the sanction of the American senate, I wish, by presenting a faithful outline of the real questions involved in the resolution of 1834, to make a last, even if it is to be an ineffectual appeal, to the sober judgments of senators. I begin by reasserting the truth of that resolution.

Our British ancestors understood perfectly well the immense importance of the money power in a representative government. It is the great lever by which the crown is touched, and made to conform its administration to the interests of the kingdom, and the will of the people. Deprive parliament of the power of freely granting or withholding supplies, and surrender to the king the purse of the nation, he instantly becomes an absolute monarch. Whatever may be the form of government, elective or hereditary, democratic or despotic, that person who commands the force of the nation, and at the same time has uncontrolled possession of the purse of the nation, has absolute power, whatever may be the official name by which he is called.

Our immediate ancestors, profiting by the lessons on civil liberty, which had been taught in the country from which we sprung, endeavored to encircle around the public purse, in the hands of congress, every possible security against the intrusion of the executive. With this view, congress alone is invested by the constitution with the power to lay and collect the taxes. When collected, not a cent is to be drawn from the public treasury, but in virtue of an act of congress. And among the first acts of this government, was the passage of a law establishing the treasury department, for the safe keeping and the legal and regular disbursement of the money so collected. By that act a secretary of the treasury is placed at the head of the department; and varying in respect from all the other departments, he is to report, not to the president, but directly to congress, and is liable to be called to give information in person before congress. It is impossible to examine dispassionately that act, without coming to the conclusion that he is emphatically the agent of congress in performing the duties assigned by the constitution of congress. The act further provides that a treasurer shall be appointed to receive and keep the public money, and none can be drawn from his custody but under the authority of a law, and in virtue of a warrant drawn by the secretary of the treasury, countersigned by the comptroller, and recorded by the register. Only when such a warrant is presented can the treasurer lawfully pay one dollar from the public purse. Why was the concurrence of these four officers required in disbursements of the public money? Was it not for greater security? Was it not intended that each, exercising a separate and independent will, should be a check upon every other? Was it not the purpose of the law to consider each of these four officers, acting in his proper sphere, not as a mere automaton, but as an intellectual, intelligent, and responsible person, bound to observe the law, and to stop the warrant, or stop the money, if the authority of the law were wanting?

Thus stood the treasury from 1789 to 1816. During that long time no president had ever attempted to interfere with the custody of the public purse. It remained where the law placed it, undisturbed, and every chief magistrate, including the father of his country, respected the law.

In 1816 an act passed to establish the late bank of the United States for the term of twenty years; and, by the sixteenth section of the act, it is enacted,

‘That the deposits of the money of the United States in places in which the said bank and the branches thereof may be established, shall be made in said bank or branches thereof, unless the secretary of the treasury shall at any time otherwise order and direct; in which case the secretary of the treasury shall immediately lay before congress, if in session, and if not, immediately after the commencement of the next session, the reasons of such order or direction.’

Thus it is perfectly manifest, from the express words of the law, that the power to make any order or direction for the removal of the public deposits, is confided to the secretary alone, to the absolute exclusion of the president, and all the world besides. And the law, proceeding upon the established principle, that the secretary of the treasury, in all that concerns the public purse, acts as the direct agent of congress, requires, in the event of his ordering or directing a removal of the deposits, that he shall immediately lay his reasons therefor before whom? the president? No: before congress.

So stood the public treasury and the public deposits from the year 1816 to September, 1833. In all that period of seventeen years, running through or into four several administrations of the government, the law had its uninterrupted operation, no chief magistrate having assumed upon himself the power of diverting the public purse from its lawful custody, or of substituting his will to that of the officer to whose care it was exclusively intrusted.

In the session of congress of 1832–3, an inquiry had been instituted by the house of representatives into the condition of the bank of the United States. It resulted in a conviction of its entire safety, and a declaration by the house, made only a short time before the adjournment of congress on the fourth of March, 1833, that the public deposits were perfectly secure. This declaration was probably made in consequence of suspicions then afloat of a design on the part of the executive to remove the deposits. These suspicions were denied by the press friendly to the administration. Nevertheless, the members had scarcely reached their respective homes, before measures were commenced by the executive to effect a removal of the deposits from that very place of safety which it was among the last acts of the house to declare existed in the bank of the United States.

In prosecution of this design, Mr. McLane, the secretary of the treasury, who was decidedly opposed to such a measure, was promoted to the department of state, and Mr. Duane was appointed to succeed him. But Mr. Duane was equally convinced with his predecessor, that he was forbidden by every consideration of duty to execute the power with which the law had intrusted the secretary of the treasury, and refused to remove the deposits; whereupon he was dismissed from office, a new secretary of the treasury was appointed, and, in September, 1833, by the command of the president, the measure was finally accomplished. That it was the president’s act was never denied, but proclaimed, boasted, defended. It fell upon the country like a thunderbolt, agitating the union from one extremity to the other. The stoutest adherents of the administration were alarmed; and all thinking men, not blinded by party prejudice, beheld in the act a bold and dangerous exercise of power; and no human sagacity can now foresee the tremendous consequences which will ensue. The measure was adopted not long before the approaching session of congress; and, as the concurrence of both branches might be necessary to compel a restoration of the deposits, the object was to take the chance of a possible division between them, and thereby defeat the restoration.

And where did the president find the power for this most extraordinary act? It has been seen that the constitution, jealous of all executive interference with the treasury of the nation, had confined it to the exclusive care of congress by every precautionary guard, from the first imposition of the taxes to the final disbursement of the public money.

It has been seen that the language of the sixteenth section of the law of 1816 is express and free from all ambiguity; and that the secretary of the treasury is the sole, exclusive depository of the authority which it confers.

Those who maintain the power of the president, have to support it against the positive language of the constitution, against the explicit words of the statute, and against the genius and theory of all our institutions.

And how do they surmount these insuperable obstacles? By a series of far-fetched implications, which, if every one of them were as true as they are believed to be incorrect or perverted, would stop far short of maintaining the power which was exercised.

The first of these implied powers is, that of dismissal, which is claimed for the president. Of all the questioned powers ever exercised by the government, this is the most questionable. From the first congress down to the present administration, it had never been examined. It was carried then, in the senate, by the casting vote of the vice-president. And those who, at that day, argued in behalf of the power, contended for it upon conditions which have been utterly disregarded by the present chief magistrate. The power of dismissal is nowhere in the constitution granted, in express terms, to the president. It is not a necessary incident to any granted power; and the friends of the power have never been able to agree among themselves as to the precise part of the constitution from which it springs.

But, if the power of dismissal was as incontestable as it is justly controvertible, we utterly deny the consequences deduced from it. The argument is, that the president has, by implication, the power of dismissal. From this first implication, another is drawn, and that is, that the president has the power to control the officer, whom he may dismiss, in the discharge of his duties, in all cases whatever; and that this power of control is so comprehensive as to include even the case of a specific duty expressly assigned by law to the designated officer.

Now, we deny these results from the dismissing power. That power, if it exists, can draw after it only a right of general superintendence. It cannot authorize the president to substitute his will to the will of the officer charged with the performance of official duties. Above all, it cannot justify such a substitution in a case where the law, as in the present instance, assigns to a designated officer exclusively the performance of a particular duty, and commands him to report, not to the president, but to congress, in a case regarding the public purse of the nation, committed to the exclusive control of congress.

Such a consequence as that which I am contesting would concentrate in the hands of one man the entire executive power of the nation, uncontrolled and unchecked.

It would be utterly destructive of all official responsibility. Instead of each officer being responsible, in his own separate sphere, for his official acts, he would shelter himself behind the orders of the president. And what tribunal, in heaven above or on earth below, could render judgment against any officer for an act, however atrocious, performed by the express command of the president, which, according to the argument, he was absolutely bound to obey?

Whilst all other official responsibility would be utterly annihilated in subordinated officers, there would be no practical or available responsibility in the president himself.

But the case has been supposed, of a necessity for the removal of the deposits, and a refusal of the secretary of the treasury to remove them; and it is triumphantly asked if, in such a case, the president may not remove him, and command the deed to be done. That is an extreme case, which may be met by another. Suppose the president, without any necessity, orders the removal from a place of safety to a place of hazard. If there be danger that a president may neglect his duty, there is equal danger that a president may abuse his authority. Infallibility is not a human attribute. And there is more security for the public in holding the secretary of the treasury to the strict performance of an official duty specially assigned to him, under all his official responsibility, than to allow the president to wrest the work from his hands, annihilate his responsibility, and stand himself practically irresponsible. It is far better that millions should be lost by the neglect of a secretary of the treasury, than to establish the monstrous principle that all the checks and balances of the executive government shall be broken down, the whole power absorbed by one man, and his will become the supreme rule. The argument which I am combating places the whole treasury of the nation at the mercy of the executive. It is in vain to talk of appropriations by law, and the formalities of warrants upon the treasury. Assuming the argument to be correct, what is to prevent the execution of an order from the president to the secretary of the treasury to issue a warrant, without the sanction of a previous legal appropriation, to the comptroller to countersign it, to the register to register it, and to the treasurer to pay it? What becomes of that quadruple security which the precaution of the law provided? Instead of four substantive and independent wills, acting under legal obligations, all are merged in the executive voters.

But there was in point of fact, no cause, none whatever for the measure. Every fiscal consideration, (and no other had the secretary or the president a right to entertain,) required the deposits to be left undisturbed in the place of perfect safety where by law they were. We told you so at the time. We asserted that the charges of insecurity and insolvency of the bank were without the slightest foundation. And time, that great arbiter of human controversies, has confirmed all that we said. The bank, from documents submitted to congress by the secretary of the treasury at the present session, appears to be able not only to return every dollar of the stock held in its capital by the public, but an addition of eleven per centum beyond it.

Those who defend the executive act, have to maintain not only that the president may assume upon himself the discharge of a duty especially assigned to the secretary of the treasury, but that he may remove that officer, arbitrarily, and without any cause, because he refused to remove the public deposits without cause.

My mind conducts me to a totally different conclusion. I think, I solemnly believe, that the president ‘assumed upon himself authority and power not conferred by the constitution and laws, but in derogation of both,’ in the language of the resolution. I believed then in the truth of the resolution; and I now in my place, and under all my responsibility, reavow my unshaken conviction of it.

But it has been contended on this occasion, as it was in the debate which preceded the adoption of the resolution of 1834, that the senate has no right to express the truth on any question which by possibility, may become a subject of impeachment. It is manifest, that if it may, there is no more usual or appropriate form in which it may be done than that of resolutions, joint or separate, orders, or bills. In no other mode can the collective sense of the body be expressed. But senators maintain, that no matter what may be the executive encroachment upon the joint powers of the two houses, or the separate authority of the senate, it is bound to stand mute, and not breathe one word of complaint or remonstrance. According to the argument, the greater the violation of the constitution or the law, the greater the incompetency of the senate to express any opinion upon it! Further, that this incompetency is not confined to the acts of the president only, but extends to those of every officer who is liable to impeachment under the constitution. Is this possible? Can it be true? Contrary to all the laws of nature, is the senate the only being which has no power of self-preservation; no right to complain or to remonstrate against attacks upon its very existence?

The argument is, that the senate, being the constitutional tribunal to try all impeachments, is thereby precluded from the exercise of the right to express any opinion upon any official malfeasance, except when acting in its judicial character.

If this disqualification exist, it applies to all impeachable officers, and ought to have protected the late postmaster-general against the resolution, unanimously adopted by the senate, declaring that he had borrowed money contrary to law. And it would disable the senate from considering that treasury order, which has formed such a prominent subject of its deliberations during the present session.

And how do senators maintain this obligation of the senate to remain silent, and behold itself stripped, one by one, of all constitutional powers, without resistance, and without murmur? Is it imposed by the language of the constitution? Has any part of that instrument been pointed to which expressly enjoins it? No, no, not a syllable. But attempts are made to deduce it by another far-fetched implication. Because the senate is the body which is to try impeachments, therefore it is inferred the senate can express no opinion on any matter which may form the subject of impeachment. The constitution does not say so. That is undeniable; but senators think so.

The senate acts in three characters, legislative, executive, and judicial; and their importance is in the order enumerated. By far the most important of the three is its legislative. In that, almost every day that it has been in session, from 1789 to the present time, some legislative business has been transacted; whilst in its judicial character, it has not sat more than three or four times in that whole period.

Why should the judicial function limit and restrain the legislative function of the senate, more than the legislative should the judicial? If the degree of importance of the two should decide which ought to impose the restraint, in cases of conflict between them, none can doubt which it should be.

But if the argument is sound, how is it possible for the senate to perform its legislative duties? An act in violation of the constitution or laws is committed by the president or a subordinate executive officer, and it becomes necessary to correct it by the passage of a law. The very act of the president in question was under a law to which the senate had given its concurrence. According to the argument, the correcting law cannot originate in the senate, because it would have to pass in judgment upon that act. Nay, more, it cannot originate in the house, and be sent to the senate, for the same reason of incompetency in the senate to pass upon it. Suppose the bill contained a preamble reciting the unconstitutional or illegal act, to which the legislative corrective is applied; according to the argument, the senate must not think of passing it. Pushed to its legitimate consequence, the argument requires the house of representatives itself cautiously to abstain from the expression of any opinion upon an executive act, except when it is acting as the grand inquest of the nation, and considering articles of impeachment.

Assuming that the argument is well founded, the senate is equally restrained from expressing any opinion, which would imply the innocence or the guilt of an impeachable officer, unless it be maintained, that it is lawful to express praise and approbation, but not censure or difference of opinion. Instances have occurred in our past history, (the case of the British minister, Jackson, was a memorable one,) and many others may arise in our future progress, when in reference to foreign powers, it may be important for congress to approve what has been done by the executive, to present a firm and united front, and to pledge the country to stand by and support him. May it not do that? If the senate dare not entertain and express any opinion upon an executive measure, how do those who support this expunging resolution justify the acquittal of the president, which it proclaims?

No senator believed in 1834, that, whether the president merited impeachment or not, he ever would be impeached. In point of fact he has not been, and we have every reason to suppose, that he never will be impeached. Was the majority of the senate, in a case where it believed the constitution and laws to have been violated, and the liberties of the people to be endangered, to remain silent, and to refrain from proclaiming the truth, because, against all human probability, the president might be impeached by a majority of his political friends in the house of representatives?

If an impeachment had been actually voted by the house of representatives, there is nothing in the constitution which enjoins silence on the part of the senate. In such a case, it would have been a matter of propriety for the consideration of each senator to avoid the expression of any opinion on a matter upon which, as a sworn judge, he would be called to act.

Hitherto I have considered the question on the supposition, that the resolution of March, 1834, implied such guilt in the president, that he would have been liable to conviction on a trial by impeachment before the senate of the United States. But the resolution, in fact, imported no such guilt. It simply affirmed, that he had ‘assumed upon himself authority and power not conferred by the constitution and laws, but in derogation of both.’ It imputed no criminal motives. It did not profess to penetrate into the heart of the president. According to the phraseology of the resolution, the exceptionable act might have been performed with the purest and most patriotic intention. The resolution neither affirmed his innocence, nor pronounced his guilt. It amounts, then, say his friends on this floor, to nothing. Not so. If the constitution be trampled upon, and the laws be violated, the injury may be equally great, whether it has been done with good or bad intentions. There may be a difference to the officer, none to the country. The country, as all experience demonstrates, has most reason to apprehend those encroachments which take place on plausible pretexts, and with good intentions.

I put it, Mr. President, to the calm and deliberate consideration of the majority of the senate, are you ready to pronounce, in the face of this enlightened community, for all time to come, and whoever may happen to be president, that the senate dare not, in language the most inoffensive and respectful, remonstrate against any executive usurpation, whatever may be its degree or danger?

For one, I will not, I cannot. I believe the resolution of March, 1834, to have been true; and that it was competent to the senate to proclaim the truth. And I solemnly believe, that the senate would have been culpably neglectful of its duty to itself, to the constitution, and to the country, if it had not announced the truth.

But let me suppose that in all this I am mistaken; that the act of the president, to which exception was made, was in conformity with the spirit of our free institutions, and the language of our constitution and laws; and that, whether it was or not, the senate of 1834 had no authority to pass judgment upon it; what right has the senate of 1837, a component part of another congress, to pronounce judgment upon its predecessor? How can you, who venture to impute to those who have gone before you an unconstitutional proceeding, escape a similar imputation? What part of the constitution communicates to you any authority to assign and try your predecessors? In what article is contained your power to expunge what they have done? And may not the precedent lead to a perpetual code of defacement and restoration of the transactions of the senate, as consigned to the public records?

Are you not only destitute of all authority, but positively forbidden to do what the expunging resolution proposes? The injunction of the constitution to keep a journal of our proceedings is clear, express, and emphatic. It is free from ambiguity; no sophistry can pervert the explicit language of the instrument; no artful device can elude the force of the obligation which it imposes. If it were possible to make more manifest the duty which it requires to be performed, that was done by the able and eloquent speeches, at the last session, of the senators from Virginia and Louisiana, (Messrs. Leigh and Porter,) and at this of my colleague. I shall not repeat the argument. But I would ask, if there were no constitutional requirement to keep a journal, what constitutional right has the senate of this congress to pass in judgment upon the senate of another congress, and to expunge from its journal a deliberate act there recorded? Can an unconstitutional act of that senate, supposing it to be so, justify you in performing another unconstitutional act?

But, in lieu of any argument upon the point from me, I beg leave to cite for the consideration of the senate two precedents; one drawn from the reign of the most despotic monarch in modern Europe, under the most despotic minister that ever bore sway over any people; and the other from the purest fountain of democracy in this country. I quote from the interesting life of the cardinal Richelieu, written by that most admirable and popular author, Mr. James. The duke of Orleans, the brother of Louis XIII, had been goaded into rebellion by the wary Richelieu. The king issued a decree declaring all the supporters of the duke guilty of high treason, and a copy of it was despatched to the parliament at Paris, with an order to register it at once. The parliament demurred, and proceeded to what was called an arret de partage.

‘Richelieu, however, could bear no contradiction in the course which he had laid down for himself;’ [how strong a resemblance does that feature of his character bear to one of an illustrious individual whom I will not further describe!] ‘and hurrying back to Paris with the king, he sent, in the monarch’s name, a command for the members of the parliament to present themselves at the Louvre in a body, and on foot. He was obeyed immediately; and the king receiving them with great haughtiness, the keeper of the seals made them a speech, in which he declared that they had no authority to deliberate upon affairs of state; that the business of private individuals they might discuss, but that the will of the monarch in other matters they were alone called upon to register. The king then tore with his own hands the page of the register on which the arret de partage had been inscribed, and punished with suspension from their functions several of the members of the various courts composing the parliament of Paris.’

How repeated acts of the exercise of arbitrary power are likely to subdue the spirit of liberty, and to render callous the public sensibility, and the fate which awaits us, if we had not been recently unhappily taught in this country, we may learn from the same author.

‘The finances of the state were exhausted, new impositions were devised, and a number of new offices created and sold. Against the last-named abuse the parliament ventured to remonstrate; but the government of the cardinal had for its first principle despotism, and the refractory members were punished, some with exile, some with suspension of their functions. All were forced to comply with his will, and the parliament, unable to resist, yielded, step by step, to his exactions.’

The other precedent is suspended by the archives of the democracy of Pennsylvania, in 1816, when it was genuine and unmixed with any other ingredient.

The provisions of the constitution of the United States and of Pennsylvania, in regard to the obligation to keep a journal, are substantially the same. That of the United States requires that

‘Each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, except such parts as may in their judgment require secrecy; and the yeas and nays of the members of either house on any question shall, at the desire of one fifth of the members present, be entered on the journal.’

And that of Pennsylvania is,

‘Each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and publish them weekly except such parts as require secrecy, and the yeas and nays of the members on any question shall, at the desire of any two of them, be entered on the journals.’

Whatever inviolability, therefore, is attached to a journal, kept in conformity with the one constitution, must be equally stamped on that kept under the other. On the tenth of February, 1816, in the house of representatives of Pennsylvania, ‘the speaker informed the house that a constitutional question being involved in a decision by him yesterday, on a motion to expunge certain proceedings from the journal, he was desirous of having the opinion of the house on that decision, namely, that a majority can expunge from the journal any proceedings in which the yeas and nays have not been called.’ Whereupon Mr. Holgate and Mr. Smith appealed from said decision; and on the question, is the speaker right in his decision? the members present voted as follows: yeas three, nays seventy-eight. Among the latter are to be found the two senators now representing in this body the state of Pennsylvania. On the same day a motion was made by one of them, (Mr. Buchanan,) and Mr. Kelly, and read as follows.

‘Resolved, that in the opinion of this house, no part of the journals of the house can be expunged, even by unanimous consent.’

The senate observes, that the question arose in a case where the yeas and nays had not been called. Even in such a case, there were but four members, out of eighty-two, who thought it was competent to the house to expunge. Had the yeas and nays been called and recorded, as they were on the resolution of March, 1834, there would not have been a solitary vote in the house of representatives of Pennsylvania in support of the power of expunging. And if you can expunge the resolution, why may you not expunge also the recorded yeas and nays attached to it?

But if the matter of expunction be contrary to the truth of the case, reproachful for its base subserviency, derogatory to the just and necessary powers of the senate, and repugnant to the constitution of the United States, the manner in which it is proposed to accomplish this dark deed is also highly exceptionable. The expunging resolution, which is to blot out or enshroud the four or five lines in which the resolution of 1834 stands recorded, or rather the recitals by which it is preceded, are spun out into a thread of enormous length. It runs, whereas, and whereas, and whereas, and whereas, and so forth, into a formidable array of nine several whereases. One who should have the courage to begin to read them, unaware of what was to be their termination, would think that at the end of such a tremendous display he must find the very devil. It is like a kite or a comet, except that the order of nature is inverted, and the tail, instead of being behind, is before the body to which it is appended.

I shall not trespass on the senate by inquiring into the truth of all the assertions of fact and of principle, contained in these recitals. It would not be difficult to expose them all, and to show that not one of them has more than a colorable foundation. It is asserted by one of them, that the president was put upon his trial and condemned, unheard, by the senate, in 1834. Was that true? Was it a trial? Can the majority now assert, upon their oaths, and in their consciences, that there was any trial or condemnation? During the warmth of debate, senators might endeavor to persuade themselves and the public, that the proceeding of 1834 was, in its effects and consequences, a trial, and would be a condemnation of the president; but now, after the lapse of nearly three years, when the excitement arising from an animated discussion has passed away, it is marvellous that any one should be prepared to assert, that an expression of the opinion of the senate upon the character of an executive act was an arraignment, trial, and conviction of the president of the United States.

Another fact, asserted in one of those recitals, is, that the resolution of 1834, in either of the forms in which it was originally presented, or subsequently modified prior to the final shape which it assumed when adopted, would have been rejected by a majority of the senate. What evidence is there in support of this assertion? None. It is, I verily believe, directly contrary to the fact. In either of the modifications of the resolution, I have not a doubt, that it would have passed! They were all made in that spirit of accommodation by which the mover of the resolution has ever regulated his conduct as a member of a deliberative body. In not one single instance did he understand from any senator at whose request he made the modification, that, without it, he would vote against the resolution. How, then, can even the senators, who were of the minority of 1834, undertake to make the assertion in question? How can the new senators, who have come here since, pledge themselves to the fact asserted, in the recital of which they could not have had any connusance? But all the members of the majority; the veterans and the raw recruits――the six years men and six weeks men――are required to concur in this most unfounded assertion, as I believe it to be. I submit it to one of the latter, (looking toward Mr. Dana, from Maine, here by a temporary appointment from the executive,) whether, instead of inundating the senate with a torrent of fulsome and revolting adulation poured on the president, it would not be wiser and more patriotic to illustrate the brief period of his senatorial existence by some great measure, fraught with general benefit to the whole union? Or, if he will not or cannot elevate himself to a view of the interest of the entire country, whether he had not better dedicate his time to an investigation into the causes of an alien jurisdiction being still exercised over a large part of the territory of the state which he represents? And why the American carrying trade to the British colonies, in which his state was so deeply interested, has been lost by a most improvident and bungling arrangement?

Mr. President, what patriotic purpose is to be accomplished by this expunging resolution! What new honor or fresh laurels will it win for our common country? Is the power of the senate so vast that it ought to be circumscribed, and that of the president so restricted, that it ought to be extended? What power has the senate? None, separately. It can only act jointly with the other house, or jointly with the executive. And although the theory of the constitution supposes, when consulted by him, it may freely give an affirmative or negative response according to the practice, as it now exists, it has lost the faculty of pronouncing the negative monosyllable. When the senate expresses its deliberate judgment, in the form of resolution, that resolution has no compulsory force, but appeals only to the dispassionate intelligence, the calm reason, and the sober judgment of the community. The senate has no army, no navy, no patronage, no lucrative offices, nor glittering honors to bestow. Around us there is no swarm of greedy expectants, rendering us homage, anticipating our wishes, and ready to execute our commands.

How is it with the president? Is he powerless? He is felt from one extremity to the other of this vast republic. By means of principles which he has introduced, and innovations which he has made in our institutions, alas! but too much countenanced by congress and a confiding people, he exercises uncontrolled the power of the state. In one hand he holds the purse, and in the other brandishes the sword of the country. Myriads of dependents and partisans, scattered over the land, are ever ready to sing hosannas to him, and to laud to the skies whatever he does. He has swept over the government, during the last eight years, like a tropical tornado. Every department exhibits traces of the ravages of the storm. Take, as one example, the bank of the United States. No institution could have been more popular with the people, with congress, and with state legislatures. None ever better fulfilled the great purposes of its establishment. But it unfortunately incurred the displeasure of the president; he spoke, and the bank lies prostrate. And those who were loudest in its praise are now loudest in its condemnation. What object of his ambition is unsatisfied? When disabled from age any longer to hold the sceptre of power, he designates his successor, and transmits it to his favorite. What more does he want? Must we blot, deface, and mutilate the records of the country to punish the presumptuousness of expressing an opinion contrary to his own?

What patriotic purpose is to be accomplished by this expunging resolution? Can you make that not to be which has been? Can you eradicate from memory and from history the fact, that in March, 1834, a majority of the senate of the United States passed the resolution which excites your enmity? Is it your vain and wicked object to arrogate to yourselves that power of annihilating the past which has been denied to omnipotence itself? Do you intend to thrust your hands into our hearts, and to pluck out the deeply-rooted convictions which are there? or is it your design merely to stigmatize us? You cannot stigmatize us.

‘Ne’er yet did base dishonor blur our name.’

Standing securely upon our conscious rectitude, and bearing aloft the shield of the constitution of our country, your puny efforts are impotent, and we defy all your power. Put the majority of 1834 in one scale, and that by which this expunging resolution is to be carried in the other, and let truth and justice, in heaven above and on the earth below, and liberty and patriotism decide the preponderance.

What patriotic purpose is to be accomplished by this expunging? Is it to appease the wrath, and to heal the wounded pride, of the chief magistrate? If he be really the hero that his friends represent him, he must despise all mean condescension, all grovelling sycophancy, all self-degradation, and self-abasement. He would reject with scorn and contempt, as unworthy of his fame, your black scratches, and your baby lines in the fair records of his country. Black lines! Black lines! Sir, I hope the secretary of the senate will preserve the pen with which he may inscribe them, and present it to that senator of the majority whom he may select, as a proud trophy, to be transmitted to his descendants. And hereafter, when we shall lose the forms of our free institutions, all that now remain to us, some future American monarch, in gratitude to those by whose means he has been enabled, upon the ruins of civil liberty, to erect a throne, and to commemorate especially this expunging resolution, may institute a new order of knighthood, and confer on it the appropriate name of the knight of the black lines.

But why should I detain the senate or needlessly waste my breath in fruitless exertions. The decree has gone forth. It is one of urgency, too. The deed is to be done; that foul deed, like the blood-stained hands of the guilty Macbeth, all ocean’s waters will never wash out. Proceed, then, to the noble work which lies before you, and like other skilful executioners, do it quickly. And when you have perpetrated it, go home to the people, and tell them what glorious honors you have achieved for our common country. Tell them that you have extinguished one of the brightest and purest lights that ever burned at the altar of civil liberty. Tell them that you have silenced one of the noblest batteries that ever thundered in defence of the constitution, and bravely spiked the cannon. Tell them that, henceforward, no matter what daring or outrageous act any president may perform, you have for ever hermetically sealed the mouth of the senate. Tell them that he may fearlessly assume what power he pleases; snatch from its lawful custody the public purse, command a military detachment to enter the halls of the capitol, overawe congress, trample down the constitution, and raze every bulwark of freedom; but that the senate must stand mute, in silent submission, and not dare to raise its opposing voice. That it must wait until a house of representatives, humbled and subdued like itself, and a majority of it composed of the partisans of the president, shall prefer articles of impeachment. Tell them, finally, that you have restored the glorious doctrine of passive obedience and non-resistance, and, if the people do not pour out their indignation and imprecations, I have yet to learn the character of American freemen.

ON THE SUB-TREASURY BILL.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, SEPTEMBER 25, 1837.

[AFTER the removal of the public deposits from the bank of the United States, by order of president Jackson, in October, 1833, the revenues were collected and disbursed through certain state banks, selected by the secretary of the treasury. In the month of May, 1837, the pressure upon the banks was so great, from a variety of causes, that a general suspension of specie payments took place. In this state of things, Mr. Van Buren, who succeeded general Jackson as president, in March, 1837, issued a proclamation, calling an extra session of congress, to meet on the first Monday in September. In his message to that body, which contained a majority favorable to his administration, he recommended the adoption of a system of finance, in collecting and disbursing the revenue of the nation, in gold and silver, which was called by its supporters, ‘the Independent Treasury,’ and by its opponents, ‘the Sub-Treasury.’ The system had been before proposed in congress, by Mr. Gordon, of Virginia, and rejected, the friends of Mr. Van Buren at that time generally voting against it. On the present occasion, Mr. Clay delivered his sentiments on this novel project, in the following remarks; a bill having been introduced by Mr. Wright, chairman of the committee on finance, embodying the system referred to, which was not finally adopted, until near the close of Mr. Van Buren’s administration.]

FEELING an anxious desire to see some effectual plan presented, to correct the disorders in the currency, and to restore the prosperity of the country, I have avoided precipitating myself into the debate now in progress, that I may attentively examine every remedy that may be proposed, and impartially weigh every consideration urged in its support. No period has ever existed in this country, in which the future was covered by a darker, denser, or more impenetrable gloom. None, in which the duty was more imperative to discard all passion and prejudice, all party ties, and previous bias, and look exclusively to the good of our afflicted country. In one respect, and I think it a fortunate one, our present difficulties are distinguishable from former domestic trouble, and that is their universality. They are felt, it is true, in different degrees, but they reach every section, every state, every interest, almost every man in the union. All feel, see, hear, know their existence. As they do not array, like our former divisions, one portion of the confederacy against another, it is to be hoped that common sufferings may lead to common sympathies and common counsels, and that we shall, at no distant day, be able to see a clear way of deliverance. If the present state of the country were produced by the fault of the people; if it proceeded from their wasteful extravagance, and their indulgence of a reckless spirit of ruinous speculation; if public measures had no agency whatever in bringing it about; it would, nevertheless, be the duty of government to exert all its energies, and to employ all its legitimate powers, to devise an efficacious remedy. But if our present deplorable condition has sprung from our rulers; if it is to be clearly traced to their acts and operations, that duty becomes infinitely more obligatory; and government would be faithless to the highest and most solemn of human trusts should it neglect to perform it. And is it not too true, that the evils which surround us are to be ascribed to those who have had the conduct of our public affairs?

In glancing at the past, nothing can be further from my intention than to excite angry feelings, or to find grounds of reproach. It would be far more congenial to my wishes, that, on this occasion, we should forget all former unhappy divisions and animosities. But in order to discover how to get out of our difficulties, we must ascertain if we can, how we got into them.

Prior to that series of unfortunate measures which had for its object the overthrow of the bank of the United States, and the discontinuance of its fiscal agency for the government, no people upon earth ever enjoyed a better currency, or had exchanges better regulated, than the people of the United States. Our monetary system appeared to have attained as great perfection as any thing human can possibly reach. The combination of United States and local banks presented a true image of our system of general and state governments, and worked quite as well. Not only within the country had we a local and general currency perfectly sound, but in whatever quarter of the globe American commerce had penetrated, there also did the bills of the United States bank command unbounded credit and confidence. Now we are in danger of having fixed upon us, indefinitely as to time, that medium, an irredeemable paper currency, which, by the universal consent of the commercial world, is regarded as the worst. How has this reverse come upon us? Can it be doubted that it is the result of those measures to which I have adverted? When, at the very moment of adopting them, the very consequences which have happened were foretold as inevitable, is it necessary to look elsewhere for their cause? Never was prediction more distinctly made; never was fulfilment more literal and exact.

Let us suppose that those measures had not been adopted; that the bank of the United States had been rechartered; that the public deposits had remain undisturbed; and that the treasury order had never issued: is there not every reason to believe that we should be now in the enjoyment of a sound currency; that the public deposits would be now safe and forthcoming, and that the suspension of specie payments in May last, would not have happened?

The president’s message asserts that the suspension has proceeded from over-action, over-trading, the indulgence of a spirit of speculation, produced by bank and other facilities. I think this is a view of the case entirely too superficial. It would be quite as correct and just, in the instance of a homicide perpetrated by the discharge of a gun, to allege that the leaden ball, and not the man who levelled the piece, was responsible for the murder. The true inquiry is, how came that excessive over-trading, and those extensive bank facilities, which the message describes? Were they not the necessary and immediate consequences of the overthrow of the bank, and the removal from its custody of the public deposits? And is not this proved by the vast multiplication of banks, the increase of the line of their discounts and accommodations, prompted and stimulated by secretary Taney, and the great augmentation of their circulation which ensued?

What occurred in the state of Kentucky, in consequence of the veto of the recharter of the bank of the United States, illustrates its effects throughout the union. That state had suffered greatly by banks. It was generally opposed to the reëstablishment of them. It had found the notes of the bank of the United States answering all the purposes of a sound currency, at home and abroad, and it was perfectly contented with them. At the period of the veto, it had but a single bank, of limited capital and circulation. After it, the state, reluctant to engage in the banking system, and still cherishing hopes of the creation of a new bank of the United States, encouraged by the supporters of the late president, hesitated about the incorporation of new banks. But at length, despairing of the establishment of a bank of the United States, and finding itself exposed to a currency in bank notes from adjacent states, it proceeded to establish banks of its own; and since the veto, since 1833, has incorporated for that single state, bank capital to the amount of ten millions of dollars――a sum equal to the capital of the first bank of the United States, created for the whole union.

That the local banks, to which the deposits were transferred from the bank of the United States, were urged and stimulated freely to discount upon them, we have record evidence from the treasury department.

The message, to reconcile us to our misfortunes, and to exonerate the measures of our own government from all blame in producing the present state of things, refers to the condition of Europe, and especially to that of Great Britain. It alleges that

‘In both countries we have witnessed the same redundancy of paper money, and other facilities of credit; the same spirit of speculation; the same partial success; the same difficulties and reverses; and, at length, nearly the same overwhelming catastrophe.’

The very clear and able argument of the senator from Georgia, (Mr. King,) relieves me from the necessity of saying much upon this part of the subject. It appears that during the period referred to by the message, of 1833–5, there was, in fact, no augmentation, or a very trifling augmentation, of the circulation of the country, and that the message has totally misconceived the actual state of things in Great Britain. According to the publications to which I have had access, the bank of England, in fact, diminished its circulation, comparing the first with the last of that period, about two and a half millions sterling; and although the joint stock and private banks increased theirs, the amount of increase was neutralized by the amount of diminution.

If the state of things were really identical, or similar, in the two countries, it would be fair to trace it to similarity of causes. But is that the case? In Great Britain a sound currency was preserved by a recharter of the bank of England, about the same time that the recharter of the bank of the United States was agitated here. In the United States we have not preserved a sound currency, in consequence of the veto. If Great Britain were near the same catastrophe, (the suspension of specie payments,) which occurred here, she nevertheless escaped it; and this difference in the condition of the two countries, makes all the difference in the world. Great Britain has recovered from whatever mercantile distresses she experienced; we have not; and when shall we? All is bright, and cheerful, and encouraging, in the prospects which lie before her; and the reverse is our unfortunate situation.

Great Britain has, in truth, experienced only those temporary embarrassments which are incident to commercial transactions, conducted upon the scale of vast magnitude on which hers are carried on. Prosperous and adverse times, action and reaction, are the lot of all commercial countries. But our distresses sink deeper; they reach the heart, which has ceased to perform its office of circulation in the great concerns of our body politic.

Whatever of embarrassment Europe has recently experienced, may be satisfactorily explained by its trade and connections with the United States. The degree of embarrassment has been marked, in the commercial countries there, by the degree of their connection with the United States. All, or almost all, the great failures in Europe have been of houses engaged in the American trade. Great Britain, which, as the message justly observes, maintains the closest relations with us, has suffered most, France next, and so on, in the order of their greater or less commercial intercourse with us. Most truly was it said by the senator from Georgia, that the recent embarrassments of Europe were the embarrassments of a creditor, from whom payment was withheld by the debtor, and from whom the precious metals have been unnecessarily withdrawn by the policy of the same debtor.

Since the intensity of suffering, and the disastrous state of things in this country, have far transcended anything that has occurred in Europe, we must look here for some peculiar and more potent causes than any which have been in operation there. They are to be found in that series of measures to which I have already adverted――

First, the veto of the bank;

Second, the removal of the deposits, with the urgent injunction of secretary Taney upon the banks to enlarge their accommodations;

Third, the gold bill, and the demand of gold for the foreign indemnities;

Fourth, the clumsy execution of the deposit law; and,

Fifth, the treasury order of July, 1836.

[Here Mr. Clay went into an examination of these measures, to show that the inflated condition of the country, the wild speculations, which had risen to their height when they began to be checked by the preparations of the local banks necessary to meet the deposit law of June, 1836, the final suspension of specie payments, and the consequent disorders in the currency, commerce, and general business of the country, were all to be traced to the influence of the measures enumerated. All these causes operated immediately, directly, and powerfully upon us, and their effects were indirectly felt in Europe.]

The message imputes to the deposit law, an agency in producing the existing embarrassments. This is a charge frequently made by the friends of the administration against that law. It is true, that, the banks having increased their accommodations, in conformity with the orders of secretary Taney, it might not have been convenient to recall and pay them over for public use. It is true, also, that the manner in which the law was executed by the treasury department, transferring large sums from creditor to debtor portions of the country, without regard to the commerce or business of the country, might have aggravated the inconvenience. But what do those who object to the law think ought to have been done with the surpluses which had accumulated, and were daily augmenting to such an enormous amount in the hands of the deposit banks? Were they to be incorporated with their capital, and remain there for the benefit of the stockholders? Was it not proper and just, that they should be applied to the uses of the people from whom they were collected? And whenever and however taken from the deposit banks, would not inconvenience necessarily happen?

The message asserts that the bank of the United States, chartered by Pennsylvania, has not been able to save itself or to check other institutions, notwithstanding ‘the still greater strength it has been said to possess under its present charter.’ That bank is now a mere state or local institution. Why is it referred to more than the bank of Virginia, or any other local institution? The exalted station which the president fills forbids the indulgence of the supposition, that the allusion has been made to enable the administration to profit by the prejudices which have been excited against it. Was it the duty of that bank, more than any other state bank, to check the local institutions? Was it not even under less obligation to do so than the deposit banks, selected and fostered by the general government?

But how could the message venture to assert, that it has greater strength than the late bank of the United States possessed? Whatever may be the liberality of the conditions of its charter, it is impossible that any single state could confer upon it faculties equal to those granted to the late bank of the United States――first, in making it the sole depository of the revenue of the United States; and, secondly, in making its notes receivable in the payment of all public dues. If a bank of the United States had existed, it would have had ample notice of the accumulation of public moneys in the local banks; and, by timely measures of precaution, it could have prevented the speculative uses to which they were applied. Such an institution would have been bound by its relations to the government, to observe its appropriations and financial arrangement and wants, and to hold itself always ready promptly to meet them. It would have drawn together gradually, but certainly, the public moneys, however dispersed. Responsibility would have been concentrated upon it alone, instead of being weakened or lost by diffusion among some eighty or ninety local banks, dispersed throughout the country, and acting without any effective concert.

A subordinate but not unimportant cause of the evils which at present encompass us, has been the course of the late administration towards the compromise act. The great principle of that act, in respect to our domestic industry, was its stability. It was intended and hoped that, by withdrawing the tariff from their annual discussions in congress, of which it had been the fruitful topic, our manufactures would have a certainty, for a long period, as to the measure of protection extended to them by its provisions, which would compensate any reduction in the amount contained in prior acts. For a year or two after it was adopted, the late administration manifested a disposition to respect it, as an arrangement which was to be inviolable. But for some time past it has been constantly threatened from that quarter, and a settled purpose has been displayed to disregard its conditions. Those who had an agency in bringing it forward, and carrying it through congress, have been held up to animadversion; it has been declared by members, high in the confidence of the administration in both houses, to possess no obligatory force beyond any ordinary act of legislation, and new adjustments of the tariff have been proposed in both houses, in direct contravention of the principles of the compromise; and, at the last session, one of them actually passed the senate, against the most earnest entreaty and remonstrance. A portion of the south has not united in these attacks upon the compromise; and I take pleasure in saying, that the two senators from South Carolina, especially, have uniformly exhibited a resolution to adhere to it with perfect honor and fidelity.

The effect of those constant threats and attacks, coming from those high in power, has been most injurious. They have shown to the manufacturing interest that no certain reliance was to be placed upon the steadiness of the policy of the government, no matter under what solemn circumstances it was adopted. That interest has taken alarm; new enterprises have been arrested, old ones curtailed; and at this moment it is the most prostrate of all the interests in the country. One half in amount, as I have been informed, of the manufacturers throughout the country, have actually suspended operations, and those who have not, chiefly confine themselves to working up their stock on hand.

The consequence has been, that we have made too little at home, and purchased too much abroad. This has augmented that foreign debt, the existence of which so powerfully contributed to the suspension, and yet forms an obstacle to the resumption of specie payments.

The senator from South Carolina, (Mr. Calhoun,) attributed the creation of the surplus revenue to the tariff policy, and especially to the acts of 1824 and 1828. I do not perceive any advantage, on the present occasion, in reviving or alluding to the former dissensions which prevailed on the subject of that policy. They were all settled and quieted by the great healing measure, (the compromise,) to which I have referred. By that act I have been willing and ready to abide. And I have desired only that it should be observed and executed in a spirit of good faith and fidelity, similar to that by which I have been ever actuated towards it.

The act of 1828 was no measure of the friends of the manufacturers. Its passage was forced by a coalition between their secret and open opponents. But the system of protection of American industry did not cause the surplus. It proceeded from the extraordinary sales of the public lands. The receipts, from all sources other than that of the public lands, and expenditures of the years 1833–6, (during which the surplus was accumulating,) both amount to about eighty-seven millions of dollars; thus clearly showing, that the customs only supplied the necessary means of public disbursement, and that it was the public domain that produced the surplus.

If the land bill had been allowed to go into operation, it would have distributed generally and regularly among the several states the proceeds of the public lands, as they would have been received from time to time. They would have returned back in small streams, similar to those by which they have been collected, animating, and improving, and fructifying the whole country. There would have been no vast surplus to embarrass the government; no removal of deposits from the bank of the United States to the deposit banks, to disturb the business of the country; no accumulations in the deposit banks of immense sums of public money, augmented by the circuit it was performing between the land offices and the banks, and the banks and the land offices; no occasion for the secretary of the treasury to lash the deposit banks into the grant of inordinate accommodations; and possibly there would have been no suspension of specie payments. But that bill was suppressed by a most extraordinary and dangerous exercise of executive power.

The cause of our present difficulties may be stated in another way. During the late administration we have been deprived of the practical benefit of a free government; the forms, it is true, remained and were observed, but the essence did not exist. In a free, or self-government, the collected wisdom, the aggregate wisdom of the whole, or at least of a majority, moulds and directs the course of public affairs. In a despotism, the will of a single individual governs. In a practically free government, the nation controls the chief magistrate; in an arbitrary government, the chief magistrate controls the nation. And has not this been our situation in the period mentioned? Has not one man forced his will on the nation? Have not all these disastrous measures――the veto of the bank, the removal of the deposits, the rejection of the land bill, and the treasury order――which have led to our present unfortunate condition, been adopted, in spite of the wishes of the country, and in opposition, probably, to those of the dominant party itself?

Our misfortune has not been the want of wisdom, but of firmness. The party in power would not have governed the country very ill, if it had been allowed its own way. Its fatal error has been to lend its sanction, and to bestow its subsequent applause and support upon executive acts, which, in their origin, it previously deprecated or condemned. We have been shocked and grieved to see whole legislative bodies and communities approving and lauding the rejection of the very measures which previously they had unanimously recommended! To see whole states abandoning their long-cherished policy, and best interests, in subserviency to the executive pleasure! And the numberless examples of individuals who have surrendered their independence, must inflict pain on every patriot bosom. A single case forces itself upon my recollection as an illustration, to which I do not advert from any unkind feelings towards the gentleman to whom I refer, between whom and myself civil and courteous relations have ever existed. The memorial of the late bank of the United States, praying for a recharter, was placed in his hands, and he presented it to the senate. He carried the recharter through the senate. The veto came; and, in two or three weeks afterwards, we behold the same senator at the head of an assembly of the people, in the state-house yard, in Philadelphia, applauding the veto, and condemning the bank――condemning his own act! Motives lie beyond the reach of the human eye, and it does not belong to me to say what they were, which prompted this self-castigation, and this praise of the destruction of his own work; but it is impossible to overlook the fact that this same senator, in due time, received from the author of the veto the gift of a splendid foreign mission!

The moral deducible from the past is, that our free institutions are superior to all others, and can be preserved in their purity and excellence only upon the stern condition that we shall for ever hold the obligations of patriotism paramount to all the ties of party, and to individual dictation; and that we shall never openly approve what we secretly condemn.

In this rapid, and I hope not fatiguing review of the causes which I think have brought upon us existing embarrassments, I repeat that it has been for no purpose of reproaching or criminating those who have had the conduct of our public affairs; but to discover the means by which the present crisis has been produced, with a view to ascertain, if possible, what (which is by far much more important) should be done by congress to avert its injurious effects. And this brings me to consider the remedy proposed by the administration.

The great evil under which the country labors is the suspension of the banks to pay specie; the total derangement in all domestic exchanges; and the paralysis which has come over the whole business of the country. In regard to the currency, it is not that a given amount of bank notes will not now command as much as the same amount of specie would have done prior to the suspension; but it is the future, the danger of an inconvertible paper money being indefinitely or permanently fixed upon the people, that fills them with apprehensions. Our great object should be to reëstablish a sound currency, and thereby to restore the exchanges, and revive the business of the country.

The first impression which the measures brought forward by the administration make, is, that they consist of temporary expedients, looking to the supply of the necessities of the treasury; or, so far as any of them possess a permanent character, its tendency is rather to aggravate than alleviate the sufferings of the people. None of them proposes to rectify the disorders in the actual currency of the country; but the people, the states, and their banks, are left to shift for themselves, as they may or can. The administration, after having intervened between the states and their banks, and taken them into their federal service, without the consent of the states; after having puffed and praised them; after having brought them, or contributed to bring them, into their present situation; now suddenly turns its back upon them, leaving them to their fate! It is not content with that; it must absolutely discredit their issues. And the very people, who were told by the administration that these banks would supply them with a better currency, are now left to struggle as they can with the very currency which the government recommended to them, but which it now refuses itself to receive!

The professed object of the administration is, to establish what it terms the currency of the constitution, which it proposes to accomplish by restricting the federal government, in all receipts and payments, to the exclusive use of specie, and by refusing all bank paper, whether convertible or not. It disclaims all purposes of crippling or putting down the banks of the states; but we shall better determine the design or the effect of the measures recommended, by considering them together, as one system.

The first is the sub-treasuries, which are to be made the depositories of all the specie collected and paid out for the service of the general government, discrediting and refusing all the notes of the states, although payable and paid in specie.

Second, a bankrupt law for the United States, levelled at all the state banks, and authorizing the seizure of the effects of any one of them that stop payment, and the administration of their effects under the federal authority exclusively.

Third, a particular law for the District of Columbia, by which all the corporations and people of the District, under severe pains and penalties, are prohibited from circulating, sixty days after the passage of the law, any paper whatever not convertible into specie on demand, and are made liable to prosecution by indictment.

Fourth, and last, the bill to suspend the payment of the fourth instalment to the states, by the provisions of which the deposit banks indebted to the government are placed at the discretion of the secretary of the treasury.

It is impossible to consider this system without perceiving that it is aimed at, and, if carried out, must terminate in, the total subversion of the state banks; and that they will all be placed at the mercy of the federal government. It is in vain to protest that there exists no design against them. The effect of those measures cannot be misunderstood.

And why this new experiment, or untried expedient? The people of this country are tired of experiments. Ought not the administration itself to cease with them? Ought it not to take warning from the events of recent elections? Above all, should not the senate, constituted as it now is, be the last body to lend itself to further experiments upon the business and happiness of this great people? According to the latest expression of public opinion in the several states, the senate is no longer a true exponent of the will of the states or of the people. If it were, there would be thirty-two or thirty-four whigs to eighteen or twenty friends of the administration.

Is it desirable to banish a convertible paper medium, and to substitute the precious metals as the sole currency to be used in all the vast extent of varied business of this entire country? I think not. The quantity of precious metals in the world, looking to our fair distributive share of them, is wholly insufficient. A convertible paper is a great time-saving and labor-saving instrument, independent of its superior advantages in transfers and remittances. A friend, no longer ago than yesterday, informed me of a single bank, whose payments and receipts in one day amounted to two millions of dollars. What time would not have been necessary to count such a vast sum? The payments, in the circle of a year, in the city of New York, were estimated several years ago at fifteen hundred millions. How many men and how many days would be necessary to count such a sum? A young, growing, and enterprising people, like those of the United States, more than any other, need the use of those credits which are incident to a sound paper system. Credit is the friend of indigent merit. Of all nations, Great Britain has most freely used the credit system; and of all, she is the most prosperous. We must cease to be a commercial people; we must separate, divorce ourselves from the commercial world, and throw ourselves back for centuries, if we restrict our business to the exclusive use of specie.

It is objected against a convertible paper system, that it is liable to expansions and contractions; and that the consequence is the rise and fall of prices, and sudden fortunes or sudden ruin. But if is the importation or exportation of specie, which forms the basis of paper, that occasions these fluctuations. If specie alone were the medium of circulation, the same importation or exportation of it would make it plenty or scarce, and affect prices in the same manner. The nominal or apparent prices might vary in figures, but the sensation upon the community would be as great in the one case as in the other. These alternations do not result, therefore, from the nature of the medium, whether that be specie exclusively, or paper convertible into specie, but from the operations of commerce. It is commerce, at last, that is chargeable with expansions and contractions; and against commerce, and not its instrument, should opposition be directed.

I have heard it urged by the senator from South Carolina, (Mr. Calhoun,) with no little surprise, in the course of this debate, that a convertible paper would not answer for a currency, but that the true standard of value was to be found in a paper medium not convertible into the precious metals. If there be, in regard to currency, one truth which the united experience of the whole commercial world has established, I had supposed it to be that emissions of paper money constituted the very worst of all conceivable species of currency. The objections to it are, first, that it is impracticable to ascertain, a priori, what amount can be issued without depreciation; and, second, that there is no adequate security, and, in the nature of things, none can exist, against excessive issues. The paper money of North Carolina, to which the senator referred, according to the information which I have received, did depreciate. It was called proc., an abbreviation of the authority under which it was put forth, and it took one and a half, and sometimes two dollars of proc. to purchase one in specie. But if any one desires to understand perfectly the operation of a purely paper currency, let him study the history of the bank of the commonwealth of Kentucky. It was established about fifteen or sixteen years ago, with the consent of a majority of the people of that state. It is winding up and closing its career with the almost unanimous approbation of the whole people. It had an authority to issue, and did issue, notes to the amount of about two millions of dollars. These notes, upon their face, purported an obligation of the bank to pay the holder, on demand, the amount in specie; but it was well known that they would not be so paid. As a security for their ultimate payment, there were, first, the notes of individuals supposed to be well secured, every note put out by the bank being represented by an individual note discounted; secondly, the funds of the state in a prior state bank, amounting to about half a million of dollars; thirdly, the proceeds of a large body of waste lands belonging to the state; and, fourthly, the annual revenue of the state, and public dues, all of which were payable in the notes of the commonwealth bank.

Notwithstanding this apparently solid provision for the redemption of the notes of the bank, they began to depreciate shortly after it commenced operation, and in the course of a few months they sunk as low as fifty per centum――two dollars for one specie dollar. They continued depreciated for a long time, until after large amounts of them were called in and burned. They then rose in value, and now, when there is only some fifty or one hundred thousand dollars out, they have risen to about par. This is owing to the demand for them, created by the wants of the remaining debtors to the bank, and their receivability in payment for taxes. The result of the experiment is, that, although it is possible to sustain at about par a purely paper medium to some amount, if the legislative authority which creates it also create a demand for it, it is impracticable to adjust the proportions of supply and demand so as to keep it at par, and that the tendency is always to an excess of issue. The result, with the people of Kentucky, has been a general conviction of the mischiefs of all issues of an irredeemable paper medium.

Is it practicable for the federal government to put down the state banks, and to introduce an exclusive metallic currency? In the operations of this government, we should ever bear in mind that political power is distributed between it and the states, and that, while our duties are few and clearly defined, the great mass of legislative authority abides with the states. Their banks exist without us, independent of us, and in spite of us. We have no constitutional power or right to put them down. Why, then, seek their destruction, openly or secretly, directly or indirectly, by discrediting their issues, and by bankrupt laws, and bills of pains and penalties. What are these banks, now so decried and denounced? Intruders, aliens, enemies, that have found their way into the bosom of our country against our will! Reduced to their elements, and the analysis shows that they consist, first, of stockholders; secondly, debtors; and, thirdly, bill-holders and other creditors. In some one of these three relations, a large majority of the people of the United States stand. In making war upon the banks, therefore, you wage war upon the people of the United States. It is not a mere abstraction that you would kick and cuff, bankrupt and destroy; but a sensitive, generous, confiding people, who are anxiously turning their eyes towards you, and imploring relief. Every blow that you inflict upon the banks, reaches them. Press the banks, and you press them.

True wisdom, it seems to me, requires that we should not seek after if we could discover unattainable abstract perfection; but should look to what is practicable in human affairs, and accommodate our legislation to the irreversible condition of things. Since the states and the people have their banks and will have them, and since we have no constitutional authority to put them down, our duty is to come to their relief when in embarrassment, and to exert all our legitimate powers to retain and enable them to perform, in the most beneficial manner, the purposes of their institution. We should embank, not destroy, the fertilizing stream which sometimes threatens an inundation.

We are told, that it is necessary to separate, divorce the government from the banks. Let us not be deluded by sounds. Senators might as well talk of separating the government from the states, or from the people, or from the country. We are all――people, states, union, banks――bound up and interwoven together, united in fortune and destiny, and all, all entitled to the protecting care of a parental government. You may as well attempt to make the government breathe a different air, drink a different water, be lighted and warmed by a different sun from that of the people! A hard money government, and a paper money people! A government, an official corps――the servants of the people――glittering in gold, and the people themselves, their masters, buried in ruin, and surrounded with rags.

No prudent or practical government, will ♦in its measures run counter to the long-settled habits and usages of the people. Religion, language, laws, the established currency and business of a whole country, cannot be easily or suddenly uprooted. After the denomination of our coin was changed to dollars and cents, many years elapsed before the old method of keeping accounts, in pounds, shillings, and pence, was abandoned; and, to this day, there are probably some men of the last century who adhere to it. If a fundamental change becomes necessary, it should not be sudden, but conducted by slow and cautious degrees. The people of the United States have been always a paper money people. It was paper money that carried us through the revolution, established our liberties, and made us a free and independent people. And, if the experience of the revolutionary war convinced our ancestors, as we are convinced, of the evils of an irredeemable paper medium, it was put aside only to give place to that convertible paper, which has so powerfully contributed to our rapid advancement, prosperity, and greatness.

The proposed substitution of an exclusive metallic currency to the mixed medium with which we have been so long familiar, is forbidden by the principles of eternal justice. Assuming the currency of the country to consist of two thirds of paper and one of specie; and assuming, also, that the money of a country, whatever may be its component parts, regulates all values, and expresses the true amount which the debtor has to pay to his creditor, the effect of the change upon that relation, and upon the property of the country, would be most ruinous. All property would be reduced in value to one third of its present nominal amount, and every debtor would, in effect, have to pay three times as much as he had contracted for. The pressure of our foreign debt would be three times as great as it is, whilst the six hundred millions, which is about the sum now probably due to the banks from the people, would be multiplied into eighteen hundred millions.

But there are some more specific objections to this project of sub-treasuries, which deserve to be noticed. The first is its insecurity. The sub-treasurer and his bondsmen constitute the only guarantee for the safety of the immense sums of public money which pass through his hands. Is this to be compared with that which is possessed through the agency of banks? The collector, who is to be sub-treasurer, pays the money to the bank, and the bank to the disbursing officer. Here are three checks; you propose to destroy two of them; and that most important of all, the bank, with its machinery of president, directors, cashier, teller, and clerks, all of whom are so many sentinels. At the very moment, when the secretary of the treasury tells us how his sub-treasury system will work, he has communicated to congress a circular, signed by himself, exhibiting his distrust in it; for he directs in that circular that the public moneys, when they amount to a large sum, shall be specially deposited with these very banks which he would repudiate. In the state of Kentucky, (other gentlemen can speak of their respective states,) although it has existed but about forty-five years, three treasurers, selected by the legislature for their established characters of honor and probity, proved faithless. And the history of the delinquency of one, is the history of all. It commenced in human weakness, yielding to earnest solicitations for temporary loans, with the most positive assurances of a punctual return. In no instance was there originally any intention to defraud the public. We should not expose poor human nature to such temptations. How easy will it be, as has been done, to indemnify the sureties out of the public money, and squander the residue?

Second, then there is the liability to favoritism. In the receipts, a political partisan or friend may be accommodated in the payment of duties, in the disbursement, in the purchase of bills, in drafts upon convenient and favorable offices, and in a thousand ways.

Third, the fearful increase of executive patronage. Hundreds and thousands of new officers are to be created; for this bill is a mere commencement of the system, and all are to be placed under the direct control of the president.

The senator from South Carolina, (Mr. Calhoun,) thinks that the executive is now weak, and that no danger is to be apprehended from its patronage. I wish to God I could see the subject in the same light that he does. I wish that I could feel free from that alarm at executive encroachments by which he and I were so recently animated. Where and how, let me ask, has that power, lately so fearful and formidable, suddenly become so weak and harmless? Where is that corps of one hundred thousand office-holders and dependents, whose organized strength, directed by the will of a single man, was lately held up in such vivid colors and powerful language by a report made by the senator himself? When were they disbanded? What has become of proscription? Its victims may be exhausted, but the spirit and the power which sacrificed them remain unsubdued. What of the dismissing power? What of the veto? Of that practice of withholding bills contrary to the constitution, still more reprehensible than the abuses of the veto? Of treasury orders, put in force and maintained in defiance and contempt of the legislative authority? And, although last, not least, of that expunging power which degraded the senate, and placed it at the feet of the executive?

Which of all these numerous powers and pretensions has the present chief magistrate disavowed? So far from disclaiming any one of them, has he not announced his intention to follow in the very footsteps of his predecessor? And has he not done it? Was it against the person of Andrew Jackson, that the senator from South Carolina, so ably coöperated with us? No, sir; no, sir; no. It was against his usurpations, as we believed them, against his arbitrary administration; above all, against that tremendous and frightful augmentation of the power of the executive branch of the government; that we patriotically but vainly contended. The person of the chief magistrate is changed; but there stands the executive power, perpetuated in all its vast magnitude, undiminished, reasserted, and overshadowing all the other departments of the government. Every trophy which the late president won from them, now decorates the executive mansion. Every power, which he tore from a bleeding constitution, is now in the executive armory, ready, as time and occasion may prompt the existing incumbent, wherever he may be, to be thundered against the liberties of the people.

Whatever may have been the motives of the course of others, I owe it to myself and to truth to say, that, in deprecating the election of general Andrew Jackson to the office of chief magistrate, it was not from any private considerations, but because I considered it would be a great calamity to my country; and that, in whatever opposition I made to the measures of his administration, which more than realized my worst apprehensions, I was guided solely by a sense of public duty. And I do now declare my solemn and unshaken conviction, that, until the executive power, as enlarged, extended, and consolidated by him, is reduced within its true constitutional limits, there is no permanent security for the liberties and happiness of this people.

Fourth; lastly, pass this bill, and whatever divorce its friends may profess to be its aim, that perilous union of the purse and the sword, so justly dreaded by our British and revolutionary ancestors, becomes absolute and complete. And who can doubt it, who knows that over the secretary of the treasury at Washington, and every sub-treasurer, the president claims the power to exercise uncontrolled sway, to exact implicit obedience to his will?

The message states that, in the process both of collection and disbursement of the public revenue, the officers who perform it act under the executive commands; and it argues that, therefore, the custody also of the treasury might as well be confided to the executive care. I think the safer conclusion is directly opposite. The possession of so much power over the national treasure is just cause of regret, and furnishes a strong reason for diminishing it, if possible; but none for its increase, none for giving the whole power over the purse to the chief magistrate.

Hitherto I have considered this scheme of sub-treasuries as if it was only what its friends represent it――a system solely for the purpose of collecting, keeping, and disbursing the public money, in specie exclusively, without any bank agency whatever. But it is manifest that it is destined to become, if it be not designed to be, a vast and ramified connection of government banks, of which the principal will be at Washington, and every sub-treasury will be a branch. The secretary is authorized to draw on the several sub-treasurers, in payment for all the disbursements of government. No law restricts him as to the amount or form of his drafts or checks. He may throw them into amounts suited to the purposes of circulation, and give them all the appearance and facilities of bank notes. Of all the branches of this system, that at New York will be the most important, since about one half of the duties is collected there. Drafts on New York are at par, or command a premium from every point of the union. It is the great money centre of the country. Issued in convenient sums, they will circulate throughout the whole union as bank notes; and as long as confidence is reposed in them, will be preferred to the specie, which their holders have a right to demand. They will supply a general currency, fill many of the channels of circulation, be a substitute for notes of the bank of the United States, and supplant to a great extent the use of bank notes. The necessities of the people will constrain them to use them. In this way they will remain a long time in circulation; and in a few years we shall see an immense portion of the whole specie of the country concentrated in the hands of the branch bank――that is, the sub-treasurer at New York――and represented by an equal amount of government paper, dispersed throughout the country. The responsibility of the sub-treasurer will be consequently greatly increased, and the government will remain bound to guarantee the redemption of all the drafts, checks, or notes, (whatever may be their denomination,) emitted upon the faith of the money in his custody, and, of course, will be subject to the hazard of the loss of the amount of specie in the hands of the sub-treasurer. If, in the commencement of this system, the holders of this government paper shall be required to present it for payment in coin, within a specified time, it will be found inconvenient or impracticable to enforce the restriction, and it will be ultimately abandoned.

Is the senate prepared to consent to place not only all the specie that may be collected for the revenue of the country at the will of the president, or, which is the same thing, in the custody of persons acting in obedience to his will, but to put him at the head of the most powerful and influential system of government banks that ever existed?

It is said in the message, that government is not bound to supply the country with the exchanges which are necessary to the transaction of its business. But was that the language held during the progress of the contest with the late bank of the United States? Was not the expectation held out to the people, that they would be supplied with a better currency, and with better regulated exchange? And did not both the late president and the secretary of the treasury dwell, with particular satisfaction, in several messages and reports, upon the improvement of the currency, the greater amount in exchange, and the reduction of the rates, under the operation of the state bank system, than existed under the bank of the United States? Instead of fulfilling his promises then held out, the government now wraps itself up in its dignity; tells the people that they expect too much of it; that it is not its business to furnish exchanges; and that they may look to Europe for the manner in which, through the agency of private bankers, the commerce and business of its countries are supplied with exchange. We are advised to give up our American mode of transacting business through the instrumentality of banking corporations, in which the interests of the rich and the poor are happily blended, and to establish bankers similar to the Hopes, the Barings, the Rothschilds, the Hotinguers, of Europe; houses which require years of ages to form and to put in successful operation, and whose vast overgrown capitals, possessed by the rich, exclusively of the poor, control the destiny of nations, and determine the fate of empires.

Having, I think, Mr. President, shown that the project of the administration is neither desirable nor practicable, nor within the constitutional power of the general government, nor just; and that it is contrary to the habits of the people of the United States, and is dangerous to their liberties, I might here close my remarks; but I conceive it to be the duty of a patriotic opposition not to confine itself merely to urging objections against measures to promote the general prosperity brought forward by those in power. It has further and higher duties to perform. There may be circumstances in which the opposition is bound formally to present such measures as, in its judgment, are demanded by the exigency of the times; but if it had just reason to believe that they would be unacceptable to those who alone can adopt them and give them effect, the opposition will discharge its duty by suggesting what it believes ought to be done for the public good.

I know, sir, that I have friends whose partiality has induced them to hope that I would be able to bring forward some healing measure for the disorders which unhappily prevail, that might prove acceptable. I wish to God that I could realize this hope, but I cannot. The disease is of such an alarming character as to require more skill than I possess; and I regret to be compelled to fear that there is no effectual remedy but that which is in the hands of the suffering patient himself.

Still, under a deep sense of the obligation to which I have referred, I declare that, after the most deliberate and anxious consideration of which I am capable, I can conceive of no adequate remedy which does not comprehend a national bank as an essential part. It appears to me that a national bank, with such modifications as experience has pointed out, and particularly such as would limit its profits, exclude foreign influence in the government of it, and give publicity to its transactions, is the only safe and certain remedy that can be adopted. The great want of the country is a general and uniform currency, and a point of union, a sentinel, a regulator of the issues of the local banks, and that would be supplied by such an institution.

I am not going now to discuss, as an original question, the constitutional power of congress to establish a national bank. In human affairs there are some questions, and I think this is one, that ought to be held as terminated. Four several decisions of congress affirming the power, the concurrence of every other department of the government, the approbation of the people, the concurrence of both the great parties into which the country has been divided, and forty years of prosperous experience with such a bank, appear to me to settle the controversy, if any controversy is ever to be settled. Twenty years ago, Mr. Madison, whose opposition to the first bank of the United States is well known, in a message to congress said:

‘Waiving the question of the constitutional authority of the legislature to establish an incorporated bank, as being precluded, in my judgment, by repeated recognitions, under varied circumstances, of the validity of such an institution, in acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the government, accompanied by indications, in different modes, of a correspondence of the general will of the nation; the proposed bank does not appear to be calculated to answer the purposes of reviving the public credit, of providing a national medium of circulation, and of aiding the treasury by facilitating the indispensable anticipations of revenue, and by affording to the public more durable loans.’

To all the considerations upon which he then relied, in treating it as a settled question, are now to be added two distinct and distant subsequent expressions of the deliberate opinion of a republican congress, two solemn decisions of the supreme court of the United States, twenty years of successful experience, and disastrous consequences quickly following the discontinuance of the bank.

I have been present, as a member of congress, on the occasion of the termination of the charters of both the banks of the United States; took part in the discussion to which they gave rise, and had an opportunity of extensively knowing the opinions of members; and I declare my deliberate conviction, that upon neither was there one third of the members in either house who entertained the opinion that congress did not possess the constitutional power to charter a bank.

But it is contended, that, however indispensable a bank of the United States may be to the restoration of the prosperity of the country, the president’s opinion against it opposes an insuperable obstacle to the establishment of such an institution.

It will, indeed, be unfortunate, if the only measure which can bring relief to the people should be prevented by the magistrate whose elevated station should render him the most anxious man in the nation to redress existing grievances.

The opinion of the president which is relied upon, is that contained in his celebrated letter to S. Williams, and that which is expressed in the message before us. I must say, with all proper deference, that no man, prior to, or after his election to the chief magistracy, has a right to say, in advance, that he would not approve of a particular bill, if it were passed by congress. An annunciation of such a purpose is premature, and contrary to the spirit, if not the express letter, of the constitution. According to that instrument, the participation of the president in the legislative power――his right to pass upon a bill――is subsequent, and not previous to, the deliberations of congress. The constitutional provision is, that, when a bill shall have passed both houses, it shall be presented to the president for his approval or rejection. His right to pass upon it results from the presentation of the bill, and is not acquired until it is presented. What would be thought of the judge who, before a cause is brought before the court, should announce his intention to decide in favor of a named party? Or of the senate, which shares the appointing power, if it should, before the nomination of a particular individual is made for an office, pass a resolution that it would not approve the nomination of that individual?

It is clear, that the president places his repugnance to a bank of the United States mainly upon the ground that the popular will has been twice ‘solemnly and unequivocally expressed’ against it. In this I think the president is mistaken. The two occasions to which he is understood to refer, are the election of general Andrew Jackson in 1832, and his own election in 1836. Now, as to the first, there was not, before it took place, any unequivocal expression of the opinion of the late president against a national bank. There was, in fact, a contrary expression. In the veto message, president Jackson admitted the public convenience of a bank; stated that he did not find in the renewed charter such modifications as could secure his approbation, and added, that if he had been applied to, he could have furnished the model of a bank that would answer the purposes of such an institution. In supporting his reëlection, therefore, the people did not intend, by the exercise of their suffrage, to deprive themselves of a national bank. On the contrary, it is within my knowledge, that many voted for him, who believed in the necessity of a bank quite as much as I do. And I am perfectly persuaded, that thousands and tens of thousands sustained his reëlection under the full expectation that a national bank would be established during his second term.

Nor, sir, can I think that the election of the present chief magistrate ought to be taken as evidence that the people are against a bank. The most that can be asserted is, that he was elected, the expression of his opinion in the letter to Mr. Williams notwithstanding. The question of the election of a chief magistrate is a complex question, and one of compensations and comparison. All his opinions, all his qualifications are taken into consideration, and compared with those of his competitors. And nothing more is decided by the people, than that the person elected is preferred among the several candidates. They take him as a man takes his wife, for better or for worse, with all the good and bad opinions and qualities which he possesses. You might as well argue, that the election of a particular person to the chief magistracy implies that his figure, form, and appearance exhibit the standard of human perfection, as to contend that it sanctions and approves every opinion which he may have publicly expressed on public affairs. It is somewhat ungrateful to the people to suppose that the particular opinion of Mr. Van Buren in regard to a United States bank, constituted any, much less the chief recommendation of him to their suffrages. It would be more honorable to him and to them, to suppose that it proceeded from his eminent abilities, and his distinguished services at home and abroad. If we are to look beyond them and beyond him, many believe that the most influential cause of his election was the indorsement of that illustrious predecessor, in whose footsteps he stands pledged to follow.

No, sir, no; the simple and naked question of a bank or no bank of the United States was not submitted to the people, and ‘twice solemnly and unequivocally’ decided against by them. I firmly believe, that if such a question were now submitted to them, the response of a vast majority would be in the affirmative. I hope, however, that no bank will be established or proposed, unless there shall be a clear and undisputed majority of the people and of the states in favor of such an institution. If there be one wanted, and an unequivocal manifestation be made of the popular will that it is desired, a bank will be established. The president’s opposition to it is founded principally upon the presumed opposition of the people. Let them demonstrate that he is mistaken, and he will not separate himself from them. He is too good a democrat, and the whole tenor of his life shows that, whatever other divorces he may recommend, the least that he would desire, would be one between him and the people. Should this not prove to be the case, and if a majority should not exist sufficiently large to pass a bank charter in spite of the veto, the ultimate remedy will remain to the people to change their rulers, if their rulers will not change their opinions.

But during this debate it has been contended, that the establishment of a new bank of the United States would aggravate existing distresses; and that the opinion necessary to put it in operation could not be obtained without prejudice to the local banks.

What is the relief for which all hearts are now so anxiously throbbing? It is to put the banks again in motion; to restore exchanges, and revive the drooping business of the country. And, what are the obstacles? They are, first, the foreign debt; and, secondly, a want of confidence. If the banks were to reopen their vaults, it is apprehended that the specie would be immediately exported to Europe to discharge our foreign debt. Now, if a bank of the United States were established, with a suitable capital, the stock of that bank itself would form one of the best subjects of remittance; and an amount of it equal to what remains of the foreign debt would probably be remitted, retaining at home or drawing from abroad the equivalent in specie.

A great, if not the greatest existing evil is the want of confidence, not merely in the government, but in distant banks, and between the banks themselves. There is no tie or connection binding them together, and they are often suspicious of each other. To this want of confidence among the banks themselves, is to be ascribed that extraordinary derangement in the exchanges of the country. How otherwise can we account for the fact, that the paper of the banks of Mississippi cannot now be exchanged against the paper of the banks of Louisiana, without a discount on the former of ten or fifteen per centum; nor that of the banks of Nashville, without a discount of eight or ten per centum against the paper of the banks of the adjoining state of Kentucky? It is manifest, that, whatever may be the medium of circulation, whether it be inconvertible paper, or convertible paper and specie, supposing confidence to exist, the rates of exchange in both cases ought to be nearly the same. But, in times like these, no bank will allow its funds to accumulate, by the operations of exchange, at points where no present use can be made of them.

Now, if a bank of the United States were established, with a proper capital, and it were made the sole depository of the public moneys, and its notes were receivable in all government dues, it might commence operations forthwith, with a small amount of specie, perhaps not more than two millions. That sum would probably be drawn from the community, where it is now hoarded and dormant; or if it were taken even from the local banks, they would be more than compensated in the security which they would enjoy, by the remittance of the stock of the new bank to Europe, as a substitute for their specie.

Such a new bank, once commencing business, would form a rallying point; confidence would revive, exchanges be again regulated, and the business and prosperity of the country be restored. And it is by no means certain that there would be any actual augmentation of the banking capital of the country, for it is highly probable that the aggregate amount of unsound banks, which can never resume specie payments, would be quite equal to that of the new bank.

An auxiliary resolution might be adopted with salutary effect, similar to that which was adopted in 1816, offering to the state banks, as a motive to resume specie payments, that their paper should be received for the public dues; or, as their number has since that period greatly increased, to make the motive more operative, the offer might be confined to one or two banks in each state, known to be trustworthy. Let them, and a bank of the United States, commence specie payments, and all the other sound banks would be constrained, by the united force of public opinion and the law, to follow the example.

If, in contrasting the two periods of 1817 and 1837, some advantages for the resumption of specie payments existed at the former epoch, others which distinguish the present greatly preponderate. At the first there were none except the existence of a public debt, and a smaller number of banks. But then an exhausting war had wasted our means. Now we have infinitely greater wealth, our resources are vastly more developed and increased, our population nearly doubled, our knowledge of the disease much better, and, what is of the utmost importance, a remedy, if applied now, would be administered in a much earlier stage of the disorder.

A general currency, of sound and uniform value, is necessary to the well being of all parts of the confederacy, but it is indispensable to the interior states. The seaboard states have each of them banks, whose paper freely circulates within their respective limits, and serves all the purposes of their business and commerce at their capitals, and throughout their whole extent. The variations in the value of this paper, in passing through those states, from one commercial metropolis to another, are not ordinarily very great. But how are we of the interior to come to the Atlantic cities to purchase our supplies of foreign and domestic commodities, without a general medium? The paper of our own banks will not be received but at an enormous discount. We want a general currency, which will serve at home and enable us to carry on our accustomed trade with our brethren of the Atlantic states. And such a currency we have a right to expect.

I do not arrogate to myself a right to speak for and in behalf of all the western states; but as a senator from one of them I am entitled to be heard. This union was formed to secure certain general, but highly important objects, of which the common defence, commerce, and a uniform currency, were the leading ones. To the interior states none is of more importance than that of currency. Nowhere is the attachment to the union more ardent than in those states; but if this government should neglect to perform its duty, the value of the union will become impaired, and its very existence in process of time may become endangered. I do believe, that between a sound general currency, and the preservation of itself, in full vigor and perfect safety, there is the most intimate connection.

If, Mr. President, the remedies which I have suggested were successful, at a former period of our history, there is every reason to hope, that they would again prove efficacious; but let me suppose that they should not, and that some unknown cause, which could not then, should now, thwart their operation, we should have, in any event, the consolation of knowing that we had endeavored to profit by the lessons of experience; and if they failed, we should stand acquitted in the judgment of the people. They are heartily tired of visionary schemes and wild experiments. They wish to get out of the woods, into which they have been conducted, back to the plain, beaten, wide road, which they had before trod.

How, and when, without such measures as I have suggested, are the state banks to resume specie payments? They never can resume without concert; and concert springs from confidence; and confidence from knowledge. But what knowledge can eight hundred banks, scattered over our own vast territory, have of the actual condition of each other? It is in vain that statements of it be periodically published. It depends, at last, mainly upon the solvency of the debtors to the bank; and how, whenever their names are not known, can that be ascertained?

Instead of coming to the aid of these prostrate institutions, and assisting them by a mild and parental exercise of your power, in a mode sanctioned and approved by experience, you propose to abandon them and the country to their fate. You propose worse, to discredit their paper, to distrust them even as special depositories, and to denounce against them all the pains and penalties of bankruptcy.

How, and when, will they resume specie payments? Never, as far as my information extends, have exertions been greater than those which the banks have generally made, to open again their vaults. It is wonderful that the community should have been able to bear, with so much composure and resignation, the prodigious curtailments which have been made. Confidence reëstablished, the foreign debt extinguished, and a national institution created, most of them could quickly resume specie payments, some of them, urged by a high sense of probity, and smarting under severe reproaches, will no doubt make the experiment of resuming and continuing specie payments. They may even go on a while; but without the coöperation of the state banks generally, and without the coöperation of a national bank, it is to be apprehended that they will be again seized with a paralysis. It is my deliberate conviction, that the preservation of the existence of the state banks themselves, depends upon the institution of a national bank. It is as necessary to them as the union is to the welfare of the states in our political system. Without it, no human being can foresee when we shall emerge from the difficulties which surround us. It has been my fortune, several times, to see the country involved in great danger, but never before have I beheld it encompassed with any more menacing and portentous.

Entertaining the views which I have presented, it may be asked, why I do not at once propose the establishment of a national bank. I have already adverted to the cause, constituted as congress now is, I know that such a proposition would be defeated; and that it would be, therefore, useless to make it. I do not desire to force upon the senate, or upon the country, against its will, if I could, my opinion, however sincerely or strongly entertained. If a national bank be established, its stability and its utility will depend upon the general conviction which is full of its necessity. And until such a conviction is deeply impressed upon the people, and clearly manifested by them, it would, in my judgment, be unwise even to propose a bank.

Of the scheme of the senator from Virginia, (Mr. Rives,) I think now as I thought in 1834, I do not believe that any practical connection of state banks can supply a general currency, be a safe depository of the public moneys, or act efficiently as a fiscal agent of the general government. I was not then opposed to the state banks in their proper sphere. I thought that they could not be relied upon to form exclusively a banking system for the country, although they were essential parts of a general system.

The amendment of the senator, considered as a measure to bring about the resumption of specie payments, so much desired, I think must fail. The motive which it holds out of the receivability in all payments to the government of the paper of such banks as may resume at a given day, coupled with the conditions proposed, is wholly inadequate. It is an offer to eight hundred banks; and the revenue, payment of which in their notes is held out as the inducement, amounts to some twenty or twenty-five millions. To entitle them to the inconsiderable extension of their circulation, which would result from the credit given by government to the paper of all of them, they are required to submit to a suppression of all notes below five dollars, and at no very distant period, to all below twenty. The enlargement of their circulation, produced by making it receivable by government, would be much less than the contraction which would arise from the suppression of the prohibited notes. Besides, if the quality proposed again to be attached to the notes of these local banks was insufficient to prevent the suspension, how can it be efficacious enough to stimulate a resumption of specie payments?

I shall, nevertheless, if called upon to give a vote between the project of the administration and the amendment of the senator from Virginia, vote for the latter, because it is harmless, if it effects no good, and looks to the preservation of the state banks; whilst the other is fraught with mischiefs, as I believe, and tends, if it be not designed, to the utter destruction of those institutions. But preferring to either the postponement moved by the senator from Georgia, I shall, in the first instance, vote for that.

Such, Mr. President, are the views which I entertain on the present state of our public affairs. It is with the deepest regret that I can perceive no remedy, but such as is in the hands of the people themselves. Whenever they shall impress upon congress a conviction of that which they wish applied, they will obtain it, and not before. In the mean time, let us go home, and mix with and consult our constituents. And do not, I entreat you, let us carry with us the burning reproach, that our measures here display a selfish solicitude for the government itself, but a cold and heartless insensibility to the sufferings of a bleeding people.

ON THE PREËMPTION BILL.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, JANUARY 26, 1838.

[THE system of granting preëmption rights to settlers on the public lands, or squatters, as they are called, being persons who locate themselves on those lands without first obtaining the right by purchase, Mr. Clay has always opposed. In taking this course he has shown his disregard of the effect calculated to be produced on his personal popularity in the newly settled states, by opposing a measure which he considered detrimental to the interests of the country, however desirable it might be to the pioneers in the new settlements. At the session of congress in 1838, a bill granting preëmption rights to settlers on the public lands was introduced and passed the senate by a large majority, but, while the measure was under consideration, Mr. Clay did not hesitate, to oppose it in the following remarks.]

MR. CLAY said, that in no shape which should be given to this bill could he give it his vote. In any aspect it was to be considered as a bounty, or a grant of the property of the whole people to a small part of the people; often the speculator; and he would like to know by what authority such a bill could be passed. He regarded it as a reward for the violation of law; as a direct encouragement to intruding lawlessly on the lands of the United States, and for selecting and taking what the trespasser pleased of the property of the whole people; and he was not to be deterred from the most strenuous opposition to such measures by any denunciation, come from what quarter it might, let these measures be supported by whom they might.

But he would not now enter into the consideration of granting the public property in the manner proposed by this bill. He had risen to notice a subject which seemed to have been lost sight of. It had been said, the government lost nothing by preëmption; but he could not conceive how the accounts were made out in proof of this assertion. The president tells us, that the whole average amount gained above the minimum price is only about six cents per acre; others state it at two, four, and five cents; and the secretary of the treasury asserted, in his annual report, that the revenue would be augmented by the passage of a preëmption law. The preëmption law! As if the competition of a fair, open, public sale would not produce more; as if preëmptioners would not go to the public sales, if preëmption were denied them, and buy their land as reasonably as it could be purchased! Could any one be so stupid as to suppose that the gain on the land could be greater by preëmption than by public auction?

But Mr. Clay wished especially to call the attention of the senate to a document to which he would refer. Two years ago a report from the commissioner of the land office had been sent here by this same secretary of the treasury, the report of a person more conversant with settlements in the western country than perhaps any man in congress, and certainly more than any connected with the executive government, the late commissioner, Mr. Brown, the late governor of the state of Ohio. What did he say of the loss incurred by preëmption laws? The document was number two hundred and eleven of the session of 1836. The whole of it was well worthy of deliberate perusal, and it was replete with fraud, abominable, execrable fraud, scandalous to the country, scandalous to the government, and scandalous to the perpetrators. In saying this, Mr. Clay would not denounce any whole class; but he would say that the preëmption system was a scheme of heartless and boundless speculation. What does the commissioner say?

‘This office possesses no data whereby to estimate with tolerable accuracy how far the sales of public lands have been effected, in respect to quantity, by the preëmption act of nineteenth of June, 1834. Considering the great demand for land within the last two years, it remains to be shown that a greater number of acres has been disposed of in that period in consequence of the privilege it confers. It is quite impossible to estimate with satisfactory accuracy the effect that has been produced on this branch of the revenue by allowing (to those who have, and pretend to, a right of preference) the choice, at the lowest rate, of distinguished sites for towns, and their vicinities, the best mill seats, and the finest farming lands, including those so highly prized for the culture of cotton.

‘The general land office has no certain data for a just calculation of the amount which the treasury has been prevented from receiving by the operation of this law, but considering the many tens of thousands of claims that have arisen under it and the prevailing desire in the mean while to vest money in public land, the conclusion seems fair, that the selected spots would have been sold for a price proportioned to their excellence, if no such law, nor any improper conspiracy, had existed. The estimate of three millions of dollars, which I had the honor to submit to you on the twenty-eighth of January last, appears to me now to underrate much rather than magnify the difference between the receipts for preëmption concessions, and the sum the same lands would have brought into the treasury, had no impediment laid in the way of full and free competition for the purchase.

‘It is but just, however, to observe, that the revenue from public lands has not been impaired by preëmptions alone; and I may be allowed to remark, in this place, that the information, on the subject of the last resolution referred to me, consists of what common fame represents as avowed and notorious, namely: that the public sales are attended by combinations of two kinds, interested in keeping bids down to the minimum; the one composed of those who have and those who pretend to a right of preference, and resort to intimidation by threats and actual violence, as exemplified most particularly at the public sales at Chicago, in June, 1835, when and where the controlling party is represented to have effectually prevented those from bidding who were not acceptable to themselves; the other description formed of persons associated to frustrate the views of individuals desirous of purchasing, who refuse to join their coalition, or submit to their dictation, by compelling the recusants to forego their intended purchases, or give more than the market value of the lands.’

Now, resumed Mr. Clay, how did this conspiracy take place? He would tell. In September last, the Indian title had been extinguished to a tract of most valuable land in Indiana, at one dollar per acre, by the United States. What was the consequence? The instant the Indian title was extinguished, there was a rush upon it from all quarters; and if that land should be exposed at public sale, it would be found that these men, who had seized the property of the people of the United States, would combine to intimidate and overawe all competitors, and thereby acquire the land on their own terms. In this way lawless men had often combined, not only without but against the positive authority of law; and here, while vindicating the rights and guarding the property of the whole people, Mr. Clay would not be awed nor deterred from performing his duty by any personal considerations. He would read no more of this document, senators could read it at their leisure; it was the deliberate judgment of an experienced and intelligent man against the whole system of preëmption.

But he wished to call the attention of the senate to some official documents, one of which was from a district attorney, he believed of Louisiana.

‘Sir: I present, herewith, a number of affidavits in relation to preëmptions obtained by Gabriel H. Tutt, to the southeast quarter, Richard Tutt, to the east half of the northeast quarter, and Benjamin Tutt, to the west half of the northeast quarter, of section number three west, in the land district of Dempolis, in the state of Alabama. These affidavits have been taken by some of the most respectable men in the state of Alabama, and have been sent on to me for the purpose of procuring the grant of the above preëmptions to be set aside, on the ground that they were obtained by fraud and imposition; and that this is the fact, I entertain no doubt whatever. Shortly before I left Alabama, I was in the immediate vicinity of the above lands, and heard a number of persons speaking of the manner in which they had been paid out; and the opinion was general, without exception, that a most shameful and scandalous imposition had been practiced upon the government. There is no doubt that all the lands mentioned were paid out at the instance and for the benefit of James B. Tutt, a man, to my knowledge, of notoriously bad character. Gabriel H. Tutt, as the affidavit shows, is a citizen of Greene county, (the county in which I reside myself, and I know him well,) and that he never did reside on the quarter section paid out in its name, or near it, his residence in Greene county being at least fifteen or twenty miles from the land paid out in his name. Richard Tutt and Benjamin Tutt are, I believe, both public paupers, and have been so for years; I am confident as to one, and am satisfied in my own mind as to the other. I have known them for several years; they have lived in Greene county, and have been supported at the charge and expense of the county. Neither of them, as the affidavits show, have resided on the lands since they were paid out, and Richard Tutt was not on the land paid out in his name until January, 1834, and had no improvements whatever in ♦1833.’

‘If reckless and unprincipled men can succeed in cheating and defrauding government, by appropriating and securing to their own use public lands at the minimum price, under acts of bounty and benevolence, passed for the benefit of honest, enterprising, and industrious settlers, corruption and venality must and will become the order of the day, wherever there is a quarter section of public land left worth contending for: and it is greatly to be feared that this has become too much the case already. May I ask to be informed of any steps taken by the department in this matter, as early as convenient?’

And here are some comments of the receiver of the land office at Mount Salus, who tells us he has been in the public service since 1806.

‘It is much to be regretted that the surveys are not made, and the lands offered for sale, before the country is settled. Preëmption in parts of the country where there are no private claims to adjust, seem to hold out rewards to those who, in the first instance, violate the laws with a view of greatly benefiting themselves, by securing the choice parts at the lowest price, while others, more conscientious, wait for the public sales. It has a very demoralizing effect; the temptation is so great to get land worth five or ten dollars an acre, in many instances, at the government price for the poorest land, that witnesses will be found to prove up the occupancy of the land. It occasions severe disputes between the settlers, and much troublesome unthankful service for the officers, all of which would be avoided by hastening the surveys, and immediately offering the land for sale. The witnesses are sometimes probably deceived by not knowing where the subdivisional lines would run if extended through the tracts.’

The same officer, in illustrating the subject in another place, says,

‘The preëmption system is not a practicable system to dispose of the public lands; and if the president could see the outrageous uproar and confusion in the register’s office for one day, I am well convinced he would never sign another preëmption law. The preëmption rights heretofore were confined to small districts, interspersed with private claims, and the right was given only to actual settlers who resided on the very tract claimed by them, and then only to heads of families, and persons over twenty-one years of age. There were no floating rights. Even that system created great confusion and fraud in Louisiana, and was generally believed to do more harm than good. I know one considerable battle royal fought on the occasion, and was told by the deputy surveyors that many of the tracts they surveyed, perhaps in the very year the preëmption right was obtained, were in a wild state, where they did not see the trace of a human being, and were proved to be in a state of cultivation. At present it is customary for the leader of a party of speculators to agree with a number of dealers, with their witnesses, men, women, and children, to meet on a certain day at the register’s office. They come like the locusts of Egypt, and darken the office with clouds of smoke and dust, and an uproar occasioned by whisky and avarice, that a register, at least, can never forget.

‘The many different propositions made by members of congress to dispose of the public lands, makes it probable that some change in the system will be effected; I therefore ask your indulgence to make some general remarks on the subject. I have been engaged in the land business from the year 1806, first as a deputy surveyor, about one year; then about fifteen years as principal deputy for the western district, Louisiana; four years of which, as one of the commissioners for deciding on and adjusting the claims of that district; and have now been more than eight years register for the Choctaw land district. I think it is to be regretted, that there is so much feverish anxiety to make alterations in the land system by members of congress, who have not the practical experience necessary to enable them to avoid confusion and endless difficulties.

‘The preëmption act of the twenty-ninth of May, 1830, is the most unguarded, and in all respects the worst land law that has ever been passed in the United States. In districts where the public land could not be disposed of for many years, on account of private claims, there seemed to be some necessity for allowing preëmptions; but where there are no private claims to be adjusted, the exclusive advantage given to those who go on the most choice spots, and that in direct violation of an act of congress, has a very unequal bearing and demoralizing effect. If the whole community, who are equally interested, were authorized by law to make settlements on the public lands, the advantages would seem to be equal; but, if such was the case, I think it likely that it would cause the loss of many lives in the general scramble which would take place. If the preëmption right only extended to the forfeited lands, or such as had been improved under the credit system, where the tracts paid for had cost the parties a high price, there would seem to be some reason in it; but that a general sweep should be made of the most valuable lands of the United States by intruders, at as low a price as that which the poorest person in the nation would have to pay for the poorest pine barren, is unreasonable in the extreme.’

[Mr. Walker. What is the name of that officer?]

Gideon Fitz; and this extract is on the forty-ninth page of the document.

Mr. Clay did not intend at present to go so far into the subject as he had done, hoping for another occasion on which he designed, should God spare his life and health, to speak more fully on the subject, and endeavor to expose this system of iniquity.

Two years ago, according to the official report of commissioner Brown, there was a loss of three millions of dollars, which would not have occurred if the land had been put up fairly in the market――a loss occasioned by this system of iniquity, and the combinations which it occasions to keep down the price, and to prevent all competition. When the senate should receive the account which Mr. Clay had called for, (by a resolution,) which he hoped they would receive in time for this bill, they would see what amount was received at the public sales, what was the average price of each acre sold at the public sales, without confounding them with the private sales, and making an average from the whole.

[Mr. Walker, in reply, alluded to a charge made against himself, by an anonymous letter, that he owned half a million of preëmption in Mississippi, and to his formal denial, in the senate, that he owned any land whatever in that quarter, or had any interest there, direct or indirect. He proceeded at considerable length to adduce facts and arguments to invalidate the testimony on which Mr. Clay had depended, and made some allusion to the preëmption part of Mr. Clay’s land bill, and charged the old states with grasping after the public lands.

Mr. Clay, of Alabama, (rising at the same time with Mr. Clay of Kentucky,) said he had a few words for this distinguished commissioner of the public lands.

(Mr. Clay, of Kentucky. A bad, a very bad commissioner.)

Mr. Clay, of Alabama, had understood this commissioner to say, that there had been a loss of three millions of dollars, occasioned by preëmption laws, which prevented the sale of the public lands. But he wished to call the attention of the senate to some documentary facts, in regard to the assumption that government suffered a loss by allowing preëmption, and that the land would sell for more under other circumstances. The requisite documents were on the table, (Mr. Clay said,) by which it would appear, that in 1822, there was an average excess of three cents above the minimum price, in 1823 only of five, and in 1824 no more than of two cents. At that time no general preëmption law had been enacted. Afterwards there was a still further falling off, and in 1828 the excess was only one cent; in 1829 the same. These facts would put down the assumption, that government had lost any thing by preëmption laws. The document to which Mr. Clay referred had been obtained only within the last ten days, and it appeared from that, that up to the present time, the excess had been little more than two cents per acre.

Mr. Clay argued, that the preëmption laws were calculated to put down fraud instead of encouraging it. The only fraud was that of speculators, and the charge of it against the settlers was utterly groundless. To oppose this system, and to continue that of public auction, was to minister to the cupidity of speculators; and the most effectual remedy against fraud was to be found in preëmption laws.]

Mr. Clay, of Kentucky, said he knew how unequal this contest was. A number of senators from the new states were ever ready to spring up and eulogize the preëmption laws; but, unequal as it was, while he had a place here, he would contend for those interests of the whole people, which he was endeavoring to protect.

He would repel the imputation of the senator from Mississippi against the old states. It was not the old states, but some of the new, that were grasping at the public domain. If there was such a spirit anywhere, it was not in the old states, but somewhere else.

The subject of the public lands had been forced upon him by the political party of the senator from Mississippi several years ago. The land bill for distributing the proceeds of them was the consequence; but was there anything of grasping, even in that? It did not propose to touch the land system, to alter or affect the price or the mode of sale. The old, the tried system was admirable. Under the auspices of such men as Jeremiah Morrow, nothing human could have been more perfect or just. But what did that measure propose? To distribute the whole net proceeds of the lands among all the states, old and new, allowing to the new an extra bounty of fifteen per cent. What kind of grasping by the old states was this? And how was the equitable measure received by some of the new states? The senator was mistaken; it was not the old states to whom his imputation would apply; the hand that made the grip was thrust from some other quarter.

He had no part in the charge against the senator in relation to lands in Mississippi; but how had he made out in his vindication of the officers of the government? The commissioner of the land office was not to be believed, because he differed from him; a commissioner appointed by the immortal Jackson, governor of Ohio, and well worthy to be sent on a foreign mission, was not to be believed, because his views did not agree with those of the senator from Mississippi. But could the senator say that the two or three millions of acres taken up by preëmptions might not have produced, at public sales, three millions of dollars, which the commissioner had estimated to have been lost? Had not the senator himself stated, at a former session, that many of these lands were worth fifty dollars per acre?

Mr. Clay, after a few remarks on certain frauds in Louisiana, and on the alleged frauds in Mississippi, recurred to the case of the valuable land in Indiana, for which there is a contest between individuals and the legislature. He hoped, if either party should get the land, it would be the whole state. But the legislature was now in session, and what did they seem themselves to think of individual preëmption rights, when not the whole union, but that state alone was concerned? They gave thirty-nine votes against individual preëmption rights, and only five votes in favor. He would read a short account of the debate on this point.

[Here Mr. Clay read parts of several speeches in the Indiana legislature, denouncing the preëmption system, and showing that attempts were made by ♦speculators, under the garb of poor settlers, to appropriate the land which had been recently acquired from the Miami Indians.]

Mr. Clay had taxed his recollection in relation to persons in Kentucky, to whom preëmption rights had been granted; and he knew of but one man who lived on land granted to him by Virginia as a settler. Mr. Clay was for abiding by, defending, and protecting the land system heretofore existing, against all and every material innovation.

ON THE SUB-TREASURY SCHEME.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, FEBRUARY 19, 1838.

[THE independent or sub-treasury scheme being pressed upon the consideration of congress, by Mr. Van Buren, although public opinion was setting strongly against it, Mr. Clay delivered the following elaborate speech, in which he shows that a deliberate design had existed on the part of general Jackson, and his successor, Mr. Van Buren, to break down the whole banking system of the United States, and to create on their ruins a government treasury bank, under the exclusive control of the executive. This speech was partly in reply to Mr. Calhoun, of South Carolina, who had become a supporter of the administration.]

I HAVE seen some public service, passed through many troubled times, and often addressed public assemblies, in this capitol and elsewhere; but never before have I risen in a deliberative body, under more oppressed feelings, or with a deeper sense of awful responsibility. Never before have I risen to express my opinions upon any public measure, fraught with such tremendous consequences to the welfare and prosperity of the country, and so perilous to the liberties of the people, as I solemnly believe the bill under consideration will be. If you knew, sir, what sleepless hours reflection upon it has cost me, if you knew with what fervor and sincerity I have implored divine assistance to strengthen and sustain me in my opposition to it, I should have credit with you, at least, for the sincerity of my convictions, if I shall be so unfortunate as not to have your concurrence as to the dangerous character of the measure. And I have thanked my God that he has prolonged my life until the present time, to enable me to exert myself in the service of my country, against a project far transcending in pernicious tendency any that I have ever had occasion to consider. I thank him for the health I am permitted to enjoy; I thank him for the soft and sweet repose which I experienced last night; I thank him for the bright and glorious sun which shines upon us this day.

It is not my purpose, at this time, Mr. President, to go at large into a consideration of the causes which have led to the present most disastrous state of public affairs. That duty was performed by others, and myself, at the extra session of congress. It was then clearly shown, that it sprung from the ill-advised and unfortunate measures of executive administration. I now will content myself with saying that, on the fourth day of March, 1829, Andrew Jackson, not by the blessing of God, was made president of these United States; that the country then was eminently prosperous; that its currency was as sound and safe as any that a people were ever blessed with; that, throughout the wide extent of this whole union, it possessed a uniform value; and that exchanges were conducted with such regularity and perfection, that funds could be transmitted from one extremity of the union to the other, with the least possible risk or loss. In this encouraging condition of the business of the country, it remained for several years, until after the war, wantonly waged against the late bank of the United States, was completely successful, by the overthrow of that invaluable institution. What our present situation is, is as needless to describe as it is painful to contemplate. First felt in our great commercial marts, distress and embarrassment have penetrated into the interior, and now pervade almost the entire union. It has been justly remarked by one of the soundest and most practical writers that I have had occasion to consult, that ‘all convulsions in the circulation and commerce of every country must originate in the operations of the government, or in the mistaken views and erroneous measures of those possessing the power of influencing credit and circulation; for they are not otherwise susceptible of convulsion; and, if left to themselves, they will find their own level, and flow nearly in one uniform stream.’

Yes, Mr. President, we all have but too melancholy a consciousness of the unhappy condition of our country. We all too well know, that our noble and gallant ship lies helpless and immovable upon breakers, dismasted, the surge beating over her venerable sides, and the crew threatened with instantaneous destruction. How came she there? Who was the pilot at the helm when she was stranded? The party in power! The pilot was aided by all the science and skill, by all the charts and instruments, of such distinguished navigators as Washington, the Adamses, Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe; and yet he did not, or could not, save the public vessel. She was placed in her present miserable condition by his bungling navigation, or by his want of skill and judgment. It is impossible for him to escape from one or the other horn of that dilemma. I leave him at liberty to choose between them.

I shall endeavor, Mr. President, in the course of the address I am about making, to establish certain propositions, which I believe to be incontestable; and, for the sake of perspicuity, I will state them severally to the senate. I shall contend,

First, that it was the deliberate purpose and fixed design of the late administration to establish a government bank――a treasury bank――to be administered and controlled by the executive department.

Secondly, that, with that view, and to that end, it was its aim and intention to overthrow the whole banking system, as existing in the United States when that administration came into power, beginning with the bank of the United States, and ending with the state banks.

Thirdly, that the attack was first confined, from considerations of policy, to the bank of the United States; but that, after its overthrow was accomplished, it was then directed, and has since been continued, against the state banks.

Fourthly, that the present administration, by its acknowledgments, emanating from the highest and most authentic source, has succeeded to the principles, plans, and policy, of the preceding administration, and stands solemnly pledged to complete and perfect them.

And, fifthly, that the bill under consideration is intended to execute the pledge, by establishing, upon the ruins of the late bank of the United States, and the state banks, a government bank, to be managed and controlled by the treasury department, acting under the commands of the president of the United States.

I believe, solemnly believe, the truth of every one of these five propositions. In the support of them, I shall not rely upon any gratuitous surmises or vague conjectures, but upon proofs, clear, positive, undeniable, and demonstrative. To establish the first four, I shall adduce evidence of the highest possible authenticity, or facts admitted or undeniable, and fair reasoning founded on them. And as to the last, the measure under consideration, I think the testimony, intrinsic and extrinsic, on which I depend, stamps, beyond all doubt, its true character as a government bank, and ought to carry to the mind of the senate the conviction which I entertain, and in which I feel perfectly confident the whole country will share.

First. My first proposition is, that it was the deliberate purpose and fixed design of the late administration to establish a government bank――a treasury bank――to be administered and controlled by the executive department. To establish its truth, the first proof which I offer is the following extract from president Jackson’s annual message of December, 1829.

‘The charter of the bank of the United States expires in 1836, and its stockholders will most probably apply for a renewal of their privileges. In order to avoid the evils resulting from precipitancy, in a measure involving such important principles, and such deep pecuniary interests, I feel that I cannot, in justice to the parties interested, too soon present it to the consideration of the legislature and the people. Both the constitutionality and the expediency of the law creating this bank, are well questioned by a large portion of our fellow-citizens; and it must be admitted by all, that it has failed in the great end of establishing a uniform and sound currency.

‘Under these circumstances, if such an institution is deemed essential to the fiscal operations of the government, I submit to the wisdom of the legislature, whether a national one, founded upon the credit of the government and its revenues, might not be devised, which would avoid all constitutional difficulties, and, at the same time, secure all the advantages to the government and the country, that were expected to result from the present bank.’

This was the first open declaration of that implacable war against the late bank of the United States, which was afterwards waged with so much ferocity. It was the sound of the distant bugle, to collect together the dispersed and scattered forces, and prepare for battle. The country saw with surprise the statement, that ‘the constitutionality and expediency of the law creating this bank are well questioned by a large portion of our fellow-citizens,’ when, in truth and in fact, it was well known that but few then doubted the constitutionality, and none the expediency, of it. And the assertion excited much greater surprise, that ‘it must be admitted by all, that it has failed in the great end of establishing a uniform and sound currency.’ In this message, too, whilst a doubt is intimated as to the utility of such an institution, president Jackson clearly first discloses his object to establish a national one, founded upon the credit of the government and its revenues. His language is perfectly plain and unequivocal. Such a bank, founded upon the credit of the government and its revenues, would secure all the advantages to the government and the country, he tells us, that were expected to result from the present bank.

In his annual message of the ensuing year, the late president says:

‘The importance of the principles involved in the inquiry, whether it will be proper to recharter the bank of the United States, requires that I should again call the attention of congress to the subject. Nothing has occurred to lessen, in any degree, the dangers which many of our citizens apprehend from that institution, as at present organized. In the spirit of improvement and compromise which distinguishes our country and its institutions, it becomes us to inquire, whether it be not possible to secure the advantages afforded by the present bank, through the agency of a bank of the United States, so modified in its principles as to obviate constitutional and other objections.

‘It is thought practicable to organize such a bank, with the necessary officers, as a branch of the treasury department, based on the public and individual deposits, without power to make loans, or purchase property, which shall remit the funds of government; and the expense of which may be paid, if thought advisable, by allowing its officers to sell bills of exchange, to private individuals, at a moderate premium. Not being a corporate body, having no stockholders, debtors, and property, and but few officers, it would not be obnoxious to the constitutional objections which are urged against the present bank; and having no means to operate on the hopes, fears, or interests, of large masses of the community, it would be shorn of the influence which makes that bank formidable.’

In this message president Jackson, after again adverting to the imaginary dangers of a bank of the United States, recurs to his favorite project, and inquires, ‘whether it be not possible to secure the advantages afforded by the present bank, through the agency of a bank of the United States, so modified in its principles and structure as to obviate constitutional and other objections.’ And to dispel all doubts of the timid, and to confirm the wavering, he declares, that it is thought practicable to organize such a bank, with the necessary officers, as a branch of the treasury department. As a branch of the treasury department! The very scheme now under consideration. And, to defray the expenses of such an anomalous institution, he suggests, that the officers of the treasury department may turn bankers and brokers, and sell bills of exchange to private individuals at a moderate premium!

In his annual message of the year 1831, upon this subject, he was brief and somewhat covered in his expressions. But the fixed purpose which he entertained is sufficiently disclosed to the attentive reader. He announces, that ‘entertaining the opinions heretofore expressed in relation to the bank of the United States, as at present organized, I felt it my duty, in my former messages, frankly to disclose them, in order that the attention of the legislature and the people should be seasonably directed to that important subject, and that it might be considered, and finally disposed of, in a manner best calculated to promote the ends of the constitution, and subserve the public interests.’ What were the opinions ‘heretofore’ expressed, we have clearly seen. They were adverse to the bank of the United States, as at present organized, that is to say, an organization with any independent corporate government; and in favor of a national bank which should be so constituted as to be subject to exclusive executive control.

At the session of 1831–2, the question of the recharter of the bank of the United States came up; and although the attention of congress and the country had been repeatedly and deliberately before invited to the consideration of it by president Jackson himself, the agitation of it was now declared by him and his partisans to be precipitate and premature. Nevertheless, the country and congress conscious of the value of a safe and sound uniform currency, conscious that such a currency had been eminently supplied by the bank of the United States, and unmoved by all the outcry raised against that admirable institution, the recharter commanded large majorities in both houses of congress. Fatally for the interests of this country, the stern self-will of general Jackson prompted him to risk every thing upon its overthrow. On the tenth of July, 1832, the bill was returned with his veto; from which the following extract is submitted to the attentive consideration of the senate.

‘A bank of the United States is, in many respects, convenient for the government and useful to the people. Entertaining this opinion, and deeply impressed with the belief that some of the powers and privileges possessed by the existing bank are unauthorized by the constitution, subversive of the rights of the states, and dangerous to the liberties of the people, I felt it my duty, at an early period of my administration, to call the attention of congress to the practicability of organizing an institution, combining all its advantages, and obviating these objections. I sincerely regret that, in the act before me, I can perceive none of those modifications of the bank charter which are necessary, in my opinion, to make it compatible with justice, with sound policy, or with the constitution of our country.

‘That a bank of the United States, competent to all the duties which may be required by government, might be so organized as not to infringe upon our own delegated powers, or the reserved rights of the states, I do not entertain a doubt. Had the executive been called upon to furnish the project of such an institution, the duty would have been cheerfully performed. In the absence of such a call, it is obviously proper that he should confine himself to pointing out those prominent features in the act presented, which, in his opinion, make it incompatible with the constitution and sound policy.’

President Jackson admits, in the citation which has just been made, that a bank of the United States is, in many respects, convenient for the government; and reminds congress that he had, at an early period of his administration, called its attention to the practicability of so organizing such an institution as to secure all its advantages, without the defects of the existing bank. It is perfectly manifest, that he alludes to his previous recommendations of a government, a treasury bank. In the same message he tells congress, that if he had been called upon to furnish the project of such an institution, the duty would have been cheerfully performed. Thus it appears, that he had not only settled in his mind the general principle, but had adjusted the details of a government bank, to be subjected to executive control; and congress is even chided for not calling upon him to present them. The bill now under consideration, beyond all controversy, is the very project which he had in view, and is to consummate the work which he began. I think, Mr. President, that you must now concur with me in considering the first proposition as fully maintained. I pass to the second and third, which, on account of their intimate connection, I will consider together.

Second, that with the view of establishing a government bank, it was the settled aim and intention of the late administration, to overthrow the whole banking system of the United States, as existing in the United States when that administration came into power, beginning with the bank of the United States, and ending with the state banks.

Third, that the attack was first confined, from considerations of policy, to the bank of the United States; but that, after its overthrow was accomplished, it was then directed, and has since been continued, against the state banks.

We are not bound to inquire into the motives of president Jackson for desiring to subvert the established monetary and financial system, which he found in operation; and yet some examination into those which probably influenced his mind, is not without utility. These are to be found in his peculiar constitution and character. His egotism and vanity, prompted him to subject every thing to his will; to change, to remould, and retouch every thing. Hence the proscription which characterized his administration, the universal expulsion from office, at home and abroad, of all who were not devoted to him, and the attempt to render the executive department of government, to use a favorite expression of his own, a complete ‘unit.’ Hence his seizure of the public deposits, in the bank of the United States, and his desire to unite the purse with the sword. Hence his attack upon all the systems of policy which he found in practical operation, on that of internal improvements, and on that of the protection of national industry. He was animated by the same sort of ambition which induced the master mind of the age, Napoleon Bonaparte, to impress his name upon every thing in France. When I was in Paris, the sculptors were busily engaged chiselling out the famous N., so odious to the Bourbon line, which had been conspicuously carved on the palace of the Tuilleries, and on other public edifices and monuments, in the proud capital of France. When, Mr. President, shall we see effaced, all traces of the ravages committed by the administration of Andrew Jackson! Society has been uprooted, virtue punished, vice rewarded, and talents and intellectual endowments despised; brutality, vulgarism, and loco focoism upheld, cherished, and countenanced. Ages will roll around before the moral and political ravages which have been committed, will, I fear, cease to be discernible. General Jackson’s ambition was to make his administration an era in the history of the American government, and he has accomplished that object of his ambition; but I trust that it will be an era to be shunned as sad and lamentable, and not followed and imitated as supplying sound maxims and principles of administration.

I have heard his hostility to banks ascribed to some collision which he had with one of them, during the late war, at the city of New Orleans; and it is possible that may have had some influence upon his mind. The immediate cause, more probably, was the refusal of that perverse and unaccommodating gentleman, Nick Biddle, to turn out of the office of president of the New Hampshire branch of the bank of the United States, at the instance of his excellency Isaac Hill, in the summer of 1829, that giant-like person, Jeremiah Mason――giant in body, and giant in mind. War and strife, endless war and strife, personal or national, foreign or domestic, were the aliment of the late president’s existence. War against the bank, war against France, and strife and contention with a countless number of individuals. The wars with Black Hawk and the Seminoles were scarcely a luncheon for his voracious appetite. And he made his exit from public life, denouncing war and vengeance against Mexico and the state banks.

My acquaintance with that extraordinary man commenced in this city, in the fall of 1815 or 1816. It was short, but highly respectful, and mutually cordial. I beheld in him the gallant and successful general, who, by the glorious victory of New Orleans, had honorably closed the second war of our independence, and I paid him the homage due to that eminent service. A few years after, it became my painful duty to animadvert, in the house of representatives, with the independence which belongs to the representative character, upon some of his proceedings, in the conduct of the Seminole war, which I thought illegal, and contrary to the constitution and the law of nations. A non-intercourse between us ensued, which continued until the fall of 1824, when, he being a member of the senate, it was sought to bring about an accommodation between us, by the principal part of the delegation from his own state. For that purpose, we were invited to dine with them, at Claxton’s boarding-house, on Capitol hill, where my venerable friend from Tennessee, (Mr. White,) and his colleague on the Spanish commission, were both present. I retired early from dinner, and was followed to the door by general Jackson and the present minister of the United States at the court of Madrid. They pressed me earnestly to take a seat with them in their carriage. My faithful servant and friend, Charles, was standing at the door, waiting for me, with my own. I yielded to their urgent politeness, directed Charles to follow with my carriage, and they sat me down at my own door. We afterwards frequently met, with mutual respect and cordiality; dined several times together, and reciprocated the hospitality of our respective quarters. This friendly intercourse continued, until the election, in the house of representatives, of a president of the United States, came on, in February, 1825. I gave the vote which, in the contingency that happened, I told my colleague, (Mr. Crittenden,) who sits before me, prior to my departure from Kentucky, in November, 1824, and told others, that I should give. All intercourse ceased between general Jackson and myself. We have never since, except once accidentally, exchanged salutations, nor met, except on occasions when we were performing the last offices towards deceased members of congress, or other officers of government. Immediately after my vote, a rancorous war was commenced against me, and all the barking dogs let loose upon me. I shall not trace it during its ten years’ bitter continuance. But I thank my God that I stand here, firm and erect, unbent, unbroken, unsubdued, unawed, ready to denounce the mischievous measures of his administration, and ready to denounce this, its legitimate offspring, the most pernicious of them all.

His administration consisted of a succession of astounding measures, which fell on the public ear like repeated bursts of loud and appalling thunder. Before the reverberations of one peal had ceased, another and another came, louder and louder, and more terrifying. Or rather, it was like a volcanic mountain, emitting frightful eruptions of burning lava. Before one was cold and crusted, before the voices of the inhabitants of buried villages and cities were hushed in eternal silence, another, more desolating, was vomited forth, extending wider and wider the circle of death and destruction.

Mr. President, this is no unnecessary digression. The personal character of such a chief as I have been describing, his passions, his propensities, the character of his mind, should be all thoroughly studied, to comprehend clearly his measures and his administration. But I will now proceed to more direct and strict proofs of my second and third propositions. That he was resolved to break down the bank of the United States, is proved by the same citations from his messages which I have made to exhibit his purpose to establish a treasury bank, is proved by his veto message, and by the fact that he did destroy it. The war against all other banks was not originally announced, because he wished the state banks to be auxiliaries in overthrowing the bank of the United States, and because such an annunciation would have been too rash and shocking, upon the people of the United States, for even his tremendous influence. It was necessary to proceed in the work with caution, and to begin with that institution against which could be embodied the greatest amount of prejudice. The refusal to recharter the bank of the United States was followed by a determination to remove from its custody the public money of the United States. That determination was first whispered in this place, denied, again intimated, and, finally, in September, 1833, executed. The agitation of the American public which ensued, the warm and animated discussions, in the country and in congress, to which that unconstitutional measure gave rise, are all fresh in our recollection. It was necessary to quiet the public mind, and to reconcile the people to what had been done, before president Jackson seriously entered upon his new career of hostility to the state banks. At the commencement of the session of congress, in 1834, he imagined a sufficient calm had been produced, and, in his annual message of that year, the war upon the state banks was opened. In that message he says:

‘It seems due to the safety of the public funds remaining in that bank, and to the honor of the American people, that measures be taken to separate the government entirely, from an institution so mischievous to the public prosperity, and so regardless of the constitution and laws. By transferring the public deposits, by appointing other pension agents, as far as it had the power, by ordering the discontinuance of the receipt of bank checks, in payment of the public dues, after the first day of January next, the executive has exerted all its lawful authority, to sever the connection between the government and this faithless corporation.’

In this quotation, it will be seen that the first germ is contained of that separation and divorce of the government from banks, which has recently made such a conspicuous figure. It relates, it is true, to the late bank of the United States, and he speaks of separating and severing the connection between the government and that institution. But the idea, once developed, was easily susceptible of application to all banking institutions. In the message of the succeeding year, his meditated attack upon the state banks, is more distinctly disclosed. Speaking of a sound currency, he says:

‘In considering the means of obtaining so important an end, (that is, a sound currency,) we must set aside all calculations of temporary convenience, and be influenced by those only that are in harmony with the true character and permanent interests of the republic. We must recur to first principles, and see what it is that has prevented the legislation of congress and the states, on the subject of currency, from satisfying the public expectation, and realizing results corresponding to those which have attended the action of our system, when truly consistent with the great principle of equality upon which it rests, and with that spirit of forbearance and mutual concession and generous patriotism, which was originally, and must ever continue to be, the vital element of our union.

‘On this subject, I am sure that I cannot be mistaken, in ascribing our want of success to the undue countenance which has been afforded to the spirit of monopoly. All the serious dangers which our system has yet encountered, may be traced to the resort to implied powers, and the use of corporations clothed with privileges, the effect of which is to advance the interests of the few at the expense of the many. We have felt but one class of these dangers, exhibited in the contest waged by the bank of the United States, against the government, for the last four years. Happily they have been obviated for the present, by the indignant resistance of the people; but we should recollect that the principle whence they sprang is an ever-active one, which will not fail to renew its efforts in the same and in other forms, so long as there is a hope of success, founded either on the inattention of the people, or the treachery of their representatives, to the subtle progress of its influence.’

* * * * ‘We are now to see whether, in the present favorable condition of the country, we cannot take an effectual stand against this spirit of monopoly, and practically prove, in respect to the currency, as well as other important interests, that there is no necessity for so extensive a resort to it as that which has been heretofore practiced.’

* * * * ‘It has been seen, that without the agency of a great moneyed monopoly, the revenue can be collected, and conveniently and safely applied to all the purposes of the public expenditure. It is also ascertained that, instead of being necessarily made to promote the evils of an unchecked paper system, the management of the revenue can be made auxiliary to the reform which the legislatures of several of the states have already commenced, in regard to the suppression of small bills; and which has only to be fostered by proper regulations on the part of congress, to secure a practical return, to the extent required for the security of the currency, to the constitutional medium.’

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